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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation tackles, head on, two fundamental questions:  What is human systems 
integration (HSI) and how should one think about HSI problems?  The objective was to 
develop a coherent systems method to improve the integration of HSI domains to create 
sustainable systems while preserving system stakeholder preferences.   
This dissertation addresses these questions by accomplishing two things:  1) 
extracting the lessons learned from a historical analysis of the emergence of HSI both as 
a philosophy and as a Defense Department program, and 2) using those lessons to 
characterize and illustrate a technical approach to addressing HSI considerations early in 
an acquisition process.  It is shown that the discourse on general systems that occurred 
over the latter half of the twentieth century, coupled with pressing organizational factors 
within the U.S. Army, were the principal forces that shaped and drove the emergence and 
formal recognition of HSI.  As determined from this historical analysis, HSI involves the 
integration of the behavioral sciences, human factors engineering, and operations 
research to more broadly represent human considerations in early weapon system 
analyses and the products that evolve from these analyses.   
Inclusion of HSI in system analyses necessitates a holistic perspective of the 
performance and economic trade space formed by the synthesis of the HSI domains.  As a 
result, individual domain interventions are considered in terms of tradeoff decisions.  
Ideally, the HSI trade space can be systematically explored by integrating Simon’s 
research strategy, Kennedy and Jones’ isoperformance approach, and coupling 
isoperformance with utility analysis through means such as physical programming.  
Although domain tradeoffs are a central element of HSI, very few studies illustrate the 
integration of the behavioral sciences and human factors engineering with the tools and 
methodologies of operations research.  Accordingly, three case studies are presented:  a 
preexisting opportunistic dataset of potential Air Force unmanned aircraft pilots, a 
prospective dataset of Army Soldiers in Basic Combat Training, and data derived from 
simulation of staffing and shift scheduling solutions using a biomathematical model.  
Lastly, guidelines for a New HSI method and future challenges are discussed. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The major purpose in undertaking this discourse was to tackle two fundamental 
questions:  What is human systems integration (HSI) and how should one think about HSI 
problems?  The objective was to develop a coherent systems method that would improve 
the integration of the HSI domains to create sustainable systems while preserving 
consideration of system stakeholder preferences.  Addressing these questions first 
required putting the concept of HSI in context, both in terms of a philosophy and a 
Defense Department program.   
The lesson learned from the juxtaposition of these two conceptual views (i.e., 
philosophy versus program) was the rejecting of the notion that HSI is simply “post-
modern” human factors.  HSI as a philosophy evolved within the context of the larger 
systems movement that occurred in the 1960s in response to the issue of irreducible 
complexity.  HSI emerged in response to real-world, macroergonomic, political and 
military challenges that resulted in an organizational crisis.  This crisis, in the simplest of 
terms, was caused by technological complexity and its effects on personnel.  Thus, the 
fundamental impetus for HSI was complexity. 
Allowing philosophy to inform method, the lessons learned from the historical 
analysis were used to characterize and illustrate an approach to addressing HSI issues 
early in a weapon system acquisition process.  The following prime directive—the 
highest level of abstract, objective statement of purpose—was proposed for an HSI 
program:  To produce sustained system performance that is humanly, technologically, 
and economically feasible.   Based on an analysis of this prime directive, and with an 
implicit reference to sociotechnical systems theory, the following definition of HSI was 
derived:    
A philosophy applied to personnel and technological subsystems within 
organizations in pursuit of their joint optimization in terms of maximally 
satisfying organizational objectives at minimum life cycle cost.  Its 
practice is concerned with the specification and design for reliability, 
availability, and maintainability of both the personnel and technological 
subsystems over their envisioned life cycle.   
 xxx
We assert that the principle approach to HSI should involve the integration of the 
behavioral sciences, human factors engineering, and operations research to more broadly 
represent human considerations early in weapon system analyses and in the products that 
evolve from these analyses. 
Inclusion of HSI in system analyses necessitates a holistic perspective of the trade 
space formed by the synthesis of economic considerations and the individual HSI 
domains and their interactions.  This conceptualization of HSI was expanded to include 
both a macro-HSI and micro-HSI trade space.  The goal of HSI then becomes one of 
ensuring that micro HSI tradeoffs are organizationally net positive.  Ideally, the micro-
HSI trade space can be considered in systems analyses by integrating Simon’s research 
strategy of efficient multifactor design of experiments, Kennedy and Jones’ 
isoperformance approach, and coupling isoperformance with utility analysis through 
means such as physical programming.   
Three case studies were used to illustrate this paradigm of integrating the 
behavioral sciences and human factors engineering with the tools and methodologies of 
operations research to address HSI issues.  The first case study used an opportunistic 
dataset from a USAF study evaluating the impact of prior flight experience on acquisition 
of unmanned aircraft system operator skills.  Isoreliability models were then constructed 
and aggregated across system functions, thereby allowing consideration of personnel and 
training domain tradeoffs in terms of total system reliability.  The second case study 
applied the isoperformance methodology to data from a prospective study examining the 
effect of a sleep scheduling intervention on measures of Soldier performance during 
Basic Combat Training.  Tradeoff models were constructed for both rifle marksmanship 
performance and occupational health in terms of the personnel and survivability domains 
of HSI.  The third case study used a mixed integer program—the Task Effectiveness 
Scheduling Tool—to analyze simulation data derived from a validated biomathematical 
fatigue model to explore the trade space that exists between the manpower, survivability, 
habitability, and human factors engineering domains of HSI. 
 Finally, based on a meta-synthesis of the aforementioned concepts and ideas, 
design guidelines for a New HSI method were proposed and future challenges discussed. 
 xxxi
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 1
I. INTRODUCTION  
To a very great degree, all of us are products of our experiences.  We are 
products of our own times and our own experiences.  We accept as “truth” 
only those wisdoms that our own experience validates as being true.  I 
would encourage you…to recognize that you will not have had an 
opportunity to experience all of those things that your colleagues have.  
You will not be able to validate, by your own experience, all of the truths 
that maybe they have validated by theirs (General Russell E. Dougherty, 
USAF, retired, 1992)  
A. ORIENTATION 
If, like me, you have spent much time working in the human performance-related 
domains, systems engineering, or defense systems acquisition, you may have noticed that 
there is an incomplete understanding of Human Systems Integration (HSI).  Such 
ambiguity can be attributed, in no small part, to the lack of a general consensus on the 
definition, scope, and intent of HSI as well as the corresponding body of knowledge it is 
supposed to cover.  HSI practitioners have a problem, not only explaining to other people 
what they do, but also defining it amongst themselves.  This problem is further 
exacerbated by the internal fragmentation of the HSI work force according to vocational 
specialty and educational background.  Reflecting on personal experience and reviewing 
the literature, there does not appear to be a unique body of knowledge for HSI.  The 
individual HSI domains are disciplines and careers in themselves and each has its own 
literature.  Consequently, individuals charged with integrating the HSI domains often 
lack both a clear mental image of the trade space and a set of basic principles that they 
can put to useful work.  This is evidenced by my frequent observation that graduate 
students in HSI at the Naval Postgraduate School, when asked, struggle to illustrate a 
simple conceptual model of HSI—a difficulty shared by many HSI practitioners, program 
managers, and engineers.  Thus, we are left to collectively ponder the nagging question, 
“what is HSI, and how should it work?” 
Our incomplete understanding of HSI is a problem because lots of dedicated 
people are spending energy and resources trying to develop educational programs and 
courseware, promulgate policies, and create tools to conduct HSI.  Worse yet, program 
 2
managers, system engineers, and HSI practitioners are presently grappling with 
integrating “the human element” into “technological systems” and becoming greatly 
confused in the process.  They have difficulty incorporating the spectrum of HSI 
considerations in their decision making since they lack a systematic process for “pulling 
together” domain-specific studies and expertise in an applied situation.  Yet integration of 
the HSI domains will inevitably occur in virtually all system acquisitions.  That is, 
domain interactions will occur in an ad hoc fashion rather than by deliberate design.  The 
consequences of this approach may include prohibitive total ownership costs and failure 
to attain system performance thresholds.  Even when system performance objectives are 
met, there are lost opportunity costs resulting from decreased productivity and wasted 
resources.   
While admirable work is being accomplished by various HSI stakeholders, much 
of it is focused on progressively breaking down HSI into ever more detailed sets of 
technical and engineering management activities.  In so doing, HSI proponents have 
presented their approach as logical, rational, and multi-disciplinary, but in the whole, it is 
seemingly not based on any science in the way that the constituent HSI domains were, 
such as the human factors engineering or training domains.  Echoing the charge proffered 
by Hitchins (1992) against systems engineers, I assert that instead of HSI theory there has 
developed a HSI “theology.”  Part of the HSI theology includes the development of 
design options, assessment of the individual HSI domain considerations for these design 
options and their subsequent tradeoff to select the optimal solution in terms of total 
system performance and ownership cost.  Trading between HSI domains is, at best, a 
crude art as presently practiced and there is no agreed upon metric for defining what 
“optimal” means in terms of HSI.  All in all, it can be said that the theology on which 
HSI is supposed to be based has dubious foundations in policy guidance that has evolved 
over the past two decades.  Nevertheless, suggestions to create a more robust 
philosophical or scientific underpinning for HSI continue to receive little approbation 
from either HSI proponents or detractors.   
For the skeptical reader, I will borrow an example from Hamming (1997) to 
illustrate the challenges of such “faith-based” thinking about the HSI trade space.   
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Putting off any discussion of HSI definitions for the moment, the Defense Department 
describes HSI in terms of seven factors or domains (Department of Defense, 2008), 
which by implication means that we should describe a HSI solution in terms of at least 
seven parameters and other military services expand this number to eight, nine, or even 
higher.  Hence, while we may build and operate systems in 3-dimensional space, system 
designers and HSI practitioners must be concerned with a higher (N) dimensional design 
space that has one dimension for each design parameter.   
Although N-dimensional space is a mathematical construct, we must think about it 
to better understand what happens to us when we wander there with a HSI problem.  To 
do so, we begin with a simple geometric example and consider a square whose edges are 
each four units in length (Figure I-1) and in which we place four unit circles (depicted in 
black), each circle having a radius of one unit.  We then draw a circle (depicted in red) 
about the center of the square with radius just touching the four unit circles.  Based on 
simple application of Pythagorean’s theorem, its radius must be  
2 2 1 0.414r = − = …  
 
Figure I-1. Balls enclosing ball [After Hamming, 1997]. 
 
In three dimensions, we have a cube whose edges are each four units and into 
which we can place eight spheres of unit radius.  Now consider a sphere circumscribed 
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about the center of the cube with radius just touching the surface of the other spheres.  By 
repetitive application of Pythagorean’s theorem, this sphere must have a radius of  
3 3 1 0.732r = − = …  
By induction, as we go to n dimensions, we will have a 4 4 4× × ×… cube with 
2n spheres, one in each corner of the cube and touching its n adjacent neighbors.  A 
sphere circumscribed at the center of this cube with radius touching the surface of the 
other spheres will have a radius of 
1nr n= −  
Now consider the case of ten dimensions where the radius of the central sphere is 
10 10 1 2.162 2r = − = >…  
In ten dimensions, the radius of the central sphere reaches outside the surrounding cube—
an apparent paradox! 
The point of this example is that simple raw intuition is inadequate when 
considering N-dimensional space.  However, this is the very space where the design of 
HSI solutions generally takes place.  As stated by Hamming, it is not 3-dimensional space 
that matters in system design, but rather it is N-dimensional space, and N-dimensional 
space can be very vast.  To illustrate the latter, consider for a moment an HSI problem in 
which the set of potential solutions is limited to only two design options per domain and a 
proper solution requires a choice be made for every domain.  In this relatively 
constrained scenario, there are 72 or 128 solutions to consider if we entertain seven 
domains and 92 or 512 solutions with nine domains.  If we relax our constraints and allow 
ten potential design choices per domain, we have ten million solutions to consider.  Even 
if you could model and compute all these design solutions, there would be insufficient 
time to even look through them, let alone test them!  Clearly, we cannot mechanically 
explore the HSI trade space using generic tools without some form of educated 
inspiration.  This then leads me to the following proposition:  
Accommodating the human element in technological systems is an  
N-dimensional creativity problem, not a 3-dimensional ergonomics 
problem. 
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By considering HSI from the perspective of creative design or problem solving in 
N-dimensional space, it becomes clear that accommodating the human element is a very 
hard problem.  If one makes a small change in one HSI variable, it tends to reverberate 
throughout the entire system, often times with unintended consequences.   This makes 
even small perturbations potentially difficult to cope with.  I will illustrate the concept in 
a HSI context using a causal loop diagram (CLD) or influence diagram derived from the 
work by Miller and Firehammer (2007).  For the novice, a CLD is a systems thinking tool 
that depicts a diagram with arrows connecting variables (i.e., things that change over 
time) in a way that shows how one variable affects another.   
Now consider the simple CLD depicted in Figure I-2 showing the potential 
implications of changes in the numbers of human resources (i.e., manpower) provided to 
operate and maintain a military system.  Manpower related costs significantly drive a 
system’s total life-cycle cost and can be as much as 80% of total operations and support 
costs (U.S. Air Force, 2008).   It should thus come as no surprise that senior decision 
makers and system designers often look for opportunities to reduce manpower when 
developing new systems or upgrading legacy systems.  However, requirements to reduce 
manpower frequently result in system designers allocating more tasks and roles to 
individual crewmembers with consequent increases in their overall workload.  Increased 
workload, when not mitigated by adequate opportunities for rest and recovery, results in 
chronic fatigue, which subsequently leads to decreased productivity and increased risk of 
errors and mishaps.   These outcomes, in turn, drive up life-cycle costs in contrast to the 
system designer’s original expectations.  Alternatively, the system’s owners may later opt 
to provide opportunities for recovery through schedule changes, but such changes require 




Figure I-2. Causal loop diagram showing the implications of manpower changes. 
 
Hopefully the casual reader has not been put off by the discussion of such an 
abstract construct as N-dimensional space; it was mainly a prop used to illustrate the 
innate complexity of the HSI trade space that all too often seems to go unappreciated, 
perhaps even unrealized, by many self-proclaimed HSI experts.  Nevertheless, as a 
theology, HSI continues to survive principally because it provides a way of approaching 
the human element in systems that appears axiomatically sound.  Absent demonstrable 
evidence of recurring success, the current approach to HSI invites reference to the 
popular refrain on insanity as “doing the same activity over and over and expecting 
different results.”  Hence, in developing the ideas for this dissertation, I perceived the 
need for a more systemic and systematic approach to HSI than is presently discernable 
within the Defense Department’s integrated lifecycle management framework.  Such an 
approach should promote a more harmonious balance in considering human capabilities 
versus technological capabilities early in system acquisition, while simultaneously 
preserving the focus on system stakeholder values in identifying preferred solutions.  The 
topics and objective of this dissertation are shown in Figure I-3, which has been 
organized into an intent structure starting with foundation and theory at the bottom and 
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culminating in a future vision at the top.  Such a structure is often used to develop 
mission statements for organizations, and so my mission statement is: 
To develop a coherent systems method that will improve the integration of 
the HSI domains to create sustainable systems while preserving 
consideration of system stakeholder preferences. 
 
 
Figure I-3. Intent structure outlining topics and objectives starting with foundation 
and theory at the bottom and working up to a future vision at the top.  Numbered boxes 
correspond to dissertation chapters.   
 
Figure I-4, intended as a guide or road map, shows my approach to form a bridge 
from a HSI process-oriented theology to a more enlightened state of understanding.  The 
first step is to identify the vague, unstructured issues underlying the need for HSI.  My 
objective is to move from these vague issues progressively towards solutions, borrowing 
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along the way from substantiated work in related fields where applicable.  In particular, 
although perhaps not qualifying as a substantiated work, Derek Hitchins’ Putting Systems 
to Work (1992) plays a significant role in framing my thinking and approach to HSI and 
those familiar with his book will note some parallel themes.  My desired end state, and  
hence benchmark for success, is an intellectually coherent and defensible architecture for 
relating HSI domain considerations that addresses the issues for which HSI was 
originally devised.   
 
 
Figure I-4. Bridging from issues to HSI solutions [After Hitchins, 1992]. 
 
My intent in writing this dissertation is for it to be useful for systems practitioners 
responsible for addressing HSI problems and issues.  I am as much concerned about 
displaying a way of thinking about HSI problems as in advancing any particular technical 
approach.  Since it is questionable whether a way of thinking can be conveyed simply by 
narrative description, it is my intent to approach the topic through examples in the form 
of the studies described in Chapters V, VI, and VII.  You should need no special skills to 
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understand this work other than perhaps an introductory experience in operations 
research or systems engineering.  Although at times I resort to mathematics to illustrate 
and connect ideas and concepts, I have strived to ensure that the underlying ideas can be 
grasped from the words alone.  Much of this work has been developed from both my 
experiences as a HSI practitioner and the constellation of insights garnered during 
lectures and projects in my postgraduate studies.  I have deviated from the normal 
dissertation format to provide a concise presentation of topics that should be useful for 
experienced systems practitioners with no formal qualifications in HSI.   
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II. HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION PHILOSOPHY 
The professionalized cognitive and occupational styles that were refined in 
the first half of this century, based in Newtonian mechanistic physics, are 
not readily adapted to contemporary conceptions of interacting open 
systems and to contemporary concerns with equity (Rittel & Webber, 
1973, p. 13) 
A. AN INTRODUCTION TO HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION 
As of this writing, there is no general consensus on the definition of HSI as 
evidenced by a white paper prepared by the International Council of Systems Engineering 
(INCOSE) HSI Working Group that identified 39 definitions (Deal, 2007).  So where to 
start?   While it is not our purpose here to join this debate, let us delve into a few general 
ideas.  For instance, if we are to think about HSI, what do the constituent words mean?  A 
“human” is simply a bipedal primate mammal, or so the dictionary definition states 
(Merriam-Webster, 2009).  The definition of a “system” is somewhat more abstract 
(Merriam-Webster, 2009): 
• A regularly interacting or interdependent group of items forming a unified whole 
• An organized set of doctrines, ideas, or principles usually intended to explain the 
arrangement or working of a systematic whole 
• An organized or established procedure; a manner of classifying, symbolizing, or 
schematizing 
• Harmonious arrangement or pattern. 
And lastly, the definition of “integrate” (i.e., the verb form of integration) includes 
(Merriam-Webster, 2009):  
• To form, coordinate, or blend into a functioning or unified whole 
• To find the integral of (as a function or equation) 
• To unite with something else; to incorporate into a larger unit 
• To end the segregation of and bring into equal membership in society or an 
organization.  
Notwithstanding that the definition of “system” seems all-embracing, the 
combinatorial sum of these definitions can give rise to a variety of divergent viewpoints 
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of HSI.  For example, one could describe HSI as incorporating bipedal primate mammals 
into an interacting group of items to form a unified whole.  If those items are 
technological artifacts, say workstations, one develops an engineering-centric viewpoint 
of HSI.  If those items are instead doctrines or policies, then the perspective changes to 
that of organizational behavior and the management sciences.  There is also a moralistic 
viewpoint if one chooses to define integration in terms of equal membership.  Believing 
there is an organizational or societal tendency to overemphasize the technological 
elements of systems, one might argue for coequal consideration of humans in systems.  
Lest you think this moralistic interpretation is overreaching: 
…our “equipment” oriented culture needs to change to one that is 
“people” oriented (Booher, 1990, p. 2). 
As science, [human factors engineering] is needed to understand the 
ramifications of the human-technology relationship.  Note that the word 
human [emphasis in original] precedes technology; that is because 
technology should be the servant, not the master, although in too many 
instances the roles are reversed (Meister, 1999, p. 359). 
One might even envision such a moralistic imperative evolving into a formal legal 
viewpoint of HSI should self-aware, intelligent machines ever be realized (Brooke, 
2009).  Finally, there is precedent for the mathematical definition of integration, as in 
finding the integral, being used to describe HSI, at least symbolically, in Booher’s (2003) 
double-integration process model (Figure II-1). 
 
Figure II-1. HSI double-integration process model [From Booher, 2003]. 
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Without appealing to any of the potentially competing camps of HSI stakeholders, 
we have just generated several definitions of HSI that give rise to a variety of viewpoints, 
or Weltanschauungen—“worldviews” in English.  These include: 
• An engineering view 
• An organizational behavior and management view 
• A moral view 
• A mathematical view. 
It is reassuring that Deal (2007) independently makes a similar observation in his survey 
of definitions for the INCOSE HSI Working Group:  
[HSI] definitions refer to the same target concept, but from different 
perspectives.  Therefore, HSI definitions show a significant scatter of 
concept and element (p. 2). 
The idea of developing different Weltanschauungen when exploring a problem situation 
is a keystone of modern systems thinking (Checkland, 2000).  If definitions are being 
driven by viewpoints, then it is counterproductive to try to identify a single, 
comprehensive definition for HSI.  Unfortunately, the stated intent of the INCOSE HSI 
Working Group is to formulate just such a universal definition (Deal 2007, p. 1).  The 
result of their work, not surprisingly, is a definition that captures the engineering 
viewpoint: 
Human systems integration is the interdisciplinary technical and 
management processes for integrating human considerations within and 
across all system elements; an essential enabler to systems engineering 
management (Mueller, 2008, p. 7). 
To the contrary, we should entertain the idea that a portfolio of HSI definitions, borne 
from a diversity of viewpoints, is probably desirable.  For example, von Bertalanffy 
(1972), an early proponent of general systems theory, views multiple definitions as a 
healthy development in a new field:  
The existence of different descriptions is nothing extraordinary and is 
often encountered in mathematics and science… (p. 415). 
Deal (2007) notes that the Defense Department’s policy guidance for operation of 
its acquisition system is the source document for many HSI definitions.   This policy 
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guidance is a physical artifact of the Defense Department management’s efforts to 
address a particular problem situation that evolved over several decades (Booher, 2003).  
It defines the objectives and scope and delineates accountability for the HSI program 
(Department of Defense [DoD], 2008) − it describes the Defense Department’s way of 
doing business with respect to HSI.  What it does not do is address how to think about 
HSI as a systems discipline.  For that, it is necessary to distinguish “program” from 
“philosophy,” which brings us again to the moral viewpoint of HSI. 
So, from whence did “HSI philosophy” come?  Clearly, we cannot formulate a 
strictly objective answer to this question, for as Popper (1957) asserts, the best we can 
hope to accomplish is to write a history that is consistent with a particular point of view.  
Thus, we should, if possible, clearly articulate that point of view.  Accordingly, our intent 
is to provide a sketch of the development of HSI that enables us to understand the nature 
of HSI as being complementary to the human factors sciences that formalized in the first 
half of the twentieth century.  Checkland (1981) provides an excellent overview of the 
long story of the development of the science movement in Western civilization and the 
more recent emergence of the related systems movement, and we borrow heavily from 
his work to develop our ideas here.  What follows, then, is only a brief outline of some of 
the more pertinent features of relatively recent efforts to address human performance in 
systems using the method of science.  Its purpose is to provide an accounting of the initial 
attempts to address the complexity of the problem through reductionist thinking so that 
we can explain the emergence of HSI within the broader sweep of the systems 
movement. 
Following from the seminal lecture series, Lectures on Men and Machines, by 
Chapanis, Garner, Morgan, and Sanford (1947), the foundations for a formal scientific 
discipline focused on humans in systems were laid during the Second World War: 
Only within the last few years have most of us realized how little of 
practical value is known about the coordination between man’s senses and 
his muscles.  During the war, this ignorance frequently cost us much in 
both men and materials.  To fill some of the specific gaps in our 
knowledge, a great deal of psycho-physical research was started.  One of 
the resulting efforts was the Harvard “Systems Research” contract…a 
project to improve the complex information systems which made up our 
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shipboard Combat Information Centers…At the end of hostilities, 
“Systems Research” was continued through a contract between the John 
Hopkins University and the Special Devices Center, Office of Naval 
Research.  It was as a part of this contract that the ten excellent 
lectures…were delivered to the Naval Postgraduate School, Annapolis, in 
the spring of 1947…These lectures, the first coherent public discussion of 
their subject [emphasis added], show the work which has been done and, 
even more vividly, the work which still needs doing (pp. v–vi). 
The war was a watershed for technological America and the West in the twentieth 
century (Meister, 1999).  Wartime developments in radar, communications, sonar, 
aircraft, and combat information centers significantly increased the complexity of the 
tasks required of the human and served to highlight the rising problem of human 
performance in systems (Chapanis et al., 1947): 
When we stop to think how much a single radar can do in a fraction of a 
second, and then stop to think also that even the simplest form of a 
reaction for a human being requires approximately 1.5 of a second, we 
realize the limitations we are up against.  This simple comparison of a 
machine’s reaction time with a man’s reaction time furnishes us with a 
clear cut example of what we are up against.  The human factor in any 
system must be studied.  Machines that demand super-human performance 
will fail because the human is not yet in a super stage.  Jobs that push man 
beyond his limits of skill, speed, sensitivity and endurance will not be 
done—cannot be done (pp. 12–13). 
As described by Chapanis and colleagues (1947), appreciation of the problem of human 
performance in systems, in turn, led to the emergence of a new scientific discipline 
concerned with application of human factors to engineering design: 
The war needed, and produced, many complex machines, and it taxed the 
resources of both the designer and the operator in making them practical 
for human use.  The war also brought together psychologists, 
physiologists, physicists, design engineers and motion-and-time engineers 
to solve some of these problems…Today there are many groups busy with 
research on man-machine problems.  They use different names to describe 
the work in its various aspects…But whatever the name, the objective is 
the same—to develop, through fundamental research and applied tests, a 
science which can deal adequately with the design and operation of 
machines for human use (p. vii). 
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These early pioneers described their emerging field as “psychophysical systems 
research,” later to be known as “human engineering,” in a somewhat clumsy attempt to 
provide specificity regarding the types of systems that were the focus of their research, 
namely “systems of people and things” (Chapanis et al., 1947, p. 4).  They also 
acknowledged a common lineage in time-and-motion engineering and experimental 
psychology, and while they offered that “personnel” and “educational” psychology were 
related to psychophysical systems research, they felt that these fields had developed into 
relatively distinct and independent branches of psychology.  Such sentiment was made 
abundantly clear by Chapanis and colleagues (1947) in their very first lecture: 
There is no denying the very great significance of selection.  In the general 
trend toward studying and doing something about the human being in his 
working environment, the studying of, and the doing something about, 
personnel selection has been, and is, of outstanding importance.  We in the 
Systems Research Laboratory, however, are not primarily interested in this 
aspect of the total problem.  We are interested in the man and the 
equipment with which he must work:  we are interested in the design of 
the job, and we are interested in the design of the machine…We have 
chosen not to engage in systematic worry about the fact that one man may 
be better than another on a given job.  There are many other people who 
are very competently worrying in this area (p. 10). 
Hence, it appears that the problem of human performance in systems was parsed into 
distinct fields of inquiry almost from the very point in time at which there was 
cognizance of the problem.  As described by Kennedy, Jones, and Balzley (1989) in their 
outline sketch of the progress of the broader human factors movement in the Defense 
Department, this arrangement established the pattern for the next four decades: 
Since the 1950’s [sic] applied behavioral scientists working in the fields of 
systems, training, and selection have remained largely independent from 
each other.  Within the Department of Defense, mission and function 
statements reinforce this separation.  Personnel [emphasis in original] 
activities emphasize the use of correlational analyses.  Education and 
training commands keep track of time course changes and employ 
repeated measures.  In Systems Research and engineering psychology, 
man, machine and environmental interactions are studied.  In systems 
work, the emphasis is often placed on the application of military standards 




boundaries) of central tendency and dispersion of human lawful 
relationships (transfer functions) from independent variable manipulations 
(p. 4).   
Even within the field of psychophysical systems research, now called human factors 
engineering (HFE), specialization is a continuing trend: 
It may be that the trend to specialization is the most obvious change that 
one can discern.  Whether there was ever a generic HFE may be a 
misconception because, in the early days, we were mostly working in a 
few specialty areas…Now that HFE has expanded into a much larger 
number of specialties (the latest [Human Factors and Ergonomics Society] 
Directory lists 20 specialty groups), it may appear that there is no common 
body of theory and methodology—or, more likely, that the commonality 
resides in the psychological background knowledge that most HFE 
professionals bring to the discipline (Meister, 1999, p. 206). 
While it is commonplace today to bemoan such compartmentalization of 
knowledge, using terms like “stove-piped” or “siloed,” we should by no means seek to 
discredit the thinking of the early pioneers in human factors.  A cursory inspection of our 
world suggests that it may be fairly characterized as complex, being comprised of many 
parts that are densely connected.  This was no less the case in the 1940s when early 
behavioral scientists were faced with the urgent wartime problem of addressing human 
performance in systems.  They attempted to tackle this problem of complexity using the 
method of science, and in so doing, engaged the potent combination of rational thinking 
and experimentation that had demonstrably worked in the past.  
 Science copes with the complexity of the world by deconstructing phenomenon 
of interest into separate parts for analysis and study.  Likewise, Checkland (1981) 
suggests that the practitioners of science manage complexity by dividing their knowledge 
of the world into different subjects or disciplines that are necessarily man-made and 
arbitrary.  If we accept that our knowledge has to be arranged in this way because of our 
limited ability to take in the whole, then it is useful to arrange the classification of 
knowledge according to some rational principle.  Many possible classifications may be 
proposed based on any number of different principles, and it is foolish to expect that any 
one version will be generally accepted given the different purposes for which a 
classification may be carried out.  Perhaps the more important issue, as pointed out by 
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Checkland, is the apparent natural human tendency for these divisions to become so 
ingrained in our thinking that we begin to have difficulty seeing the unity that underlies 
the divisions.   
As we reflect on the emergence of a human-systems discipline, it is useful to 
recall the classification of the sciences proposed by Auguste Comte (1865) in the 19th 
century as summarized by Checkland (1981): 
Comte’s doctrine was that human thought in any subject area passed 
through three phases: a theological [emphasis in original] phase 
dominated by fetish beliefs and totemic religions; a metaphysical phase in 
which supernatural causes are replaced by ‘forces’, ‘qualities’, and 
‘properties’; and finally a positive phase in which the concern is to 
discover the universal laws governing phenomena…(p. 61). 
Comte claimed that all sciences pass through this sequence.  For example, chemistry 
progressed from alchemy to a positive science in the 18th century, and biology evolved 
during the 19th century from teleology (i.e., a doctrine that objects in the world fulfill 
their intrinsic nature or purpose) and vitalism (i.e., a doctrine that the processes of life are 
not explicable by the laws of physics and chemistry alone and that life is in some part 
self-determining) to a positive investigation of the laws relating living organisms in an 
environment.  Similarly, human engineering (i.e., early human factors) turned its back on 
Darwinian trial and error to test the fit of the human to the machine (Meister, 1999) and 
began positive scientific investigations to determine “estimates of human lawful 
relationships from independent variable manipulations” (Kennedy, Jones, & Baltzley, 
1988, p. 1) in the early 20th century.  Comte’s doctrine led him to place the sciences in a 
natural order, which with some updating by Checkland, assumes the following sequence:  
physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, and the social sciences, where physics is the 
most basic science, being concerned with mass, motion, force, and energy.  Checkland 
notes that “the principles behind the classification are:  the historical order of the 
emergence of the sciences; the fact that each rests upon the one which precedes it and 
prepares the way for the one which follows; the increasing degree of complexity of 
subject matter; and the increasing ease with which the facts studied by a  
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particular science may change” (pp. 61–62).  The overarching pattern then is one of a 
hierarchy of levels of complexity that we find convenient to tackle through a hierarchy of 
separate sciences.   
 Checkland (1981) asserts that physics is most successful as a science because it 
best exemplifies the characteristics of the scientific method.  These characteristics, which 
can be traced back to the history of the development of science, are reductionism, 
repeatability, and refutation: “We may reduce [emphasis in original] the complexity of 
the variety of the real world in experiments whose results are validated by their 
repeatability, and we may build knowledge by the refutation of hypotheses” (p. 51).  
Checkland then proceeds to raise the question of how the scientific method copes with 
increasingly complex problems beyond those encountered in physics.  The main puzzle 
for him is that a new problem is seen to be a problem of that science and of the particular 
level of phenomena with which that science deals.  For example, a phenomenon in 
chemistry can be explained in terms of the physics of the constituent atoms and 
molecules, such as their masses, energies, and force fields.  However, this explanation 
does not explain away the fact that the phenomenon of chemistry exists or that it is 
capable of being investigated experimentally at a higher level of complexity than that 
encountered in physics.  While physics can provide an accounting of the mechanism of 
some chemical phenomenon, it cannot explain the existence of problems of chemistry as 
such.  If the latter were possible, we could reduce the science of chemistry to physics and 
simply address the problems at this lower level of complexity.  Similarly, the problems of 
genetics and heredity, although explainable in terms of the chemistry of nucleic acids, are 
nevertheless problems of biology, and the science of biology cannot be explained away 
by, or collapsed into, the science of chemistry.  Checkland thus concludes that each level 
of scientific complexity is characterized by its own autonomous problems.  Moreover, he 
suggests that “the existence of the problem of the emergence of new phenomena at higher 
levels of complexity is itself a major problem for the method of science, and one which 
reductionist thinking has not been able to solve” (p. 65).   
This concept of irreducible complexity may be easier to understand in terms of 
the “turtle metaphor” popularized by Stephen Hawking (1988): 
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A well-known scientist (some say it was Bertrand Russell) once gave a 
public lecture on astronomy.  He described how the earth orbits around the 
sun and how the sun, in turn, orbits around the center of a vast collection 
of stars called a galaxy.  At the end of the lecture, a little old lady at the 
back of room got up and said:  “What you have told is rubbish.  The world 
is really a flat plate supported on the back of a giant tortoise.” The 
scientist gave a superior smile before replying, “What is the tortoise 
standing on?” “You’re very clever, young man, very clever,” said the old 
lady.  “But it’s turtles all the way down!” (p. 1).  
The metaphor illustrates the problem of the infinite regression argument, where each 
explanation requires a further explanation.  Such an argument eventually leads to the 
problem of first causality, where a circular cause and consequence cycle occurs, this 
being an infinite tower of turtles in Hawking’s example.  In the case of epistemology, 
absent irreducible complexity, we would experience a similar regression argument, where 
a social phenomenon can be explained in terms of a phenomenon of psychology, and in 
turn, as a phenomenon of biology, chemistry, physics, and so on.  Irreducible complexity 
explains why this is the not the case, because a phenomenon observed at one level of 
complexity simply does not exist at a lower level.     
 Checkland’s discussion of complexity necessarily raises the following question, 
which hitherto has not been asked:  where in the hierarchy of levels of complexity, and 
hence the levels of science, do problems of human performance in systems occur?   By 
and large, the early human factors pioneers were practitioners of the science of 
psychology.  They saw the wartime problem of the increased complexity of man-machine 
interactions as a problem of psychology and hence, of the particular level of phenomenon 
dealt with by that science.  Being steeped in the methods of science, they applied 
reductionist thinking to the problem, dividing it into concerns of selection, training, and 
equipment design.  As suggested in the lectures by Chapanis and colleagues (1947), they 
were conscious of the fact that each of these avenues of inquiry was but an aspect of the 
total problem of addressing human performance in systems.  Nevertheless, they likely felt 
justified in taking a reductionist approach since the doctrine of dividing physical 
phenomena into separate parts was an unquestioned part of the scientific perspective of 
their world.  In so doing, they necessarily accepted the fundamental assumption that such 
division did not distort the phenomena they were studying.  However, nearly 25 years 
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later, the work by Simon (1976), reviewing the prior two decades of human factors 
experimental results, challenged the veracity of this assumption: 
Generalizable experimental data that will predict performance 
quantitatively and with reasonable accuracy is not likely to be generated 
from experiments that examine only a few factors.  The world is more 
complex than any two-, three-, or four-factor study is likely to 
approximate.   More factors must be examined before predictive precision 
can be achieved…(p. 92). 
It thus appears that the human factors sciences had become unduly restricted as a 
result of discarding from the outset a great deal of the complexity inherent in the problem 
of human performance in systems.  By selecting simple subsets of the problem for 
examination and controlling others, they introduced a systematic bias into any picture of 
human performance that was based on them.  Indeed, there is the possibility that the 
human factors sciences, based upon reductionism, repeatability, and refutation, foundered 
when faced with extremely complex phenomena that entailed more interacting variables 
than they could cope with in their experiments: 
Traditional ergonomics has failed to significantly improve overall system 
[emphasis in original] productivity, worker health, and the intrinsic 
motivational aspects of work systems…progressively more examples were 
being seen where organizational systems with good traditional micro-
ergonomic design were not achieving overall organizational goals because 
of a failure to address the macro-ergonomic design of the work system 
(Hendricks, 1995, p. 1618). 
Overall then, the first three decades of the post-war period demonstrated that the human 
factors sciences could provide an accounting of the mechanisms of some human 
performance phenomena, but they could not fully explain the problem of human 
performance in systems.   In other words, the problem of human performance in systems 
could not be effectively collapsed into the human factors sciences.  There was some 
aspect of the problem that emerged at higher levels of complexity that simply could not 
be resolved through reductionist thinking—that is, irreducible complexity.   
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Not surprisingly, the 1980s saw the emergence of two “large-systems” disciplines, 
macroergonomics1 and HSI (Table II-1), both of which are founded, to varying degrees, 
on sociotechnical systems theory (Kleiner, 2008).  Sociotechnical systems theory, in turn, 
views organizations as open systems engaged in the process of transforming inputs into 
desired outcomes.  They are open because the work system boundaries are permeable and 
exposed to the environment in which they function and on which they depend.  
Organizations bring two critical factors to bear on the transformation process:  
technology in the form of a technological subsystem, and people in the form of a 
personnel subsystem.  The design of the technological subsystem primarily defines the 
tasks to be performed, whereas the design of the personnel subsystem prescribes the ways 
in which the tasks are performed.  The two subsystems interact with each other, are 
interdependent, and operate under the concept of joint causation, meaning that both 
subsystems are affected by causal events in the environment.  The technological 
subsystem, once designed, is fixed and whatever adaptation the organization permits falls 
to the personnel subsystem to implement.  Joint causation underlies a related key 
sociotechnical systems concept, namely joint optimization.  Since the technological and 
personnel subsystems respond jointly to causal events, optimizing one subsystem and 
then fitting the second to it results in suboptimization of the joint work system.  
Consequently, joint optimization requires the integrated design of the two subsystems to 
develop the best possible fit between the two given the objectives and requirements of 
each and the overall work system (Meister, 1999; Hendrick & Kleiner, 2002). 
 
 
                                                 
1 Industrial/organizational (I/O) psychology, which includes the field of organizational behavior, 
predates and is distinguished from macroergonomics (Muchinsky, 1993).  I/O psychology is primarily 
concerned with selecting people to fit work systems, in contrast to ergonomics and human factors 
engineering, which focus on designing work systems to fit people.  In turn, macroergonomics can be 
viewed as the opposite side of the coin from organizational psychology.  Both organizational psychology 
and macroergonomics are concerned with the design of organizational structures and processes, but their 
focus is somewhat different.  Common objectives of organizational psychology include improving 
motivation and job satisfaction, developing effective incentive systems, enhancing leadership and 
organizational climate, and fostering teamwork.  While these objectives also are important to 
macroergonomics, the primary focus of macroergonomics is to design work systems that are compatible 
with an organization’s sociotechnical system characteristics; and then to ensure that the micro-ergonomic 
elements are designed to harmonize with the overall work system structure and processes (Hendrick & 
Kleiner, 2002). 
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Table II-1. Comparison among three large-system approaches [After Kleiner, 2008]. 
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Checkland (1981) describes the systems movement as an effort to investigate the 
implications of using the concept of the irreducible whole, or “a system,” in any area of 
endeavor.  He asserts that the systems movement is not itself a discipline, but a way of 
thinking about problems that can be applied to any of the arbitrary divisions of human 
knowledge known as disciplines.  He explains systems thinking as “an attempt, within the 
broad sweep of science, to retain much of that tradition but to supplement it by tackling 
the problem of irreducible complexity via a form of thinking based on wholes and their 
properties which complements scientific reductionism” (p. 74).  Within this context, it is 
easy to see that sociotechnical systems theory ascribes to a systems approach:  it focuses 
on an emergent property of a whole, namely the ability of an entity to transform inputs 
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into desired outcomes, which results from the degree of optimization of the integration of 
its technological and personnel subsystems.  Those disciplines that have arisen from 
sociotechnical systems theory, such as macro-ergonomics, HSI, systems ergonomics and 
human factors integration in the United Kingdom, and perhaps even the total quality 
management movement in the United States, all share a “large-system perspective” in 
which the primary level of focus is a system (Kleiner, 2008).  Hence, one would expect to 
find systems thinking scientists, engineers, technologists, psychologists, and management 
scientists within these disciplines.   
B. THE TRANSITION FROM MACHINE AGE TO SYSTEMS AGE 
As previously discussed, the pioneering behavioral scientists of World War II, 
typified by Chapanis and colleagues, used the rational approach to epistemology known 
as reductionism to deal with the complexity inherent in the problem of human 
performance in systems.  This philosophy of reductionism is often attributed to Descartes, 
as presented in his Discourse on the Method (1637), and is based on four precepts: 
• Accept as true only what is definite  
• Divide every question into manageable parts 
• Begin with the simplest issues and ascend to the more complex 
• Review frequently enough to retain the whole argument at once.  
Reductionism gives rise to the analytical way of thinking whereby understanding 
of the world is the sum, or result, of an understanding of its parts.  Reductionist analysis 
involves decomposing phenomena into independent and indivisible parts, explaining the 
behavior of these individual parts, and then aggregating these partial explanations into the 
explanation of the whole.  All phenomena are explainable by mechanisms consisting of 
one simple relationship:  cause and effect.  The cause is both necessary and sufficient for 
the effect.  The prevailing view of the world is then deterministic and there is no need for 
teleological concepts.  This approach predisposes one to thinking of the world as a 
machine, which led Russell Ackoff (1981) to refer to reductionist thinking as “Machine 
Age.”  Ackoff claims we are now in the “Systems Age,” which necessitates a different 
approach (Table II-2).  
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Table II-2. Machine Age versus Systems Age paradigms [From Ackoff, 1981]. 
Machine Age procedure Systems Age procedure 
Decompose that which is to be explained 
Explain the behavior or properties of the 
contained parts separately 
Aggregate these explanations into an 
explanation of the whole 
Identify a containing system of which the 
thing to be explained is a part 
Explain the behavior or properties of the 
containing whole 
Explain the behavior of the thing to be 
explained in terms of its role(s) and 
function(s) within its containing whole 
Machine Age analysis Systems Age synthesis 
Analysis focuses on structure; it reveals 
how things work 
Analysis yields knowledge 
Analysis enables description 
Analysis looks into things 
Synthesis focuses on function; it reveals why 
things operate as they do 
Synthesis yields understanding 
Synthesis enables explanation 
Synthesis looks outward from things 
   
In contrast to Descartes’ philosophy of reductionism, Aristotle argued that the 
whole was more than the sum of the parts, and the form of the whole signified its 
function, and hence, its intrinsic purpose or telos.  Although Aristotle’s doctrine was 
superseded by the Scientific Revolution of the 17th century, his ideas have, in part, been 
reinstated in the Systems Age concepts of expansionism and teleonomy, which replace 
reductionism and cause-and-effect relationships.  Expansionism is a doctrine maintaining 
that all objects and events, and all experiences of them, are parts of larger wholes; 
teleonomy is a doctrine in which structures and behaviors are determined by the purpose 
they fulfill.  Synthesis is simply the combination of parts so as to form a whole, and thus, 
synthetic thinking requires integrating things within a containing, or parent, system and 
explaining them in terms of their role(s) and function(s) in the parent system.  
Expansionism requires synthetic thinking, whereby attention is turned from ultimate 
elements to the whole with interrelated parts—“systems.”  Phenomena are explained in 
terms of probabilistic producer-product relationships such that a producer is only 
necessary but not sufficient for its product, and by implication, cannot provide a complete 
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explanation of it.  The prevailing view of the world is then stochastic and there is a need 
to look at systems teleonomically, in an output- or outcome-oriented way, rather than 
deterministically, in an input-oriented way (Ackoff, 1981; Checkland, 1981).   
Returning to our problem of interest of explaining human performance in a 
system, a Machine Age thinker would likely start by first considering the system 
functions allocated to the human.  They might then identify the tasks that must be 
performed in accomplishing those functions, assess the aptitude profile of the 
prototypical user (i.e., personnel selection), examine the human-machine interface (i.e., 
human factors engineering), and review the training curriculum.  Finally, the Machine 
Age thinker would aggregate these considerations to explain how the human should 
perform in the system.  In contrast, a Systems Age thinker would start by identifying a 
system containing the human, say the personnel system, and would then define the 
functions or objectives of the personnel system with reference to an even wider social 
system that contains it, such as an organization or military service.  Finally, they would 
explain the roles or functions of the human in the system with reference to the objectives 
of the personnel system.  While it is clear that analysis (i.e., reduction) and synthesis (i.e., 
expansion) both have a role when considering human performance in systems, it is 
synthesis that is the particular focus of sociotechnical systems theory.   
C. GESTALT AND HOLISM 
The word Gestalt, while not having an exact equivalent in English, is used in 
German to mean the way a thing has been “placed” or “put together.”  In psychology, the 
word is often implied to mean “pattern” or “configuration.”  Gestalt philosophy emerged 
in the early twentieth century, mainly in Germany and Austria, in reaction to 
reductionism.  The field of Gestalt psychology was launched in 1912 with the publication 
of Max Wertheimer’s study of the visual illusion of movement resulting from the serial 
presentation of still images.  Gestalt psychology was based on the observation that we 
often experience things that are not a part of our simple sensations.  Gestalt theory was 
holistic and embraced the concept of emergent properties: 
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The fundamental “formula” of Gestalt theory might be expressed in this 
way:  There are wholes, the behavior of which is not determined by that of 
their individual elements, but where the part-processes are themselves 
determined by the intrinsic nature of the whole.  It is the hope of Gestalt 
theory to determine the nature of the wholes (Wertheimer, 1938, p. 2). 
While early Gestalt work was primarily concerned with perception, particularly visual 
perception of illusions, the approach was later extended to problems in other areas such 
as social psychology and economic and political behavior.   
Despite the fact that von Bertalanffy (1972), a founder of general systems theory, 
mentions Gestalt theory as a historical prelude, Hitchins (1992) asserts that the legacy of 
Gestalt theory is often overlooked despite its central tenets being deeply embedded in 
modern systems thinking.  Contemporary HSI philosophy, for example, with its focus on 
the synthesis of human performance in systems seems to owe as much to Gestalt theory 
as to the original human factors sciences.  For instance, the Gestalt principle of reification 
addresses the constructive aspect of perception whereby the experienced entity contains 
more spatial information than its component sensory stimuli.  Illustrated in Figure II-2A, 
the component sensory stimuli consist of three black wedges, but the viewer likely 
perceives a triangle, with the wedges at the vertices, even though no triangle has actually 
been drawn.  The triangle is an emergent property of the whole that cannot be discerned 




Figure II-2. Illustration of the Gestalt principle of reification. 
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By analogy, human performance is an emergent property of the whole of 
individual abilities (i.e., personnel domain), training, and equipment design (i.e., human 
factors engineering), among other determinants.  Likewise, total system performance is 
an emergent property of the whole of the personnel and technological subsystems.  
Human performance in systems cannot be fully discerned through the independent 
examination of foci like human factors, manpower, personnel, training, system safety, 
health hazards, etc.  The concepts of holism and emergence could well explain Simon’s 
(1976) observation after reviewing 239 human factors engineering experiments:  between 
one-third and one-fifth of the variance in human performance is not attributable to an 
interpretable source.   
D. EMERGENCE AND HIERARCHY 
We just demonstrated the concept of emergence in the context of a simple system 
of symbols, and we will now expand this concept to hierarchical systems in general. 
Figure II-3 illustrates n nested systems such that each system contains, and is contained, 
by other systems.   
 
 
Figure II-3. Emergence and hierarchy [From Hitchins, 1992]. 
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The principle of emergence states that whole entities exhibit properties that are 
meaningful only when attributed to the whole and not the parts.  For example, the human 
brain exhibits self-awareness, but this property cannot be attributed to any specific locus 
within the brain.  Every system exhibits emergent properties that derive from its 
component activities, interactions, and structure but which cannot be reduced to the 
individual components.  Often it is these emergent properties that make a system 
purposeful or yield value to system stakeholders (Hitchins, 1992).   
According to the principle of hierarchy, entities that can be meaningfully 
considered as wholes are built up from smaller entities, which themselves are whole, and 
so on (Hitchins, 1992).  For example, the human is composed of several systems such as 
the digestive, cardiovascular, neurological, reproductive, and musculoskeletal systems, to 
name just a few.  The cardiovascular system, in turn, is composed of the heart, arteries, 
veins, capillaries, etc.  Continuing the example, but instead ascending in the hierarchy, it 
also may be observed that individual humans are components of larger social systems 
such as teams, families, or communities.   
These concepts of emergence and hierarchy are fundamental to the systems 
movement and systems thinking (Checkland, 1981).  In a hierarchy, emergent properties 
correspond to levels.  The key insight, then, is that a system-of-interest can only be 
meaningfully observed from the level of its containing system (Hitchins, 1992).  For 
example, in Figure II-3, if one were interested in the ( )st1n −  system, it would be 
necessary to observe it from the nth level to perceive its emergent properties.  Checkland 
(1981) goes so far as to explain emergence and hierarchy in terms of a generalized model 
of organized complexity: 
…the general model of organized complexity is that there exists a 
hierarchy of levels of organization, each more complex than the one 
below, a level being characterized by emergent properties which do not 
exist at the lower level.  Indeed, more than the fact that they ‘do not exist’ 
at the lower level, emergent properties are meaningless [emphasis in 
original] in the language appropriate at the lower level. ‘The shape of an 
apple,’ although the result of processes which operate at the level of the 
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cells, organelles, and organic molecules which comprise apple trees…has 
no meaning at the lower levels of description.  The processes at those 
levels result in an outcome which [sic] signals the existence of a new 
stable level of complexity—that of the whole apple itself—which has 
emergent properties, one of them being an apple’s shape (p. 78). 
Given Checkland’s perspective, we might reasonably ask ourselves whether human 
performance in systems “has any meaning” at the lower levels of description created by 
the human factors sciences and corresponding HSI domains.  This might explain, for 
instance, why human factors engineers choose to sidestep the topic: 
If the system hierarchy breaks down into the workstation, the subsystem, 
and the total system, the systems concept requires measurement at all 
these levels and the determination of the relationships among them.  
Again, this is a conceptual requirement that is usually ignored (Meister, 
1999, pp. 144–145). 
Meister appears to suggest that the human factors community has a preference to avoid 
traversing levels of organized complexity.   
While emergence and hierarchy are not yet phrases in general use among HSI 
practitioners, they need to be thought of as twin components of any HSI philosophy.  For 
example, it is both reasonable and insightful to describe the primary task of HSI in terms 
of emergence as: 
Integrating humans with other system elements to form and maintain a 
system with the requisite emergent properties to meet stakeholders’ needs. 
It is equally constructive to consider where in the system hierarchy HSI is appropriately 
addressed.  For instance, the HSI domains of human factors engineering, manpower, 
personnel, training, system safety, etc., can meaningfully be considered as individual 
systems, both in the sense of organizations within the Defense Department and as bodies 
of knowledge.  To consider the emergent properties of the synthesis of these systems, 
HSI must reside at the level of their containing system.  So, as a philosophy, HSI is best 
considered a meta-discipline, sitting “above” the constituent domains, seeking to provide 
an umbrella over them, and establishing a comprehensive set of unifying perspectives.  
Thus, it is the principle of hierarchy that distinguishes HSI from the corresponding field 
of human factors.  Likewise, from the perspective of sociotechnical systems theory, joint 
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optimization is an emergent property that must be considered from the level of the system 
that contains both the personnel and technological subsystems.  Consequently, HSI as a 
program should be implemented at a level in the Defense Department that has oversight 
and/or coordination responsibility for both of these subsystems.   
E. SYSTEMS TYPOLOGIES  
A major premise of the systems movement is the notion that it is more insightful 
to view the apparently chaotic universe as being comprised of a complex of interacting 
wholes called “systems” rather than as a set of phenomena whose laws can be established 
by the reductionist experimental approach.  Given this hypothesis, it is not surprising, 
then, that a number of general attempts have been made to describe and classify the 
possible types of systems (Checkland, 1981).  Kenneth Boulding (1956), a founding 
father of general systems theory, proposed one of the first general classifications of 
systems types (Table II-3).   
 
Table II-3. Boulding’s classification of systems [After Boulding, 1956]. 
Level Characteristics Examples Relevant disciplines 
1. Structures, 
frameworks 
Static Crystal structures, 
bridges 
Description, verbal or 
pictorial, in any 
discipline 
2. Clock-works Predetermined 
motion (may exhibit 
equilibrium) 
Clocks, machines, 















Theory of metabolism 
(information theory) 







Level Characteristics Examples Relevant disciplines 
6. Animals A brain to guide 
total behavior, 
ability to learn 
Birds and beasts Zoology 






















The idea of God ? 
 
Boulding sought to organize “individual” units as found in empirical studies of 
the real world into an informal, intuitive hierarchy based on their relative degree of 
complexity.  Within this hierarchy: 
• Emergent properties are assumed to arise at each defined level 
• Complexity increases as one ascends the hierarchy 
• Lower-level systems, and their distinguishing properties, are found in higher-level 
systems. 
Boulding’s objective, given the emergence at the time of an increasing number of hybrid 
disciplines, was to provide a framework of complexity within which one could relate the 
different empirical sciences.  Accordingly, we can view the historical development of 
HSI, itself a hybrid discipline, as an attempt to bring in HSI domain-related disciplines to 
treat problems at levels 7 and 8.   
Nehemiah Jordan (1968) proposed a second general systems taxonomy based on 
three organizing principles that he asserts allow us to perceive a group of entities as a 
proper system.  These principles include rate of change, purpose, and connectivity, and 
each is defined in terms of a pair of systems properties that are polar opposites (Figure II-




Figure II-4. Jordan’s taxonomy [After Jordan, 1968]. 
 
Thus, a system is characterized as structural if the rate of change is slow or 
functional if the rate of change is fast.  Systems are either purposive or non-purposive.  
They are mechanistic if the parts of a system are not strongly interdependent, or they are 
organismic if such interdependence is strong.  Jordan argues that we should only use 
“dimensional” descriptions, his principles and properties being prototypes, when talking 
about systems.  Hence, there are 32  or eight ways of selecting one from each of his three 
pairs of properties to form potential descriptions of groupings worthy of the name 
“system.”  For example, a system to carry out HSI might be described as having a 
functional, purposive, and organismic system of domains (i.e., manpower, personnel, 
training, system safety, etc). 
Checkland (1981) also proposed a systems typology, or systems map of the 




Figure II-5. Checkland’s systems map of the universe [From Checkland, 1981]. 
 
Natural systems are the physical systems that make up the universe, to include the 
living things observed on Earth.  These can be considered as “given” systems because 
their origin is that of the universe and they result from the processes of evolution.  There 
are many other systems that are similar to natural systems, with the very important 
exception that they result from human conscious design.  Unlike natural systems, such 
systems could be made to be other than they are.  These include designed physical 
systems, which range from simple hand tools to spacecraft, and designed abstract systems 
such as mathematics and philosophies.  These systems are brought into existence to serve 
some human purpose, although at times that purpose may be hard to define explicitly.  
Then there is the human act of design, which itself is a fourth possible system class, 
namely the human activity system.  Human activity systems are less tangible than natural 
and designed systems, but nevertheless, are clearly observable in the world as sets of 
human activities more or less consciously ordered into wholes as a result of some 
underlying purpose or mission.  This is a very broad class of systems, ranging from the 
extremes of a single artist wielding a paintbrush to international political systems 
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working to make life more tolerable for the human race.  Beyond these four classes of 
systems, there is a category called transcendental systems, which includes those systems 
that are beyond knowledge (e.g., God).  The systems map suggests that the absolute 
minimum number of systems needed to describe the whole of reality is four: natural, 
designed physical, designed abstract, and human activity systems.   
Following Checkland’s paradigm, HSI is concerned with the combination of 
natural systems, in the form of humans, and designed systems (more often than not 
designed physical systems) to form wider systems showing emergent properties that are 
coherent with the purpose or mission of at least one human activity system.    From the 
broader perspective of sociotechnical systems theory and the related concept of joint 
optimization, HSI may also be described as being concerned with the combination of 
human activity systems (i.e., the personnel subsystem) and designed physical systems 
(i.e., the technological subsystem).  When the idea of HSI emerged as a conscious 
product of the human mind, it was a designed abstract system.  When the idea was 
captured and translated into text in the form of published articles, books, and Defense 
Department policy guidance, it became a designed physical system.  As an organizational 
activity, HSI is itself the purpose or mission of specific human activity systems.   While 
perhaps confusing, this should reinforce the importance of perspective, or 
Weltanschauung, in systems thinking.  You must know the perspective from which 
observations are made.  This distinction separates reductionist studies of natural systems, 
which can be made independent of the perspective of the observer, and hence the 
definition of scientific fact, from that of human-created systems (Checkland, 1981).  
While few would dispute that a human is a natural system, such certainty is not the case 
when we describe “HSI.”  The latter does not fit easily into any one system class, and so 
it is not easy to obtain descriptions of HSI upon which all observers can agree (Deal, 
2007). 
F. COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS 
Many human and social systems can be likened to complex adaptive systems, a 
notion derived from the study of non-equilibrated natural systems such as physical, 
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chemical, and biological systems (Holland, 1995).  Classical science, based on the 
reductionist view of the world, considers entities as independent and treats systems as 
being close to equilibrium.  System dynamics are considered to be linear; models and 
theories are validated if they can accurately predict experimental results.  Complexity 
science recognizes that entities are interdependent and many systems studied are far from 
equilibrium, giving rise to non-linear system dynamics.  Complex systems exhibit self-
organization, emergence, and evolution; understanding is no longer demonstrated by 
prediction, but rather by an awareness of the limits of predictability (Holland, 1995, 
1998; Lyons, 2004).   
As an illustration, consider Figure II-6 depicting a human activity system.  The 
entities in the human activity system are the component teams performing specific 
activities supporting a common purpose or mission.  These teams interact and connect 
with each other in unpredictable and unplanned ways.  Certain regularities emerge from 
the mass of their interactions and form a pattern that feeds back to the human activity 
system and informs the interactions of its constituent teams.   
 
Figure II-6. Complex adaptive systems. 
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Now suppose the teams comprising our system-of-interest are each functionally 
specialized such that the members of any one team are not directly interchangeable with 
those on other teams.  Let us assume changing population demographics or economic 
factors deplete the number of individuals that can be recruited and trained to staff one of 
the teams.  For example, a change occurs in the personnel system that contains our 
system-of-interest and hence contributes to its external environment.  This change may 
result in either more or less work for other teams in the system and will affect their 
behavior and size.  A period of flux occurs in all the teams in the system until a new 
balance is established.  It is reasonable to expect diminished system performance during 
the acute period of heightened system disequilibrium.  However, system adaptation may 
also result in chronic performance decrements, increased system losses, and/or excessive 
ownership costs.  Aptly, this example then illustrates a typical HSI challenge: to 
anticipate and/or manage system adaptations, thereby increasing the likelihood that 
designed systems meet their stated purpose.  At a macro-level, it also captures the very 
scenario that led to the development of a Defense Department HSI program (which was 
the problem of economically recruiting personnel of sufficient quality to match the influx 
of substantial amounts of technologically advanced equipment into the military services) 
(Booher, 1990).    
Before moving on, it is worth briefly discussing chaos since the concept is often 
mentioned in connection with complex adaptive systems.  Complexity theory is distinct 
from chaos theory, but the idea of chaos still plays an important role in complexity 
theory.  Systems can be considered as existing along a spectrum ranging from 
equilibrium to chaos.  A system in equilibrium lacks the internal dynamics to enable it to 
respond to its environment and it will subsequently die.  At the other extreme, a system in 
chaos ceases to function as a system and dies as well.  The most productive state then for 
a system is to be “on the edge of chaos” where there is maximum internal dynamics, and 
hence capability to respond to the environment (Lyons, 2004).   
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G. WICKED PROBLEMS 
Systems thinking is a general intellectual framework for approaching problem 
situations.  Pidd (2003) discusses the ways in which people use the term “problem” and 
provides a spectrum containing three points as examples: 
• Puzzles:  Situations with clear objectives and where solutions are obtained by 
applying known methods 
• Problems:  Well defined and structured situations, but requiring considerable 
ingenuity and expertise to solve 
• Messes:  Ill-defined and unstructured situations for which there is considerable 
disagreement over objectives; must be structured and shaped before any solution, 
should such exist, can be found.   
Rittel and Webber (1973), working on problems of policy planning, describe Pidd’s 
messes as “wicked problems.” Their choice of the term “wicked” is not meant to 
characterize certain problems as having properties that are ethically deplorable, but rather 
to assert that they are “vicious” or “tricky.” Problems in the natural sciences, such as 
those worked by scientists and some classes of engineers, have both clear objectives and 
identifiable “optimal” solutions making them “tame.”  Wicked problems, in contrast, 
have neither of these clarifying traits.  Figure II-7 considers puzzles, problems, and 
messes/wicked problems within the spectrum of systems modeling approaches.  At one 
extreme, models are used to totally or partially replace humans in routine decision 
making such as by providing automated decision making or routine decision support.  At 
the other extreme, models are used to support people who are thinking through difficult 
issues, either by representing possible system designs or by representing insights that are 




Figure II-7. Spectrum of problems with corresponding systems modeling approaches 
[From Pidd, 2004]. 
 
Rittel and Webber (1973) propose ten distinguishing properties of wicked 
problems for which systems practitioners should be alert: 
• There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem.  The information needed 
to understand the problem depends upon one’s ideas for solving it. 
• Wicked problems have no stopping rule.  Work stops on the problem not for 
reasons inherent to the logic of the problem, but for considerations that are 
external to the problem such as time or funds.   
• Solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false, but good-or-bad.  There are no 
conventionalized criteria for objectively deciding whether a solution is correct, 
only relative judgments of “goodness.” 
• There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem.  
Solutions to wicked problems will generate waves of consequences over an 
extended, perhaps even virtually unbounded, period of time.   
• Every solution to a wicked problem is a “one-shot operation” because there is no 
opportunity to learn by trial-and-error; every attempt counts significantly.  Any 
solution actions are effectively irreversible and the half-lives of their consequence 
are very long.   
• Wicked problems do not have an enumerable set of potential solutions, nor is 
there a well-described set of permissible operations that may be incorporated into 
plans. 
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• Every wicked problem is essentially unique.  “Essentially unique” means that the 
current problem, while sharing many similarities with previous ones, has a 
distinguishing property that is of overriding importance.   
• Every wicked problem can be considered a symptom of another problem.  This 
characteristic implies a hierarchy of problems; consequently, the challenge 
becomes to determine the appropriate level for intervention. 
• The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be explained in 
numerous ways, and the choice of explanation determines the nature of the 
problem’s resolution (e.g., crime can be explained by not enough police, too many 
guns, or insufficient socioeconomic opportunities, each of which offers a different 
approach to attacking crime).  An analyst’s Weltanschauung is the strongest 
determining factor in explaining a discrepancy, and therefore, in resolving a 
wicked problem. 
• The aim is not to find truth but to improve some characteristics of the world in 
which people live. 
HSI problems, which involve the challenge of bringing together human activity 
systems and designed physical systems, often exhibit attributes of wicked problems.  For 
example, the Defense Department objectives for HSI include both optimizing total 
system performance and minimizing total ownership costs (DoD, 2008).  Since 
performance and cost objectives are usually inversely correlated, progress towards either 
objective will be at the expense of the other.  Given the absence of guidance on relative 
priority, these two objectives are often assumed to be equally important.  One would have 
to conclude then that the objective of the Defense Department’s HSI program is 
constantly to maintain and adjust a politically acceptable balance between these 
incompatible objectives.  These types of problems are distinctly different from human 
factors problems that can be technically defined: e.g., “reduce assembly mean time to 
repair to 8 hours,” or “the interface must accommodate the 5th percentile female.”  While 
the methods of the human factors disciplines play a prominent role in HSI, they become 
operational only after the most important decisions have been made − after the wicked 
planning problem has already been tamed.  
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H. SOFT AND HARD SYSTEMS APPROACHES 
Pure hard and soft systems approaches represent extreme points on a spectrum, 
and Table II-4 presents the way theorists and practitioners view the differences (Pidd, 
2004).  To understand the two archetypal systems approaches, it is helpful to distinguish 
between two extreme types of rationality (Simon, 1982).  The first type, substantive 
rationality, is what most people assume when discussing rational analysis.  It is based on 
the notion that: 
• A set of alternative courses of action can be presented for an individual’s choice 
• Data and information are available that permit the individual to predict the 
consequences of choosing any alternative 
• A criterion exists for determining the preferred set of consequences. 
The course of action that leads to the most preferred set of consequences is then selected 
by the individual.  When problem situations recur, many mathematical and statistical 
models can be used to help manage situations that meet the requirements specified above.   
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Table II-4. Practical aspects of hard and soft systems approaches [From Pidd, 2004]. 
 Hard approaches Soft approaches 
Methodology Based on common sense, 
taken-for-granted views of 
analysis and intervention 
Based on rigorous epistemology 
Models Shared representations of the 
real world 
Representations of concepts 
relevant to the real world 
Validity Repeatable and comparable 
with the real world in some 
sense 
Defensibly coherent, logically 
consistent, plausible 
Data From a source that is 
defensibly there in the world 
with an agreed or shared 
meaning, observer 
independent 
Based on judgment, opinion, 
some ambiguity, observer-
dependent 
Values and outcome 
of the study 
Quantification assumed to be 
possible and desirable. From 
option comparison based on 
rational choice 
Agreement (on action?), shared 
perceptions. Informing action 
and learning 
Purpose  For the study: taken as a given 
at the start 
For the model: understanding 
or changing the world, linked 
to the purpose 
For the study: remains 
problematical 
For the model: a means to 
support learning 
 
In contrast, a second type of rationality, procedural rationality, is applied in 
situations that are novel and irregular as in the case of wicked problems.  Procedural 
rationality stresses processes to support decision making based on human deliberation 
when substantive rationality is impossible or impracticable.  Procedural rationality is 
based on the following notions: 
• Options or courses of action must be discovered 
• Acceptable solutions must be developed by resolving conflict over ends and 
means 
• Information and analysis are still crucial but are bounded by cognitive and 
economic limitations 
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• Individuals tend to satisfice across known acceptable solutions rather than work to 
discover globally optimal solutions. 
 HSI problem situations, more often than not, require the application of procedural 
rationality, thereby lending them to analysis using the “softer” approaches, particularly in 
the early stages of the problem situation.  For example, as previously mentioned, the 
Defense Department’s objectives for its HSI program include both optimizing total 
system performance and minimizing total ownership costs (DoD, 2008), but no 
description or definition of “optimization” is provided in the program guidance.  
Consequently, there exists no a priori quantitative criterion for determining the preferred 
set of consequences vis-à-vis HSI as is required to apply substantive rationality and make 
use of the hard systems approaches.  This point was aptly demonstrated during a recently 
developed graduate level course on HSI at the Naval Postgraduate School in which 
students were asked to formulate a key performance parameter (i.e., a single quantitative 
criterion) for HSI.  A survey of the students’ responses revealed that almost none of them 
were able to provide a relatively tractable or robust criterion.   However, the larger issue 
for HSI as a discipline is that it is a hybrid, in part, of the social sciences—recall HSI’s 
lineage in sociotechnical systems theory!  As described by Checkland (1981), the social 
sciences pose a particular challenge because they are “unrestricted” sciences: 
In a restricted science such as physics or chemistry a limited range of 
phenomena are studied, well-designed reductionist experiments in the 
laboratory are possible, and it is probable that far-reaching hypotheses, 
expressed mathematically, can be tested by quantitative 
measurements…In an unrestricted science…the effects under study are so 
complex that designed experiments with controls are often not possible.  
Quantitative models are more vulnerable and the chance of unknown 
factors dominating the observations is much greater (p. 65). 
 Any “unrestricted” science in Checkland’s sense will present considerable problems for 
those seeking to employ the hard systems approaches.   
 Although the hard and soft approaches in systems modeling are often presented as 
polar opposites, there is a growing interest among the corresponding disciplines in 
looking at the combined use of the two approaches—something Pidd (2004) calls 
“complementarity in systems modeling.” Pidd suggests three possible relationships 
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between the hard and soft systems approaches which are represented in Figure II-8.  In 
the left-hand part of the figure, the soft and hard systems approaches are shown as being 
completely distinct and incommensurable, while in the middle part of the figure, the two 
are seen feeding off one another in a pragmatic way.  In the right-hand part of the figure, 
the soft systems approaches are shown as containing the classical hard systems 
approaches, implying that the understanding gained from the soft systems approaches 
enables a sensible attempt at the hard approaches.    Pidd does not explicitly endorse any 
of these perspectives, but he does offer Flood and Jackson’s (1991) Total System 
Intervention as a prototype approach for achieving complementarity.   
 
 
Figure II-8. Relationships between hard and soft systems approaches [From Pidd, 
2004]. 
 
I. TOTAL SYSTEMS INTERVENTION 
 The existence of the hard and soft system dichotomy appears to break with the 
original holistic intent of the systems perspective.  Flood and Jackson (1991) attempt to 
remedy this situation with their Total Systems Intervention (TSI) approach to problem 
solving, which demonstrates that all problem solving methods can be arranged and 
operated successfully as an organized whole.  In essence, TSI serves as a meta-
methodology that enables problem solvers to employ a variety of methods by first 
creatively surfacing issues an organization faces and then choosing the method(s) best 
equipped to tackle those issues most effectively (Flood, 1995).  TSI is constructed on a 
theoretical foundation called Critical Systems Thinking, which assumes the following 
three positions (Flood & Jackson, 1991): 
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• Complementarism:  The existence of a range of systems methodologies, each 
driven by a different theoretical position, is a strength of the systems movement if 
each methodology is put to work only on the kinds of problems for which it is the 
most suitable. 
• Sociological awareness:  Organizational and societal pressures exist that lead at 
times to certain systems methodologies being popular for guiding interventions, 
making it necessary for problem solvers to contemplate the social consequences 
of using a particular methodology. 
• Human well-being and emancipation:  The exercise of power in the social process 
can limit the open and free discussion necessary for successful mutual 
understanding among all those involved in social systems; human beings have an 
“emancipatory interest” in freeing themselves from constraints imposed by power 
relations and in learning to control their own destiny. 
TSI can be studied through its philosophy, principles, and process.  The philosophy 
describes the worldview from a TSI perspective, the principles propose the kinds of 
action that should be taken, and the process sets out how to implement the principles.   
The TSI philosophy ascribes to the image of a whole that has emergent properties, 
a hierarchical structure, and processes of communication and control to enable it to adapt 
and survive in a changing environment.  This image provides a framework on which an 
ideal whole system view of an organization can be constructed in five stages (Flood, 
1995): 
1) An organization is a horizontally and vertically integrated set of technical and 
human activities. 
2) Activities of an organization must be efficiently and effectively controlled while 
maintaining viability of the organization. 
3) Activities of an organization must be directed to achieve some intended purpose. 
4) People in organizations appreciate 1) and 3) in different ways, which can cause 
conflict, lack of cohesion, inefficiency, ineffectiveness, rigidity, and non-viability 
in organizations. 
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5) Both 3) and 4) must be harmonized through organizational design and 
management style. 
Given this view, organizational problem solving equates to managing interrelated sets of 
issues arising from the interaction of technical and human activities rather than solving 
identifiable problems.  An organization can then be understood in terms of interacting 
issues, and problem solving may be considered as being part of the continuous process of 
managing these issues. 
 There are four principles, or kinds of action, that promote the implementation of 
the TSI philosophy described above:  
1) Being systemic:  Study the world as if it were systemic, which means taking into 
account interactions between all technical and human activities at three 
hierarchical levels (i.e., the system, the subsystems, and the suprasystem) in the 
process of continuously managing interacting issues.   
2) Achieving meaningful participation:  If we are to develop an adequate 
appreciation of all interactions between technical and human activities at three 
hierarchical levels (i.e., the system, the subsystems, and the suprasystem) at any 
one time, then the perceptions of all people involved and affected must be drawn 
into the picture.  
3) Being reflective:  Ensure that a whole system understanding is achieved and all 
issues are acknowledged by reflecting upon the relationship between different 
organizational interests and where domination over people exists; ensure that all 
issues are managed using relevant methods by reflecting upon the dominance of 
favored approaches to intervention.   
4) Striving for human freedom:  Management practices must be based on an explicit 
ideology that promotes human freedom (i.e., disemprisoning people from 
dominating structures and decisions so as to encourage open and meaningful 
debate).   
The fourth principle follows from the preceding three principles:  human freedom may be 
achieved through reflection, which in turn helps to achieve meaningful participation, so  
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as to promote being systemic and taking into account the whole.  Hence, taking the whole 
into account is an important step toward effective problem solving and avoidance of 
counter-intuitive consequences. 
 The process of TSI sets out how to implement the four principles, thereby 
realizing the philosophy.  The process is a systemic cycle of inquiry with interaction back 
and forth between its three phases:  creativity, choice, and implementation.  As 
represented in Figure II-9, TSI is a continuous process, with no predetermined start or 
finish points, which identifies sets of interacting issues and aids their management.  
Moreover, the process can move in either direction, having both clockwise and 
counterclockwise modes of operation.   In the clockwise mode, the tasks of each of the 
phases are as follows (Flood & Jackson, 1991; Flood, 1995): 
• Creativity phase:  Identify issues to be dealt with and demonstrate the interacting 
nature of these issues.   
• Choice phase:  Choose a method(s) that will best manage the interacting issues 
identified by the creativity phase, tackling the most pressing issues while 
managing as many issues as possible. 
• Implementation phase:  Employ the chosen method(s) from the choice phase to 
manage the issues identified by the creativity phase to develop and implement 




Figure II-9. The process of TSI in clockwise and counterclockwise modes [From 
Flood, 1995]. 
 
In contrast, the counterclockwise mode is a process of critical reflection in which 
the task of each phase is to question the outcome of the previous phase.  For example, 
when the choice phase receives details of a set of interacting issues to be managed from 
the creativity phase, the critical reflection position asks, “Is this an adequate appreciation 
of the organization?” Consequently, each phase passes its outcome to the next phase in a 
clockwise direction and receives critical reflections about that outcome from the next 
phase in a counterclockwise direction.  While this might suggest a sequential process, 
Flood (1995) stresses that no phase exists independently, but rather, all three phases 
occur simultaneously, albeit one phase may be in sharper focus at times compared to the 
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other two phases.  Additionally, there exists a recursive structure with the TSI process 
whereby each of the three phases operates within all the other phases as a subphase. 
 The aim of the creativity phase is to identify issues to be managed by focusing on 
decontextualizing, contextualizing, and synthesizing the two.  Decontextualization, which 
emphasizes divergent thinking that looks at the organization from many angles and 
viewpoints, provides the creative input necessary to identify a wide range of issues to be 
managed.  Contextualizing then helps to converge on issues that should be managed and 
is guided by the use of systems metaphors as organizing structures for thinking creatively 
about the problem situation.  These metaphors are machine, organic, neuro-cybernetic, 
socio-cultural, and socio-political.  They respectively conceive organizations to be 
mechanistic, organic, organic but intelligent, as if they were a culture, or as if they were a 
political system (Table II-5).  The first three metaphors focus on the technical activities 
of an organization, while the last two metaphors focus on the human activities. 
Implementation of the choice of issues then follows from the synthesis of 
decontextualization and contextualization, and selected issues to be managed are passed 
on to the choice phase (Flood & Jackson, 1991; Flood, 1995).    
 
Table II-5. The main attributes of five metaphors used in the creativity phase of TSI 
[From Flood, 1995]. 
             Metaphor Main attributes 
















             Metaphor Main attributes 
Self-regulation 
Passive control 
Neuro-cybernetic As organic, but also includes: 
• Active learning and control 
• Information prime 
• Law of requisite variety 
• Viable system 
• Learning to learn 
• Getting the whole into the parts 
Socio-cultural Collaboration 
Shared characteristics: 








Socio-political Coercive conflict 
Domination 
Whose interests are served? 
Power central issue 
People are politically motivated 
Power as a consequence of structure 
Disintegration 
  
 Flood and Jackson (1991) proposed in their original description of TSI that the 
choice of systems methodology should be informed by the System of Systems 
Methodologies (SOSM).  The SOSM attempts to logically group systems methodologies 
based on the underlying assumptions they make about problem contexts in terms of two 
dimensions:  systems and participants.  The systems dimension refers to the relative 
complexity of the system(s) that make up the problem situation, which are classified on a 
continuum of system types ranging from “simple” to “complex” (Table II-6).   
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Table II-6. Characteristics of simple and complex systems [After Flood & Jackson, 
1991]. 
Simple Complex 
• Small number of elements 
• Few interactions between the elements 
• Attributes of the elements predetermined 
• Interaction between elements is highly 
organized 
• Well-defined laws govern behavior 
• The system does not evolve over time 
• Sub-systems do not pursue their own 
goals 
• The system is unaffected by behavioral 
influences 
• The system is largely closed to the 
environment 
• Large number of elements 
• Many interactions between the elements 
• Attributes of the elements are not 
predetermined 
• Interactions between elements is loosely 
organized 
• They are probabilistic in their behavior 
• The system evolves over time 
• Sub-systems are purposeful and generate 
their own goals 
• The system is subject to behavioral 
influences 
• The system is largely open to the 
environment 
 
 The participant dimension refers to the relationship of agreement or disagreement 
between the individuals or parties who stand to gain or lose from a systems intervention.  
Participant relationships are classified as unitary, pluralist, or coercive based on the 
political characteristics of the situation in terms of the issues of interest, conflict, and 
power (Table II-7).   
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Table II-7. Characteristics of unitary, pluralist, and coercive relationships between 
participants [After Flood & Jackson, 1991]. 
  Unitary Pluralist Coercive 
• Share common values 
• Values and beliefs are 
highly compatible 
• Largely agree upon ends 
and means 
• All participate in decision 
making 
• Act in accordance with 
agreed objectives 
 
• Have a basic 
compatibility of interest 
• Values and beliefs diverge 
to some extent 
• Do not necessarily agree 
upon ends and means, but 
compromise is possible 
• All participate in decision 
making 
• Act in accordance with 
agreed objectives 
• Do not share common 
interests 
• Values and beliefs are 
likely to conflict 
• Do not agree upon ends 
and means and “genuine” 
compromise is not 
possible 
• Some coerce others to 
accept decisions 
• No agreement over 
objectives is possible 




 Combining the dimensions of systems and participants yields a 6-celled matrix 
with problem contexts falling into the following ideal-type categories:  simple-unitary, 
complex-unitary, simple-pluralist, complex-pluralist, simple-coercive, and complex-
coercive.  Each of these problem contexts differs in a meaningful way from the others,  
implying  the  need  for  at least  six  types  of  problem  solving  methodologies  or 
systems approaches.  Figure II-10 groups system methodologies based upon the 
assumptions they make about the nature of the problem context in terms of the systems 
from which problems or issues emerge and the participants.  The systems methodologies 
included in the SOSM are not constrained to those shown in Figure II-10, and any well-









 Unitary Pluralist Coercive 
Simple 
• Operations research 
• Systems analysis 
• Systems engineering 
• System dynamics 
• Social systems design 
• Strategic assumption 
surfacing and testing 
• Critical systems 
heuristics 
Complex 
• Viable system 
diagnosis 
• General system 
theory 
• Socio-technical 
systems thinking  
• Contingency thinking 
• Interactive planning 
• Soft systems 
methodology 
? ? ? 
 
Figure II-10. Grouping of systems methodologies based upon the assumptions they 
make about problem contexts [From Flood & Jackson, 1991]. 
  
 So where does HSI fit into the SOSM?  Having asserted earlier in Section II-A 
that HSI is based on sociotechnical systems theory, Figure II-10 would imply that HSI is 
most applicable in complex-unitary problem contexts where there are shared values and 
agreement on ends and means.  From a TSI perspective, in problems where this is not the 
case, then another (soft) systems approach is required to first make the problem more 
tractable for HSI.   Likewise, in the case where the problem situation is complex, HSI can 
be applied to make complex-unitary problems simpler, and hence more tractable for hard 
systems approaches such as systems analysis and systems engineering.  In this respect, 
HSI might be considered an enabler of these hard systems methods. 
J. UNDERSTANDING HSI THROUGH TOTAL SYSTEMS 
INTERVENTION 
1. Introduction 
In Chapter I, we discussed the difficulty shared by many HSI practitioners, 
program managers, and engineers in answering the question, “What is HSI, and how 
should it work?”  What now follows is a short case study that illustrates the use of TSI to 
address this very question.  The focus is not on the main features of the method per se, 
but on the outcome in terms of a prototype systems model for “doing” HSI.  Note that 
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this model is not offered as a universal answer to the original question.  Rather, it 
summarizes the understanding gained from the application of soft systems approaches to 
a specific organization’s problem of addressing human performance in systems.  The 
application of soft systems approaches provides the necessary understanding of meanings 
vis-à-vis HSI such that a sensible attempt can be made in subsequent chapters to explore 
applying hard systems approaches to specific aspects of the problem.  Thus, recalling 
Figure II-8, we are in effect choosing one of Pidd’s (2004) suggested relationships 
between hard and soft systems approaches—namely, the right-hand part of the figure 
(reproduced below in Figure II-11) 
 
 




The armed services of the United States, though at core “a military force,” are 
engaged in many research and development programs that entail advancing science and 
technology for the purpose of developing or improving systems crucial to military 
superiority.  In transitioning “ideas to weapons” (Holley, 1953), the historical record 
suggests the need for the armed services to “develop effective systems for integrating the 
advances of science with the military machine” (Holley, 2004, p. 74).  The armed 
services have responded by organizing large military laboratories and technical 
workforces that are responsible for a diverse portfolio of science and technology ranging 
from basic research to advanced technology development.  The latter includes targeted 
research to shape the future battlespace, integrated technology options to satisfy 
identified requirements, and rapid solutions to meet urgent operational needs.   
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Starting in 1997, the United States Air Force has organized for research around 
the Air Force Research Laboratory, which consists of several technology directorates 
such as space vehicles, information, air vehicles, propulsion, directed energy, sensors, 
munitions, and human effectiveness.  The latter directorate is composed of a diverse 
group of scientists and engineers who study developing technologies specific to the 
human element of warfighting capability.  Their portfolio of science and technology 
projects predominately involve human factors engineering and training, and to a lesser 
extent, personnel selection and survivability.  However, as a result of a major 
reorganization in 2005, the lab merged to form the 711th Human Performance (HP) Wing 
by combining its human effectiveness directorate with several external organizational 
entities responsible for aerospace medicine education, training, and consultation; 
occupational and environmental health; and HSI.  This reorganization marked the 
creation of the first human-centric warfare wing to consolidate research, consultation, and 
education within a single organizational entity.  The HP Wing’s stated primary mission 
areas are aerospace medicine, science and technology, and HSI (reference 
http://www.wpafb.af.mil/afrl/711HPW/ accessed September 10, 2009). 
Nearly one year after the organizational merger, the new HP Wing Director sent a 
message to his key managers.  This message aimed to set the tone for the future growth 
and maturation of the HP Wing, and it did so in terms of developing “long term 
integrated Human Performance solutions to UAS [Unmanned Aircraft System] 
challenges including operator screening, selection, training, effectiveness, and other 
human systems integration considerations.”  In the spirit of the organizational culture it 
was trying to create, the message did not spell out exactly how the desired ends were to 
be achieved.  Rather, the Human Performance Integration Directorate (HPID), the HP 
Wing’s HSI function, was charged with developing a new approach to ensure that human 
performance challenges were considered in a more holistic manner. 
Subsequent discussions between the HP Wing Director and HPID managers over 
a short period of time filled in the background to the message.  Following multiple 
consolidations and downsizing of the Air Force laboratories in the 1990s, there was a 
shift in strategic direction away from improving human performance in complex system 
 56
operation by broadly addressing issues in selection, training, and equipment design to 
instead becoming a supplier of “technical solutions” to problems involving human factors 
engineering and training.  This most recent major reorganization had resulted in the 
appointment of new top management, increased staff numbers, expanded expertise, and 
new missions.  These changes imposed considerable demands upon both the HP Wing’s 
management and workforce, and the HP Wing Director felt that the change process was 
far from complete.  
In the volatile environment of UAS (Singer, 2009), the HP Wing had now 
acquired and/or was developing numerous science and technology projects supporting a 
range of stakeholders in the acquisition, training, and operational UAS communities.  
Yet, at the individual project level, the HP Wing’s workforce remained oriented around 
particular domain competencies and pre-merger organizational identities.  The HP Wing 
Director questioned how all their efforts fit together as part of a coherent strategy to 
address the broader range of UAS human performance considerations.  He sought some 
unifying theme for holistically looking at the HP Wing’s contributions that could persist 
as further changes occurred and as different organizational structures evolved.  This 
search led to the idea of managing human performance-related science and technology 
projects using HSI as an embedded business practice.  However, this new conception 
necessarily raised the question, what is HSI and how could HPID be the catalyst for 
organizational change?  What the HPID managers needed was a broad approach to 
examine this problem situation in a way that could lead to decisions on action at the level 
of both “what” and “how.”   
3. Consulting Using Soft Systems Methodology Through TSI 
a. TSI:  Task, Tool, and Outcome 
A consulting project was undertaken in June 2009, at the request of the 
HPID Director.  It was agreed to hold a two-day participatory workshop at the HPID 
office in San Antonio, Texas to explore HPID’s role in diminishing the HP Wing’s 
difficulties addressing human performance in UAS.   Managers from the principle HPID 
divisions as well as those in the organization from the UAS integrated product team were 
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convened for the workshop.  The task was to learn how the HPID team perceived and 
understood their current problem situation.  Given prior discussions with the HPID 
Director, it was determined that the problem context was best characterized as complex-
pluralistic.  Thus, the appropriate tool was soft systems methodology employed through 
TSI.  The expected outcome was a set of recommendations for new ways of 
organizationally addressing HSI in the HP Wing. 
b. Creativity 
Once the HPID team assembled for the first day of the 2-day workshop, 
formal proceedings began with approximately two hours of unstructured but intense 
discussion of the HP Wing and its problems managing UAS-related projects.  By the end 
of the second hour, the energy of the discussion had begun to subside as now-familiar 
complaints were being reexpressed.  At this point, the HPID Director presented his view 
that the workshop should not simply focus on managing the current problem situation but 
should rethink HPID’s role within the HP Wing and refine it.  In effect, he was indicating 
to his managers that he was looking for a fundamental study not constrained to UAS-
related matters.  
The HPID team responded by first formally recording a “finding out” 
phase even though most managers felt they were well steeped in the issues.  They readily 
perceived their overall situation as complex, with no simple, unitary definition of “the 
problem.”  Encouraged to name “problem themes,” the team started with several key 
phrases from the HP Wing Director’s message: 
• “[Those] working on pieces of the UAS effort aren’t talking to each other and 
coordinating efforts when they should be” 
• “Question is [sic] do all the separate actions fit together as part of a coherent 
strategy to address the broad range of human performance considerations” 
• “[Look] at our contributions holistically” 
The HP Wing Director’s expressions of concern had something in common:  they implied 
a need for a planning and organizing function (i.e., a neuro-cybernetic finding).  Two 
other dominant concerns then subsequently emerged.  First, while the HPID team was in 
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agreement over their currently stated mission of “advocating, facilitating and supporting 
the application of HSI principles to optimize operational capabilities,” there was an 
uneasy acknowledgement that they lacked a holistic appreciation of the necessary 
activities within HPID to achieve this purpose (i.e., an organic finding).  Second, the 
HPID team noted that the other HP Wing organizations were essentially nets of semi-
autonomous groups, each consisting of relatively independent professionals exercising 
their professional judgment in addressing what they perceived as unmet human 
performance needs.  Many of these groups corresponded to clusters of experts in the 
human factors engineering (HFE); personnel (P); training (T); and environment, safety 
and occupational health (ESOH) domains of HSI.  It was also evident to the team that 
many, if not most, HP Wing personnel worked in HSI (via one of the domains) but not 
for HSI, which is to say there was no unitary power structure for managing a HSI process 
within the HP Wing (i.e., a neuro-cybernetic and socio-political finding).     
c. Choice 
Given that the problem context was considered complex-pluralist, we 
chose to introduce soft systems methodology (SSM) to the HPID team.  SSM grew out of 
the work by Checkland and colleagues at the University of Lancaster to apply systems 
ideas to tackle “messy” management problems (Checkland, 1981; Checkland & Scholes, 
1990; Checkland, 2000; Checkland & Poulter, 2006).  The basic premise underlying SSM 
is the argument that individuals or groups necessarily attribute meaning to their 
perceptions of the world.  These meanings constitute interpretations of the world (i.e., 
“worldviews”), the latter derived from previously gained experience-based knowledge of 
the world.  Such interpretations inform perceptions and intentions, which can be 
translated into purposeful action.  Once taken, purposeful action changes the experienced 
world and the process repeats.  This argument places knowledge acquisition in a cycle 
that embodies the possibility of learning, in which case purposeful action can be aimed at 
intended improvements.  This process then lends to the idea of formally operating the 
learning cycle so that purposeful action is taken in specific situations to bring about what 
are deemed improvements by those carrying out the process. 
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SSM provides an organized way of approaching problematic situations 
based on this process of inquiry and social learning.  It has evolved to take the form of 
the four-activities model or the inquiring/learning cycle illustrated in Figure II-12.  
Checkland (2000) defines the four activities as follows: 
1) Finding out about a problem situation, including culturally and politically; 
2) Formulating some relevant purposeful activity models, each made to encapsulate 
a declared worldview and comprised of a cluster of linked activities that together 
make up a purposeful whole; 
3) Debating the situation, using the models, seeking from the debate both 
a) changes which would improve the situation and that are regarded as both 
desirable and feasible, and 
b) the accommodations between conflicting interests that will enable action-to-
improve to be taken; 
4) Taking action in the situation to bring about improvement. 
In practice, it has been observed that the latter activities tend to take on one of two foci.  
The first is the original one in which SSM is an action-oriented approach, seeking the 
enabling accommodations necessary for any action-to-improve to be taken.  The second 
more recent focus is on SSM as a sense-making approach in which activity models are 








Conceptual models are used in SSM as intellectual devices for ensuring an 
organized process of inquiry and learning.  Model building begins with the formulation of 
the names of relevant systems, which must be crafted so as to make it possible to 
assemble a logic-based model of the systems named.  These names become “root 
definitions” since they express the core or essence of the perception to be modeled.  All 
root definitions express a purposeful activity in terms of a transformation process, T, in 
which some entity, the “input,” is changed into some new form of the same entity, the 
“output.”  Well-formulated root definitions are prepared by consciously considering the 
elements captured in the mnemonic CATWOE, which stems from the initial letters of the 
following six terms: 
• Customers:  The victims or beneficiaries of T. 
• Actors:  Those who would do T. 
• Transformation process:  The conversion of input to output. 
• Weltanschauung:  The worldview that makes this T meaningful in context. 
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• Owner(s):  Those who could stop T. 
• Environmental constraints:  Elements outside the system that it takes as given. 
The SSM modeling language is based upon verbs (i.e., activities), and the modeling 
process consists of assembling and structuring the minimum necessary number of 
activities to carry out a single transformation process in light of the definitions of the 
CATWOE elements.  These activities are derived by means of a straightforward logic-
based stream of analysis and the heuristic guideline is to aim for 7 ± 2 individual 
activities.  Once enumerated, individual activities are linked together based on whether or 
not they are “contingent upon” or “logically dependent upon” another activity. 
Accordingly, the first model produced by the HPID team represented a 
notional system that directly addressed the HP Wing Director’s stated concerns.  The root 
definition of this system is shown in Figure II-13; Figure II-14 shows the root definition 
and its CATWOE in conventional form.  It was instantly appreciated that this EROS (i.e., 
Environment-Relation-Operation-Support) model was at too high a level of abstraction 
for describing relevant systems.  However, setting the real world expressions of concern 
against this simple concept proved useful in provoking further discussion and insights.  
These insights provided the basis for producing the rich picture (Figure II-15) that served 
as the genesis for a more detailed model of a general (primary issue) system to satisfy 
human performance needs. 
 
 
Figure II-13. A representation of HPID’s role in the HP Wing (as one of the enabling 
support systems, S). 
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Figure II-14. Root definition and CATWOE based on Figure II-13. 
 
 
Figure II-15. Rich picture based on Figure II-14. 
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In the course of producing a rich picture, the HPID team discovered they 
were also building a structural picture of a larger problem situation, which led to yet 
another round of “finding out.”  Aided, no doubt, by the extremely simple nature of the 
EROS model of Figure II-13, the team changed their perceptions to consider the broader 
context of the recently formed HP Wing as a unique Air Force asset for planning and 
developing human performance capabilities. This shift led to consideration of the 
Defense Department’s capabilities-based planning process, often described in terms of 
the DOTMLPF mnemonic {doctrine (D), organization (O), training (T), materiel (M), 
leadership (L), personnel (P) and facilities (F)}, as a relevant wider system, and hence 
another Weltanschauung that should be considered by the team.  If the DOTMLPF 
paradigm defines the solution space for developing new national security capabilities and 
human performance is considered a form for providing such capabilities, how then does 
the EROS model relate to this higher-level system?  In answering this question, the team 
produced Figure II-16, which builds on prior work by the team drafting conceptual 
frameworks for a human performance doctrine (Tvaryanas, Brown, & Miller, 2009). 
 
Figure II-16. Concept for systematically developing human performance-related 
capabilities. 
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The ensuing discussions provoked by Figures II-15 and II-16 enabled 
ideas for a relatively circumscribed number of activities to be agreed upon by the HPID 
team.  These activities, depicted in the conceptual model shown in Figure II-17, described 
a purposeful activity system for meeting human performance needs.  In a period of 
reflection, the team noted that the finding out phase had become very broad and was no 
longer limited to the original UAS-related expressions of concern.  However, this issue 
was not in itself considered problematic as the team now appreciated that the UAS 
problem situation was actually just a specific manifestation of a larger HP Wing problem 
situation.  Nevertheless, the team exercised the model using several UAS-related projects 




Figure II-17. The conceptual model for the root definition in Figure II-14. 
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The conceptual model in Figure II-17 was the first significant model 
produced by the HPID team, and it would prove to be one that raised much concern.  As 
described earlier, the HPID Director desired to gain insight through this systems study 
into the role of HSI within a human performance-generating operation.  However, at the 
start of the workshop, the HPID team was frustrated by its lack of success in articulating 
HSI as a transformational process in the sense of SSM in which “some entity” is 
converted into “that entity in a transformed state.”  The team’s long held model of HSI 
(Figure II-18), which was used often in the past to good effect, envisioned the HSI 
domains as inputs and human performance as an output—not transformed HSI domains 
as SSM would have it.   
 
 
 Figure II-18. Old Human Performance Integration Directorate HSI model. 
 
Stymied in developing a root definition for HSI as a transformation 
process, the team had tabled the debate in favor of letting a description of the HSI process 
emerge from the analysis and model building directed at the HP Wing Director’s 
expressions of concern.  Now, at the end of that phase of the study, the team was 
dismayed to find that HSI was not a specifically named activity in the conceptual model 
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of Figure II-17.  Slowly, the team came to appreciate that HSI, as they now understood it 
in relation to the conceptual model, addressed activities primarily focused on the 
planning and organizing, but not necessarily actually delivering, human performance 
solutions.   
Even with this newfound appreciation, the conceptual model of Figure II-
17 was at too high a level for gaining useful insights into HSI as a set of purposeful 
activities.  The first thought was to expand each of the activities of the first conceptual 
model into an activity model at the next level of resolution.  However, it was quickly 
concluded that this expansion would lead to too much detail and far too many activities 
with the potential for further obscuring the problem situation rather than providing 
clarification.  Taking a more pragmatic approach, the HPID team decided to rank the 13 
core activities in Figure II-17 to determine by consensus the activity they perceived as 
most representative of HSI.  Activity 6 (“Appreciate multi-domain nature of unmet 
needs”), in itself a subsystem, was chosen as the framework for a second cycle of 
analysis and modeling.     
The HPID team decided to approach Activity 6 using the original UAS-
related expressions of concern, but agreed to work towards a broader context for the 
resulting conceptual model.  Within the framework of Activity 6, HSI activities were 
conceptualized as transforming “human performance criteria” to “human performance 
criteria as multi-domain solution sets”—a correctly formulated transformation in the 
sense of SSM.  Figure II-19 shows the concept and root definition (and its CATWOE) in 




Figure II-19. Concept and root definition for Activity 6. 
 
With the prior experience with the EROS model still fresh in memory, the 
HPID team set about placing the real-world UAS-related expressions of concern against 
the very simple transformation depicted in Figure II-19.  The discussion this provoked 
enabled an intense “finding out” phase, which led to the production of a basic structural 
picture of the problem situation (Figure II-20) as well as a rather detailed model of a 




Figure II-20. A rich picture of a system concept for generating human performance 
solutions. 
 
Figure II-21. Activity 6 of Figure II-17 expanded. 
 69
During their iterative elaboration, the system concept and conceptual 
model quickly shed explicit reference to the original UAS-related expressions of concern 
(with the sole exception of the UAS depicted in Figure II-20) in favor of a more 
generalizable system.  Again, this was not considered problematic, particularly since this 
was the team’s conscious intent.  Nevertheless, it was judged prudent to exercise the 
model using several UAS-related projects to ensure that it was logically consistent.   
In carrying out the second methodological cycle, there was an expected 
shift from the level of “what activities to do” to that of “how activities should be carried 
out.”  This shift reflected the transition in the HPID team’s focus of inquiry from the 
original system level to the sub-system level.  The result was a view of HSI that was 
significantly different from that previously held by the HPID team.  This change occurred 
largely because the method used in this study drove the team back to the raison d’être of 
the HP Wing—as a human performance-generating operation—which subsequently led 
to radically different ideas about HPID’s role and constituent activities relative to the 
larger organization.  Initially, the HPID team had been unable to articulate HSI as a 
purposeful set of activities because they first needed to work at the higher levels of 
“why” and “what,” rather than at the structural level, which is about “how.”   This point 
was illustrated poignantly in the systems concept shown emblematically in Figure II-20, 
which begins with “appreciating HP need as capability for skilled work”—a direct 
allusion to the capability paradigm embodied by the wider Defense Department system 
that contains the HP Wing.  This insight was unavailable to the team at the start of the 
workshop. 
Indicative of the HPID team’s changing perceptions was their feeling that 
a more detailed level of analysis was needed for the conceptual model in Figure II-21 and 
some parts of the model in Figure II-17.   However, it was also becoming clear that the 
team was coming to the end of the work that they themselves could do in the workshop.  
The detailed work accomplished up to this point enabled the team to build a preliminary 
account of a refined HPID and to examine logically and in detail the organizational 
changes required by the HP Wing to address the Director’s expressions of concern.  
Reference to a wider audience was now necessary.   
 70
e. Conclusions From the Workshop Example 
By the close of the workshop, the experience of the HPID team with TSI 
and SSM enabled them to sharpen their ideas about problematical issues and to do so 
holistically.  It also introduced them to the idea of making models of purposeful activity 
systems and structuring debate.   This learning was accomplished initially by means of 
the very simple EROS model, which led to more expansive thinking in terms of 
developing human performance capabilities for a wider system.  In turn, this expanded 
thinking enabled insight into the need for a system to provide the environmental context 
for holistically assessing human performance needs and gauging whether or not they are 
met—a key concept for enabling hard systems approaches.  This concept was initially, 
represented in Figure II-13 as the environment (E) supporting the human performance-
generating operations (O).  Later, the conceptual model in Figure II-17 showed 
development of this environmental context as a deliberate and controlled set of activities 
supporting the human performance-generating operations.  This enabling role of a human 
performance doctrine was a particularly novel discovery.  However, it was the conceptual 
model in Figure II-21 that really pointed the team towards a new vision of HPID as a 
proactive support function rather than as a reactive service function.  The difference was 
between, on the one hand, reacting to requests for HSI consultation efficiently and 
effectively, and on the other, proactively supporting the business of human performance-
generation through the planning and organizing activities of management.   
As the HP Wing exists currently, domain-specific scientists develop and 
apply the fundamental theory that supports their domain, in essence determining what can 
be done in terms of generating domain solutions to meet human performance needs.  
These scientists are capable and eager for autonomy in providing solutions in accordance 
with their domain expertise and with a strong focus on their individual clients (and hence 
funding sources).  Yet, based on the Weltanschauung of the HPID team, human 
performance solutions are actually solution sets, as illustrated in Figure II-20, which must 
be described in terms of each of the HSI domains.  By virtue of this Weltanschauung, 
human performance should be considered as emerging from the amalgamation of 
domain-specific theories.  
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In the “more radical” view of HSI that formed from this study, the HPID 
team envisioned their workforce providing the theoretical synthesis across domain sets 
with the more pragmatic aim of satisfying multiple clients.  To do this job, HPID 
personnel would need to understand each of the HSI domains, work effectively with their 
domain colleagues, and know when to bring interdisciplinary teams together to create 
solution sets, design studies, and interpret results.  All together, the methods and concepts 
of SSM (through TSI) significantly improved the HPID team’s understanding of HSI.  
Without a doubt, this case study shows only one convoluted trajectory in understanding 
HSI, of which there probably could be any number.  The details of this consultancy, 
however, offer a general lesson on applying systems methodologies within a TSI 
perspective to move our understanding of HSI from “messes” to interacting issues that 
can be managed.   
K. BRINGING IT ALL TOGETHER 
The discussion up to this point has attempted to tackle the issue of HSI as a 
philosophy or discipline.  We traced the origins of HSI philosophy to the early human 
factors movement, which began in earnest during the Second World War and approached 
the problem of human performance in systems from the reductionist perspective of the 
scientific method.  We then discussed the limitations of this approach in dealing with the 
complexity inherent in the problem, leading to the emergence of the systems-oriented 
disciplines of macroergonomics and HSI based on sociotechnical systems theory and the 
concept of joint optimization of personnel and technological subsystems.   These 
disciplines are distinctly different from the other human factors-related disciplines in that 
there primary focus is a system, and hence they are artifacts of the transition in thinking 
about human performance in systems from the Machine Age to the Systems Age: 
HSI is not “post-modern” human factors; it is the evolution of human 
factors within the context of a larger systems movement that has occurred 
in response to the issue of irreducible complexity. 
 As part of a larger systems movement, HSI provides a systems account of the 
world and a systems approach to its problems.  HSI thinking is, therefore, necessarily 
holistic and embraces the two pairs of ideas that are core to systems thinking in general:  
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emergence and hierarchy, and communication and control.  In turn, the concepts of 
emergence and hierarchy lead to the consideration of human performance in systems as 
an emergent phenomenon that exists within a hierarchy of complexity.  The concepts of 
communication and control drive a dynamic view of human performance from the 
perspective of complex adaptive systems.  A major premise of the systems movement at 
large is that these ideas will enable us to tackle problems that the traditional scientific 
method has found difficult to resolve.  However, much work remains in the human 
factors-related sciences to explore the consequences of this shift to holistic rather than 
reductionist thinking.   
Since sociotechnical systems theory deals with optimization of personnel and 
technological subsystems within an organization, by implication, HSI “lives” relatively 
high in the hierarchy of complexity.  This idea was explored in terms of several systems 
typologies, which made it evident that the task of joint optimization involves the 
integration of very different types of subsystems.  We also considered the implication of 
dealing with problems that emerge relatively high in the hierarchy of complexity.  Such 
problems, referred to as “messes” by Pidd (2003) or “wicked problems” by Rittel and 
Webber (1973), entail evolving sets of interlocking issues and constraints that can be 
managed, but not solved, and for which there are many stakeholders with divergent 
values who must be satisfied.  Such problems often must be tackled using soft systems 
approaches to make them more tractable for hard systems approaches, the latter being the 
tools and methods of systems analysts and systems engineers.  Flood and Jackson (1991) 
provide a meta-methodology (i.e., TSI) that deals with messes by first creatively 
identifying issues to be managed and then choosing and implementing the systems 
method(s) that are best equipped to tackle those issues most effectively.  They provide a 
logical organization of systems methods, which suggests various soft systems approaches 
should first be employed to make problems more tractable for HSI in terms of clarity of 
objectives.  In turn, HSI can then be used to make problems more tractable for hard 
systems approaches by reducing problem complexity. 
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L. AN HSI HYPOTHESIS 
At the opening of this chapter, we looked at several logical definitions of HSI 
based on combinations of the definitions of the three constituent words:  human, 
system(s), and integration.  We later presented a case study in which SSM (through TSI) 
was used to help an organization understand HSI as a purposeful activity.  This study was 
inspired, in no small part, by a similar study conducted by Checkland (1981) in which 
SSM was used to help clarify the theoretical concept of “terotechnology”: 
In the 1970s some of the Government money spent to help improve 
industrial efficiency in the UK was channeled to what are known as the 
‘industrial technologies’.  These were originally conceived as ‘multi-
disciplinary technologies’, applicable to many different industries, whose 
neglect led to economic inefficiency.  In the early 1970s, there were four 
of them:  corrosion technology, tribology, materials handling technology, 
and ‘terotechnology’.  We were asked to help define the latter.  In 1972, 
there was a newly constituted Committee of Terotechnology but no agreed 
definition of the concept.  The Committee set up a Panel…to propose an 
argued definition, indicating exactly what was within the concept and 
what was not…The problem situation was an interesting one in that it was 
entirely arbitrary.  It was not a case of defining and describing something 
which existed in the real world.  Rather the task was to define a concept 
which in the opinion of the Department of Trade and Industry and some 
interested industrialists ought to be taken seriously by anyone concerned 
with the process of generating wealth by industrial activity (p. 202). 
Their officially sanctioned definition of terotechnology follows (for those familiar with 
the Defense Department’s policy guidance on HSI, it is interesting to note a number of 
shared themes between terotechnology and HSI!): 
Terotechnology is a combination of management, financial, engineering, 
and other practices applied to physical assets in pursuit of economic life-
cycle costs.  Its practice is concerned with the specification and design for 
reliability and maintainability of plant, machinery, equipment, buildings 
and structures, with their installation, commissioning, maintenance, 
modification and replacement, and with the feedback of information on 
design, performance and costs (p. 205). 
In the case study of the HP Wing (which also used SSM), we might define HSI, at least 
as it was perceived by the study participants with regards to their processes, as follows: 
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HSI is a system staffed by multi-disciplinary integrated product teams that 
decomposes human performance needs, identified by internal and external 
customers, into HSI domain solution sets for the purpose of strategically 
designing programs of research to systematically explore the entire human 
performance trade space. 
This definition is obviously very different from the HSI definition offered by the National 
Research Council (2007): 
HSI [refers] to the design activities associated with ensuring that the 
human-system domains…are described in concert with all the other design 
activities associated with the systems engineering process, so that the 
resulting designs are truly responsive to the needs, capacities, and 
limitations of the ultimate users of the systems (p. 11). 
We could continue citing or deriving definitions, but such a list would be quite long and 
exhibit a high degree of variability, solving little. 
At the end of the HP Wing SSM case study, I stated that there are likely an 
innumerable set of definitions of HSI that could be elaborated based on one’s 
Weltanschauung, so it is senseless to argue that I have a universal definition.  I have also 
avoided, at least up to this point, enumerating a list of HSI domains, which like 
definitions, appear to vary between organizations.  For example, the Canadian armed 
forces describe five HSI domains, the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense uses six 
domains, and the U.S. Defense Department has seven domains—although some military 
services within the Defense Department list more than seven.  As was discussed 
previously in regards to the division of knowledge into scientific disciplines, the division 
of HSI into domains is necessarily man-made and arbitrary and largely a matter of 
organizational convenience.  So again, I do not argue for an exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive set of HSI domains.  Rather, I will simply declare my Weltanschauung as that 
of the Defense Department, and in so doing, I will accept their arbitrary set of seven HSI 
domains as listed in DoD Instruction 5000.02 (2008):  human factors engineering, 
personnel, habitability, manpower,  training, safety and occupational health, and 
survivability.   
Now, instead of proceeding directly to a definition, I start with the concept of the 
prime directive.   Hitchins (1992) asserts that the prime directive, which is the highest 
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level of abstract, objective statement of a system’s purpose, is central to the idea of 
conceiving systems.  He suggests four features that characterize a good prime directive:  
highest level of abstraction, ultimate purpose, sphere of endeavor, and solution 
transparency.  Accordingly, I offer the following prime directive for an HSI system: 
To produce sustained system performance that is humanly, 
technologically, and economically feasible. 
While terse, this prime directive succinctly expresses the raison d’être, the limits of 
action, and the sphere of activity of HSI.  It does not over-specify; “produce” is vague yet 
entirely sufficient for purpose and there is no hint of solution in the prime directive’s 
wording.  According to the Defense Department Weltanschauung, HSI must ensure that 
the technological subsystem can accommodate the characteristics of the people in the 
personnel subsystem.  It also should drive towards the most cost-effective solution in 
terms of life-cycle costs (DoD, 2008).  These two notions are both Defense Department 
mandates for HSI as well as constraints on the potential solution space.  Additionally, 
they are both called out specifically in the HSI prime directive, making our approach to 
HSI commensurable with official Defense Department policy.   
 Given the HSI prime directive, it is possible to proceed by semantic analysis to a 
supporting definition of HSI.  Semantic analysis is a straightforward process in which 
each word in a statement, in this case the HSI prime directive, is examined and expanded 
to extract all meaning that it might contain, whether stated or implied.  In so doing, and 
with an implicit reference to sociotechnical systems theory, we arrive at the following 
definition of HSI: 
HSI is a philosophy applied to personnel and technological subsystems 
within organizations in pursuit of their joint optimization in terms of 
maximally satisfying organizational objectives at minimum life cycle cost.  
Its practice is concerned with the specification and design for reliability, 
availability, and maintainability of both the personnel and technological 
subsystems over their envisioned life cycle.   
This definition expands our understanding of the prime directive by providing increased 
discrimination with regards to our strategy for its achievement.  The major new insights 
include: 
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1) HSI is a philosophy concerned with the joint optimization of the personnel and 
technological subsystems (i.e., sociotechnical systems theory) comprising some 
system-of-interest (SOI).  These subsystems are being optimized with regard to 
some emergent property, which can only be observed from the level of the SOI’s 
containing system (Figure II-22).  The personnel subsystem is generally the 
province of human resources management and the technological subsystem is 
often the realm of some type of technical or engineering management.  
Consequently, the layer of organizational management within the containing 
system with cognizance over both the human resources and technical managers is 
the appropriate entity to address joint optimization, and hence HSI. 
 
 
Figure II-22. Personnel and technological subsystems comprising system-of-interest 
(SOI) as viewed from that SOI’s containing system. 
 
2) HSI must continuously address the issue of the sustained performance of a SOI 
over its life.  Organizations operate systems to perform functions required to 
achieve objectives that are believed to further organizational goals.  HSI, through 
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joint optimization, is concerned with the properties and interactions of the 
personnel and technological subsystems such that the emergent properties of the 
SOI meet the objectives specified by those in the containing system.  Usually, 
organizations desire that these emergent properties are maintained through time—
they want the system to work today, tomorrow, and possibly the next year, 
decade, etc.  Given the concept of joint causation, HSI must then be concerned 
with changes in the SOI’s environment and corresponding adaptive changes to its 
subsystems (recall the earlier discussion on complex adaptive systems).   Hence, 
joint optimization may be short lived, necessitating that the issue be continuously 
managed rather than definitively solved.  Recall the prior discussion of wicked 
problems! 
3) The focus on sustained performance naturally leads to a concern with designing 
for operational feasibility, meaning that the system will perform as intended in an 
effective and efficient manner (Blanchard & Fabrychy, 2006).  In terms of the 
technological subsystem, this concern includes such design dependent parameters 
as reliability, availability, and maintainability.  Note, however, that our HSI 
definition extends these same concepts to the personnel subsystem.  It remains to 
be shown how this extension can be done, and we will begin to address this task 
in Chapter V starting with reliability.  Nevertheless, in applying these concepts to 
both subsystems, it then becomes possible to examine their joint optimization 
within the SOI using a common set of constructs.   
4) HSI can be viewed from both a local or global perspective.  For example, 
consider Figure II-23, depicting a SOI and three sibling systems, each consisting 
of a personnel subsystem and a technological subsystem.  The SOI and sibling 
systems, in turn, are components of a larger containing system (this is simply 
another example of a hierarchy of complexity).  Assuming a local HSI 
perspective, we would seek the joint optimization of the personnel and 
technological subsystems within the SOI, thereby increasing the SOI’s 
effectiveness and contributing positively to the containing system’s objectives.  
This view is the traditional approach to HSI as it is applied in a large Defense 
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Department weapon system acquisition.  Now, let us assume that the SOI and its 
sibling systems must share a common personnel resource pool.  It is possible in 
optimizing the SOI to have unintended downstream effects on the personnel 
subsystems of the sibling systems.  These downstream effects could result in 
decreased effectiveness of the sibling systems.  In aggregate, optimizing the SOI 
may actually result in a net negative contribution towards achieving the 
containing system’s objective!  Such a scenario illustrates the need to also 
consider a global HSI perspective.   
 
 
Figure II-23  A family of interacting systems, to include a system-of-interest and its 
sibling systems, all existing within the environment provided by the containing system. 
 
These two perspectives, local and global, differ both in their level of focus within 
the hierarchy of systems and their metrics for assessing the worth of systems.  The local 
perspective lends itself to optimizing the SOI in terms of effectiveness, which addresses 
the question, “Which of the proposed solutions is best?”  In contrast, the global 
perspective addresses net contribution, which asks the question, “How do the emergent 
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properties of the SOI contribute to its containing system?”  The global perspective, being 
based on net contribution, offers the following advantage: 
If all systems were evaluated correctly using Net Contribution, and only 
net positive solutions accepted, then—owing to the recursive nature of the 
technique, a hierarchy of net positive systems contained within next 
positive systems must develop. Thus, Net Contribution presents a high 
degree of implicit integrity in its effects on environment, its use of 
resource and its development of effective, enduring systems (Hitchins, 
1992, p. 109). 
However, these benefits come at the cost of greatly increased complexity in the process 
of evaluating options.  Fortunately, our definition of HSI allows either perspective!   
M. FINAL THOUGHTS 
 As the title states, this chapter provides a brief introduction into an admittedly 
rudimentary HSI philosophy, a topic that has yet to receive substantive treatment 
elsewhere.  In suggesting the notion of a HSI philosophy, there is the implicit assumption 
that the subject of “HSI” aspires to the status of a serious discipline.  It is probably fair at 
this point in time to characterize HSI, at best, as an emerging discipline.  Accordingly, 
this chapter has attempted to bring together the views and concepts from a variety of 
systems thinkers and present a new set of ideas for perceiving, understanding, and 
analyzing problems from a unique HSI Weltanschauung.  This attempt has a bold aim 
and it is difficult to prove or disprove any of the contentions presented, which is why, in 
the end, an HSI hypothesis is offered rather than a theory.  It is open to criticism on that 
score, but hopefully in the process, it advances thinking on the nature of HSI as a 
discipline. 
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III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE EMERGENCE OF THE DEFENSE 
DEPARTMENT’S HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION 
PROGRAM 
Edward Luttwak’s study on specialized light units pointed out that while 
the armies of America’s allies tended to be “equipment constrained,” the 
U.S. Army was more “manpower constrained” (Romjue, 1993, p. 27). 
 
A. PHILOSOPHY VS. PROGRAM 
In Chapter II, we considered human systems integration (HSI) as a philosophy 
that emerged as a result of the limitations of traditional science in dealing with the 
complexity of human performance in systems.  The general intent was to provide some 
insight into how one might think broadly about HSI as a philosophy absent the baggage 
of its programmatic instantiation in the real world.  Such a statement necessarily implies 
that there is a distinction between HSI as a “philosophy” versus a “program” (Booher, 
1990, pp. 3–5).  HSI philosophy can be applied to any purposeful human activity; hence, 
it is organizationally agnostic.  In contrast, HSI programs apply to specific organizations 
and are tailored to their individual ways of doing business.  For example, the Defense 
Department’s HSI program applies only to the Defense Department.  However, the 
Defense Department’s HSI program, as the first large-scale programmatic instantiation of 
HSI philosophy, has become a relative benchmark for discussions of the topic of HSI at 
large.  This assertion is supported by Deal’s (2007) observation that many HSI definitions 
are traceable to Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction 5000.2.  Thus, the historical 
analysis which follows provides an ancillary but indispensable explanation of the concept 
of HSI as it came to exist within the U.S. military. 
B. SOME CONTEXT 
1. American Post-World War II Political Culture  
 The idea of building military systems to optimize the collective performance of 
the soldier and their weapon is not new.  Wu Ch’i (430 – 381 B.C.), a recognized expert 
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on warfare whose name is frequently associated with Sun Tzu, author of The Art of War, 
is reported to have declared to the Marquis (i.e., nobleman) Wen of Wei (Sun Tzu, 1963): 
At present, My Lord, during the four seasons you cause animals to be 
skinned and lacquer their hides and paint them vermilion and blue.  You 
brilliantly decorate them with rhinoceros horn and ivory. 
If you wear these in the winter you are not warm, and in the summer, not 
cool.  You make spears twenty-four feet long and short halberds of half 
this length.  You cover the wheels and doors of chariots with leather; they 
are not pleasing to the eyes, and when used for hunting they are not light.   
I do not comprehend how you, My Lord, propose to use them.   
If these are made ready for offensive or defensive war and you do not seek 
men able to use such equipment it would be like chickens fighting a fox, 
or puppies which attack a tiger.  Though they have fighting hearts, they 
will perish (pp. 151–152).  
This quote demonstrates that concern for integrating soldier and weapon was by no 
means a unique phenomenon of the 20th century.  However, the cognizance of a 
“man/machine interface crisis” by senior military leaders in the 1980s, coupled with a 
wider organizational sense of urgency to systematically address the issue, culminating in 
major organizational change in the form of a Defense Department HSI program could be 
reasonably characterized as a unique phenomenon within the annals of military history.  
If we wish to then study this phenomenon, which is now one of history, we must accept a 
priori that we will not be able to do so in an entirely objective manner.  As mentioned in 
an earlier chapter, Popper (1957) asserts that the best we can hope to accomplish is to 
write a history that is consistent with a particular point of view.  Thus, Popper would 
have us, if possible, clearly articulate the point of view we are choosing.  Accordingly, 
our intent is to sketch an analysis that provides an explanation for the development of a 
Defense Department HSI program in terms of America’s post-World War II political 
culture and the resulting linkage between U.S. foreign policy, military strategy, and high 
technology.   
 We begin by looking at the work of Paul Edwards (1988, 1996) who proposed a 
cultural and historical accounting for the U.S. military’s fascination with computing.  In 
what follows, we borrow heavily from Edwards’ work, expanding his premise from 
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computers to more broadly considering technology (computers being ubiquitous in 
modern technology).  Edwards (1988) asserts that it is not possible to analyze the 
military’s technological choices without an understanding of the larger political context 
and vice versa: 
Thus the worldview of military institutions and their technological choices 
are bound up.  In other words, the tasks assigned to the U.S. military by 
the political process determine the types and quantities of technology it 
develops and deploys.  But, at the same time, the available technologies 
also affect which assignments it believes itself ready to accept [emphasis 
in original] (p. 247).   
Hence, if technological choices led to soldier and weapon integration problems in the 
1980s, we must set about seeking to understand the prevailing political situation at the 
time.   Accordingly, we next consider several key elements of the post-World War II U.S. 
political culture that Edwards ascribes as shaping the worldview of the American 
military.  These elements are 1) the apocalyptic struggle with the former Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, 2) the long history of antimilitarist sentiment in American politics, 
and 3) the rise of technology-based military power (Edwards, 1988, p. 245).   
 In the collective American psyche, World War II was a “good war” that was 
fought against nationalist aggressors and the antidemocratic fascist ideology, a fact that 
was only reinforced by postwar revelations of Nazi atrocities.  Given postwar Soviet 
maneuvering in Eastern Europe and the openly expansionist Soviet ideology, the 
American sense of a Biblical struggle between good and evil did not simply fade away 
after the war.  Instead, it underwent transference with Stalin being equated to Hitler and 
communism replacing fascism as a total enemy, thereby facilitating the transition into the 
Cold War (Figure III-1).  This transference also carried with it the World War II sense of 
conflict on a global and total scale.  The Truman Doctrine of containment and worldwide 
American military support for “free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by 
armed minorities or by outside pressures” (Harry Truman as quoted in Compston & 
Seidman, 2003, p. 194) codified the continuation of global conflict more or less on a 
permanent basis.  However, the U.S., at the time having only recently emerged from the 
economic depression and political isolationism of the 1930s, had no immediately 
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available models for its new global role other than those of World War II itself.  
Consequently, the key events of World War II became basic icons in the organization of 
American Cold War foreign policy and military strategy, from Munich (the danger of 
appeasement) to Pearl Harbor (always be prepared for surprise attack) to Hiroshima 
(victory through technologies of overwhelming force).  Thus, Edwards asserts that the 
Cold War was not a new conflict with communism, but rather, it was a continuation of 
the American experience with the apocalyptic struggle of World War II, only projected 
onto a different enemy (Edwards, 1988, pp. 247–248).2 
 
                                                 
2 A nice illustration of this element of Edwards’ thesis is provided in Robert McNamara’s memoir, In 
Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (1995).  In his recounting of the deliberations leading up 
to the 1965 decision to escalate U.S. involvement in Vietnam, McNamara wrote: 
…I want to quote [Secretary of State David Dean Rusk’s] exact words, because his view—that if 
we lost South Vietnam, we increased the risk of World War III—influenced others of us to 
varying degrees as well. [Dean] wrote: 
The integrity of the U.S. commitment is the principal pillar of peace throughout the 
world.  If that commitment becomes unreliable, the communist world would draw 
conclusions that would lead to our ruin and almost certainly to a catastrophic war.  
So long as the South Vietnamese are prepared to fight for themselves, we cannot 
abandon them without disaster to peace and to our interests throughout the world. 
The reader may find it incomprehensible that Dean foresaw such dire consequences from 
the fall of South Vietnam, but I cannot overstate the impact our generation’s experiences had on 
him (and, more or less, on all of us).  We had lived through appeasement at Munich; years of 
military service during World War II fighting aggression in Europe and Asia; the Soviet 
takeover of Eastern Europe…(p. 195). 
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Figure III-1. Drawing by the British cartoonist Leslie Illingworth, published in June 
1947, depicting the threatening reach of Stalin and the spread of the communist ideology 
in postwar Europe.  
 
   The second element of the postwar cultural situation was America’s long history 
of antimilitarism.  By antimilitarism, Edwards does not mean to imply pacifism or 
objection to armed force itself, but rather an “anti-power ethic” that strongly values limits 
on political power, hierarchy, and authority.  As a result of their colonial experience with 
large garrisoning European armies, early generations of Americans understood both the 
importance of military power in international conflict and the dangers it posed in 
domestic political life.  Prior to World War II, what American society strongly sought to 
avoid was not so much war itself as the permanent presence of a powerful national 
military institution (Figure III-2).  However, the U.S. military success in World War II, 
the occupation of Germany and Japan, the smooth transition to the Cold War, and the 
U.S. emergence from the war relatively unscathed as a world power all contributed to a 
rapidly changing perception among the American populace of the need for a large 
military force.  Additionally, technological factors such as atomic weapons and the 
maturation of air warfare created the possibility for a U.S. sphere of influence that 
extended well beyond North America.  Consequently, the Cold War marked the first time 
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in its history that the U.S. maintained a vigorous military presence in peacetime.  Even 
so, the longstanding American tradition of antimilitarism ensured that the form of this 
military force was different from the more traditional European and Soviet approaches 
that relied on large numbers of men under arms (Edwards, 1988, pp. 248–249).   
 
 
Figure III-2. Typical antimilitarism cartoon from 1914 (source unknown). 
  
 The third element of the postwar political and cultural situation was the rise of 
science-based military power.  At the end of World War II, science and engineering were 
widely viewed as being largely, in not entirely, responsible for the ultimate Allied 
victory.  The crowning technological achievement of the war, the atomic bomb, 
represented nothing less than the military apotheosis of science.  During the war, 
engineering academies like the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the California 
Institute of Technology played major roles in the war effort, thereby increasing their base 
of political power and prestige.  Their scientists and engineers, embracing the American 
tradition of pragmatic enterprise, showed that they could create impressive weapons 
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when given virtually unlimited resources.  Consequently, the postwar period saw the 
emergence of a powerful and self-conscious science and engineering lobby and a 
permanent governmental association with science, largely mediated through the military 
services.  The postwar scientific community therefore enjoyed an unprecedented sense of 
community, and its wartime miracles had won them patrons among the political and 
military leadership (Figure III-3) (Edwards, 1988, p. 249).3   
 
 
Figure III-3. Time magazine cover from April 1957 celebrating two visionary scientist-
engineers, Dean Woolridge and Simon Ramo, who are widely credited with introducing 
the high-technology, science-based, systems-oriented management approach (Hughes 
1998).   
  
 According to Edwards, these three key elements of post-World War II U.S. 
political culture contributed to the sense of the world as a closed system accessible to 
American technological control.  In particular, the postwar partitioning of Europe created 
the sense for most Americans that the world was now closed, being fully occupied by the 
                                                 
3 Again, an illustration of another element of Edwards’ thesis is provided in Robert McNamara’s 
(1995) memoir.  In recounting the members of the “Wise Men,” an informal group called together by 
President Johnson to provide council on the Vietnam War, McNamara describes “distinguished Harvard 
chemist George Kistiakowsky” as personifying “the interrelationship of science and politics in the nuclear 
era” (p. 196).  
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apocalyptic struggle between the American and Soviet superpowers (Figure III-4).  
Moreover, under the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the world had become a 
system to be protected and manipulated by the U.S. government.  As a result, the 
demonstrated ability of science and engineering during World War II, and the global 
nature of the conflict with the Soviet Union, served to both justify and exaggerate the 
U.S. focus on high technology.  The U.S. experience with the atomic bomb during World 
War II held out the promise of unlimited military power through American technological 
ingenuity.  Simultaneously, the policy of containment required an ability to intervene 
with military force anywhere on the globe.  In addition, the American tradition of 
antimilitarism further focused strategic planning on technological solutions as evidenced 
by the Strategic Air Command, which rose to prominence exactly because it required 




Figure III-4. Drawing by the British cartoonist Leslie Illingworth, published in May 
1950, depicting a partitioned globe and emerging communist threats all over the world. 
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2. Technological Determinism  
 Thus, the rapidly evolving postwar geopolitical concerns of the U.S. as a world 
power shaped a strategic discourse centered on high technology.  Such was the situation 
described by Edwards (1996): 
The primary weapons of the Cold War were ideologies, alliances, 
advisors, foreign aid, national prestige—and above and behind them all, 
the juggernaut of high technology [emphasis added]…Of all the 
technologies built to fight the Cold War, digital computers have become 
its most ubiquitous, and perhaps its most important, legacy.  Yet few have 
realized the degree to which computers created the technological 
possibility of the Cold War and shaped its political atmosphere, and 
virtually no one has recognized how profoundly the Cold War shaped 
computer technology.  Its politics became embedded in the machines—
even, at times, in their technical design—while the machines helped make 
possible its politics (p. ix). 
Implicit within this strategic discourse was the assumption that superior technology and 
weaponry would be a guarantor of combat success.  Watts (1996), in his discussion of the 
basic relationships between doctrine, technology, and war within the domain of air 
warfare, describes this “hypothesis that technically superior hardware often or always 
guarantees success in combat [emphasis in original]” as “technological determinism” (p. 
10).   
 So what is the problem with technological determinism?  As noted by retired 
Major General Irving Holley (2004), a respected authority on military innovation, there is 
the unpleasant fact that technological determinism is not a sufficient cause for military 
success: 
…the thesis that superior arms favor victory, while essential, [is] 
insufficient unless the “superior arms” are accompanied by a military 
doctrine of strategic or tactical application that provides for full 
exploitation of the innovation.  But even doctrine is inadequate without an 
organization to administer the tasks involved in selecting, testing, and 
evaluating “inventions.” The history of weapons in the United States is 
filled with evidence on this point (p. 70).   
Hence, Holley cautions that the hypothesis inherent in technological determinism is only 
potentially true when superior institutional weapon system acquisition practices yield 
 92
innovative technologies that are wed to thoughtful doctrine.  So what can be said about 
the history of the U.S. Army from 1965–1985 in regards to Holley’s concepts and ideas?  
Was a general institutional concern with technological superiority, if not outright 
technological determinism, a characteristic of the U.S. Army during this period?  
Answering such questions is of some importance in formulating a historical perspective 
of the emergence of the Army’s MANPRINT program, which was the progenitor of the 
Defense Department’s HSI program.   Toward that end, it is necessary to consider the 
design and development of the Army of Excellence in the 1980s, which itself was the 
culmination of a massive tactical reorganization of the Army that created, in large part, 
the necessary preconditions for the historic emergence of the Army’s MANPRINT 
program.   
3. The Evolution of the Army of Excellence  
 In the midst of the first large scale troop reductions of  the Vietnam War in 1969, 
the Nixon administration announced their “Guam Doctrine,” which attempted to scale 
back the defense establishment with the objective of being able to fight  a “1½” war 
contingency.  This new doctrine was interpreted to mean that the Army should prepare to 
engage in a general war, likely in the European theater, and in a minor conflict, 
presumably a third world counterinsurgency.  However, Nixon’s vision for a smaller 
Army quickly faced growing challenges.  U.S. intelligence agencies in the early 1970s 
observed that the Soviets were both modernizing and enlarging their armored forces in 
Europe and were stationing these forces ever further westward.  Richard Stewart (2005) 
provides a somewhat more stark assessment of the perceived strategic reality of the time 
in his history, The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917–2003: 
If general war had come to Europe during the 1970s, the U.S. Army and 
its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies would have 
confronted Warsaw Pact armies that were both numerically and 
qualitatively superior.  With the Army mired down in Vietnam, and with 
modernization postponed, this was a very sobering prospect (p. 377). 
Additionally, the Arab-Israeli War in October 1973 was a watershed event for military 
planners.  It vividly highlighted the increased battle tempo and materiel lethality of 
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modern war and called into question the Army’s Vietnam-era concentration on infantry-
airmobile warfare at the expense of other forces (Stewart, 2005): 
American observers who toured the battlefields of Egypt and Syria began 
to create a new tactical vocabulary when they reported on the “new 
lethality” of a Middle Eastern battlefield where in one month of fighting, 
the Israeli, Syrian, and Egyptian armies lost more tanks and artillery than 
the entire U.S Army, Europe, possessed.  Improved technology in the form 
of antitank and antiaircraft guided missiles, much more sophisticated and 
accurate fire-control systems, and vastly improved tank cannons heralded 
a far more costly and lethal future for conventional warfare. […] It seemed 
clear that in future wars American forces would fight powerful and well-
equipped armies with soldiers proficient in the use of extremely deadly 
weapons.  Such fighting would consume large numbers of men and 
quantities of material.  If became imperative for the Army to devise a way 
to win any future war quickly (pp. 377–378). 
With many in the Army at the time concerned that they could not presently fight this type 
of new war, the Army set course on a decade of modernization and reform (Stewart, 
2005, pp. 377–378).  
 John Romjue (1993), in writing the official history of the Army of Excellence for 
the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) historical monograph series,  
calls out the “central importance” of “the personal push and stamp given to the Army’s 
structural modernization and reform by Army Chiefs of Staff of the era, in particular 
General Edward C. Meyer (1979–1983) and General John A. Wickman, Jr. (1983–1987), 
as a well as by the early TRADOC commanders, General William E. DePuy (1973–
1977), Donn A. Starry (1977–1981),…and William R. Richardson (1983–1986)” (p. 2).   
Accordingly, we will follow the story of the Army of Excellence largely through these 
“personal pushes and stamps.”  Much of this story comes from Romjue’s excellent 
history on the subject.   
It is worthwhile to take a moment to provide a short primer for those, like your 
author, who are not familiar with U.S. Army tactical organization.  Since World War I, 
the basic ground unit in the Army, capable of sustained independent action, is the 
division.  For that reason, the division has been the focus of tactical organization in the 
Army.  Division structures are periodically redesigned as a result of their perceived 
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obsolescence in the face of anticipated conditions of future battle.  Over the last century, 
each redesign has involved a progressively increasing application of technology to the 
division, due in part to the following:  1) the increasing mechanization of the fighting 
force, and 2) the extension of technology into virtually all the division’s combat and 
support functions.  One design of particular note to our story is the ROAD (for 
Reorganization Objective, Army Division) division, a 15,500-man structure consisting of 
a common division base and three maneuver brigade headquarters to which maneuver 
battalions—infantry, armored, mechanized infantry, airborne, or airmobile—were 
flexibly attached.  The ROAD division was implemented between 1962 and 1964.  Thus 
it was with the ROAD division that the Army went to war in Vietnam in 1965, and it was 
the ROAD division that formed the ground defense of Europe throughout the middle 
decades of the Cold War (Romjue, 1993, pp. 4–6).   
   With that background, we now introduce the first major protagonist of the story, 
General William E. DePuy, who from 1973 to 1977, was the first commander of the 
newly established U.S. Army TRADOC.  General DePuy, an infantry officer in World 
War II and commander of the 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam, surveyed conditions on 
the modern battlefield and observed many of the same lessons that he and his men had 
learned painfully in World War II.  Convinced that advances in weaponry were driving a 
tactical revolution in ground warfare that rendered the ROAD division obsolete, DePuy 
set in motion in 1976 a restructuring study of the heavy division.  A major concern 
driving DePuy’s thinking was that the volume and array of firepower now available to the 
company commander had exceeded manageable quantities.  Additionally, he believed if 
the Army was to best exploit new weapons, organizational structures needed to be built 
around these new weapons rather than grafting new weapons onto existing organizational 
structures.  Accordingly, the Division Restructuring Study (DRS) was carried out by 
TRADOC headquarters between May and July 1976 by a small group under DePuy.  
DePuy constrained the DRS to focus only on armored and mechanized infantry (i.e., 
heavy) divisions.  The resulting proposed 17,800-man DRS heavy divisions featured 
significant changes to include smaller companies and smaller but more numerous 
maneuver battalions.  The DRS heavy division was approved for testing in the 1st Calvary 
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Division at Fort Hood, Texas with favorable results, but ultimately, the DRS heavy 
division did not survive.  Doubts arose in the Army Staff and elsewhere about the smaller 
units, the brigades’ increased span of control, and other features.  When DePuy’s 
successor, General Donn A. Starry assumed command at TRADOC in July 1977, he 
expressed doubts that essentially sealed the demise of the DRS heavy division (Romjue, 
1993, p. 8).  
 General Starry, a noted cavalry leader in Vietnam and a soldier-scholar, arrived at 
TRADOC straight from command of the V Corps in Germany, where he had the 
opportunity to develop a firsthand appreciation of the Soviet’s overwhelming forces.  
Under Starry, TRADOC began a comprehensive reorganizational effort, Army 86, which 
continued and extended the aim of the Division Restructuring Study work.  This effort 
was initiated with the Division 86 Study in August 1978, which, like the DRS, focused on 
the heavy division—the element of the fighting Army critical to the primary strategic 
theater in central Europe.  Unlike his predecessor, General DePuy, who structured his 
DRS heavy division specifically upon new weapon systems, General Starry took a 
systems engineering approach to the division problem (Romjue, 1993): 
Starry’s whole approach was ‘a systematic breakdown into the division’s 
specific tasks and subfunctions and then a reconstruction into a coherent 
whole or division capability.’  What he wanted division designers to do 
was to leave behind parochial branch approaches to battles and to see their 
challenge instead in terms of the major functions that he believed 
characterized modern battle (p. 9).   
Out of his V Corps experience and his functional vision came the concept of “seeing 
deep” to the enemy’s follow-on echelons, which led to a doctrinal focus on deep attack to 
disrupt the enemy’s second echelon forces—what eventually became known as AirLand 
Battle (Romjue, 1993, p. 9). 
 Having just mentioned AirLand Battle, we now consider a parallel thread in this 
story—one involving the same protagonists, but focused instead on the evolution of 
corresponding operational concepts.  In the immediate post-Vietnam era, the emphasis of 
Army planning refocused on large scale conventional war in Europe (Stewart, 2005): 
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Generals Abrams and DePuy and like-minded officers believed the 
greatest hazard, if not the greatest probability of war, existed [in Europe].  
They conceived of an intense armored battle, reminiscent of World War II, 
to be fought in the European theater.  If the Army could fight the most 
intense battle possible, some argued, it also had the ability to fight wars of 
lesser magnitude (p. 387).   
This focus on conventional war in Europe necessitated a change from the doctrine that 
prevailed during the middle decades of the protracted Cold War.  A new operations field 
manual is the method by which the Army promulgates and codifies its latest doctrine.  
General DePuy began a post-Vietnam doctrinal renaissance by rewriting much of the 
1976 edition of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, the Army’s central doctrinal 
publication.  DePuy’s FM 100-5 touted the concept of Active Defense, which once more 
focused on the primacy of defense.  It emphasized the importance of the tank as the 
pivotal element of land forces, promoted concentration of fires rather than forces, and 
advocated for the replacement of tactical reserves with the lateral movement of 
unengaged units behind strong covering fires.  Such a radical departure from earlier 
doctrine proved both controversial and difficult to implement at the time, leading to an 
extended doctrinal and tactical discussion in the service journals that served to clarify and 
occasionally modify the manual (Stewart, 2005, pp. 378–379).   
When General Starry succeeded DePuy at TRADOC, he directed a substantial 
revision of FM 100-5 to concentrate on the offensive and stress aggressive operations in 
depth with an increased emphasis on the exploitation of tactical air power—a concept 
that became known as AirLand Battle doctrine.  The major shift in Army doctrine was 
officially signaled by the publication of the 1982 edition of FM 100-5, which documented 
the changeover from Active Defense to AirLand Battle.  The manual stressed that the 
Army had to “fight outnumbered and win” the first battle of the next war, an imperative 
that, in turn, required a trained and ready peacetime force.  It acknowledged the 
preeminence of the armored battle in warfare and the tank as the single most important 
weapon in the Army’s arsenal.  The manual also embraced the traditional concepts of 
maneuver warfare as the means for achieving success on the field of battle.  More 
importantly, as described by Stewart (2005), AirLand Battle doctrine: 
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…explicitly acknowledged the growth of technology both as a threat and 
as a requirement for new equipment to meet the threat.  The U.S. Army 
and its NATO allies could not hope to match Soviet and Warsaw Pact 
forces either in masses of manpower or in floods of materials.  To that 
extent, AirLand Battle served as a basis for both an organizational strategy 
and a procurement rationale.  To fight outnumbered and survive, the Army 
needed to better employ the nation’s qualitative edge in technology (p. 
379). 
Thus, AirLand Battle doctrine proved useful to the Army because it helped both define 
the proper weapon systems for its execution and the appropriate organization of military 
units for battle (Stewart, 2005, p. 379).  
 The primary justification for technologically superior weapons came from the 
military theorists of the time who generally believed that a defending army could 
reasonably expect success if an attacking army had no greater than a 3:1 advantage in 
combat power.  The problem for the U.S Army was that the best intelligence estimates in 
the 1970s gave the Soviets an advantage that was significantly greater than 3:1.  
Moreover, continuing budget constraints made the option of increasing the size of the 
U.S. military to match Soviet growth untenable.  Consequently, the Army looked to solve 
this problem by relying on superior technology that, it was hoped, would allow the Army 
to defeat an enemy at ratios higher than 1:3.  To that end, in the early 1970s, the Army 
began work on its “big five” weapon systems:  a new tank (the M1 Abrams tank), a new 
infantry combat vehicle (the M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle), a new attack 
helicopter (the AH-64A Apache attack helicopter), a new transport helicopter (the UH-
60A Black Hawk utility helicopter), and a new antiaircraft missile (the Patriot air defense 
missile).  However, these were by no means the only significant equipment 
modernization programs.  Other important Army procurements included the multiple 
launch rocket system; a new generation of tube artillery to upgrade fire support; 
improved small arms; tactical-wheeled vehicles such as a new 5-ton truck and utility 
vehicle (the high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle, or HMMWV); and a family of 
new  command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) systems (Stewart, 2005, 
pp. 379–384).   
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 The coincidence of several factors had significant effects on the design of these 
new weapon systems.  Stewart (2005) describes some of the more important factors: 
Among the most important was the flourishing technology encouraged by 
the pure and applied research associated with the space programs.  
Although the big five [weapon systems] originated in the years before 
AirLand Battle was first enunciated, that doctrine quickly had its effect on 
design criteria.  Other factors were speed, survivability, and good 
communications, essential to economize on small forces and give them the 
advantages they required to defeat larger, but presumably more ponderous, 
enemies.  Target acquisition and fire control were equally important since 
the success of a numerically inferior force depended heavily on the ability 
to score first-hit rounds (p. 380).   
Despite the clear future vision provided by AirLand Battle, the complexity of the space 
age technologies and the conflicting nature of many of the doctrinally relevant design 
criteria made it difficult for the Army to bring system concepts to fruition (Stewart, 
2005): 
Even such simply stated criteria were not easy to achieve, with 
compromises and trade-offs often necessary between weight, speed, and 
survivability.  All of the weapon programs suffered through years of 
mounting costs and production delays.  A debate that was at once 
philosophical and fiscal raged around the new [weapon systems], with 
some critics preferring simpler and cheaper [systems] fielded in greater 
quantities.  The Department of Defense persevered, however, in its 
preference for technologically superior systems and managed to retain 
funding for most of the proposed new weapons.  Weapon systems were 
expensive, but defense analysts recognized that personnel costs were even 
higher and pointed out that the services could not afford the manpower to 
operate increased numbers of simpler weapons.  Nevertheless, spectacular 
procurement failures, such as the Sergeant York Division Air Defense 
(DIVAD) weapon, kept the issue before the public; such cases kept 
program funding for other equally complex weapons on the debate agenda 
(p. 380).  
Nevertheless, a close relationship between doctrine and technology swiftly developed.  
Weapon system modernization led doctrinal thinkers to consider even more ambitious 
concepts that would exploit the potential capabilities the new systems promised (Stewart, 
2005, p. 385).   
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 While General Starry directed development of doctrinal concepts that would take 
advantage of the increased combat power of the new materiel systems that were 
becoming available, he also focused on designing the organizations that could exploit 
them—and hence, the segue back to our earlier story of the Division 86 Study.  The 
method of the Division 86 Study departed from that of DePuy’s small study-cell 
approach used in his Division Restructuring Study.  The Division 86 Study was a major 
year-long enterprise involving several task forces at selected Army schools and 
employing analysis and war gaming of alternative unit structures—Romjue (1993) 
suggests that “its depth may have been unprecedented in Army tactical unit 
reorganization” (p. 10).   
The resulting Division 86 heavy division, much of the structure of which survived 
into the 1980s Army, numbered approximately 20,000 soldiers.  There were six tank 
battalions and four mechanized infantry battalions in its armor version, and five tank and 
five mechanized infantry battalions in its mechanized infantry form.  It also added a 
significant new component in an air cavalry attack brigade as well as expanded the 
division artillery (Romjue, 1993, p. 10).  The new brigade support battalions of Division 
86 implemented the concept of “arm, fuel, fix, and feed forward.”  Additionally, as 
described by Romjue (1993): 
An important design element was the building into the heavy division of 
what planners called ‘R3’:  personnel strength providing robustness, 
redundancy, and resilience for critical division control functions and key 
combat tasks.  The heavy divisions in Europe facing the overwhelming 
might of the Warsaw Pact forces had to be heavy and then some (p. 9).   
Collectively:  
…the Division 86 organizations were keyed to concepts of maximum 
firepower forward; improved command control; increased fire support, air 
defense, and ammunition resupply; and an improved combining of arms.  
The structure imposed an increased leader-to-led ratio, with smaller and 
less complex fighting companies and platoons (p. 10). 
The logic behind the Division 86 design was clear:  1) to fight and win on a conventional, 
high-intensity battlefield in Europe without relying on tactical nuclear weapons, and 2) to 
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field forces that vastly increased the depth over which the enemy could be attacked 
(Hawkins & Carafano, 1997).  
 General Edward C. Meyer, the Chief of Staff of the Army, approved the Division 
86 design in principle in October 1979 and approved it for implementation in decisions of 
August and September 1980 (Romjue, 1993, p. 10).  However, his 1980 decision carried 
significant future manpower costs (Romjue, 1993): 
In the defense climate of 1980, Army force design focused on the serious 
threat posed by the massive Soviet buildup.  That concern, and not end-
strength Army totals, dictated the initially strong designs of [Division] 86.  
The election to the U.S. presidency in the fall of 1980 of Ronald Reagan, a 
strong defense advocate, might have been expected to provide the needed 
Army manpower increases.  Reagan was strongly committed to an 
accelerated buildup of American military power to enable the nation to 
meet the Soviet challenge in Europe and elsewhere.  His accession did 
indeed soon lead to increased budget commitments.  In that general trend, 
however, and as planning began toward conversion to the new heavy 
division designs, the Department of the Army did not move to press for 
the significantly higher active-component end-strength needed to 
accommodate the larger Division 86 designs (p.13). 
Repeated attempts by the Army in the early 1980s to raise the manpower ceiling by 5,000 
to 15,000 men did not succeed at either the level of the Defense Department or Congress 
(Romjue, 1993, p. 21).  In the meantime, the modernization of the force was proceeding 
apace.  In the latter half of 1981, Department of the Army and TRADOC planners began 
to examine alternative solutions to the manpower problem.  In November 1981, the 
Department of the Army select committee, chaired by the Vice Chief of Staff of the 
Army, General John W. Vessey, Jr., convened to take up the problems of Division 86 
transition.  The select committee, recognizing that the Division 86 design was not 
affordable with the Army end-strength levels established through 1988, directed 
TRADOC to reduce the heavy divisions by ten percent to 18,000 soldiers.  The 
subsequent Division 86 Restructuring Study, carried out by TRADOC, attempted to 
downward structure the heavy division while keeping the basic design intact with combat 




reduced not by 2,000 but by 1,000 from the original 20,000 structure.  Nevertheless, the 
1982 restructuring exercise ultimately failed to materially affect the manpower impasse 
(Romjue, 1993, pp. 13–15). 
It is time to consider yet another thread in this story—one that includes, if only 
tangentially, a future organizational sponsor of MANPRINT, namely Lieutenant General 
Robert M. Elton.  Recall that the Division 86 study was but one of several Army 86 
elements.  Starry’s Division 86 study was driven, in large part, by a shift in U.S. national 
military strategy in 1978, which implemented, in conjunction with NATO, a conventional 
force buildup in Europe to match the Warsaw Pact (Hawkins & Carafano, 1997).  Similar 
studies, collectively known as the Army 86 Studies, considered the correct structure for 
the infantry division, the corps, and larger organizations.  One of these studies, Infantry 
Division 86, was begun in 1979 and reflected another transition in the national military 
strategy:  the U.S was broadening its focus again beyond Europe to consider regional 
contingency missions.  Up to the close of the 1970s, U.S. national military strategy paid 
little attention to the prospect of military action elsewhere in the world other than Europe, 
leading the Army to focus almost exclusively on the development of heavy forces.   It 
was only in 1979, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian hostage crisis, 
that senior policy makers began seriously considering the need for flexible contingency 
forces including more rapidly deployable light divisions (Romjue, 1993, pp. 10–13, 15).  
As late as 1979, Army plans called for mechanizing all the remaining standard 
infantry divisions, exclusive of the 82nd and 101st Airborne.  However, in that same year, 
General Edward C. Meyer, a cavalry leader in Vietnam and an advocate of lightness, 
ascended to the Army Chief of Staff position and quickly took steps to stop the 
mechanizing trend.  General Meyer believed there was another way, other than “heavying 
up” (i.e., mechanization), to make the standard infantry divisions effective:  increased 
technology.  Meyer convinced then Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to forego a plan 
to mechanize the 9th Infantry Division, proposing instead that it be redesigned to obtain 
many of the characteristics of a heavy division through innovative organization and new 
technology.  The search for a light division design in 1979 took two courses, though no 
such separation of effort was originally planned.  In late 1979, the Army 86 planners 
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began the Infantry Division 86, or ID 86, Study (Romjue, 1993, pp. 15–16).  Generals 
Meyer and Starry developed a detailed concept for ID 86 (Hawkins & Carafano, 1997): 
It had to be able to conduct worldwide contingency operations as well as 
deploy rapidly to reinforce forward NATO forces. To do this the division 
would need increased mobility, flexibility and firepower.  General Meyer 
detailed two design constraints. The division would be capped at 14,000 
soldiers and limited to equipment that could deploy in C-141 aircraft. The 
designers would have to depend on advanced technologies to enable these 
smaller divisions to accomplish their diverse and demanding missions. 
This dual concept of a nonmechanized light division that could be effective as a rapid 
deployment division in third world contingencies as well as on the armor dominated 
battlefield of Europe proved a constant frustration for planners.  The ID 86 Study 
conducted during 1979–1980 excluded tank and mechanized infantry battalions, but 
emphasized a strong antiarmor capability, hopefully provided by “high technology.”  
However, in the end, the NATO half of the infantry division’s dual mission drove an ID 
86 design that was not “light” in men, equipment, or support.  Plans went forward to test 
the resulting 18,000-man ID 86 design using the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, 
Washington as a so-called “high technology test bed” for transition (Romjue, 1993, p. 
16).     
 The High Technology Test Bed, or HTTB, was the second developmental course 
spawned by the ID 86 Study.  Though not initially viewed by the Army 86 planners as a 
separate effort, it in fact evolved in that direction.  By official agreement in October 
1980, the HTTB was the united effort of TRADOC, the Army Materiel Development and 
Readiness Command, and the Army Forces Command.  At the direction of the 
Department of Army, the 9th Infantry Division Commander (i.e., Lt. General Elton) was 
the HTTB test director (Romjue, 1993, p. 17).  As is often the case with collaborative 
agreements, differing perceptions soon developed between TRADOC and the 9th Division 
as to the relative relationship between technology and organizational design (Romjue, 
1993): 
Was the test bed to test the Infantry Division 86 concepts and 
organizations and infuse new high technology systems into the 9th 
Division, as TRADOC understood?  Or was the focus first on the infusion 
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of new technology and on innovative and enhanced deployability 
unhampered by conceptual structures—the 9th Division’s understanding of 
things?  The upshot of the disagreement—the decision by General Meyer 
in April 1981 that ID 86 was the starting point only—effectively set the 9th 
Infantry Division test bed upon the effectively independent track it 
subsequently pursued under Meyer to develop high technology light 
division designs and ideas (p. 17). 
Thus, the high technology light division subsumed the ID 86 effort to become the focus 
of light infantry division design—technology would drive organizational design.  In the 
end, however, no high technology light division eventuated from the test bed.  A major 
reason for this failure was that the weapons programs on which the concept depended 
failed to gain funding.   Chiefly involved were light or “fast attack” vehicles and armored 
assault gun vehicles (Romjue, 1993, p. 17).  In summary judgment, the Army 86 work 
failed to realize a design for the Army’s main light force element (Romjue, 1993): 
In 1982–1983, Army force designers found themselves no farther along 
toward a new realistic infantry division design than they had been four 
years earlier.  High technology testing had not proved sufficiently 
convincing to pose the “high-tech” route as an answer (p. 20). 
 The year 1983 saw the onset of what Army planners called the “bow wave” of 
force modernization as new weapons and equipment were fielded in earnest to the 
divisions in U.S. Army, Europe.  The accession of General John A. Wickham, Jr., to the 
post of Chief of Staff of the Army in June 1983 set in motion a major new design and 
structuring approach to the Army’s tactical units—the Army of Excellence (AOE)—that 
effectively superseded the Army 86 design and modernization effort.  As early as April 
1983, while still Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Wickham formed a small 
group of officers under Brigadier General Colin Powell, called “Project 14,” to identify 
issues he expected to face.  Among the findings of the Project 14 team were the need to 
move in the direction of more light infantry and the common recognition that Division 86 
was not affordable.  During this period, General Wickham notified General William R. 
Richardson, who had taken command of TRADOC in March 1983, that he wanted 
TRADOC to develop a light division of 10,000 personnel.  General Richardson, who was 
involved in a major portion of the Army 86 force design, agreed but advised the Chief of 
Staff that such a redesign should be part of a larger whole.  Richardson’s thinking was to 
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line up the Army by its several corps and by elements (i.e., combat, combat support, and 
combat service support) and to design and structure it in a way that the light infantry 
divisions would best fit in (Romjue, 1993, pp. 23–24). 
 General Wickham, looking ahead to TRADOC’s future concept, AirLand Battle 
2000, believed the Army needed to move with reasonable urgency toward a lighter force 
design.  He was also interested in not only preserving, but actually increasing combat 
strength (Romjue, 1993, p. 25).  Wickham looked to history—relatively recent history at 
that—for the way forward (Romjue, 1993): 
Ten years earlier when the Army, withdrawing from Vietnam, had been 
reduced to a low of thirteen divisions, the Army Chief of Staff General 
Creighton Abrams, eyeing the rising Soviet threat to NATO Europe, had 
set a goal of 16 Active Army divisions by 1976 without Army end-
strength increases.  Abram’s initiative, which had been carried through to 
completion after his untimely death in office in September 1974, had 
achieved that goal through a paring-back of the support structure and 
employment of reserve component “roundout” brigades and other units for 
the Active Army divisions.  What that meant was that some active 
divisions commanded only two active brigades, filling out their strength 
with a reserve unit as the third brigade.   Those measures were strongly 
supported by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger.  Not only did they 
convert fat to muscle in terms of combat units and anchor the Army’s 
future war fighting commitment in its reserves as well as in its active 
forces; the Abrams initiatives also sent a deterrence message (p. 25). 
General Wickham elected to resurrect and employ the Abrams paradigm.  Facing the 
reality of an inflexibly capped Army end-strength and the twin dilemmas of a continuing 
Soviet threat in Europe and a growing need for light, rapidly deployable contingency 
forces to meet third world crises, Wickham pushed for a force design initiative that 
placed a premium on replacing support strength with combat units (Romjue, 1993, pp. 
24–25).   
 In preparation for the 1983 Summer Army Commanders’ Conference, the major 
Army commands began surfacing issues under the theme of “resources for excellence” 




assisting the Army to field and transition to the organizations of Army 86, and the 
necessity to deal with the force structure dilemma arising from the Army 86 designs 
(Romjue, 1993): 
The specifics of the dilemma were that, in order to fulfill the 
organizational designs of Army 86, the Army’s projected active force 
structure would have to increase to 836,000 personnel in the coming 
decade.  That manpower total exceeded considerably the 780,000 end-
strength imposed by foreseeable budgetary constraints.  Given that 
limitation, and the assumption that none of the Active Army divisions 
would be inactivated, TRADOC needed to describe how to modify the 
Army 86 force structure to conform to the end-strength reality.  [It was] 
advised that the following steps would be necessary:  further reduce the 
heavy division; suggest design options for smaller light divisions; examine 
the design of the special operations forces; and consider new support 
ratios between division, corps, and echelons above corps (p. 29). 
Accordingly, General Richardson became interested in the disproportionate growth in 
combat support and combat service support in recent years at the expense of the combat 
elements of the force structure.  The trend had begun with the increase in 20,000 spaces 
of what Army planners called the division force equivalent, or DFE, a planning term 
referring to the division plus those nondivision forces needed to support it in combat.   
Both Division 86 and the high technology light division had a direct bearing on this trend 
as they reduced the infantry structure and increased support (Romjue, 1993, pp. 29–30). 
During the Army Commanders’ Conference of August 1983, General Wickham 
tasked TRADOC to develop a total force design that fully considered the factors of 
supportability, deployability, threat, and manpower ceiling.  General Richardson directed 
the Fort Leavenworth Combined Arms Center to form an AOE study group and provide 
recommendations to the Chief of Staff by the Army Commanders’ Conference of October 
1983 (Romjue, 1993, pp. 35–37).  The crux of the study was the question, “How is the 
Army going to pay the manpower bill?” (Wild, 1987, p. 5).  The Army Staff also 
provided the following points of guidance for TRADOC’s AOE study (Dupay, 1988, p. 
6):   
1) The recommended designs would not exceed the Army’s programmed end- 
strength. 
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2) Determine whether the Army could be manned at Authorization Level of 
Organization 2, which equated to manning units at no less than 90 percent of 
required wartime strength. 
3) Develop a proposal for a light, division-size force for rapid deployment for 
contingency missions. 
4) Recommend reductions to the end-strength of heavy divisions to increase 
maneuverability of organizations. 
5) Redesign corps and echelon above corps to improve their combat capability.   
In sum, the primary objective of the AOE study was to address the “hollowness” and lack 
of strategic deployability that had resulted from the Army 86 designs (Dupay, 1988, pp. 
4–5).  
The AOE study methodology began with the design of the light infantry division.  
Design criteria, in addition to the manpower limitation of approximately 10,000 soldiers, 
included the following (Wild, 1987, pp. 5–6): 
1) The division force design would be optimized for employment at the lower end of 
the conflict spectrum in a contingency mission, yet retain utility for employment 
at higher conflict levels as might be anticipated in Europe. 
2) The division would be deployable in no more than 500 C-141 sorties. 
3) The division would contain approximately 50 percent infantry. 
4) The division design would have nine maneuver battalions. 
Heavy division redesign followed with the goal of retaining the combat capability of the 
Division 86 design while reducing the division end-strength.  AOE modifications moved 
some functions out of the heavy division to the corps or higher and reduced personnel 
robustness, redundancy, and resilience (R3) from the remaining functions with the goal of 
achieving economies through centralization (Dupay, 1988, pp. 18–20).  Such reductions 
could not be made without some loss in capability, but wherever possible, cuts were 
made primarily in support and service support functions (Wild, 1987, p. 6).   
Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Dupay, in a 1988 Army War College study of the 
AOE, asserts that the primary objective of the AOE was to make combat service support 
functions (the “tail”) the primary bill payers for two new light infantry divisions (the 
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“teeth”) (p. 9).  In so doing, the Army could increase its overall “tooth-to-tail” ratio in 
accordance with the Abrams paradigm.  Additionally, by developing the new light 
infantry divisions such that they were greatly reduced in size and revised in concept from 
existing and proposed designs—that is, General Wickham’s goal of a 10,000-man 
division—the spaces saved could be applied to other changes needed such as the full 
manning of Active Army units (Romjue, 1993, p. 30).  
Changes to the tooth-to-tail ratio were guided, in large part, by the Logistics Unit 
Productivity Study, or LUPS (Romjue, 1993, pp. 49–50).  Realizing that many of the 
formulas for combat service support force requirements were based upon the Army’s 
experience in World War II, the Army Logistics Center conducted the LUPS in 1982 to 
examine “ways to replace as many soldiers in combat service support units as possible 
with modern high-technology equipment, seeking efficiencies from productivity 
enhancement” (Wild, 1987, p. 6).  According to Dupay (1988): 
The key was to improve the reliability, availability, maintainability, and 
durability of equipment; reduce weight, volume and manpower 
requirements; and improve logistics unit and systems productivity and 
throughput.  Specific issues such as the palletized loading system (PLS), 
automated pipeline construction system, robotic refueling systems, and 
expert diagnostic systems were just some of the reasons the logistics 
community assumed the “can do” attitude and handed over more than 
15,000 spaces for the AEO initiative (p. 24).   
Overall, LUPS was credited with freeing upwards of 15,000 combat service support 
soldiers for reassignment, thereby facilitating the creation of the two light infantry 
divisions (Wild, 1987, p. 7).  However, Dupay (1988) notes that these projected 
manpower savings were based on efficiencies through technologies that were still early in 
the research, development, test, and evaluation process (p. 24).   
 Despite the focus on AOE logistical changes, it was the creation of the light 
infantry division that was the real centerpiece of the AOE reorganization.  The AOE light 
infantry division represented a significant break in the history of Army tactical 
organization.  The light infantry division was fashioned for use primarily to respond to 
contingencies in the third world with only a collateral mission to reinforce heavy forces, 
and only then when terrain and circumstances were appropriate.  The latter represented a 
 108
significant relaxation of the dual mission requirements that stymied the Army 86 planners 
working on the original high technology, light infantry concept (Romjue, 1993, pp. 45–
48).  Nevertheless, the design of the light infantry division was still dependent on some 
efficiency gained through technology (Dupay, 1988): 
The [light] division is composed primarily of fighters equipped with 
lightweight weapons systems [sic] which are supposed to be sustained by 
an austere support structure.  The division was designed to capitalize on 
technological advances to enhance its performance and reduce the 
manpower required to perform essential battlefield tasks (p. 31). 
Combat service support was limited to the minimum essential assets required for 
operations in contingency areas (Dupay, 1988, p. 31).  As envisioned by General 
Wickham, the light infantry divisions were developed as a hard-hitting, elite force 
derivative of the Rangers.  A premium was placed on the capabilities of the individual 
light infantry solider and his unit (Romjue, 1993, p. 53). 
 In far reaching decisions during October and November 1983, General Wickham 
endorsed the AOE design for planning and then implementation.  He believed the AOE 
design combined affordability, high combat readiness, and strategic deployability and 
struck a sound balance between heavy and light forces (Romjue, 1993, p. 55).  Another 
key figure in the MANPRINT story, General Maxwell R. Thurman, Vice Chief of Staff 
of the Army, also strongly supported the AOE design (Romjue, 1993, p. 38).  On 10 
January 1984, the Department of the Army issued further implementing decisions and 
instructions.  The phased restructuring of the Army began in late fiscal year (FY) 1984 
and extended throughout the next several years.  Two active-component infantry 
divisions, the 7th at Fort Ord, California, to transition between late FY 1984 and late 
1986, and the 25th at Fort Drum, New York, to transition subsequently, would convert to 
the new light infantry design (Romjue, 1993, pp. 52–56).   
 The story of the AOE continues, but it was the efforts through 1983 that 
culminated in the approved organizations of the Army of the 1980s.  And so it is here that 
we will conclude this thread of the MANPRINT story.  No major reorganization can 
escape controversy, and to a degree, the AOE is open to criticism that it overemphasized 
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combat power at the expense of support units.  What should be appreciated is that  
the AOE design involved significant tradeoffs: 
In 1968, the Active Army had consisted on 18 2/3 divisions in an active 
force of 1.5 million personnel.  In 1986, the Active Army’s 18 divisions 
were carved from an end-strength of 780,000…The fielding of 18 
divisions from so small a force had been achieved only by drastic cutbacks 
in combat support and combat service support in the active force and by 
the maintenance or placement of much of the support force…in the 
nonexistent “component 4” category.  There was some degree of validity 
to the hollowness charge.  But in no army in a democracy in peacetime 
will a fully adequate force be funded.  If the Army of Excellence was not 
the best possible Army, it was an Army of the best affordable divisions 
and corps at the time. […] By maximizing combat power in more 
divisions but with no added Active Army end-strength, the AOE decisions 
left many corps and theater functions unmanned and some U.S.-based 
divisions dependent on less-ready reserve roundout brigades.  That 
inadequacy was the price and prudent risk of General Wickham’s 
decision, a decision supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for the 
deterrence value believed to be gained.  Facing worldwide defense 
challenges in the 1980s, the U.S. Army leadership chose more divisions 
and battalions, more forward combat strength and combat diversity, over 
the security of a force of fewer divisions, stronger in support, manned 
adequately top to bottom (Romjue, 1993, p. 126). 
It is not my intent here to critique those tradeoffs, which is a task best left to a scholar of 
military history.  What is important is that we gain at least an elementary cognizance of 
the doctrinal and organizational context within which the U.S. Army of the early 1980s 
worked—the Army from which MANPRINT emerged: 
The Army of Excellence was an Army built upon dilemmas rooted in the 
political and strategic currents of the early 1980s.  Those omnipresent 
realities—a powerful and dangerous Soviet adversary, a global defense 
mission, an ongoing major cycle of weapon modernization, and an 
inflexibly capped Army end-strength too small for the force needed—were 
factors forcing Army leaders to a compromise of balanced heavy and light 
organizational designs.  These designs were unavoidably imperfect yet 
remarkably sufficient for the historically unprecedented strategic 
challenge and responsibility faced and borne by the United States in the 
world-changing decade of the 1980s (Romjue, 1993, p. xiii). 
Thus, Romjue echoes Edwards (see Section III-B1) by stressing the necessity of 
understanding the larger post-World War II U.S. political culture—the “omnipresent 
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realities”—when analyzing the Army’s choice of military structure.  For this very reason 
we will now turn, if only briefly, to the military reform drive that was playing out in the 
press and within the hearing rooms of Congress and which reached its zenith in 1983. 
4. The Military Reform Movement 
The period spanning Jimmy Carter’s presidency (1977–1981) and Ronald 
Reagan’s first term (1981–1985) was one of significant turmoil within the U.S. defense 
establishment.  As described in Grant Hammond’s 2001 book on John Boyd: 
The Vietnam War had ended with the fall of Saigon in April 1975.  There 
was confusion about national security strategy, national military strategy, 
the transition from conscription to an all-volunteer force, military relevant 
technologies, arms control, budget battles for defense versus other needs, 
fights among the services on individual weapon systems and just why the 
war had been lost.  After being lied to about Vietnam, the American public 
was increasing skeptical of its government’s claims.  In part, it was this 
uncertainty and confusion that gave rise to the opportunity for a military 
reform movement (p. 106). 
During this period, the U.S. military had to reinvent itself after defeat and begin 
preparing for challenges on both ends of a spectrum of conflict that ranged from irregular 
warfare to strategic nuclear war.  Simultaneously, there was a saga of public 
controversies surrounding force structure planning and nonperforming weapon systems 
(Hammond, 2001, p. 102).  Robert Coram paints a succinct, if dire, picture of the state of 
affairs at the time in his 2002 biography of John Boyd: 
By 1978, both officers and enlisted personnel were leaving the military 
services in large numbers.  They left not because of pay, as military 
leaders had said for the past few years, but because they were displeased 
with what they saw as a lack of integrity among their leaders.  They 
thought careerism inhibited professionalism in the officer corps.  The 
military also was having readiness problems; expensive and highly 
complex weapon systems were fielded before being fully tested.  These 
systems were not only expensive to buy but expensive to maintain, and 
they rarely performed as advertised.  Stories began to appear in the media 
of America’s “hollow military.” […] The military’s answer was to place 
more emphasis on what it called the “electronic battlefield” by buying 
even more expensive and more high-tech weapons.  Somewhere in the 
military there must have been those who sensed the system was headed 
towards a meltdown.  If so, no one stepped forward to change it (p. 345). 
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In the wake of Vietnam, it became increasingly clear to those who sought to change the 
way the U.S. defense establishment worked that something more substantial was needed 
besides attacks against individual weapon systems, policies, or funding decisions (Figure 
III-5).  These people, which included military and civilian Pentagon insiders, journalists, 
academicians, and members of Congress, coalesced to form a loosely affiliated group, 
known as the military reform movement, which became increasingly vocal and active in 
taking on the Defense Department (Hammond, 2001, pp. 101–113). 
 
 
Figure III-5. Drawing by Ben Sargent published in September 1981, referencing the 
budget debate in the U.S. Congress.  President Reagan had managed to get major cuts in 
social security, public service, and welfare prior to that.  However, given rising 
unemployment, people and Congress were increasingly reticent to accept further cuts 
while the Defense Department was to get their usual funding.  Defense is drawn here as 
an overly obese boxer who is already unable to get up, yet alone fight.  The fairly small 
physique of the general behind him illustrates the fact that the Defense Department 
leaders had already lost control over the military forces’ quantity.  The next year, 
Congress rejected Reagan’s plan for more cutbacks and forced a scaling-down of the 
defense budget (Fischer & Fischer, 1999). 
 
Several different groups and many different issues came to be involved in the 
military reform movement.  However, Hammond (2001) characterizes the main debate as 
being between technologists and reformers, although he acknowledges that this is 
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somewhat of an oversimplification that distorts reality (pp. 107–109).  Hammond 
suggests that the best short explanation of the two schools of thought is that provided by 
Serge Herzog (1994): 
Succinctly stated, reformers hold the following positions: (1) 
overemphasis on high technology has driven cost of modern weapons out 
of control; (2) high technology has introduced a level of complexity that 
seriously hampers force readiness; (3) high technology is pushed in areas 
often irrelevant to success in combat and may even endanger its user; (4) 
the added increment in performance resulting from high technology rarely 
justifies the costs involved; and (5) high technology stretches acquisition 
and maturation, causing critical delays in technology integration and 
frequently unexplained technical problems (pp. 3–4). 
In opposition to the reformers were those characterized as technologists who held the 
following views:  “(1) technology acts as a force multiplier; (2) technology provides 
force flexibility; (3) technology has the potential to improve cost and equipment 
reliability and maintainability; and (4) technology is indispensible given the alternatives” 
(Herzog, 1994, pp. 6–7).   
 While reformers raised a broad set of defense issues beyond the high-technology 
weapons debate, key members of the reform movement were relatively unanimous in 
their criticism of complex high technology weapons.  The critical question for reformers 
was whether high technology weapons inevitably led to too much complexity.  Their 
specific argument rested, in part, on a “general relationship” between weapons 
complexity and low combat readiness.  They suggested that increasing weapons 
complexity multiplies reliability and maintainability problems, thereby increasing 
ownership costs, particularly maintenance costs.  They also argued that increasing 
complexity reduces combat force size (i.e., the tooth-to-tail ratio), supplies, spares, and 
munitions to inadequate numbers, necessarily resulting in a less capable force.  Using 
tactical aviation as an example, reformers attacked the supportability of high technology 
weapons, claiming that an overemphasis on complexity resulted from an unsatisfactory 
approach to system design—an approach that emphasizes performance, schedule, and 
acquisition cost while ignoring the “ownership considerations” of logistic support, human 
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factors, and quality assurance.4  Reformers advocated for weapons that were cheaper, less 
complex (but not devoid of new technology), easier to maintain, more autonomous, and 
facilitative of greater ease of training.  Figure III-6 presents a chart from the Spinney 
Report5 summarizing the reformers’ case.  The reformers believed the answer to the 
critical question in Figure III-6 was a resounding “no” (Kross, 1985, pp. 17–18, 57–59).  
 
 
Figure III-6. Summary arguments against complexity from the Spinney Report (From 
Spinney, 1985). 
 
                                                 
4 The focus on “ownership considerations” is a major thrust of current Defense Department policy 
guidance on HSI.  Specifically, Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02 (2008) requires program 
managers to take into account total ownership costs and accommodate the user population that will operate, 
maintain, and support the system.  Thus, we see elements of the military reform debate that were carried 
forward into Defense Department policy guidance on HSI. 
5 In making their case, the reformers relied on three major briefings – each unpublished, continually 
refined, and constantly updated.  Virtually all arguments made by the reformers on high technology 
weapons and other subjects related to military reform can be traced back to these briefings.  One of these 
briefings was Franklin C. Spinney’s “Defense Facts of Life,” a 4-hour presentation that was the reformers’ 
definitive statement on the penalties of pursuing complex, high technology weapons in an environment of 
limited defense spending.  This briefing is often called the Spinney Report (Kross, 1985). 
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The issues were, and still are, complex, but it is fair to say that the two sides of 
the reform debate differed less in their ends and far more in the means to accomplish 
them (Hammond, 2001, p. 108).  One could argue that the underlying debate was really 
over the veracity of the hypothesis of technological determinism that undergirded defense 
acquisitions during the Cold War.  This point is perhaps best illustrated by Hammond’s 
(2001) characterization of the philosophy of John Boyd, the legendary maverick and 
military strategist at the center of the debate on the side of the reformers: 
Yet Boyd and the reformers understood a central reality of national 
security.  It flowed from Boyd’s affinity for trade-off analysis and his 
propensity for trade-off thinking.  What does X mean in terms of Y?  If I 
have only so much money, Z, how much of X or Y, or combinations of the 
two, should I buy?  The reality is that despite the intellectual progression 
that would have budgets flow from strategy and military capabilities 
determined by objectives, they are seldom developed in that manner.  Far 
more likely is that a budget will drive a strategy and that threats will 
determine which capabilities are deemed necessary.  That being so the 
central questions of defense are “How much is enough?” and “To do 
what?”  Boyd was always concerned about trade-offs and cost because 
cost has both immediate and long-term consequences. 
Beyond that, those considerations were the last that one should worry 
about.  Boyd’s trinity held people first, ideas second, and things third.  
Often the military has as its first priority the things, the high-tech 
weaponry.  Ideas are second, and people, in that they are trained to be 
interchangeable parts, a tertiary consideration.  That is not meant to seem 
as heartless as it sounds but merely to point out that we often seem to 
value the capabilities of our technology more than the people who use 
it…Boyd was convinced that one’s mind was the best weapon, and hence, 
well-trained and well-educated people, who think well and quickly, were 
the most important asset, followed by ideas, in turn followed by the 
equipment they had at their disposal (p. 110). 
While many of the claims on both sides of the debate appear to have face validity, it is 
beyond the scope of this summary to pursue them in more depth.  What is important is to 
appreciate those aspects of the debate that touched on elements of what would become 
the Army’s MANPRINT program.  This is particularly true given the substantial leap 
forward the reform movement took in 1983, heralded by the appearance of reformer 
Chuck Spinney on the cover of Time magazine (Figure III-6).  This, and subsequent 
events, helped catapult the military reformers’ arguments into a wider national appeal for 
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military reform (Kross, 1985, pp. 161–180) at the same time that senior Army leaders 
were contemplating designs for the Army of Excellence.  
 
 
Figure III-7. Time magazine cover from March 1983 featuring Franklin Spinney, a 
military analyst for the Pentagon who became famous in the early 1980s for his "Spinney 
Report" criticizing the perceived reckless pursuit of costly complex weapon systems by 
the Pentagon. 
 
C. TECHNOLOGY AND ITS EFFECTS ON PERSONNEL 
 Martin Binkin (1986), in Military Technology and Defense Manpower, provides a 
good discussion of the effects of military technology on the occupational structure of the 
armed forces circa the 1980s.  Written during the period without the benefit of hindsight, 
it captures much of the uncertainty and debate of the time that was likely prevalent in the 
minds of key actors in the MANPRINT story.  Binkin asserts that the quantity and quality 
of personnel needed by the armed forces depends on several factors.  These factors 
include the tasks that units are expected to perform (and hence their workload), how they 
are organized (i.e., combat-to-support ratio), and personnel policies (i.e., how people are 
assigned and utilized).  The impact of technology comes into play when determining the 
number and qualifications of the personnel needed to operate, maintain, and support the 
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systems.  Thus, when new systems and advanced technologies are fielded, the effects on 
the work force will depend, in large part, on the degree of system complexity (Binkin, 
1986, pp. 43–44).   
 Although the term “complexity” is widely used to characterize military systems, 
those who use it seldom provide a clear definition of exactly what they mean.  Some 
consider complexity as synonymous with job difficulty, gauging it by the time needed to 
learn a system’s tasks, as in training time.  Alternatively, the quantity of documentation 
or job aids needed to support a system’s operation and maintenance is used as an 
indicator of complexity.  Procurement costs also have been used as a measure of 
technical complexity.  Finally, complexity has been defined as the number of components 
or parts that comprise a system (Binkin, 1986, pp. 44–45).     
 However it is defined, complexity generally carries a negative connotation 
because of the presumed inverse correlation between complexity and reliability, with the 
latter having important manpower implications.  Although terminology often varies with 
the system being measured, reliability is usually defined in terms of the “mean time 
between failures” (MTBF).  As a general rule, increasing the number of components in a 
system—and hence its complexity—results in a shorter MTBF and a greater need for 
maintenance.  Another characteristic of systems that impacts manpower is 
maintainability, which is often measured in terms of the “mean time to repair” (MTTR).  
Although the MTTR is affected by factors other than complexity, it generally takes 
longer to diagnose failures in complex systems and it often takes longer to service 
components that are not readily accessible (Binkin, 1986, pp. 45–47) 
 The relationship between reliability and maintainability is captured in the concept 




Downtime includes both the time actually spent doing maintenance as well as the 
administrative and logistics delays incurred during the maintenance process, such as 
awaiting technical personnel, equipment, or spare parts.  Downtime also encompasses 
maintenance actions that are unrelated to component failures, such as when scheduled or 
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preventive maintenance is performed to decrease the likelihood of system failures or 
retard wear.  Thus, the number of people needed to maintain a particular system is a 
function of how often it fails (i.e., its reliability), how long repairs take (i.e., its 
maintainability), and the extent of scheduled maintenance.  Collectively, these factors 
determine the maintenance workload, and consequently, the number of maintenance and 
support billets required (Binkin, 1986, pp. 47–49).   
 The balance of historical evidence, at least in the early 1980s, suggested that 
systems incorporating advanced technologies tended to be complex, and hence unreliable 
and hard to maintain with ensuing adverse affects on manpower.  However, the question 
of whether past trends would be predicative of the future was a central one in the debates 
related to the military reform movement.  Proponents for the new high technology 
weapon systems were convinced that historical trends would not bear out—emerging 
technologies would make military systems more reliable and easier to maintain.  They 
embraced the idea of “transparent complexity” in which technology would enable user-
friendly weapons and black-box, remove-and-replace maintenance concepts, thereby 
reducing both the quantity and quality of operators and maintainers needed for a given 
military capability.  On the other hand, critics pointed to historical experience with high 
performance systems and cautioned that anticipated manpower savings from 
technological substitutions seldom materialized (Binkin, 1986, pp. 53–68).   
 What then was the outlook for the Army of Excellence?  In summary, the 
substantial modernization that was well under way in the Army in the early 1980s was 
yielding weapon systems with embedded electronic and computer technologies that 
promised to vastly increase their capabilities—and if history was any guide, their 
complexity.  Unlike the Air Force and the Navy, both of which had a long association 
with complex weapon systems, the Army had traditionally emphasized men over 
equipment (Binkin, 1986, p. 7).  Consequently, the Army experienced significantly more 
turbulence as it converted from systems that were largely electromechanical to systems 
incorporating advanced integrated electronics.  Whether the Army would actually realize 
the full performance designed into these systems was an open question at the time, the 
answer to which depended largely on the extent that Army personnel were up to the task 
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of operating and maintaining these new weapon systems (Binkin, 1986, p. 34).  However, 
as the “bow wave” of force modernization swept through the Army in the early 1980s, 
the problems predicted by the reformers began to emerge: 
First, when a new complex system was put in the hands of soldiers, the 
overall system performance did not always meet the standards predicted 
during the engineering design.  Second, the replacement of a fielded 
weapon system with a more technologically complex system was 
generating both a requirement for more highly skilled soldiers as well as a 
higher soldier to system ratio when counting the number of operators, 
maintainers, and support personnel (Blackwood & Riviello, 1994, pp. 2–
3). 
Figure III-8, which was adapted from Binkin (1986), highlights the growth in technical 
(i.e., combat support) jobs, which accounted for a quarter of all enlisted soldiers by 
1985—a trend that was opposite of that intended by Army planners responsible for 
designing the Army of Excellence.   
 
 
Figure III-8. Growth of technical jobs in the U.S. Army for selected fiscal years 1953–
1985 (After Binkin, 1986). 
  
As early as August 1980, Generals (retired) Walter Kerwin and George Blanchard 
highlighted concerns within the Army regarding force readiness, supportability, and 
sustainability.  A World War II veteran, General Kerwin was instrumental as Deputy 
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Chief of Staff for Personnel in launching the Army’s voluntary enlistment program in 
1973 prior to serving as the Vice Chief of Staff from 1974-1978.  Likewise, General 
Blanchard, a combat veteran of three wars, helped with the transition to an all-volunteer 
force as commander of U.S. Army, Europe.  In an Army Materiel Systems Analysis 
Activity discussion paper prepared for Army Chief of Staff General Edward Meyer, 
Kerwin, Blanchard, and colleagues bluntly stated (Kerwin, Blanchard, Atzinger, & 
Topper, 1980): 
The U.S. Army has a major man/machine interface problem.  There are 
not enough qualified people to perform the tasks required to effectively 
operate, support, and maintain current Army systems…The problem is 
severe and will continue to get worse.  Increasing weapon complexity, the 
large number of new systems being developed, insufficient formal school 
training, a declining manpower pool, disproportionate numbers of CAT 
IIIB and CAT IV6 personnel, recruiting and retention problems, and unit 
turbulence all will continue to strain the already overburdened personnel, 
training, and development communities (p. 2).   
They went on to propose that the Army’s leaders adopt a total system view that 
considered soldier performance and equipment reliability together as a system: 
The Army has made some progress in dealing with this problem.  Many 
efforts are underway.  However, these efforts, while representing steps in 
the right direction, are fragmented, based on reactions rather than vision, 
and, to a large extent, individually initiated. In our opinion, these efforts 
will fall short in coping with the extent of the problem in time to have an 
impact in the near term.  Significant improvement will not occur quickly 
unless efforts are integrated, the personnel and doctrine people become 
more actively involved early in the materiel development process, and the 
Army addresses man/machine interface in its broadest sense and begins to  
think tactical system development in lieu of individual materiel 
development, individual people development and individual support 
development (p. 2). 
Specific observations presented in the discussion paper included: 
                                                 
6 The Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) is a multiple choice test, administered by 
the United States Military Entrance Processing Command, used to determine qualification for enlistment in 
the United States armed forces.  For enlistment purposes, scores are divided into several categories:  
Category I (93-100%), Category II (65-92%), Category IIIA (50-64%), Category IIIB (31-49%), Category 
IVA (21-30%), Category IVB (16-20%), Category IVC (10-15%), and Category V (0-9%).  By 
Congressional mandate, no Category V recruits can be accessed into the military and no more than 20% of 
accessions can be Category IV.   
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• The Army’s Life Cycle System Management Model must be disciplined 
concerning the manpower, personnel, and training (MPT) and logistics aspects of 
the process. 
• Careful consideration of MPT impacts must precede any variation in strategy 
which skips a phase of development for the purpose of achieving an early Initial 
Operational Capability. 
• MPT requirements must be better defined during concept evaluation. 
• System development programs must recognize training constraints and employ 
sophisticated techniques to reduce training requirements. 
• Human factors analysis and engineering must become a mandated part of system 
development early in the cycle. 
• Program managers and U.S. Army TRADOC system managers must increase 
their emphasis on the MPT features of the Integrated Logistics Support process. 
• The personnel community must become an active, rather than reactive, part of the 
acquisition process. 
• The Army needs a central authority for integrating systems development, 
acquisition, and fielding.  
Kerwin and Blanchard’s paper was accompanied by other reports of contractors 
and Defense Department personnel failing to adequately consider manpower 
requirements and human factors during the weapon system acquisition process.  For 
example, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) issued its report, Effectiveness of 
U.S. Forces Can Be Increased Through Improved Weapon System Design, in January 
1981, concluding that many military weapon systems could not be adequately operated, 
maintained, or supported because the Defense Department had not given sufficient 
attention to logistic support, human factors, and quality assurance during the design phase 
of the acquisition process.  The GAO stated in their report to Congress: 
We believe there are three important ownership factors in the acquisition 
process which recent history suggests are among the most prominent 
detractors from the effectiveness of deployed systems - logistic support, 
human reliability [emphasis added], and quality assurance. Our selection 
of these ownership factors for analysis does not imply that others are 
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unimportant.  Rather, we suggest that there has been an imbalance of 
funding and attention given between the measurable characteristics of 
weapon system development (cost, schedule, and performance) and these 
other factors which significantly influence the eventual effectiveness of 
the system in the field (p. 4).  
Specific observations in the report that related to human reliability included: 
• There are indications that poor human reliability causes over 50 percent of all 
weapon system failures. 
• The increasingly complicated nature of modern military systems, together with 
internal military personnel problems, suggests that human-induced errors, both in 
operations and maintenance, will likely increase unless more attention is paid to 
this problem during design and development.  
• Weapon system designs have been dictating manpower requirements when what 
is needed is a continuous interface between the system designers and the 
manpower planners with manpower requirements influencing system design and 
vice versa. 
• Human factor specifications, standards, and handbooks used in designing and 
developing systems almost exclusively deal with the human physical 
characteristics and design interface and do not adequately address other human 
limitations such as  skill levels, proficiency, availability, environmental stress, and 
fatigue. 
• There are no common methodologies and data sources for use by system 
designers in forecasting skill levels of future military personnel. 
• There is insufficient emphasis on testing systems from a human reliability 
standpoint, particularly in the developmental stages of the acquisition process 
when design errors are easiest to correct. 
While the military buildup of the early Reagan administration may have served to 
make these problems appear acute, they were really just a flaring of a more chronic 
pathology within the Defense Department.  Going back to October 1967, the Office of the 
Director of Defense Research and Engineering, on the recommendation of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Systems Analyses (ASD/SA), conducted a study of the 
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adequacy of consideration of manpower factors during the system acquisition process.  
One of the first problems that the study group had to tackle was one simply of 
terminology (Nucci, 1967):  
While the terms human engineering (HE) and human factors (HF) do 
relate to the man/machine interface, their application thus far in the 
system-design process has mainly dealt with man’s inherent characteristics 
and capabilities.  HE and HF do not, however, address such personnel 
factors as quantities, skill levels, proficiency, availability, and costs.  
Moreover, the HE/HF area does not adequately embrace training aspects 
(p. 4). 
After defining manpower factors to broadly include human factors, human engineering, 
human resources, and training, the study group went on to examine six current system 
acquisition programs.  Summarizing their major findings, the study group reported: 
Important gains are achievable when manpower considerations, systems 
analyses and tradeoff studies are part of the early development phases 
(concept formulation and contract definition, as well as advanced 
development).  But these gains are inhibited unless (1) management 
attention ensures consideration of manpower requirements and the 
man/machine interface in the course of program approval; (2) manpower 
factors are an inherent part of systems engineering; (3) the program is 
conducted on the basis of total system effectiveness, all tradeoff studies, 
and the final design reflection of consideration of total life-cycle costs 
(LCC); and (4) manpower factors are reflected in contract requirements (p. 
5). 
The study group also took up the issue of coordination of efforts related to manpower 
factors: 
While the Military Services are sponsoring many activities in human 
factors research, manpower study, life-cycle costing, maintenance-data 
feedback, personnel and training, etc., there appears to be little intra-
Service—much less inter-Service—coordination of this work, especially 
from the viewpoint of using results in systems development and analysis 
(p. 5). 
The study group further concluded that the military policies and procedures concerning 
manpower factors were inadequate and that, while human engineering received the most 
emphasis because of contractual requirements, training and human resources received  
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little emphasis.  Finally, the study group recommended designation of a Defense 
Department focal point for manpower factors, going so far as to propose responsibilities 
for such a focal point. 
A decade later, in December 1978, the Logistics Manpower Institute concluded 
another study of manpower planning for new weapon systems, this time for the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense, Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics (ASD/MRA&L).  In the 
report, the authors stated (Betaque, Kennelly, Nauta, & White, 1978): 
Until recently, there was a decided lack of specific guidance from the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense on manpower planning for new 
systems.  That deficiency was corrected by a 17 August 1978 
ASD(MRA&L) memorandum, “Manpower Analysis Requirements for 
System Acquisition.”  Consequently, DoD policy on manpower planning 
for new systems now appears adequate, but still there are serious 
shortcomings in the presentation and implementation of that policy (p. iii). 
The study was complemented by seven case studies, two of which concerned Army 
systems.  Significant findings from the latter included the following: 
• Most estimates of manpower requirements made during acquisition programs 
were too low. 
• There was greater uncertainty associated with maintenance manning than with 
any other element of new weapon system manpower requirements. 
• Estimates of new system manpower requirements frequently reflected program 
goals rather than unbiased assessments of manpower needs. 
• Manpower goals or constraints established for new systems addressed only the 
aggregate manning of the using unit, not total manpower or skill requirements. 
• Controlling training requirements could be as important as constraining manning 
levels. 
Binkin (1986) asserts that the implications of new technologies for future 
manpower requirements are best analyzed by looking at the effects that these 
technologies have on the operations and maintenance of military systems themselves and 
on the supporting infrastructure—that is, the total ownership considerations (pp. 39–40).  
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However, as evidenced by the aforementioned studies, such analyses generally received 
little emphasis by the military services (Binkin, 1986): 
Practically…such analyses have been hampered in the past by a lack of 
reliable data as well as by the low priority afforded by the services to 
manpower research in general and analysis of manpower requirements in 
particular.  Since the end of conscription, research on military manpower 
has concentrated on supply issues.  Numerous econometric recruitment 
and retention models have been developed, and there is no shortage of 
estimates of elasticities of supply with respect to the many variables 
thought to affect the recruitment and reenlistment decisions.  The 
mountain of often widely conflicting estimates makes all the more 
conspicuous the paucity of studies relating to manpower requirements.  
Thus most of the attention given to changes in occupational mix has been 
directed toward the near term and usually as part of the annual budgeting 
process (p. 40). 
The result was a reactive culture in which system designs drove manpower requirements 
instead of the proactive approach of using manpower considerations to derive system 
design criteria (Nucci, 1967).   
In 1980, Chief of Staff of the Army, General Meyer, took the action of ordering 
an in-depth analysis of the impact on the increasing complexity of Army weapon systems 
on personnel, training, and logistic aspects of force modernization.  The resulting Soldier 
Machine Interface Requirements (“Complexity”) Study was completed by TRADOC’s 
Combined Arms Center in May 1982.  After examining 20 new systems, the study group 
found that institutional training requirements associated with new systems were steadily 
increasing, both in terms of the number of courses and their length.  These impacts were 
felt in both initial and sustainment training, especially for logistic-oriented skills.  The 
study group also observed a general upward migration of aptitudinal skill requirements to 
satisfy the demands for operating and maintaining new, high-technology systems.  This 
trend was most evident for maintenance and repair skills, where new systems were 
reflecting the transition of applied technology from mechanical to electronic.7  An 
unintended consequence was the emergence of families of high-skill, low-density jobs 
                                                 
7 As an extreme example, the initial entry aptitude score required for the operator/repairman of the 
AN/MSM-105, General Support Automatic Test Support System, was higher than that required to enter 
Officer Candidate School. 
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that then made for significant personnel management problems.  Although new systems 
were generally easier to operate, they were significantly more difficult to repair and 
maintain.  In summary, the growth in personnel overhead, both in terms of maintenance 
and training, resulting from force modernization was working to exacerbate—not 
improve— the tooth-to-tail ratio by increasing the numbers of personnel comprising the 
tail (Ostovich, Jordan, Fowler, & Hatlestad, 1982).   
The “Complexity Study” also examined the acquisition process and found some 
explanations for the adverse impacts of complexity.  Among their findings, the study 
group reported (Ostovich et al., 1982): 
Total system equipment requirements are not developed in a coordinated 
manner…the weapon, its support equipment, and its training devices were 
not developed in parallel…This tends to support the criticism that the 
Army does not know what resources are really required to field a complete 
system (pp. xxxi–xxxii). 
They affirmed the need to “think system development [emphasis in original]” (p. xxxii) 
and accordingly state requirements as “man-machine-system minimum mission essential 
functions” (p. 376).  Additionally, the report argued that the personnel community needed 
to become more proactive in addressing the problem: 
The combat effectiveness of new weapon systems will depend on the 
Army’s ability to identify, attract, train, and retain soldiers who are both 
capable of operating and maintaining them.  At the present, there is no 
single, coherent framework for adequately analyzing these needs.  A 
consistent procedure for examining manpower and the necessary soldier 
qualifications to determine accessions, selection, training, assignment and 
reenlistment adequacy does not exist.  The relationship of the soldier’s 
ability to the requirements of new system is largely unknown.  Relating 
these factors is vital to avoiding inappropriate manpower, personnel, and 
training decisions (p. 384). 
Overall, the study group found that the Army could—and needed to—do a better job at 
integrating MPT considerations during system design and acquisition.  They also 
recommended that Army regulations assign responsibility for providing MPT data to 
system developers and for coordinating, validating, and evaluating MPT considerations 
for major defense acquisition programs.   
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That same year, then Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, General Maxwell 
Thurman, directed the U.S. Army Research Institute to undertake the Reverse 
Engineering Project, a series of four case studies examining if and how human factors, 
manpower, personnel, and training (HMPT) issues were addressed during the weapon 
systems acquisition process.  The term “reverse engineering” was used by General 
Thurman to imply the method of determining how products of the weapon system 
acquisition process came to be as they were.  It was his premise that careful examination 
of several Army systems that had already been fielded would allow identification of 
critical events in the weapon system acquisition process where, if proper consideration 
were given to HMPT issues, the Army could increase the likelihood of fielding more 
operationally useful systems (Promisel, Hartel, Kaplan, Marcus, & Whitenburg, 1985). 
The Reverse Engineering Project identified several recurring HMPT problems:  
human factors engineering was not addressed for some system components, doctrine and 
operational and organizational concepts were incomplete or ill-suited to the soldier, 
manpower levels were underestimated, skill and ability needs were undetermined or 
underestimated, training was untested, and training devices were unavailable.  Numerous 
factors in the weapon system acquisition process were found to have directly produced 
these HMPT problems, but the project’s authors concluded (Promisel et al., 1985): 
A core problem underlies the various factors related to HMPT 
problems…HMPT problems have their origin in inadequate or incomplete 
analysis of the proposed system during the concept stage.  This leads both 
to incomplete specification of requirements and inappropriate assumptions 
regarding system features.  HMPT design parameters and field test design 
become too narrowly defined.  The incomplete field tests cannot identify 
comprehensively errors of commission and omission regarding HMPT.  
The end results are:  (1) HMPT problems; and (2) uncertainty regarding 
the adequacy of system performance along with inconclusive evidence 
concerning the importance of HMPT problems (p. 35). 
Specific recommendations from the Reverse Engineering Project included: 
• Total system performance in the operational environment should be the focus of 
the weapon system acquisition process from initial analyses through testing and 
decision making.   
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• Past practices involving baseline comparison systems or standard procedures, 
particularly as they have been applied to personnel considerations, should not be 
adopted for new or successor systems without specific analysis of their 
applicability. 
• Actions and documents in the acquisition process should not be approved until 
their comprehensiveness, including attention to HMPT, has been verified. 
• There should be systematic monitoring of processes specified in requirements and 
planning documents (e.g., tradeoff studies). 
• Acquisition process decisions with bearing on HMPT issues should reflect 
estimates of the cost-effectiveness and cost-benefits associated with the available 
options. 
• Characteristics of the acquisition strategy (e.g., competition, accelerated 
development, etc.) and their impact on HMPT issues should be explicitly 
considered in acquisition process planning. 
• Actions should be taken to reduce turnover and improve HMPT-related training 
of appropriate acquisition personnel. 
• In selecting and monitoring contractors, the competence of their staff in terms of 
HMPT should be assured. 
• Responsibility for development of the total system, including HMPT, should be 
centralized to the maximum extent possible. 
While the study authors emphasized that the last recommendation was key, the more 
important message was the overall finding of the study regarding the feasibility of 
addressing HMPT considerations in the weapon system acquisition.  In summary, the 
observed shortfalls in existing systems were not inevitable consequences of increased 
system complexity.   
D. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANPRINT 
1. Progenitor Ideas (1930s–1950s) 
 Although a number of individuals in the period spanning the decades of the 1970s 
and 1980s offered ideas that laid the groundwork for the subsequent development of the 
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U.S. Army’s MANPRINT program, it is evident that the basic ideas they were espousing 
were recognized in one form or another at least as far back as the late 1930s (W. O. 
Blackwood, personal communication March 3, 2010).  As discussed by Guilmartin and 
Jacobowitz (1985) in their historical analysis of group interaction and the design of 
military technology, the integration of technology, organizational practices (i.e., military 
tactics), and social mechanisms that foster effective human action and interaction has 
been the primary historical determinant of military victory.   They assert that these 
factors—technology, tactics, and human factors—interact with one another in a dynamic 
manner than is not explainable in simple additive terms.  When the confluence of these 
factors is such that they are mutually reinforcing, the result is a force multiplying effect.  
And in the case where these factors interfere rather than reinforce, the end result is a 
negative or force dividing effect. 
Mutually reinforcing confluences of these factors does not appear to be the 
historical norm; to the contrary, true force multiplier effects are decidedly uncommon 
(Guilmartin & Jacobowitz, 1985):   
In most countries, the weapons system design and procurement process 
makes no formal provision for considering the nature of the interaction 
between the social and psychological dynamics of the combatant group 
and the characteristics of the military technology it uses.  Where human 
factors are considered—as they must be in a narrowly physiological 
sense—the tendency is to view weapon system operation as an athletic 
endeavor involving individuals or small groups working in isolation.  The 
prevalent belief seems to be that if the operator or crew is well trained and 
capable, the system will realize its theoretical, quantifiable potential; if 
not, it will not (pp. 2–3).  
As a historical illustration, Guilmartin and Jacobowitz use the case of the World War II 
era French SOMUA S35 medium tank (Figure III-9), which possessed perhaps the best 
blend of armor protection, armament, speed, and agility of any armored fighting vehicle 
in the world at the time.  A comparison of the SOUMA tank to the German opposition in 
the winter of 1939-1940, using probability-of-kill as a figure of merit, would have judged 
the French tank the sure winner.  However, an examination of the design of the French 
SOUMA tank and German tanks used in the Battle of France highlight important 
differences in the quality of crew cohesion: 
 129
Where German tanks almost invariably had the crew grouped together in a 
large and relatively spacious central compartment, French tank designers 
tended to isolate the individual members of the tank crew.  German 
tanks…all had three-man turrets; French tanks had one-man turrets.  
German tank designers favored a side-by-side seating arrangement for the 
driver and assistant driver (who doubled as bow gunner/radio operator).  
With this setup, the two men could see and communicate with each other 
across the hull.  By contrast, the crew members of French tanks (there was 
rarely an assistant driver) tended to be arranged in tandem and separated 
by machinery. […] Above and beyond the relative isolation of individual 
French tank crew members notwithstanding, tactical coordination within 
units was rendered tenuous at the outset by the physical arrangements 
faced by tank and unit commanders.  So was cohesion.  Fighting from a 
one man turret, the French tank commander was responsible for loading, 
aiming, and firing the primary armament…in addition to commanding 
their tanks and leading their units (pp. 49–50).    
In the end, the negative confluence of high technology, tactics, and human factors—the 
latter in terms of the all-important element of primary military group cohesion—led to 
the quick defeat of French armored forces.   
 
Figure III-9. French SOMUA S35s captured by Germany in 1940. 
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The lesson in this case exemplifies Guilmartin and Jacobowitz’s premise that “a 
weapon…can, through the characteristics of the employment tactics, enmesh itself with 
the social and psychological nature of the soldiers who use it to reinforce the primary 
bonds which are the basis of the fighter’s ability to withstand the stresses of combat and 
the horrors of battle” (p. 7).  Whether one wishes to accord such a statement the status of 
an enduring principle, the historical record suggests, at a minimum, that the general 
notion was grasped and applied to weapon system design by the German Wehrmacht in 
the 1930s. It is also worth noting that the major elements under consideration could be 
reasonably argued as foreshadowing the holistic focus on human factors engineering, 
personnel survivability, and habitability considerations that was to become a major thrust 
of the U.S. Defense Department’s future HSI program.     
Nevertheless, the emergence of a discipline specifically focused on human factors 
can best be regarded as an outgrowth of aviation in World War II.  While there are many 
subplots within the larger story of the history of human factors, one in particular—John 
Flanagan’s development of the critical incident technique—stands out because of its 
continued evolution and application for the study and design of human performance 
interventions across a wide range of situations.  Flanagan’s critical incident technique is 
best regarded as a product of the many studies conducted in the U.S. Army Air Forces 
Aviation Psychology Program, which was established in the summer of 1941 to develop 
procedures for the selection and classification of aircrew.  The technique itself is 
essentially a set of procedures for collecting direct observations of human behavior in 
such a way as to facilitate their potential usefulness in solving practical problems and 
developing broad psychological principles (Flanagan, 1954, pp. 327–329).   
Given the success of the technique during World War II in analyzing a range of 
activities to include combat leadership and spatial disorientation in pilots, it was further 
developed during the postwar period, primarily by the American Institute for Research 
and the University of Pittsburgh.  During the 1950s, applications of the critical incident 
technique were expanded to include studies in the following areas:  measures of typical 
performance (i.e., criteria), measures of proficiency (i.e., standard samples), training, 
selection and classification, job design, operating procedures, equipment design, 
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motivation and leadership, and counseling and psychotherapy (Flanagan, 1954, pp 330–
334, 347–355).  In so doing, Flanagan and colleagues established the paradigm of 
subjecting human dependent variables to historical analysis for the purpose of generating 
hypotheses to apply to the present.  Moreover, in the process, they developed functional 
descriptions of a broad range of human activities within complex systems based on a 
variety of perspectives, many of which would align with future MANPRINT domains. 
2. Failed Initial Attempts (1967–1983) 
Dr. John D. Weisz was a prominent figure in the Army human factors community 
during the period from the 1950s through the 1980s.8 An infantryman in World War II, 
Weisz earned a doctoral degree in experimental psychology after the war, marking him as 
a member of the second generation of human factors specialists.  Weisz spent his career 
working in the Army’s Human Engineering Laboratory (HEL), which itself was only 
established in 1952 to assist in the development of engineering designs so that soldiers 
could use their equipment “in the best possible way.”  During the 1962 Army 
reorganization, HEL became a corporate laboratory within the Army Material Command 
and was charged with coordinating all the human factors engineering initiatives within 
the Army (Army Research Laboratory, 2003, p. 11).  Consequently, as the Army Material 
Command started to emphasize systems analysis9 in the 1960s, HEL began to actively 
consider the human factors contributions to such analyses.  In the words of then HEL 
director Weisz (1967), “Since it appears that system analysis will become a standard 
technique in research and development, especially whenever there is a choice between 
two different proposed system concepts, or various alternative system mixes to meet a 
particular threat, it is now appropriate to determine what role human factors researchers 
                                                 
8 Except where otherwise noted, section D is substantially based on a compilation of a series of 
interviews carried out from January–March 2010.  These interviews, conducted by the author, included the 
following people:  William Blackwood, Kenneth Boff, Paul Chatelier, and Joyce Shields.   
9 As discussed by Hughes (1998), in the 1950s and 1960s, the definitions of the terms systems 
engineering, operations research, and systems analysis frequently overlapped.  Usually, those speaking of 
systems engineering had in mind either the management of the design and development of systems with 
purely technical components or sociotechnical systems with both technical and organizational components.  
Proponents of operations research referred usually to quantitative techniques used to analyze deployed 
military and industrial systems.  Those that were expert in systems analysis compared, contrasted, and 
evaluated proposed projects, especially those that would create weapon systems (p. 142). 
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should play in making the analysis” (p. 1).  Given Weisz also mentions recent proposals 
to use systems analysis to aid logisticians, he was probably responding, at least in part, to 
the findings and recommendations of the Department of the Army Board of Inquiry on 
the Army Logistic System, or the Brown Board, so named for the board’s chairman, 
Lieutenant General Frederic Brown.   
The Brown Board (Department of the Army, 1967) was established by the Army 
in September 1965 for the purpose of analyzing the Army logistics system to determine 
what changes and modifications were needed to make it more responsive to materiel 
readiness requirements.  The need for such an analysis was driven, in part, by the failures 
of previous logistics reorganizations to improve unit-level readiness and the perceived 
loss of “the personnel-training-doctrine-hardware” (p. I-6) integration function that was 
historically accomplished by the Army’s Technical Services, the latter having been 
largely eliminated during the Project 80 reorganization.10   Part of the Board’s study 
approach was to set up a systems analysis and operations research group to describe and 
analyze Army logistics as a system.  Not surprisingly, a major concept advanced by the 
Board was the need for the Army to use systems analytic and operations research tools as 
part of its internal management techniques: 
DOD employs the management tools of systems analysis, operations 
research, statistical analysis, cost effectiveness, and other technical 
disciplines.  The Army must also use these tools if it is to respond 
articulately to DOD.  More than this, DOD uses these tools because they 
                                                 
10 To achieve increased economies in the common or cross service support areas, a series of Defense 
Department studies were directed to explore areas that might result in more cost-effective support 
operations.  One of these, Project 80, which established the Hoelscher committee, was directed to review 
the Army organization, with particular emphasis on the logistics structure.  Some of the principal findings 
of the Hoelscher committee centered on the Army’s seven Technical Services, each of which operated a 
distinctive, vertically integrated logistics system keyed to the nature of commodities provided and services 
performed.  As a group, these services performed the Army’s wholesale logistics functions, included 
research and development, procurement and production, inventory management, storage and distribution, 
maintenance and disposal, technical and professional services, and training and development.  The 
Hoelscher committee proposed a consolidation of materiel functions and transportation services under a 
single Department of the Army operational command that was later named the Army Materiel Command 
(AMC) [In the actual implementation of the Hoelscher committee proposals, transportation services were 
not placed under AMC].  As a result of the reorganization, the personnel, training, military occupational 
specialty proponency, and doctrine functions formerly performed by the Technical Services were 
transferred to the Office of Personnel Operations, the Continental Army Command (CONARC), and the 
Combat Developments Command (CDC) (Department of the Army, 1967, pp. I-3 – I-5). 
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have been proven to be effective techniques for quantitatively structuring 
decision making and resource allocation in complex operations (p. III-2). 
Additionally, the Board suggested the need for the Army General Staff to develop a 
coordinated set of principles and policies for logistics using a “systems approach:” 
A systems analysis approach to the management of Army logistics must 
be applied to establish the basis for a coordinated and compatible set of 
principles and policies.  All aspects of Army logistics should be described 
using the tools of systems analysis…A model, preferably a mathematical 
one, should be developed of the total logistics system (p. III-4).  
In summary, the Board’s approach and recommendations mirrored the emphasis on 
systems analysis that was pervading the Defense Department under Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara, himself an ardent proponent of the approach.   
 Beyond the issue of methodologies, the Board (Department of the Army, 1966) 
found that “one of the most damaging weaknesses in the acquisition-of-materiel cycle 
[was] the failure to plan for and provide the nonmaterial aspects of equipment” (p. III-7).  
A key element of the Board’s solution to this problem was a systems analysis approach to 
the management of all interrelated materiel and nonmateriel activities: 
The focus of the systems analysis approach…was on the management of 
the process necessary to logically consider and evaluate each of the 
military, technical, and economic variables involved in the total system 
design which will achieve stated requirements.  The creation of a balanced 
system design demands that each major design decision be based on an 
appropriate consideration of systems variables.  These include equipment, 
facilities, personnel requirements, procedural data, training, testing, 
follow-on logistics, support, and intersystem and intrasystem interfaces (p. 
VI-9). 
Additionally, the Board found that “there [was] no cohesive human factors engineering 
program in the Army materiel development programs” (p. VI-16), nor did the regulations 
“provide adequate guidance to establish a basis for [human factors engineering] 
requirements in system development (i.e., system analysis of human performance 
requirements)” (p. VI-17).  Also, the materiel acquisition process was unable to assure 
the availability of qualified personnel at the time materiel was deployed because of 
inadequacies in the processes by which personnel, training, and manpower requirements 
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were developed.  Thus, the Board recommended establishment of a comprehensive 
human factors engineering program to include issuance of a related Army Regulation.  
The Board also recommended “[c]onsolidation of personnel, training, and organizational 
functions under a single command…[to facilitate the] timely provision of qualified 
personnel” (p. IX–28).   
Coming on the heels of the Army’s Brown Board study was a Defense 
Department study (Nucci, 1967), summarized earlier, highlighting the need to better 
integrate manpower factors (i.e., manpower, skill levels, proficiency, availability, rotation 
rates, costs, etc.) into materiel acquisition programs.  It is therefore not surprising that 
Weisz (1967, 1968) perceived that it was the de facto policy of the Defense Department 
and the Department of the Army to take manpower factors into consideration in system 
analysis studies.  Weisz (1967) intuitively understood the simple fact that, “No weapon 
system analysis can be considered valid unless it includes the contribution of a very 
important component, namely ‘man,’ as part of the system” (p. 1).  He also realized that 
the behavioral sciences and human factors engineering fields, which historically utilized 
experimental methodologies and statistical techniques drawn from experimental 
psychology, needed to include operations research techniques within their list of tools for 
performing their portion of weapon system analyses. Weisz saw the field of human 
factors making contributions to the following four areas of a weapon system analysis:  
manpower requirements,11 training requirements, performance requirements,12 and system 
design.   Finally, Weisz asserted that human factors should not be treated separately from 
other areas embraced in the system analytic thinking process.  In his words, “Since man 
is an integral part of the total system, his contributions must be included each and every 
time that such areas as system performance, system effectiveness, system dependability, 
system reliability, system capability, and cost effectiveness are considered [emphasis in 
                                                 
11 Weisz (1967) considered manpower the “critical commodity” and thus it needed to be considered for 
all proposed system concepts in terms of the number of personnel to be used and the skill levels of the 
personnel required to operate and maintain the system (p. 2). 
12 Weisz (1967) asserted that the contribution of man to system performance must always be 
considered in the particular environment in which the system will be utilized.  Thus, environmental factors 
were incorporated in system analyses through their effect on man doing his tasks as part of total system 
operation (p. 2).  
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original]” (Weisz, 1967, p. 3).  To that end, Weisz argued that man’s contributions to 
these areas could be determined and expressed quantitatively as accurately at most of the 
other determinants (Weisz, 1967, p. 3).   
Weisz published two HEL reports (System Analysis: Human Factors Research 
and Development Contributions [Technical Note 6-67, July 1967] and System Analysis: 
Manpower Resources/System Design Integration Methodology [Technical Note 9-68, 
August 1968]) establishing a general framework around which manpower factors could 
be effectively included and appropriately weighted in the materiel acquisition process 
(Weisz, 1989, p. 2). Moreover, an implementing guide (Manpower Resources Integration 
for Army Materiel Development [HEL Guide 1-69, January 1969]) was also published for 
the purpose of explaining how to integrate HEL’s human factors engineering program 
within the Army’s life-cycle management model.  Concurrently, the first version of Army 
Regulation (AR) 602-1, titled Man-Materiel Systems—Human Factors Engineering 
Program, was published in March 1968 with the aid of HEL, laying out a Department of 
the Army-wide human factors engineering program.  Noteworthy in this regulation was 
the redefinition of human factors engineering as “a comprehensive technical effort to 
integrate all manpower characteristics (personnel skills, training implications, behavioral 
reactions, human performance, anthropometric data, and biomedical factors) into all 
Army systems” (p. 1) to ensure operational effectiveness, safety, and freedom from 
health hazards.  This definition was written by Weisz with the help of Jacob Barber, who 
worked in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Research and Studies 
Office.  Their intent was to broaden the scope of the definition of human factors 
engineering in use at the time (HEL Guide 1-69, January, 1969): 
The term “HFE” in the sense in which it is used in AR 602-
1…encompasses all of the “human” factors with which materiel 
developers must be concerned.  Although separate Army agencies exist to 
handle the selection, classification, and training of personnel who will 
ultimately operate and maintain new equipment, it is important that the 
aspects of manpower resources administered by those agencies be 
considered during materiel development (p. 1). 
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The various HEL publications were put forth in concert with AR 602-1 in support of 
what was really a pioneering endeavor to integrate all soldier-related attributes or 
characteristics into the materiel acquisition process (Weisz, 1989, p. 2).  
Weisz’s persuasive advocacy for his innovative ideas to integrate human factors 
into weapon systems analyses stimulated other organizations, including the Army’s 
materiel development community, to at least imitate his approach.  For instance, the U.S. 
Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) reproduced large 
portions of Weisz’s report, System Analysis: Manpower Resources/System Design 
Integration Methodology, verbatim in DARCOM Pamphlet 706-102, Engineering Design 
Handbook, Army Weapon System Analysis, Part 2 (1979), under the heading, 
“Introduction to Human Factors and Weapons Systems Analysis Interface Problems.” 
The handbook provided a rather eloquent introduction to the role of the weapon systems 
analyst in addressing human factors: 
Man has often been looked upon as one of the primary components of a 
complete weapon system, and his interface with the weapon or weapon 
system he employs may likely strike the balance between success and 
defeat in battle.  It is a very natural approach for the analyst to identify 
each anticipated source of variation in expected performance of the 
weapon system, to estimate the relative sizes of the components of 
variation, and to find their effect on predicted overall system performance.  
Should it turn out that the man is contributing too large a component of 
variation toward expected system performance, then further training of the 
soldier, or operator, may be indicated, or perhaps the improved design of 
weapons will be made mandatory.   Otherwise, it becomes important to 
estimate the size of natural human variations which may be involved in 
operation of a weapon system, and to take such amounts of variability into 
account in effectiveness studies (p. 33-3). 
It then went on to identify three areas that should be of primary concern for the weapons 
systems analyst:  human engineering, human performance, and human reliability.  This 
was subsequently followed by examples of several evaluations for the purpose of 
introducing the analyst to pertinent aspects of these three areas.  Even by today’s 
standards, the handbook provided a highly memorable and salient introduction to the 
topic of human factors in weapon systems analysis.   
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In the end, however, Weisz and his HEL colleagues’ efforts to develop what 
could essentially be characterized as the MANPRINT program of the mid 1980s 
amounted to a bottom-up campaign for reform that failed to garner sufficient support 
from the Army’s senior leaders.  As described by Weisz (1986): 
Though we certainly tried, we could not fully implement AR 602-1 in 
1968 nor [sic] later on because of organization and policy problems.  
There was no mechanism to integrate the various aspects of the [AR 602-1 
human factors engineering] definition across the responsible commands 
and agencies, nor sufficient policy and guidance to enforce such 
integration (p. 3). 
Nevertheless, their efforts were not without future effect.  In the June 1976 update to AR 
602-1, Figure A-1 of the Appendix (reproduced as Figure III-10 below) was added to 
further detail the personnel considerations in system effectiveness.  Figure A-1 was 
clearly the progenitor of a similar figure published 15 years later in DoD Instruction 
5000.2 (1991) under the title “Human Systems Integration” (p. 7-B-2).  Additionally, the 
HEL later prepared an updated version of HEL Guide 1-69, titled Human Factors 
Engineering in Research, Development, and Acquisition (October 1980), at the request of 
Generals Kerwin and Blanchard (authors of Man/Machine Interface—A Growing Crisis) 
after they were shown HEL Guide 1-69, which by then had become outdated because of 
changes in the materiel acquisition process (Weisz, 1989, p. 2).  Moreover, Mr. Delbert 
L. Spurlock, who was Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve 
Affairs from 1984–1989, was oft to quote Weisz’s earlier publications (1967 and 1968) to 
the House Armed Services Committee in seeking support for the Army’s then nascent 




Figure III-10. Personnel considerations in system effectiveness (From Department of the 
Army, 1976). 
 
3. A Resurgence of Interest (1983–)  
Neil Sheehan, in his book, A Fiery Peace in a Cold War: Bernard Schriever and 
the Ultimate Weapon (2009), alludes to an old Marine Corps adage that “luck occurs 
when preparation and opportunity coincide” (p. 225).  So it was to be with one U.S. 
Army Major William O. Blackwood.  During the summer of 1983, with diplomacy 
between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. at the lowest point since Stalin’s days and with the Army 
struggling to find a workable force structure, Blackwood reported for duty in the 
Research and Studies Office within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel 
(DCSPER) in Washington, D.C.  A career Army infantry officer with two tours in 
Vietnam, Blackwood earned a doctoral degree in education from the University of 
Florida in 1977 and was a scholar of organizational change.  His assignments prior to the 
Office of the DCSPER had been with mechanized infantry divisions in Europe, and he 
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brought with him a close appreciation of the challenges soldiers faced with the new 
weapon systems of the time.  As an infantry company commander responsible for testing 
new weapons, he gained a deeper understanding of the importance of man-machine 
interaction as a determinant of weapon system performance.  Later, as a battalion 
operations officer, Blackwood witnessed firsthand the problems in training soldiers to 
high levels of proficiency with the Dragon Missile system and the lack of correlation 
between soldier proficiency on the training device and soldier performance with the 
weapon.  Whether by chance, fate, or some purposeful design, Blackwood’s subsequent 
assignment to Office of the DCSPER would turn out to be a proverbial case of the right 
person in the right place at the right time.  Over the ensuing six years, he would apply his 
expert knowledge of organizational change to successfully effect how the military 
addressed personnel issues within materiel acquisition programs.  Although having no 
formal training in human factors, Blackwood became the de facto architect and author of 
the Army’s MANPRINT program during the period from 1983–1987.  Later, during his 
follow-on assignment (1987–1989) to the Strategic Planning Office within the Office of 
the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition) he would serve as the catalyst for the 
introduction of HSI within the Defense Department at large (W. O. Blackwood, personal 
communication March 3, 2010, e-mail communication March 22, 2010).   
While Major Blackwood was prepared by way of his education and experience, 
the coincidence with opportunity occurred when the normal rotation of the Army’s 
uniformed senior leadership fortuitously brought two particular general officers to key 
positions from which they could sponsor organizational change.  The first of these 
officers was General “Mad Max” Maxwell Thurman, a reputed workaholic and master 
organizer,  who served as commander of the Army’s Recruiting Command from 1979 –
1981 and then as DCSPER from 1981–1983.  He is credited during this period with 
reversing the downward slide in Army recruit quality as well as for developing the 
Army’s well-known “Be all that you can be” recruiting campaign.  In 1983, Thurman 
became the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, a position that put him on the Army Systems 
Acquisition Review Council, the latter having responsibility for reviewing major 
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acquisition programs at key milestones.   Thus, there would now be a personnel-minded 
person sitting in judgment over major weapon system acquisition programs. 
The other significant change in assignment involved Lieutenant General Robert 
Elton, who moved from being the commanding general of the 9th Infantry Division to 
take the DCSPER position vacated by Thurman.  As discussed earlier, the 9th Infantry 
Division functioned as the High Technology Test Bed for development of a light infantry 
division design.  Consequently, Elton had been dual–designated as the division 
commander and the High Technology Test Bed test director, which necessitated that he 
work in close coordination with both TRADOC and the Army Materiel and Development 
Readiness Command to marry up emerging technologies and organizational designs.  
Working for Chief of Staff of the Army, General Meyer, Elton had been granted 
relatively free reign to develop high technology light division designs and ideas 
independently of existing force planning efforts.  Consequently, the new DCSPER 
brought to the position an innovative mindset, experience with both force design and 
materiel systems development, and a firsthand appreciation of the challenges the Army 
faced in launching the 10,000-man light infantry division project (W. O. Blackwood, 
personal communication March 3, 2010).   
 Thus the Army’s personnel community had scored a trifecta in the summer of 
1983.  During this period, the new Chief of Staff of the Army, General Wickham, 
strongly pushed his ideas for the Army of Excellence (AOE), for which he had begun 
laying the groundwork in the spring of 1983 as Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.  While it 
was Wickham who inaugurated the AOE design and gave it push and drive throughout, it 
was General Thurman, as the new Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, who was responsible 
for integrating the efforts of the Army Staff, TRADOC, the Army Materiel Command, 
and other major Army commands.  The Summer 1983 Army Commanders’ Conference 
synchronized the Army’s leadership in terms of thinking about the resources needed to 
achieve the AOE design objectives.  Above all, the light infantry division was the 
linchpin of the 1983 AOE design effort, and it was only going to be realized within the 
Army’s apparently immutable end-strength ceiling by economizing on the use of 
manpower, especially in combat service support (Romjue, 1993, pp. 31–35).   At the 
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same time, there were many examples of new weapons that did not perform well or 
increased rather than saved manpower spaces.  Since the personnel community managed 
the Army’s human resources, it was clear to General Thurman that they needed to be a 
full partner in this process.  Consequently, Lt. General Elton tasked his Research and 
Studies Office in the summer of 1983 to develop a plan for giving the personnel 
community a “sense of place and purpose” in the weapon system acquisition process with 
the goal of improving manpower and personnel utilization within the Army (Blackwood 
& Riviello, 1994, pp. 3–4, 9)   
It was readily apparent in 1983 from previous studies and analyses that the 
personnel community was not participating effectively in the Army’s weapon system 
acquisition process despite the fact that they had the authority to do so since the 1970s.  
Several factors contributed to this situation:  1) a general lack of knowledge about the 
acquisition process by those in the personnel community, 2) inadequate analytical tools 
and techniques, 3) deficiencies in structured processes and accountability, and 4) the 
bureaucratic entrenchment of the acquisition community (Blackwood & Riviello, 1994, 
p. 6).  In terms of the latter, there was particularly stiff resistance from the integrated 
logistics support (ILS) community who saw themselves as the focal point and 
management integrator for MPT actions (Blackwood & Riviello, 1994, p. 4).  However, 
within the Office of the DCSPER, it was clear that a potential window for change had 
opened (Blackwood & Riviello, 1994, p. 7).  The Army’s senior leadership was ready for 
organizational change that improved integration of soldier considerations within the 
weapon system acquisition process—a prerequisite to achieving General Wickham’s 
AOE design given the resource constrained environment (Stanley, 1985, p. 7).  
Additionally, people having both the appropriate Weltanschauung (i.e., worldview) and 
authority were in positions within the Army’s senior leadership such that they could 
effectively sponsor significant organizational change (Blackwood & Riviello, 1994, p. 4). 
Those in the Office of the DCSPER firmly believed that the answer to the 
question of who should be the integrator was not the ILS community.  As they saw it, the 
personnel community was the one left to manage the long-term consequences of 
personnel-related decisions made in the weapon system acquisition process, so they 
 142
needed to be, at a minimum, a full partner in the acquisition process.  The real question 
then was how to go about orchestrating the needed organizational change.  Planning the 
change effort was carried out at the Office of the DCSPER by a small group of just three 
officers under Lt. General Elton, headed by Major Blackwood, and residing in the 
DCSPER’s Office of Research and Studies.  Their first step was to achieve consensus on 
an approach, which directly led to the decision by the Office of the DCSPER to sponsor 
an Army Science Board summer study (W. O. Blackwood, personal communication 
March 3, 2010). 
There were several considerations that underlay the decision to orchestrate the 
change effort beginning with an Army Science Board study.  The Army Science Board 
was seen as an essential means for validating the need for change and nominating an 
acceptable approach to solving the problem.  Since the science board members included 
retired general officers and respected members of industry and academia, its findings and 
recommendations would have significant visibility among the Army’s senior leadership 
as well as industry.  Additionally, its members would likely be viewed as knowledgeable 
but impartial by the bureaucratic entrenchment, thereby helping to overcome anticipated 
resistance, particularly in the weapon system acquisition community. Perhaps most 
important, however, was the belief that the study recommendations would, if properly 
handled, eventuate in the Office of the DCSPER being empowered by the Chief of Staff 
of the Army to lead the Army Staff efforts to remedy the situation (Blackwood & 
Riviello, 1994, pp. 6, 10).   
 There was precedent for the Army Science Board to take up this issue as a logical 
extension of the Army Science Board Summer Studies 1981, Equipping the Army 1990 –
2000; 1982, Science and Engineering Personnel; and 1983, Future Development Goals, 
all of which discussed, in one form or another, the need to better integrate the soldier into 
the materiel acquisition process.  Accordingly, the Army Science Board’s 1984 Summer 
Study, Leading and Manning Army 21, took up the theme of improving readiness through 
better integration of personnel with the total Army system.  One of the major study areas 
was the “soldier-machine interface,” a term that was synonymous with human factors, 
manpower, personnel, and training (HMPT):  
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The soldier-machine interface stretches across the boundaries of several 
technical disciplines and is now used to describe any number of often 
disparate approaches to systems design and analysis, logistics support 
analysis, and manpower planning…this proliferation of meanings has 
caused some to question the usefulness of the soldier-machine interface 
concept and others to relegate it to the imprecision of slang.  The term, 
however, does meaningfully describe a specific methodology for 
improving systems design in the defense system development and 
acquisition process.  This strategy fully integrates an emerging system’s 
hardware, software, human, and other support subsystems in order to 
achieve specified mission capabilities…Hence, soldier-machine interface 
is a robust, yet precise concept, always useful and often required in order 
to optimize defense systems’ design and ultimately their performance in 
the field (p. 121).    
The study board found that institutional interest in the soldier-machine interface concept 
was driven in large part by the coincidence of several macroergonomic trends: 
The Department of Defense (DoD) has grown increasing reliant on 
advanced technology to counter the threat from a numerically superior 
potential adversary.  By almost any measure, the density of high 
technology is up in the Armed Forces. […] In effect, the advanced 
operational capability of high technology systems has been purchased, at 
least in part, with greater demands for human resource.  Yet the absolute 
size of the American workforce is shrinking. […] There has also been an 
alarming dip in the quality or capability of this smaller pool. […] This 
coincidence of a smaller, less capable workforce and burgeoning high 
technology in defense systems is already creating severe problems in 
military human resources and systems acquisition management.  It is also 
impacting negatively on the combat readiness of the Armed Forces (pp. 
121–122). 
From a sociotechnical systems perspective, the science board’s comments were clearly 
indicative of the Army having failed to jointly optimize its personnel and technological 
systems given the changes to its environment.  Moreover, the comments provided a 
compelling refutation of Cold War technological determinism.   
Having roundly validated the problem as seen from the perspective of the Office 
of the DCSPER, the science board then provided their suggested approach for solving the 
problem: 
In DoD, at least, the human-machine mismatch problem is as much a 
function of the way new defense systems are designed and developed as it 
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is a product of shifts in the American population.  Consequently, the 
solution requires a broad range of initiatives, involving both human 
resources and acquisition management.  In order to increase total system 
effectiveness, DoD needs to simplify system operation and maintenance, 
and to reduce manpower requirements, training time, and cost. […] In 
effect, then, soldier-machine interface is a strategy for total system 
development [emphasis in original] (pp 123). 
The science board went on to describe the total system development strategy: 
In the short term, this strategy will involve ad hoc actions in the system 
design process to ensure that emerging equipment is both affordable and 
supportable from a human resource perspective.  (Said another way, the 
Services must take steps to ensure that they can efficiently access, train, 
and retain adequate numbers of personnel to operate and maintain new 
systems effectively.)  These actions include training developments, 
personnel management, systems engineering, human factors engineering, 
and medical science. 
The initiatives are ad hoc in that they represent corrective and essentially 
independent efforts to redress immediate problems at the soldier-machine 
interface…In the longer term, the soldier-machine interface must extend 
beyond these useful but disconnected efforts to an alternative concept of 
system design.  This concept is best characterized as total system 
development. […] This philosophy begins with a different concept of the 
final product of design—the system.  With total system development, that 
product is a means to an end.  It is software, hardware, human beings with 
logistics support, all of which must be creatively brought together to 
provide a desired mission capability.  The emphasis, then, is on achieving 
field performance, rather than improving equipment, because only the 
former is genuine defense capability. 
The process of creating a comprehensive system that provides a desired 
capability requires a working integration of all technical disciplines 
involved with the system during its life cycle. […] The total system 
development process extends responsibility for both system design and 
field performance to all of these disciplines. […] Total system 
development will also require changes in DoD’s investment philosophy. 
[…] Ultimately, the traditionally horizontal approach to systems 
development (i.e., from concept definition, through concept demonstration 
and validation to full scale engineering development) will shift to a more 
integrated and vertical strategy. […]  
Fundamentally, total systems development will necessitate a new way of 
thinking about systems, a philosophy which focuses on the system’s 
purpose rather than on the specifications, standards, goals and objectives, 
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however detailed, of its constituent components.  A good fit at the soldier-
machine interface pushes technology and human and other support 
resources to their collective limits in pursuit of mission capability.  Hitachi 
has called this concept “humanication”; others have described it as 
“equipping the man” [emphasis in original] (pp. 124–126). 
Providing some further specificity to the total system development strategy, the science 
board identified several key functional areas—what would later become the MANPRINT 
domains13—that must necessarily be considered holistically in the system design process: 
The design objectives of a total system are achieved by integrating into the 
engineering design process the elements of human factors engineering, 
manpower, personnel, training and training equipment (HMPT).  Also 
inherent in HMPT are many biomedical aspects and health hazard  
 
 
                                                 
13 The original MANPRINT domains (Booher, 1990): 
• Manpower – The number of human resources, both men and women, military and civilian, required 
and available to operate and maintain Army systems.  
• Personnel – The aptitudes, experience, and other human characteristics necessary to achieve optimal 
system performance.   
• Training – The requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities needed by the available personnel to operate 
and maintain systems under operational conditions.   
• Human factors engineering – The comprehensive integration of human characteristics into system 
definition, design, development, and evaluation to optimize the performance of human-machine 
combinations. 
• System safety – The inherent ability of the system to be used, operated, and maintained without 
accidental injury to personnel. 
• Health hazards – Inherent condition in the operation or use of a system (e.g., shock, recoil, vibration, 
toxic fumes, radiation, noise) that can cause death, injury, illness, disability, or reduce job performance 
of personnel. 
The Army Science Board 1984 Summer Study only addressed six domains.  In the wake of Operation 
Desert Storm (1990–1991), an important lesson learned was that fratricide had to be reduced.  Chief of 
Staff of the Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan, affirmed that the Army would not tolerate casualties that 
could be prevented by proper research, development, and acquisition, thereby focusing attention on the 
issue.   Many believed that soldier survivability was a subset of system survivability, the implication being 
that if the system survives, so does the soldier.  However, this is not always the case.  In 1992, the 
DCSPER, Lt. General Thomas P. Carney, proposed resolving the issue by including “soldier survivability” 
as a seventh domain in the Army’s MANPRINT program.  In 1994, the U.S. Army Research Laboratory 
was given responsibility for soldier survivability and it was officially added as the seventh domain of 
MANPRINT.  Thus, the above list was appended with the following additional domain description: 
• Soldier survivability – The characteristics of a system than can reduce fratricide, detectability, and 




assessments, as well as test and evaluation.  These factors interact with 
each other and with the design and should not be considered separately (p. 
38). 
The science board also addressed the larger issue of integrating organizational efforts to 
better support total system development: 
The project manager (PM) must be held responsible for building a system 
which can perform its specified mission when operated and maintained by 
well led soldiers.  The combat developer must be charged with ensuring 
that the system is matched to the soldier the Army is likely to access, train, 
sustain, and retain.  These mutually supportive obligations must be bonded 
in an interactive fashion which, in turn, yields the necessary total system 
perspective (See Figure below) [emphasis in original] (pp. 38–39). 
 
 
Finally, the science board bluntly concluded that “integration of personnel acquisition 
with weapon acquisition is a must” (p. 30) and offered the following broad 
recommendations: 
• Institute a single HMPT authority equal in weight to the materiel authority 
throughout the system design and decision process 
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• Focus and resource Soldier research to improve total system performance 
• Establish HMPT initiatives with staying power in Army organizations and 
processes. 
By and large, the 1984 Summer Study proved quite favorable in making the case for the 
change sought by the Office of the DCSPER.   
However, even before the Army Science Board completed its study, the Army 
decided that changes would be made.  In June 1984, General Thurman tasked Lt. General 
Elton and the Office of the DCSPER to review various aspects of HMPT in the Army.  
The Office of the DCSPER was given staff responsibility for developing policy and 
clearly defining the HMPT responsibilities of other organizations involved in the 
acquisition and combat development processes (GAO, 1985, p. 8).  That same month, 
General Richard H. Thompson, a logistics officer, assumed command of the Army 
Materiel Command.  This change afforded General Thurman the opportunity, through 
General Thompson, to directly inject interest in personnel considerations within the 
Army’s materiel acquisition community (Blackwood & Riviello, 1994, p. 12).  General 
Thompson agreed with Thurman’s thrust, although his line of thinking was to 
institutionalize HMPT integration primarily within the management of the Army Materiel 
Command (Blanchard & Blackwood, 1990). 
Accordingly, in July 1984, General Thompson advanced his idea for 
“MANPRINT,” an acronym he is credited with creating that stood for “manpower and 
personnel integration” (MANPRINT Policy Office, July 1986, p. 1).  The acronym was 
used both as a noun, to denote the Army Materiel Command’s general action plan for 
imposing HMPT considerations across the materiel acquisition process, and as a verb, in 
the sense of putting man’s imprint or fingerprint on developmental systems (Tragesser, 
1985, p. 4).  To realize his vision for MANPRINT, General Thompson established a 
Human Factors Engineering Task Force, comprised of personnel from various Army 
Materiel Command elements, to analyze HMPT deficiencies, develop a corrective action 
plan, and oversee implementation of the plan.  The task force reviewed previous studies 
and current policy documents to develop a list of HMPT problems.  Field locations were 
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then visited to verify that the problems still existed.  By late August 1984, the task force 
had developed a matrix of 150 major HMPT action items and a series of tasking letters to 
be sent to the 31 Army organizations involved in HMPT.  These letters delineated those 
major tasks that fell within each organization’s area of responsibility and asked each 
organization to develop more details of how it planned to perform those tasks.  The intent 
of the task force was to build an Army-wide master plan based on the individual 
organizational plans.  The master plan was to be reviewed and approved by the Army 
Materiel Command’s Materiel Acquisition Review Board in March 1985 (GAO, 1985, p. 
9).    
Similarly, TRADOC formed a MPT steering committee in September 1984 to 
develop its own master plan for MPT integration.  Its steering committee included 
officials from several TRADOC organizations who worked to develop a draft master plan 
by October 1984 (GAO, 1985, p. 10).   Seeking to minimize redundancy, General 
Thompson soon formed a joint Army Materiel Command-TRADOC general officer 
steering committee to coordinate these two organizations’ efforts.  Meanwhile, various 
other smaller commands and agencies, such as the Health Services Command, the Army 
Safety Center, and the Operational Test and Evaluation Agency, were initiating their own 
planning activities.  Differing perceptions soon developed, and by the fall of 1984 the 
Office of the DCSPER had come to view the activities of the various commands and 
agencies with a degree of suspicion.  For the Office of the DCSPER, these parallel 
planning efforts were critical in raising awareness and maintaining the serious attention 
of the Army’s senior leadership on the HMPT problem.  However, if history was any 
guide, many of the initiatives would not have staying power in the Army’s organizations 
and processes given their largely short-term focus (Blackwood & Riviello, 1994, pp. 12–
13).  The upshot of this dilemma was that the Office of the DCSPER advanced its own 
comprehensive plan for MANPRINT, which effectively absorbed and subsumed the 
Army Materiel Command effort.  Buoyed by the results of the Army Science Board’s 
1984 Summer Study, the Office of the DCSPER plan for MANPRINT was briefed to a 
newly formed General Officer Steering Committee and approved in December 1984 
(Blackwood & Riviello, 1994, p. 13). 
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Unlike the other early initiatives to correct HMPT problems, the Office of the 
DCSPER plan was based on a strategy for change and represented a careful and 
deliberative planning process that was focused on a long-term (i.e., 10 year) approach 
(Blackwood & Riviello, 1994, p. 7).  The plan was carefully crafted around a broad set of 
goals to establish a unifying sense of purpose while still getting to what the Office of the 
DCSPER viewed as the true crux of the HMPT problem—namely, the limited availability 
and high cost of personnel resources.  The primary challenge for the Office of the 
DCSPER was the prevailing view within the Army at large that human resource problems 
were supply problems that should be addressed through supply-side interventions such as 
enhanced recruiting.  Consequently, directly advocating for demand-side interventions on 
the part of the force planning and materiel acquisition communities was not thought to 
have a high likelihood for success.  To make the Office of the DCSPER concept for 
MANPRINT marketable, three goals, in a specific order, were put forth: 1) improve 
human performance, thereby improving total system performance; 2) improve manpower 
and personnel utilization within the Army; and 3) improve unit effectiveness and 
readiness by designing and building weapon systems that were easy to use, maintain, and 
support.    Lt. General Elton made the decision to put his staff’s primary goal of 
improving personnel utilization in the middle to deliberately reduce its visibility.  Elton 
believed that the leading and flanking goals, while addressing byproducts of improved 
personnel utilization, would resonate more directly with field commanders, thereby 
engendering wide support for their MANPRINT concept (Blackwood & Riviello, 1994, 
p. 7).  As it eventuated, the strategy worked and the first and third goals are now widely 
appreciated as primary goals of the Defense Department HSI program (DoD, 2008).  
There was another calculated logic behind the Office of the DCSPER’s choice of 
goals for their concept of MANPRINT.  As mentioned earlier, there was a continual 
friction between the Office of DCSPER and the ILS community over MANPRINT, 
which had the unfortunate effect of slowing implementation of, and at times threatening, 
the very existence of the program.  The ILS community was repeatedly shown that 
MANPRINT could raise supportability issues earlier in the materiel acquisition process, 
thereby impacting system design so as to head off supportability problems later in the 
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system life cycle.  By implication, MANPRINT and ILS were totally compatible and 
mutually supportive—at least from the perspective of the Office of the DCSPER.  The 
ILS community, on the other hand, would have none of it.  They remained relatively 
intransigent in their view that MANPRINT was incompatible and redundant to ILS.  In 
the end, this conflict was largely side stepped by emphasizing that the focus of 
MANPRINT was on performance and not supportability (Blackwood & Riviello, 1994, 
pp. 4, 20).  However, if MANPRINT was to help achieve General Wickham’s design 
objectives for the AOE, it was going to have to address weapon system supportability. 
The Office of the DCSPER implementation plan for MANPRINT focused on six 
key areas that were determined to be essential for institutionalizing change within the 
Army:  policy and procedures, marketing and communications, training and education, 
resources, research and studies, and evaluations and applications.  Specifically, policy 
and procedures focused on publishing a MANPRINT regulation, changing related 
existing Army regulations governing the acquisition and combat development processes, 
and supporting major commands in implementing follow-on guidance.  Additionally, 
MANPRINT positions and skill identifiers were codified in the personnel bureaucracy.  
Marketing and communications included visits to industry, presentations at professional 
seminars and conferences, publication of articles, and outreach efforts aimed at the 
Army’s civilian leadership, the other military services, the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, and Congressional staffers.  Training and education was critical to explaining 
roles and imparting skills as well as in obtaining active and meaningful involvement from 
MANPRINT stakeholders.  Hay Systems was contracted to support the development and 
delivery of three nested training courses that were offered starting in January 1986:  a 3-
week entry level course for MANPRINT practitioners, a 1-week course for supervisors, 
and a 1-day course for general officers and senior executive service civilians.  Resources 
were required to support program initiatives, but the overall funding strategy was 
designed to support a minimum program within the Department of the Army (i.e., less 
than 50 new positions) and tie MANPRINT costs directly to each new acquisition 
program.  Research and studies focused on developing the tools, techniques, and methods 
for analysis, modeling and simulation, and data management (Blackwood & Riviello, 
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1994, pp. 13–14).  One of these early research initiatives involved the conversion of the 
Navy’s HARDware versus MANpower (HARDMAN) analysis technique for use by the 
Army to better identify MPT requirements (GAO, 1985, p. 7).  Finally, the evaluation 
and applications initiative focused on gaining feedback from MANPRINT applications 
and reviews to support an organizational learning cycle (Blackwood & Riviello, 1994, p. 
14). 
Overall, planning was done across a wide front with the intent of facilitating 
broad ownership of the program and developing redundancies should certain aspects fail.  
The eventual success of this approach, particularly with regards to the issue of ownership, 
can still be witnessed today in response to the question of who started MANPRINT:  
nearly everybody reports they had a key role in starting MANPRINT.  However, the 
personal interest of Lt. General Elton in “marketing” the program was critical to ensuring 
that MANPRINT had a highly visible organizational champion in its early years 
(Blackwood & Riviello, 1994, p. 13).  Additionally, the Office of the DCSPER worked to 
portray the MANPRINT concept as both intuitively simple and coherent with 
organizational values (Blackwood & Riviello, 1994, p. 9).  The simplifying notion played 
upon the Army’s quintessential philosophy about soldiers and machines, namely that the 
Army equips its men rather than mans its equipment—an assertion that is attributed to 
General Creighton Abrams circa 1974 (Tragesser, 1985, p. 4).  This, in turn, led to the 
slogan: “MANPRINT: Remember the Soldier.”  The idea engendered by the slogan was 
both basic to the Army’s culture and struck at the core of the Army leadership principle 
of “taking care of your soldiers.”  This had the effect of allowing Lt. General Elton and 
the Office of the DCSPER to seize the proverbial moral high ground (Blackwood & 
Riviello, 1994, p. 9).   
The Office of the DCSPER decided to primarily focus their efforts during 1985 
on building awareness of the MANPRINT concept within the Army (Blackwood & 
Riviello, 1994, p. 9).  Nevertheless, the Office of the DCSPER staff never lost sight of 
what they thought were the critical aspects of implementing MANPRINT:  involvement 
and communications, training, impacting the acquisition decision process, and 
influencing source selection (Blackwood & Riviello, 1994, pp. 15–18).   Involvement and 
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communication with those both within and external to the Army was credited with 
accounting for much of the initial success in institutionalizing MANPRINT.  As 
previously mentioned, a contractor, the Hay Systems, was hired in the summer of 1984 to 
develop MANPRINT training programs and support program implementation.  At the 
same time, an Army study advisory group, led by the Office of the DCSPER, was formed 
to assist Hay Systems’ work.  The advisory group was comprised of over 20 members 
who represented the MANPRINT domains, the major subordinate commands, and 
various field agencies.  Through the task of developing the MANPRINT training course, 
the contractor and the study advisory group initially defined and then evolved the 
MANPRINT roles of the various domain specialists.  The study advisory group met 
monthly for over a year to resolve issues as they emerged.  Issues that could not be 
resolved within the body of the study advisory group were referred to an informal council 
of colonels, or even to a general officer when appropriate, for solution (Blackwood & 
Riviello, 1994, p. 15). 
  In the fall of 1984, the Office of the DCSPER dispatched a fact-finding team 
comprised of members from the Army Staff, the Army Materiel Command, TRADOC, 
and the Army Research Institute to visit academia and then industry, starting with those 
who had representatives on the Army Science Board’s summer study.  The purpose of 
these visits was to both facilitate involvement and communication with key external 
Army stakeholders and to learn how personnel issues were being considered in the 
engineering design process (Blackwood & Riviello, 1994, p. 15).   It was evident from 
those visits that industry was not playing an active role in addressing personnel issues.  
However, this was attributed, in large part, to the Army’s failure to provide essential 
information in requirements and contractual documents or to stress consideration of 
personnel issues in requests for proposals.  They concluded that industry had no incentive 
to engineer designs that would allow the Army to realize personnel savings, especially in 
system maintenance and support.  Thus, these visits highlighted the need for MANPRINT 
to focus on reliability, availability, and maintainability issues as they affected 
maintenance and support personnel considerations (W. O. Blackwood, personal 
communication March 3, 2010).  Concurrent to the work of the fact-finding team, Hay 
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Systems set up a series of three meetings between General Thurman and senior 
executives from several large defense firms, with each meeting involving managers from 
different firms.  These meetings provided a venue for frank and open discussions at the 
senior executive level and served to validate the observations of the fact-finding team.  
Such meetings were held at Fort McNair and continued for several years as a means for 
soliciting inputs and communicating progress and expectations (Blackwood & Riviello, 
1994, pp. 15–16). 
 Beyond the outreach efforts, the spring of 1985 saw the publication of the draft 
version of Army Regulation 602-2, Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) 
in the Material Acquisition Process, clarifying MANPRINT roles and responsibilities.  
Meanwhile, the Army Materiel Command and TRADOC had revised program managers’ 
and TRADOC system managers’ statements of responsibility to more clearly articulate 
their accountability for MANPRINT in the materiel acquisition process (W. O. 
Blackwood, personal communication March 3, 2010).  Given the complexity of the 
materiel acquisition process and the sheer quantity of documents produced, the Office of 
the DCSPER chose to focus initial efforts on three strategic points in the weapon system 
acquisition process:  the request for proposal (RFP), source selection, and the test and 
evaluation process (Blackwood & Riviello, 1994, p. 17).  
 The RFP is a formal solicitation by the government for industry to provide 
proposals for a specific commodity or service.  It was clear from the observations of the 
fact-finding team that industry would address MANPRINT considerations if they were a 
requirement in the RFP.  Thus, a major initiative by the Office of the DCSPER was to 
ensure that RFPs incorporated MANPRINT tasks in the statement of work, included 
deliverables for those tasks, and identified MANPRINT considerations as a factor in 
source selection (Blackwood & Riviello, 1994, p. 17).   
 Source selection is the process by which the government evaluates responses by 
industry to a RFP and selects a winning proposal.  As it turned out, establishing a policy 
that caused MANPRINT to be included as a major element in the source selection criteria 
was one of the most difficult challenges faced by the Office of the DCSPER (Blackwood 
& Riviello, 1994, p. 17).  Although Army Regulation 602-2 (Department of the Army, 
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1987) provided the formal direction that the “MANPRINT assessment will be a separate 
major area in source selection and evaluations” (p. 3), the materiel acquisition community 
was very resistant given their strong belief that this would increase program costs.  The 
basic supposition that MANPRINT would actually reduce total ownership costs was 
never an issue—opponents of MANPRINT were primarily focused on the issue of 
procurement costs.  The real controversy was the fact that the inclusion of MANPRINT 
in source selection would directly impact industry, obligate resources, and limit the 
ability of the materiel acquisition community to waive MANPRINT requirements.   The 
source selection issue was sufficiently cantankerous that it had to eventually be resolved 
at the Under Secretary of the Army level through the publication of Army Acquisition 
Executive Policy Memorandum 89-2, which directed that MANPRINT be both included 
in all RFPs and considered a factor in source selection evaluations.  Unfortunately, the 
Army Materiel Command, which was adamantly opposed to including MANPRINT in 
source selection, was responsible for enforcing the source selection policy, an 
arrangement that almost guaranteed that the controversy would be perpetuated.  In the 
long run, however, this situation actually contributed to the health of the MANPRINT 
program by continuing to force the Army’s senior leadership to study the issue as 
conflicts resurfaced (Blackwood & Riviello, 1994, pp. 17–18, 21). 
Since MANPRINT was to be applied across the materiel acquisition process, it 
was imperative that a mechanism be provided for influencing acquisition decision 
making.  This was achieved by making the Office of the DCSPER an effective participant 
on the Army’s top-level materiel acquisition decision board, the Army Systems 
Acquisition and Review Council (ASARC).  The DCSPER representative to the ASARC 
could ensure that critical human performance issues were at least identified and 
acknowledged before a final decision on design, procurement, test, or fielding was made 
by the council.   Accordingly, it became the ASARC’s de facto role to evaluate whether 
MANPRINT was effectively applied to a system under review.  This situation had the 
distinct advantage that the materiel acquisition community perceived that they were 
answering for MANPRINT issues to the Army’s highest acquisition authority and not the 
Office of the DCSPER.  This helped to diffuse ownership for MANPRINT throughout 
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the materiel acquisition community while providing MANPRINT a significant go/no-go 
vote on every major Army acquisition program (Blackwood & Riviello, 1994, p. 21). 
 During 1985, a number of pilot projects were selected to expedite learning and 
gain experience with implementing MANPRINT in each of the major materiel 
acquisition phases.  But, it was the Light Helicopter Experimental (LHX) program, or 
what became known as RAH-66 Comanche, that was the key pilot program for 
demonstrating the viability and potential effects of MANPRINT.  The LHX program was 
specifically chosen because it was the Army’s largest and most visible program at the 
time and the program manager was supportive of MANPRINT.  Thus, the LHX program 
became the first major Army program to both implement MANPRINT considerations 
into the front end analysis phase of the materiel acquisition process and to include 
MANPRINT in the source selection document (MANPRINT Policy Office, July 1986).  
The LHX program would prove crucial in establishing the credibility of the MANPRINT 
effort, and hence, Lt. General Elton took significant personal interest, chairing the LHX 
MANPRINT review (W. O. Blackwood, personal communication March 3, 2010).  By 
1986, LHX became a true experimental program, testing where it was possible to 
introduce advanced technology into the Army’s inventory without creating problems of 
unsatisfactory total system performance or increasing personnel demands.  Even 
opponents of the LHX program were impressed by the advances achieved relative to the 
standard of normal acquisition practices.  It was later estimated in 1995 that the potential 
cost avoidance in the LHX program in terms of manpower, personnel, training, and safety 
was $3.3 billion, equating to an 8,000 percent return on investment for the portion of the 
program’s research and development budget that was attributable to MANPRINT 
(Skelton, 1997).  Other successful early applications of MANPRINT included the 
pedestal-mounted Stinger missile system, the line of sight-forward heavy (LOS-H) air 
defense artillery system, and the howitzer improvement program (HIP) (Booher, 1988, p. 
2). 
 By the fall of 1985, Lt. General Elton recognized that the growing MANPRINT 
effort would soon require more attention than he could realistically provide given his 
other duties as DCSPER.  Additionally, he was cognizant of the finite time that he had 
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left in his current assignment and appreciated the importance of continuity of leadership 
to the health of the program.  Consequently, a civilian senior executive service (SES) 
position was created within the Office of the DCSPER to serve as the director for the 
Army’s MANPRINT program.  While the overall MANPRINT staff would be kept 
relatively small, the fact that it was led by a SES helped ensure it had appropriate 
visibility and authority (Blackwood & Riviello, 1994, p. 10).   Moreover, the SES would 
wield a big stick as the Office of the DCSPER’s representative on the ASARC.  In July, 
1986, Dr. Harold R. Booher was hired on as the first civilian director of the Army’s 
MANPRINT program (MANPRINT Policy Office, August 1986).  With Booher at the 
helm as a Special Assistant to the DCSPER, the MANPRINT office, which had started in 
the DCSPER’s Research and Studies Office, became first a Special Assistant Office in 
1986 and then an official directorate in the Office of the DCSPER in 1987. 
4. Human Systems Integration (1987–) 
 The MANPRINT program was designed to survive on its own after 1986, 
although there were serious doubts at the time as to whether it would.  With Booher in the 
MANPRINT Office to provide continuity and leadership, and with General Thurman able 
to continue his advocacy through 1989, first as Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and then 
as commander of TRADOC, MANPRINT was afforded sufficient attention and support 
from 1986 through 1989 to maintain momentum institutionalizing the program within the 
Army.  In October 1987, Lieutenant Colonel Blackwood, who had been selected in 1983 
by Lt. General Elton to help plan, organize, and implement the MANPRINT program, 
was tapped to join the Strategic Planning Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition.  Now Blackwood would help instigate a similar effort within the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (Blackwood & Riviello, 1994, pp. 7, 19, 21-22; W. O. 
Blackwood, personal communication March 3, 2010). 
 Before continuing with this historical narrative, we must backup to introduce an 
important supporting actor in the story of how MANPRINT came into being—one Mr. 
Delbert L. Spurlock, Jr.  Mr. Spurlock was a lawyer by trade and had come from private 
practice to serve as the General Counsel at the Department of the Army starting in 1980.  
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Spurlock was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve 
Affairs in 1984, making him the highest Army civilian representative for the personnel 
community, and not surprisingly, a strong advocate for Lt. General Elton’s MANPRINT 
concept.  Spurlock’s interest and support mainly stemmed from an Army manpower 
perspective, but he also had a vision that extended the MANPRINT philosophy 
throughout the military and beyond, into the nation’s workforce at large.  But at the same 
time, Spurlock was skeptical about whether the Army would stick to its MANPRINT 
master plan.  Spurlock testified before the House Armed Services Committee to this 
effect in the spring of 1985.  As related by Booher (1988): 
In his testimony he explained that weapons developers have not been 
interested in human factors implications because they were “perceived as 
constraints” on producing systems “on time” within “cost.”  Moreover, to 
expect accountability and wise decision-making with MANPRINT 
“through one of the world’s largest bureaucracies” without the support of 
Congress would probably be wishful thinking.  With history as a guide, 
MANPRINT too would fail.  Spurlock’s testimony made clear that 
MANPRINT could work, however, if Congress insisted that “total system 
manpower quality and quantity, and training costs were prerequisite 
findings for any weapon system beyond concept exploration” (p. 2).  
According to Spurlock (as quoted in Patrick, 1988): 
I recommended that Congress get more involved in the process…and 
require some sort of analysis from the Services that quantified the MPT 
(manpower, personnel and training) burden.  That is essentially what led 
to the Manpower Estimate Report (p. 5). 
As it was established, the Manpower Estimate Report (MER) documented the human 
costs associated with operating and supporting a weapon system throughout its life cycle.  
The MER process was statutorily imposed on the Defense Department by the Fiscal Year 
1987 Defense Authorization Act, which required that a MER be submitted to Congress 
by the Secretary of Defense prior to his approval of full-scale development and/or 
production and fielding of a major weapon system or program that had Congressional 
interest.  These requirements were codified in Title 10, United States Code, Section 2434 
(U.S. Congress, 1986), and the Defense Department formally implemented them in DoD 
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Directive 5000.53, titled Manpower, Personnel, Training and Safety in the Defense 
System Acquisition Process, in December 1988 (Bergquist, 1991, p. 4).   
 From Spurlock’s perspective, the MER requirement that was imposed across the 
military services was, in effect, a Congressional mandate to address MANPRINT 
considerations (Spurlock as quoted in Patrick, 1988): 
MANPRINT is the heart of the MER process.  You cannot quantify the 
kinds of operating and supports costs we are talking about without first 
performing a MANPRINT kind of analysis (p. 6). 
Although Spurlock saw similarities between MANPRINT and the MER process, he and 
others continued to work to see the MANPRINT concept more fully embraced by the 
Defense Department.  According to Spurlock, both he and “a number of our young 
officers” were in “day-to-day contact with their counterparts in [the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense]” helping to “sell the concept” of MANPRINT (Spurlock as quoted 
in Patrick, 1988, p. 6).  Spurlock also described a more direct conversation with Mr. 
Richard Godwin, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, in which he “spent an 
hour or so talking about MANPRINT and why [Mr. Godwin] should make this a 
requirement for all of the Services” (Spurlock as quoted in Patrick, 1988, p. 6).  
 While Spurlock was providing high level MANPRINT advocacy on the part of 
the Army’s civilian leadership, Blackwood had begun pushing MANPRINT concepts 
from within the Office of the Secretary of Defense soon after his arrival in 1987.  He was 
helped in this matter by a senior civilian defense executive, that being Mr. Thomas 
Christie—Boyd Acolyte14 and member of the inner circle of the military reform 
movement.  While Christie was never to become an outright MANPRINT advocate per 
se, he did see MANPRINT concepts as being complementary to the core views held by 
the reformers.  Accordingly, Christie was supportive of Blackwood’s efforts to advance 
MANPRINT concepts within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and provided 
assistance in terms of access to both his formal and informal networks within the Defense 
                                                 
14 Christie, along with Pierre Sprey, Ray Leopold, Franklin Spinney, and Jim Burton were described by 
writer Robert Coram as (Colonel John) Boyd's Acolytes, a group who, in various ways and forms, 
promoted and disseminated Boyd's ideas throughout the modern military and defense establishment.  
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Department.  Although Blackwood was now technically working within the defense 
acquisition community, he firmly believed, given his experience in the Army, that the 
personnel community was the preferred organizational sponsor for a Defense 
Department-level MANPRINT initiative.  Over the ensuring year, he worked with his 
counterpart in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management 
and Personnel (ASD/FM&P), Air Force Lt. Colonel Michael Pearce, to convince the 
personnel community to take the lead in advocating for the MANPRINT concept.  
Blackwood’s early overtures received a tepid reception by ASD/FM&P, at least until it 
became known that the sponsorship of the acquisition executive was also being solicited.    
Through the persistent efforts of MANPRINT advocates like Mr. Spurlock and 
Lt. Colonel Blackwood, ASD/FM&P was duly persuaded to signal the Defense 
Department’s organizational commitment to MANPRINT goals.  Consequently, in 
addition to the MER process, DoD Directive 5000.53 established manpower, personnel, 
training, and safety (MPTS) criteria that were required to be addressed by all the military 
services in cooperation with industry: 
The Department of Defense shall maximize the operational effectiveness 
of all systems, whether being procured initially or being refurbished, by 
ensuring those systems can be effectively operated, maintained, and 
supported by well qualified and trained people.  To do so, human 
capabilities and limitations must be fully considered early in the system 
design process.  Such MPTS concepts, requirements and goals shall be 
developed in a consistent manner, communicated to industry, evaluated in 
contract proposals, and weighed positively and substantially as criteria for 
source selection (DoD Directive 5000.53 as quoted in Boff, 1990). 
It also required that MPTS considerations be assessed, documented, and reported to 
ASD/FM&P at each phase of the acquisition process.  Noteworthy in DoD Directive 
5000.53 was the inclusion of MPTS considerations as a major element in the source 
selection criteria, something that had been adamantly opposed by the Army’s materiel 
acquisition community during the initial implementation of MANPRINT.  Equally 
noteworthy was the omission of human factors engineering from among the criteria—a 
measure that proved necessary to circumvent an impasse that had arisen between the 
service representatives comprising the conference responsible for drafting the DoD 
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directive.15 Nevertheless, DoD Directive 5000.53 was considered a landmark 
accomplishment in the evolution of the Defense Department’s HSI program. 
 During this same period, a nascent HSI office was established within the Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel (OASD/FM&P) 
with Lt. Colonel Pearce as the chief.  At the time, there was a certain intuitive logic to the 
placement of HSI within OASD/FM&P given that training and readiness were in the 
assistant secretary’s mission statement.  Additionally, manpower and training were major 
cost drivers for the Defense Department and personnel budgets were a primary concern 
of OASD/FM&P.  However, as time passed, this arrangement quickly proved a less than 
ideal marriage (P. Chatelier, personal communication May 25, 2010).  
 Given its organizational location, the OASD/FM&P HSI office primarily 
concerned itself with training and readiness issues.16  Accordingly, it reviewed weapon 
system acquisition programs mainly in terms of manpower requirements, readiness 
documents, and training documents.  Representatives from the office also sat on a variety 
of committees within the individual Services but generally lacked sufficient 
organizational clout to effect decisions that were needed.  Part of the problem was a 
personnel issue:  the office was led by a lieutenant colonel, which was an insufficient 
rank given the power gradients of the Pentagon.  In addition, the OASD/FM&P 
bureaucracy failed to provide sufficient personnel and budgetary resources to grow the 
HSI office.  Nor did it have access to research, development, test, and evaluation 
                                                 
15 A significant source of friction was caused by varying perceptions regarding the nature of “human 
factors.”  At the time, human factors was primarily considered the province of those working in the life 
sciences—a notion that did not resonate well with the Services’ engineering communities.   Accordingly, 
the engineering communities, which had responsibility for human-machine interface design, sought to 
carve a distinction between the engineering-related elements of human factors (i.e., human factors 
engineering) and those related to manpower, personnel, training, and education.  Thus, the omission of 
human factors from DoD Directive 5000.53 was indeed deliberate.   
16 One well-documented initiative sponsored by the OASD/FM&P HSI Office was the DoD Liveware 
survey, which was an attempt, in conjunction with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
Research Study Group.21 (RSG.21), to survey the HSI community to obtain a comprehensive database of 
HSI technologies.  In addition to serving as chief of the OASD/FM&P HSI office, Pearce chaired RSG.21, 
designated Liveware Integration in Weapon System Acquisition.  RSG.21 was chartered by the NATO 
Defense Research Group 8, Defense Applications of Human and Bio-medical Sciences, to study how the 
human-machine interface was addressed and how human-related issues were resolved during acquisitions 
by member nations.  It was RSG.21 that coined the term “liveware” in an attempt to standardize references 
to HSI across national boundaries and languages (Gentner, Kancler, & Crissey, n.d.).   
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(RDT&E) or procurement monies, these being the official currencies of the acquisition 
community.  These issues—or more poignantly, the failure to correct them—were 
reflective of a general resistance on the part of the OASD/FM&P to getting involved in 
equipment-related issues and system acquisition.   Simply stated, senior personnel within 
OASD/FM&P could not make the conceptual leap from human factors engineering and 
logistics considerations within individual weapons systems programs to aggregate 
concerns about Defense Department manpower and personnel.  Thus, they felt obliged to 
let the acquisition community drive research and development initiatives.  Even in the 
area of training, which was a focus area for Pearce, the emphasis was primarily on 
advanced distributed learning, with issues of training hardware and simulation being 
deferred to the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering.  Not 
surprisingly, given the organizational atmospherics of the time, the OASD/FM&P HSI 
office quickly faded with the departure of Pearce (P. Chatelier, personal communication 
May 25, 2010).17 
 Fortunately, Defense Department level HSI policy guidance did not meet the 
same fate as the OASD/FM&P HSI office.  Instead, it appears HSI policy guidance 
followed an independent evolutionary trajectory, the story of which necessitates that we 
again backtrack for a moment.  In July 1989, Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney 
delivered his Defense Management Report, which outlined how the Defense Department 
would implement the Packard Commission’s recommendations to streamline the materiel 
acquisition process, increase tests and prototyping, change the organizational culture, and 
improve planning, among other things (Cheney, 1989).  The Defense Management 
Report was largely critical of materiel acquisition management, describing it as both 
undisciplined and overburdened by regulation.  As a result, Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Donald J. Atwood issued the 1991 edition of DoD Directive 5000.1, titled Defense 
Acquisition, and DoD Instruction 5000.2, titled Defense Acquisition Management 
Policies and Procedures.  These documents were expanded from the prior versions to 
                                                 
17 No one that was interviewed could recall the specific year at which the OASD/FM&P HSI office 
was officially dissolved.  The general consensus was that the office became defunct sometime during 1993-
1994. 
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absorb over 60 other directives, instruction, and memoranda to include DoD Directive 
5000.53 (U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2008).     
 This revision of the DoD 5000 series of documents replaced MPTS requirements 
with those addressing Human Systems Integration (HSI).  This was, however, more than 
simply a name change.18  Greater definition was provided regarding the components that 
comprised HSI and increased discipline was required in the documentation process that 
connected requirements and opportunities with resource decisions (Hewitt, 1991, p. 6).  
These directives included major sections on HSI; systems engineering/human factors 
engineering; integrated logistics support/manpower, personnel, and training (MPT); and 
systems safety, health hazards, and environmental impact.  The HSI section in particular 
stated the policy objective as follows: “Human considerations [Figure III-11] shall be 
effectively integrated into the design effort for defense systems to improve total system 
performance and reduce costs of ownership by focusing attention on the capabilities and 
limitations of the soldier, sailor, airman, or marine” (DoD, 1991, p. 7-B-1).  Additionally, 
it directed that “objectives for the human element of the system shall be initially 
established at Milestone I…and be traceable to readiness, force structure, affordability, 
and wartime operational objectives” (DoD, 1991, p. 7-B-1).  Furthermore, the revision 
effectively moved HSI from an ASD/FM&P owned directive to one controlled by the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition despite the fact that the Defense 
Department’s HSI office resided in the Office of the ASD/FM&P.   
    
 
                                                 
18 It is uncertain who first coined the term “human systems integration.”  William Blackwood, who 
helped initiate the Army MANPRINT program and the Defense Department HSI program, believes the 
term was developed by someone working for the Air Force in Dayton, Ohio.  Blackwood recounts that he 
was interested in changing the name of the Army’s nascent program in the 1980s from MANPRINT to a 
more gender-neutral term.  His thinking at the time was that MANPRINT was seemingly incongruent with 
the Army’s ongoing efforts to increase the recruitment of women as part of the all-volunteer force.  
However, given the strong headwind Blackwood was facing in just getting MANPRINT off the ground, it 
was decided that a name change was too low a priority given all the other competing demands for time.   
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Figure III-11. Depiction of the human considerations addressed in HSI as described in 
the 1991 edition of DoD Instruction 5000.2 (From DoD, 1991). 
 
 Starting with the 1991 edition of DoD Directive 5000.1 and DoD Instruction 
5000.2, HSI has remained a component of the DoD 5000 series of acquisition 
management policy documents.  Subsequent editions of DoD Instruction/Regulation 
5000.2, released in 1996, 2000, 2002, 2003, and most recently 2008, continued to feature 
one or more sections addressing HSI.  The HSI section in the 1996 and 2000 editions of 
DoD Regulation 5000.2-R were much diminished from that in the 1991 edition, 
describing the policy objectives for HSI as ensuring that “human performance; the burden 
the design imposes on manpower, personnel, and training (MPT); and safety and health 
aspects are considered throughout the system design and development processes” (DoD, 
1996 & 2000, part 4, p. 8).  In the 2002 edition of DoD Regulation 5000.2-R, the stated 
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policy objectives for HSI were revised to focus on the need to “optimize19 total system 
performance and minimize [total ownership costs]” by integrating “manpower, personnel, 
training, safety and occupational health, habitability, human factors, and personnel 
survivability considerations” (DoD, 2002, pp. 40–42, 98–99).   The 2003 edition of DoD 
Instruction 5000.2 established the contemporary policy verbiage for HSI, namely to 
“optimize total system performance, minimize total ownership costs, and ensure that the 
system is built to accommodate the characteristics of the user population that will 
operate, maintain, and support the system” (DoD, 2003, p. 44).  It further defined HSI as 
being comprised of the following components: human factors engineering; personnel; 
habitability; manpower; training; environment, safety, and occupational health (ESOH); 
                                                 
19 The use of the word “optimize” starting in the 2002 edition of DoD Instruction 5000.2-R has led to 
some ambiguity as to the overall objective of the Defense Department HSI program.  Given the historical 
legacy of systems analysis and operations research in the Defense Department, it is reasonable to consider 
the term “optimize” in its mathematical programming sense.  The issue then becomes one of identifying the 
objective or criterion function that is to be optimized.   
Since William Blackwood was principally responsible for authoring the initial policy that laid out the 
formal definition of MANPRINT (i.e., AR 602-2) and later helped instigate the Defense Department level 
implementation of HSI, the optimization question was specifically put to him during an interview on March 
3, 2010.  His response was that the use of the word “optimize” should be considered in terms of minimizing 
the following criterion:  the change in observed performance per unit aptitude (ΔP ÷ ΔA).  As an example, 
Blackwood used the comparison of the M60 and M1 tank crew performance described in Binkin (1986).  
The M1 Abrams, the Army’s newest tank in the early 1980s, was equipped with a full-solution fire control 
system featuring a laser range finder, ballistic computer, thermal-imaging night gunsight, full stabilization, 
a muzzle reference system to measure gun-tube distortion, and a wind sensor.  It was clearly more complex 
than its predecessor, the M60 tank.  The table below, taken from Binkin (p. 55), arrays range firing results 
by crews manning M1 tanks with those manning the older M60.  M1 crews consistently scored more tank 
“kills” than M60 crews with similar aptitudes.  But more interestingly, the number of kills by M1 crews 
was less influenced by their aptitudes, suggesting that the more complex M1 system was easier to employ 
than its predecessor and could be successfully operated by crew members with lower aptitude scores.  In 
essence, the Army could relax aptitude requirements for tank crews, thereby increasing the availability of 
potential crewmembers.  The end result was improved utilization of Army personnel, which was the 
primary goal of the MANPRINT program. 
 
 Tank equivalent kills 








I (above average) 10.23 12.75 25 
II (above average) 9.51 12.47 31 
IIIA (average) 8.52 12.05 41 
IIIB (average) 7.47 11.57 55 
IV (below average) 5.84 10.72 84 
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and survivability.  In the 2008 edition of the 5000 series, the components that comprised 
HSI were slightly modified by the deletion of “environment” (DoD, 2008, pp. 60–61).  
E. CONCLUSION 
 So what does the historical narrative tell us about HSI?  HSI appears to have first 
emerged as a result of the spread of the systems approach, and particularly systems 
analysis, from the RAND Corporation to the Defense Department.  In the U.S. Army’s 
Human Engineering Laboratory in the 1960s, John Weisz and colleagues worked to join 
human factors engineering and operations research to more broadly represent human 
considerations in weapon system analyses.  This was the origin of the conceptual 
framework for what would become HSI.  Unfortunately, the initial launch of HSI, 
occurring during the Army’s “lost decade” for materiel development, resulted in a 
resounding thud.    
 HSI would not take off until the Army underwent a doctrinal and organizational 
renaissance in the late 1970s and early 1980s, driven in large part by fears of an 
apocalyptic war with the Soviet Union on the plains of Europe.  This led to another rise 
of science-based military power as the Army sought to leverage high technology to 
achieve a credible parity with the numerically superior Soviet forces.  But, in so doing, 
the Army began to have trouble coping with complexity, particularly with regards to their 
most politically constrained resource—personnel.  A crisis ensued during the design of 
the Army of Excellence and the need to find personnel to create two new light infantry 
divisions.  The Army’s solution was to better utilize their human resources, especially 
those tied up in the maintenance and support of weapon systems.  Thus, the resurrection 
of HSI occurred in 1983, this time spearheaded by a coalition of advocates who, 
interestingly enough, were not of the human factors community.  These people were 
senior military and civilian leaders or experts in organizational change; many had unique 
backgrounds and experiences that made them particularly well suited for the tasks at 
hand.  They developed a systems discourse, centrally including the materiel acquisitions 
and personnel communities, which was eventually to be institutionalized in the Army’s 
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bureaucracy as MANPRINT.  Many of these same people then carried the discourse into 
the Defense Department bureaucracy, where it became formally codified as HSI.   
 The moral of this story is that real-world political and military situations drove the 
adoption of HSI and the elaboration of its constituent components and ultimate goals.  To 
put it rather bluntly, it was a means to achieving an end that was seen as essential to the 
viability of the Army as a credible defense against the Soviet Union.  The lesson of 
history, then, is that taking a closed or scientific view of HSI as it now exists within the 
Defense Department is fundamentally flawed.  Such a view ignores the open-ended 
reality of politics and the endless creativity of human beings, both in fighting and 
resolving organizational conflicts.   It remains to be demonstrated whether the application 
of the systems discourse that surrounded the Army’s MANPRINT program would yield a 
similar program in an entirely different organizational context.  My instinct is that it 
would not. 
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IV. THE HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION TRADE SPACE 
PROBLEM 
The alternative, we believe, is to offer not just limits or constraints, but 
“trade offs.”  Indeed, we suggest that the success of the field of human 
factors will be proportional to the ability of the profession to provide such 
trade offs (Kennedy, Jones, & Baltzley, 1989, p. 1).   
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since the domains of human systems integration (HSI) are interrelated, any action 
affecting a single domain will necessarily propagate to one or more other domains, 
causing either desired or unintended effects.  To help illustrate this idea, let us consider 
the analogue of a simple physical system such as the pulley system depicted in Figure IV-
1.  Le Chatelier’s Principle asserts that if a set of forces are in equilibrium and a new 
force is introduced then, in so far as they are able, the existing forces will rearrange 
themselves so as to oppose the new force (Eigen & Winkler, 1981).  The left panel in 
Figure IV-1 depicts three forces that are in equilibrium.  Moving to the right panel, a 
fourth force is introduced and the original three readjust to a new point of equilibrium for 
all four.  While this principle is unexceptional for physical systems, Hitchins (1992) 
contends that “the principle applies equally to interaction between economic, political, 
ecological, biological, stellar, particle or any other aggregations which satisfy the 
definition, system [emphasis in original]” (p. 61).   
 
 
Figure IV-1. Forces in equilibrium in simple pulley system [From Hitchins, 1992]. 
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We can extend the metaphor of the physical system in Figure IV-1 to contemplate 
how changes in one HSI domain might be resisted by corresponding changes in other HSI 
domains.  An example of interacting HSI domains seeking a new equilibrium was given 
earlier in Chapter I (Figure I-2) based on the work by Miller and Firehammer (2007).  
Decreasing manpower (manpower domain) onboard U.S. Navy ships to lower life-cycle 
costs can result in short-term advantage.  However, this is replaced by long-term 
economic loss as increased workload and fatigue (survivability domain) drive lower 
productivity (new system equilibrium) and more mishaps (system safety domain).   
Another conceptualization of interacting HSI domains is illustrated by the vector 
diagram in Figure IV-2.  In the left panel is a set of interacting HSI domains depicted as 
individual vectors, supposedly in equilibrium, such that the overall performance vector is 
as shown by the heavy arrow.   In the right panel, a putative environmental disturbance or 
new system constraint is introduced that has the potential for changing the status quo.  In 
so doing, it will perturb the equilibrium in an undesirable way.  This unwanted 
perturbation may be managed by introducing complementary HSI domain changes, as 
shown, which have the net effect of cancelling out the unwanted effect(s).  Such 
cancelling may be complete or simply sufficient to enable control of the interacting set of 
HSI domains as they tend towards a new point of equilibrium.   
 
 
Figure IV-2. Complementary HSI domain inputs neutralizing unwanted perturbations 
[After Hitchins, 1992]. 
 
Overall, this notion of perturbations and choice of complementary HSI domains 
illustrates the existence of a trade space.  This reality then necessitates a holistic 
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perspective of the performance trade space formed by the synthesis of the HSI domains, 
and as a consequence, the consideration of individual domain interventions in terms of 
tradeoff decisions.  Such a worldview, or Weltanschauung, is central to the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s definition of HSI, which calls for making “explicit the underlying 
tradeoffs [emphasis added] across the HSI domains, facilitating optimization of total 
system performance.” However, current HSI manuals and handbooks do not provide 
much guidance on HSI tradeoffs; nor is there a well-established body of knowledge 
addressing HSI domain tradeoffs despite the obvious need (Barnes & Beevis, 2003).  For 
example, Booher (1990, pp. 12, 42) makes only two references to “tradeoff,” and the 
National Academies, through its Committee of Human Factors’ HSI report (Pew & 
Mavor, 2007, pp. 3, 19, 34, 140), makes only four references to “tradeoff,” none of which 
even begin to scratch the surface of the issue.  
B. THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL HSI PROCESS MODEL 
1. Traditional Conceptual Models of HSI 
Models are designed to represent a system under study, serve as an idealized 
example of reality, or explain essential relationships (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2006).  
Thus, it should come as no surprise when Booher (2003) observes that HSI is often 
described in terms of “a top level conceptual model” (p. 4).    One of the more common 
conceptual models of HSI focuses on the constituent human related disciplines that 
should be considered during system definition, development, and deployment.  This type 
of HSI model can be traced back in some form or fashion to the Defense Department’s 
human engineering community and generally takes the form of the model shown in 
Figure IV-3, which was taken from the U.S. Army’s 1976 human factors engineering 
regulation (Army Regulation 602-1).  This type of model is useful for conveying the 
scope of potential HSI considerations and ensuring adequate representation of relevant 
domain stakeholders.  However, it also has the potential danger of leading those 
individuals who are predisposed to reductionist thinking to view HSI predominately as a 
collection of domain considerations to be addressed rather than as a complex, interacting 
system of domains to be managed.  It is interesting, then, to observe that a later iteration 
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of the model, appearing in the Defense Department’s 1991 acquisition instruction, makes 
inter-domain tradeoffs a more explicit part of the model (Figure IV-4).  Nevertheless, 
despite its shortcomings, the historical longevity of this model suggests that it has utility 
as a top-level concept for HSI, particularly with regards to obtaining representation of all 
human-related disciplines, and consequently, we should be in no rush to discard it.  
 
 
Figure IV-3. Early conceptual HSI model focusing on domain representation [From 
Department of the Army, 1976]. 
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Figure IV-4. Conceptual HSI model focusing on domain representation and the need to 
consider inter-domain tradeoffs [From Department of Defense, 1991].  
 
Another model frequently used to explain the HSI concept is that proposed by 
Booher (2003) and revised by Booher, Beaton, and Greene (2009).  Booher builds on the 
earlier human engineering derived HSI models with the aim of explaining how the HSI 
concept is fully compatible with those systems engineering processes relevant to systems 
definition, development, and deployment and their life-cycle phases (Figure IV-5a).  
According to Booher (2003), as a top-level model, HSI brings two novel features to the 
systems engineering model:  (1) a highly concentrated user focus in all aspects of the 
systems definition, development, and deployment stages; and (2) the application of 
human-related technologies and the HSI disciplines throughout the systems engineering 
management and technical processes.  No system, product, or equipment inputs can be 
considered as having had an adequate consideration of the human component if it does 
not pass through the HSI process modulated with these two inputs.  Booher 
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conceptualizes the HSI process as a double-integration process where both integration 
steps are modulated by human-related technologies and disciplines and driven by user 
requirements (Figure IV-5b).  The first integration step creates a common focus for all 
seven HSI domains.  At the second integration step, HSI contributions are fully integrated 
within the decision processes utilized by systems engineering and management processes.   
 
 
Figure IV-5. Systems engineering and HSI processes [From Booher, Beaton, & Greene, 
2009]. 
 
 Booher’s model is an evolutionary advance over the constituent domain-focused 
model in that it lends itself more to a synthetic view of HSI: a move from Descartes’ 
reductionism and Machine Age thinking to expansionist Systems Age thinking.  With 
that said, since system design proceeds iteratively through a cycle of analysis, evaluation, 
and synthesis (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2006), it may be more appropriate to view the two 
HSI models as complementary rather than as a parent-progeny couplet.   Still, it appears 
to be a struggle for many novice HSI practitioners, and certainly for the majority of 
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students in the Naval Postgraduate School’s HSI degree program, to conceptualize the 
activities that are occurring in the integration processes.  For many students, the 
challenge is to reconcile the complexity of detail in the domain-focused model with the 
simplified abstraction of the Booher model.  Consequently, this led the faculty and 
students at the Naval Postgraduate School to begin working on potentially better ways to 
illustrate the HSI trade space, in turn trading off complexity of detail for insight and 
understanding. 
2. A Process Model of HSI 
 The emphasis in the Naval Postgraduate School’s approach to conceptualizing 
HSI is to focus on the integration of the domains and the ability to leverage interactions 
between domains rather than pursue the additive value of each domain independent of the 
others.  This approach implicitly recognizes the interdependency between domains and 
acknowledges the necessity for maintaining a holistic perspective of the potential solution 
space.  In formulating their approach, the Naval Postgraduate School faculty looked to 
the field of biology for natural metaphors on which to build by analogy—an approach 
that is entirely congruent with the thinking of sociotechnical system theorists, who tend to 
view organizations as open and living systems, much like a biological cell (Pasmore & 
Sherwood, 1978).  In this case, the metaphor involves an ecosystem of interdependent 
organisms.  Bar-Yam (2003) suggests that such networks of dependency as are seen in 
ecosystems are generally characteristic of complex systems.  Consequently, the existence 
of such networks of dependency requires that one think about patterns of emergent 
behavior in addition to the behaviors of individual network components—and thus the 
basis for the metaphor.   
 What follows is a description of a marine ecosystem as originally presented by 
Miller and Shattuck (2007).   In a marine ecosystem, a multitude of natural and man-
made conditions, such as storms, pollution, and overfishing, stress the delicate balance 
required for a healthy ecosystem.  If one is interested in the health of the ecosystem, one 
could examine a number of metrics reflective of the physical and chemical composition 
of the ecosystem:  water temperature; concentrations of nutrients, chemicals, and 
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pollutants; oxygenation; etc.  However, there are other indications of the state of an 
ecosystem: scientists look for the presence of “indicator species” when trying to 
characterize the integrity of a marine ecosystem.  For example, the presence of large 
numbers of marine mammals, such as dolphin, is indicative that the ecosystem is healthy 
since it is able to sustain a population of marine mammals with voracious appetites.  
Absence of such indicator species may indicate problems with the balance of the 
ecosystem since these indicator species will only be present when there is an adequate 
food supply.  Thus, disruptions in the integrity of the marine ecosystem can be inferred 
by observing the movement patterns of such indicator species.   
 The relationships in a marine ecosystem are represented in Figure IV-6.  The 
rectangle simply delineates the arbitrary boundary of our system-of-interest.  Our system 
is clearly an open system so this is a very permeable boundary at best.  Within our 
system-of-interest, only certain components and dependencies are identified by the text 
and arrows respectively.  The components and dependencies shown are not meant to be 
all-inclusive.  Obviously, a marine ecosystem is a highly complex system with many 
more components, which in turn, have many interactions and dependencies. Thus, we 
have merely used the technique of simplification and abstraction to make the complexity 
manageable—exactly the same technique that is used by systems engineers (Bar-Yam, 
2003).  The important observation is that we can make reasonable inferences about the 
state of such a complex system (i.e., ecosystem integrity) based on an assessment of 
intermediate level emergent effects (e.g., presence of indicator species).  Additionally, 
when intermediate level emergent effects are undesirable (e.g., there are no dolphin), then 
we need to look back through the network of dependencies to find the root cause(s).  
Moreover, we need to appreciate the underlying network of dependencies if we are to 
have any chance of successfully predicting the effects of changes to system inputs or 




Figure IV-6. Simplified model of a marine ecosystem [From Miller &Shattuck, 2007]. 
 
 This ecosystem metaphor is offered mainly to assist in the understanding of the 
proposed HSI process model that is represented in Figure IV-7.  As described by Miller 
and Shattuck (unpublished manuscript): 
…this new approach to HSI assumes that some domains are inputs into the 
system while others are products or by-products that naturally result from 
decisions made regarding the inputs.  The tradeoff decisions made in any 
part of the process will result in dramatic differences in the solution space 
or trade space.  Adopting this new approach to HSI yields another 
outcome in that is forces the decision maker to be explicit about the 
tradeoffs that are being made in the HSI process.  This transparency in 
tradeoffs is a critical part of the new model and implementation of HSI (p. 
9). 
Figure IV-7 depicts the entire system-of-interest when viewed as an open system 
comprised of HSI domains and emergent system effects.  Again, the large rectangle 
represents the open system boundaries, delineating the system-of-interest as determined 
by the system definition to include system requirements and capabilities.  The mission(s) 
and concept of operation(s) in which the system is to function are also part of the context 
within which HSI tradeoffs occur.   
On the left side of the model are the domain considerations that are inputs to the 
system-of-interest:  task design (i.e., human factors engineering), manpower, personnel, 
and training.  These elements describe the personnel subsystem and its interface with the 
technological subsystem that together comprise our system-of-interest.  According to 
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sociotechnical systems theory, the personnel and technological subsystems should be 
jointly optimized so as to exhibit the emergent properties that make the system-of-interest 
of value to its stakeholders.  This is a constrained optimization at best, requiring the 
constant management of the tensions between performance, cost, schedule, and risk.  
These tensions are analogous to the storms, pollution, and overfishing that stress the 
delicate balance required for a healthy ecosystem.   
 
 
Figure IV-7. The Naval Postgraduate School HSI process model with modification by 
the author [After Miller & Shattuck, 2007]. 
 
 Moving to the right in the HSI process model, the first-order outcomes are the 
emergent properties that result from the attributes and relationships of the inputs.  Many 
of these outcomes are adjectives, describing desired qualities.  For example, close 
coupling of the personnel, training, and human factors engineering domains will result in 
interfaces between the personnel and technological subsystems that exhibit good 
usability.  It is important to note that several HSI domains, those being habitability, 
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safety, and survivability, are emergent properties of the joint optimization of the 
personnel and technological subsystems.  As a result, these domains are necessarily 
dependent on the state of the input domains, and hence, the illogic of trying to consider 
them as independent entities.  These first-order domains cannot be purchased or procured 
directly as an input or consumed as a resource.  As a thought experiment, how would one 
purchase a mishap rate of less than 0.0001 per thousand hours of operation?  Inevitably 
the answer brings one back to (one or more of) the input domains.  Consequently, we can 
use these emergent properties to assess the quality, or health, of the joint optimization of 
the personnel and technological subsystems.  Just as we used metrics such as nutrient and 
oxygen concentrations to evaluate the health of a marine ecosystem, we can monitor 
metrics like noise, temperature and humidity to assess the health of a system in terms of 
habitability.  Continuing the analogy, safety can be thought of as an indicator species:  its 
presence is indicative of the ability to sustain reliable work, while its absence suggests an 
imbalance within or between the input domains.   
As we continue further right in the HSI process model, we move up layers in the 
hierarchy of complexity and observe increasingly more holistic measures of system 
health.  Admittedly, the model omits detailed consideration of the hardware and software 
inputs to the technological subsystem at large, but this is in keeping with Booher’s highly 
concentrated user focus.  One should also note that higher order outcomes become 
progressively less user-centric and more reflective of total system performance, thereby 
showing the dependence of total system performance on the quality of the human-centric 
input domains.   
The HSI process model builds on the two traditional conceptual models of HSI 
that were discussed in Section IV-B1.  Miller and Shattuck assert that the main 
contribution of the HSI process model is that it gets into the details of how both domains 
interact and tradeoffs might be exercised: 
Decisions made in any one of the HSI domains—or in cost, schedule, and 
risk—will propagate throughout the system and will impact the other 
domains, creating a sort of domino effect whereby one decision may affect 
something that is seemingly far-removed from the original decision.  
Ultimately, all these decisions will affect total system performance 
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although this effect is not always obvious.  The ability to visualize and 
understand the ramifications and consequences of decisions, and the 
inherent tradeoffs that occur throughout the acquisition process, is the very 
essence of HSI (p. 12). 
It remains an area of active research at the Naval Postgraduate School to develop 
practical applications of this process model.  Nevertheless, it is still not evident how any 
of the HSI conceptual models discussed so far could address the local versus global—or 
micro versus macroergonomic—duality of the HSI trade space that was discussed in 
Chapter II.  Thus, we next turn to work by DePuy and Bonder addressing this very 
duality from the more circumscribed context of manpower, personnel, and training.   
C. HSI AS THE PROCESS OF MANAGING THE SUPPLY OF AND 
DEMAND FOR MANPOWER, PERSONNEL, AND TRAINING (MPT) 
RESOURCES  
1. MPT Supply and Demand Management 
Describing the Army’s acquisition of new systems and equipment in the early 
1980s, DePuy and Bonder (1982) stated: 
The new systems, more often than not, involve high technology in an 
effort to achieve high performance -- performance which provides an 
advantage over the postulated enemy threat and adversary battlefield 
systems. […] With very few exceptions personnel requirements derived 
from these new systems require higher aptitudes and more training for 
operators and especially for maintainers…A slow but steady “skill creep” 
is very much in evidence (p. 2). 
It is likely that many people within the Defense Department would view this perspective 
as still being valid today.  The current emphasis on minimizing manpower necessitates 
job consolidation, thereby increasing the breadth and depth of tasks assigned to 
individuals.  DePuy and Bonder assert that it is frequently left to the MPT communities to 
address this skill creep.  This pattern occurs because the supply side of the problem (i.e., 
managing human resources), although difficult, is more immediately tractable than the 
demand side (i.e., requirements).  They caution, however, that this is not a sustainable 
approach in the long term: 
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Personnel managers can turn to recruiters and ask for the accession of 
higher quality personnel.  They can turn to the trainers and ask for 
increased skill performance through improved or longer training.  
Although both actions are necessary, neither is apt to suffice in the long 
run.  In the long run it will probably be necessary to reduce skill demand 
by intervention in the weapons system acquisition process (pp. 3–4).   
The crux of the problem, as DePuy and Bonder see it, is a failure to effectively match 
skill requirements (demand) with skill availability (supply).  What is then needed is a 
system for “closing the loop between the MPT planning and analysis process and the 
system design process (the design engineers)” (p. 10).    
  Taking an operations research perspective, DePuy and Bonder frame the problem 
in terms of MPT supply and demand management.  Figure IV-8 depicts a concept map of 




Figure IV-8. Concept map for MPT supply management as described by DePuy and 
Bonder (1982). 
 
The supply-side approach is a reactive mode that consists primarily of efforts to 
forecast MPT requirements so that the recruiting and training organizations can be 
focused on meeting skill requirements.  It occurs when a laissez faire approach is taken to 
MPT requirements, such that program managers and design engineers are forced into 
taking the lead in addressing MPT issues.  While an individual program may do an 
exemplary job in addressing MPT issues, the result over the aggregate of programs is still 
an undisciplined front-end process.  When faced with the very real difficulties of 
concurrently addressing MPT issues early in the system development process, program 
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management are apt to follow a sequential approach that is conceptually simple and 
inherently less risky to themselves—but which, in the words of DePuy and Bonder, is “a 
cumulative disaster” for a military service at large.  In this approach, potentially superior 
technologies are first chosen, advanced engineering models are then built, task/skill 
analyses and limited human-machine tradeoffs are performed with the primary objective 
of keeping operator and maintainer tasks under control, technical manuals are developed, 
training is addressed, and finally any residual MPT issues are finessed during initial 
system deployment.   This approach, when applied to system after system, has been 
shown to lead to the rapid accumulation of MPT demands that can surpass the capability 
of a military to satisfy.   
The alternative, proactive approach is MPT demand management, an overview of 
which is provided by the concept map in Figure IV-9.  The simple logic underlying 
demand management dictates that future MPT constraints serve as shaping factors in the 
selection of system concepts by system developers and force structure designs and 




Figure IV-9. Concept map for MPT demand management as described by DePuy and 
Bonder (1982). 
 
From the standpoint of demand management, there are three principle ways to 
reduce or manage MPT requirements:   
1) Engineer complexity out of the human-machine interface, thereby reducing or 
simplifying the operator and maintainer tasks performed by service members 
2) Reduce the number of high demand systems within the force—that is, changing 
the internal composition of the force 
3) Reduce the size of the force structure and carry the demand downward across all 
systems. 
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The latter two approaches are strategic management decisions.  However, the first 
approach, which can be addressed through the human factors engineering domain, is no 
trivial or simple matter.  System developers looking to reduce complexity in the human-
machine interface are likely faced with a zero-sum game.  They can trade off complexity 
at the human-machine interface for some combination of the following:  reduced system 
effectiveness; more cost and less complexity; lower operational availability; and higher 
skill requirements, costs, and time expended elsewhere in the system support structure.  
Thus, it is critical that those on the supply side of the problem ensure that MPT demands 
inherent in higher performance systems cannot be met through supply-side interventions 
before inducing one or more of the unattractive tradeoffs available to system developers.   
However, individual program MPT decisions must also be considered from the 
perspective of aggregate MPT supply and demand.  As DePuy and Bonder aptly note, 
“Of course the Army can meet the demands for any one system, but the problem is to 
meet the aggregate demand of all systems” (p. 8). 
2. A Model for Interfacing MPT Supply and Demand 
 DePuy and Bonder’s prescription to skill creep was a dynamic process for 
managing the interactions between MPT demand (requirements) and MPT supply.  They 
described their process in terms of a conceptual model for interfacing MPT supply and 
demand, both at the macro multi-system level and at the micro system-specific level, 
within the context of the acquisition process.  In so doing, their objective was to move 
beyond the acquisition system’s historical focus on performance, cost, and schedule.  
They believed it was absolutely necessary to also consider, in an organized and 
repeatable manner, whether sufficient MPT resources would be available to operate and 
maintain future systems to their intended design performance.   
a. The Macro MPT Supply and Demand Interface Process 
  Figure IV-10 is a schematic representation of the interface between MPT 
supply and demand at the aggregated level of a military service.  The left side of the 
figure depicts the MPT demand process, the right side the supply process, and the center 
their interface.  MPT demand is generated both by the characteristics of new systems and 
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the number of those systems that will be integrated into the force structure.  As depicted 
in the upper left of Figure IV-10, the SYSTEM ACQUISITION PROCESS employs 
various studies (e.g., mission area analyses, trade off analyses, best technical approaches, 
etc.) and documents (e.g., initial capabilities documents, capabilities development 
documents, etc.) to move new systems (e.g., SYS A, B,…,X) through the development 
phases (e.g., Material Solution Analysis, Technology Development, etc.) and on to the 
FORCE DESIGN PROCESS where they are integrated into the total force.  The design 
characteristics of these new systems determine the allocation of functions between the 
human and machine, and hence, drive the personnel and training requirements for the 
systems.   
 
 
Figure IV-10. Schematic representation of the interface between MPT supply and 
demand at the aggregated level of a military service [After DePuy & Bonder, 1982]. 
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The size of the force and its functional configuration are derived from the 
FORCE PLANNING PROCESS, which relates force stength and structure to threats, 
doctrine, and available resources.  Thus, the force planning process drives manpower 
requirements for each personnel category.  The product of the FORCE DESIGN 
PROCESS is a time-phased personnel inventory by unit type and number and a table of 
organization and equipment for each unit, within which the the systems, their operators, 
and maintainers, and leadership are integrated.  From a MPT perspective, the resulting 
demand signal is expressed in terms of a PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS database 
containing the total, time-phased MPT requirements for a military service. 
For a single system, MPT information generated by the SYSTEMS 
ACQUISITION PROCESS is stored and continually updated in a SYSTEM MPT 
DATABASE.  The system MPT databases contain current, system-specific MPT 
requirements information such as number of personnel by category; functions, tasks, and 
subtasks to be performed by personnel; skill level requirements; training requirements; 
etc.  Accordingly, the system MPT databases provide access to current MPT 
requirements as systems progress through the development process and push information 
through the FORCE DESIGN PROCESS to develop aggregated demand data. 
  Moving to the right side of Figure IV-10, the MPT supply process is 
embodied in the MANNING SYSTEM, the operation of which affects flows of personnel 
into a military service (i.e., accession), among various personnel categories (i.e., 
migration), and out of a service (i.e., separation).  The number and type (e.g., 
demographic characteristics, personnel category, rank, skill level, etc.) of service 
members that are available is a function of recruiting, reclassification, migration, and 
retention incentives; the effectiveness of training systems; and the demographic 
characteristics (e.g., aptitude, education level, etc.) of those individuals to whom that 
training was applied.  The product of the manning system is a MPT supply signal 
expressed in terms of a PERSONNEL INVENTORY database containing the time-
phased inventory of trained personnel available for assignment. 
The aggregated interface between MPT supply and demand is 
accomplished by the MPT PLANNING ANALYSIS (center of Figure IV-10), which 
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continually identifies time-phased personnel shortages by personnel category over a 
sufficiently broad planning horizon (i.e., 0−20 years).  Given a set of MPT 
supply/demand imbalances, decision makers can attempt to alleviate the problem in a 
REACTIVE manner by making short-term (i.e., 0−5 years) supply side fixes.  This would 
involve time-phased changes in the manning system; recruiting, reclassification, 
migration, and retention flows; and/or training programs to alter the size and/or mix of 
future personnel inventories.  Alternatively or concurrently, decision makers could 
initiate PROACTIVE changes by making longer-term demand side fixes.  FORCE 
PROACTIVE actions involve midterm (i.e., 0−10 year) MPT constraints on force 
structure size and composition and modernization schedules.  For example, decision 
makers could stretch out time-phased system MPT requirements and the system 
development status for immature systems and/or change initial/full operational capability 
dates for mature systems to “smooth out” shortages.  In the extreme, the overall force 
design could be adjusted by reducing the number of systems in the force.  For systems in 
the very front end of the development cycle, SYSTEM PROACTIVE actions are pursued 
to head off projected future shortages.  Such long-term (i.e., 7−15 years) MPT constraints 
typically include constraining the number and/or skill levels of personnel that can be 
designed into a system.  While DePuy and Bonder discuss the use of these demand side 
changes primarily in terms of alleviating MPT shortages, there is no reason they could 
not also be used to drive force-shaping objectives or meet organizational investment 
goals.   
b. The Micro MPT Supply and Demand Interface Process 
In addition to the multi-system, service-wide aggregated interface between 
MPT supply and demand, integration of MPT into the systems acquisition process 
requires that supply and demand be interfaced at the system level early in its conceptual 
design.  DePuy and Bonder suggest that this latter MPT supply/demand interface occurs 
in the HUMAN/MACHINE ANALYSIS process depicted schematically in Figure IV-11.  
Based on a systems engineering functional analysis, an initial HUMAN/MACHINE 
TRADEOFF ANALYSIS is performed to allocate functions between the human (e.g., 
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operator, maintainer, supervisor, etc.) and machine components, thereby formulating an 
initial conceptual design (e.g., SYS X CONCEPT).  This analysis should give 
consideration to various criteria derived from a stakeholder analysis such as desired 
system performance, costs, critical system attributes, etc.  This initial conceptual design is 
then subjected to both a MPT FRONT END ANALYSIS and a MPT CAPABILITY 
TRADEOFF ANALYSIS.   
 
 
Figure IV-11. Schematic representation of the interface between MPT supply and 
demand at the system-specific level [After DePuy & Bonder, 1982]). 
 
The purpose of the MPT front end analysis is to determine the specific 
human performance requirements deemed necessary to satisfactorily accomplish the 
functions and tasks allocated to the human in the human/machine tradeoff analysis.  The 
definition of “satisfactorily accomplish” should be derived from the stakeholder analysis 
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and the resulting value model(s).  The MPT front end analysis utilizes a hierarchical 
functional decomposition to identify the tasks, subtasks, and skill levels required to 
achieve the desired system performance.   Neither the human/machine tradeoff analysis 
nor the MPT front end analysis should explicitly consider personnel quality or training 
issues.  The procedures should focus on determining the human performance 
requirements by task/subtask.  Thus, the product of the MPT front end analysis is a MPT 
demand signal in terms of the required capability for skilled human work.   
The purpose of the MPT capability tradeoff analysis is to determine the 
human performance capability that can be provided to man the system.  As envisioned by 
DePuy and Bonder, for each task or subtask allocated to the human, the MPT capability 
tradeoff analysis determines achievable levels of performance by examining tradeoffs 
between the number of personnel assigned the task or subtask, the quality of the 
personnel (as measured on some aptitude scale like the Armed Forces Qualifications Test 
(AFQT) or Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB)), and the training 
provided (e.g., type, duration, frequency, etc.) within the MPT constraints derived from 
the multi-system MPT PLANNING ANALYSIS shown to the right in Figure IV-11.  
Thus, the human-machine tradeoff analysis is embedded within, and constrained by, the 
larger macro MPT supply/demand interface (as shown center top in Figure IV-10) 
  The micro analog of the macro MPT planning analysis is the SKILL 
COMPARISON ANALYSIS (shown in the center of Figure IV-11), which compares the 
outputs from the MPT front end analysis (i.e., demand) and MPT capability tradeoff 
analysis (i.e., supply) by task and performance level to determine if the required human 
performance capability can be provided.  If the skill comparison analysis indicates that 
there is a supply/demand imbalance, then the conceptual design process must be 
reiterated and the following possible tradeoffs considered:   
1) Reallocating more tasks/subtasks to the machine component, possibly resulting in 
increased cost 
2) Reducing the human performance requirements to a feasible level, resulting in 
decreased overall system performance 
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3) Relaxing the personnel quality requirements and/or training constraints to 
improve available human performance capability, but this will likely cause a 
tightening of MPT constraints on other systems because MPT resources are finite.   
This conceptual MPT design process, involving the human/machine 
tradeoff analysis, MPT front end analysis, and MPT capability tradeoff analysis subject to 
proactive MPT constraints, should be iterated early in the acquisition process until the 
system’s MPT requirements are consistent with forecasts of available personnel 
capabilities.  Output from the dynamic interplay of MPT supply and demand is a feasible 
set of human performance requirements from the system design (MPT front end 
analysis), personnel quality requirements (MPT capability tradeoff analysis), and training 
requirements (MPT capability tradeoff analysis).  All information generated in the 
human/machine analysis process is stored and updated in the corresponding SYSTEM 
MPT DATABASE, which in turn should provide updates to the PERSONNEL 
REQUIREMENTS database. 
c. The MPT Capability Tradeoff Analysis 
The purpose of the MPT capability tradeoff analysis is to provide 
information regarding available human performance capabilities.  Since it is intended that 
the output of the capability tradeoff analysis be compared with that of the MPT front end 
analysis, personnel capabilities should be measured in terms of the performance levels 
that can be achieved on a task/subtask basis.  As described by DePuy and Bonder, the 
MPT capability tradeoff analysis “procedures should facilitate examination of the 
tradeoffs among quantity of personnel, quality of personnel, and training level to achieve 
task/subtask skill levels, within constraints imposed on the quantity, quality, training [sic] 
dimensions by the multi-system supply and demand planning process” (p. A-9).  Figure 
IV-12 depicts DePuy and Bonder’s conceptual view of the types of information conveyed 
in a MPT capability tradeoff analysis.  The quality dimension on the ordinate in Figure 
IV-12 should reflect existing personnel measures such as AFQT category, ASVAB score, 
etc. DePuy and Bonder assert that “the [capability tradeoff analysis] is a critical 
component in determining MPT requirements and in providing usable MPT guidance to 
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design engineers” (p. A-9).  Thus, capability tradeoff analysis data goes a long way 
towards enabling the military services to adequately specify MPT requirements and 
evaluate contractor responses.   
 
Figure IV-12. Achievable skill levels for subtask X as a function of personnel quality 
and training level [From DePuy & Bonder, 1982]. 
 
D. ISOPERFORMANCE 
 1. Considering Aptitude and Training Tradeoffs 
 Developing capability tradeoff analyses (i.e., tracing equivalent combinations of 
aptitude and training that yield a specified level of performance) is a highly applied 
problem.  It would help a great deal to have known empirical regularities on which one 
could depend.  It would also help to have a good theory of human performance that could 
support the development of analytical models relating aptitude, training, and 
performance.  However, neither is necessarily sufficient to formulate a capability tradeoff 
analysis for a specific function or task.  To serve the purposes of performing capability 
tradeoff analyses, it is not enough that an empirical regularity, such as the power law of 
practice, will hold on the average, for it must hold for the particular function or task of 
 197
interest.  Further, it must be possible, given both the task and the regularity, to say just 
how well an individual will perform after a certain length or type of training.  Theories of 
human performance must meet these same requirements.  Unfortunately, at present, 
neither empirical regularities or theory meet these requirements.  Therefore, in practice, 
system developers must hypothesize about human performance-related tradeoffs and then 
they should carry out experiments or tests to assess the veracity of their hypotheses—
although the latter is not always done. 
This conclusion does not mean that empirical regularities and sound theory are 
not helpful in performing capability tradeoff analyses.  For example, the power law of 
practice provides us potentially useful insights into the personnel and training factors 
(determinants) postulated to contribute to task performance.   According to this empirical 
regularity, skill acquisition tends to follow a relatively ubiquitous negatively accelerated 
learning curve, which can be represented by the following mathematical expression 
(Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981): 
( ) rP a b N E −= + ⋅ +                                                                                               (1) 
where P is the time taken to perform a task, a is the asymptote or highest level of 
performance obtainable, b is the performance on the first trial, N is the amount of practice 
in terms of trials, E is the transfer from prior experience or learning required to attain 
entry level performance, and r is a learning rate parameter (Table IV-1).  Since practice is 
the canonical form of training, HSI training domain considerations are directly reflected 
in the N variable in the power law of practice.  Likewise, training domain considerations 
of methods, curricula, and training system design will impact training effectiveness, and 
hence, the rate of improvement as reflected by the value of the r parameter.  With regards 
to the HSI personnel domain, to the extent that an individual’s experience with prior tasks 
is similar to the target task, positive transfer occurs (Wickens & Hollands, 2000) as 
captured by the variable E.  Also, since aptitude tests predict proficiency on various tasks 
and propensity for a variety of types of learning (Matthews, Davies, Westerman, & 
Stammers, 2000), individual aptitudes will influence the values for the a, b, and r 
parameters in the power law.  Overall then, the power law suggests both that the HSI 




Table IV-1. Variables in the power law of practice and corresponding HSI training and 
personnel domain considerations. 
Power law  HSI domain considerations 
Variable Description  Training Personnel 
a Highest level of performance 
obtainable (asymptote) 
 -- Individual aptitudes 
b Performance on first trial  -- Individual aptitudes 
E Transfer from prior experience (in 
terms of equivalent number of 
practice trials) 
 -- Prior experience 
(knowledge, skills, 
etc.) 
N Practice in terms of number of 
trials 
 Quantity of training -- 
P Time taken to perform task  -- -- 





In terms of a theoretical perspective for considering personnel and training 
domain tradeoffs, aptitude-treatment interaction (ATI) theory provides a useful prototype.  
Briefly, the basic premise of ATI theory is that some instructional strategies, referred to 
as treatments, vary in their effectiveness for particular individuals depending upon the 
specific abilities of those individuals.  Snow (1978) proposed that “individual differences 
in performance on ability tests and learning tasks are manifestations of cognitive 
processes to each” (p. 227).  Snow’s implication is that learning performance is higher 
when the learning method capitalizes on an individual’s cognitive aptitudes.  Likewise, 
achievement will be lower when the learning method requires that an individual use 
cognitive processes in which they are relatively weak or lacking (Whitener, 1989).   
Aptitudes and treatments interact in two basic ways as depicted in Figure IV-13.  
The left panel shows the disordinal ATI, where one type of treatment yields high 
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achievement in individuals tending to one side of the aptitude spectrum, while another 
treatment helps individuals on the other side of the spectrum.  The right panel shows the 
more common ordinal ATI, where one treatment is more effective overall, but it is 
particularly beneficial for individuals on one side of the aptitude spectrum (Whitener, 
1989).  Cronbach and Snow (1977) and Snow (1989), in reviewing the research on ATI, 
found that such interactions are very common in education.  However, in practice, many 
aptitudes and instructional treatments interact in complex patterns that can be difficult to 
clearly demonstrate or understand.  Although ATI research has focused predominately on 
acquisition of reading, language, mathematic, and science skills in the educational 
setting, it is plausible that the main conclusions should generalize to other skills 
(Matthews, Davies, Westerman, & Stammers, 2000).   Nevertheless, for the system 
designer needing to perform a MPT capability tradeoff analysis for a particular function 
or task, such generalities about aptitude-treatment interactions will not suffice.  
 
 
Figure IV-13. Possible interactive effects of aptitude and two instructional treatments on 
learning outcomes [From Whitener, 1989]. 
 
 This situation is not unusual in the larger field of human factors engineering, and 
Meister (1999), in his history of human factors engineering, calls out this issue of 
quantitative prediction as one of the field’s major unresolved problems.  It often happens 
in applied work that there are no readily available empirical regularities or theories upon 
which one can rely for making real-world predictions.  In such situations, if informed 
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decisions are then to be made, it can only be by studying empirically how performance 
varies as a function of its determinant.  However, as noted by Jones, Kennedy, and 
Stanney (2004): 
If these determinants were few in number, not more than four, say, such 
functional relationships could be worked out by means of conventional 
designs (complete factorials) without great difficulty.  Unfortunately, the 
determinants are rarely, if ever, few in number (p. 591).   
This point has obvious implications for conducting capability tradeoff analyses.  If we 
consider just the empirical regularity of the power law of practice, we have no less than 
six variables (Table IV-1), or determinants, that we need to assess if we are to make 
predictions about performance.  How then to proceed?  In the following section, I borrow 
heavily from a paper published by Jones and colleagues in Presence (Jones, Kennendy, & 
Stanney, 2004) to answer this question.  While their paper focuses on cybersickness, the 
principles and methodologies discussed are generalizable to the larger issue of human 
performance.  
2. Simon’s Research Strategy 
 Charles W. Simon was among the first engineering psychology doctorates to flow 
from Paul Fitts’ Laboratory of Aviation Psychology at Ohio State in 1952.  Simon joined 
the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica and soon moved on to the Hughes Aircraft 
Company prior to joining the Canyon Research Group, where he worked with Jones and 
Kennedy on the Navy’s Visual Technology Research Simulator project.  Simon 
subscribed to the philosophy that the task of the engineering psychologist is to predict 
and control some performance of interest that occurs in the real world.  He assumed that 
this performance of interest has many manipulable determinants of some importance, 
often more than five and likely at least 15–30.  However, he also assumed that these 
determinants obey what he called the “Pareto maldistribution theory,” meaning that the 
distribution of the magnitudes of their effects may be represented by a chi-square 
distribution.  Thus, while performance may be affected by many determinants, only a few 
factors are critical.   
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 Given then that some performance of interest likely has many manipulable 
determinants, the obvious first step is to screen those determinants to identify the most 
important ones.    Simon’s concern here is if only a few factors are studied at a time, the 
inevitable result is a list of factors with little evidence as to their relative importance or 
the interactions between them.  Moreover, there can be no comprehensive accounting of 
how the performance of interest is functionally determined.  Simon took the human 
factors community to task on this point, reviewing 239 analysis of variance tables 
published in the journal Human Factors during the period from 1958 to 1972.  He found 
that the typical experiment investigated the effects of two factors, and less than 8% of the 
experiments studied four or more factors (Simon, 1976a).  Over a period of 20 years, 
Simon published a series of technical reports, together totaling more than 1,500 pages, 
calling attention to the literature on advanced experimental designs and urging 
engineering psychologists to adopt them in their work (Simon, 1970, 1973, 1974, 1975, 
1976b, 1977, 1978, 1984, 1985, 1987; Simon & Roscoe, 1981).   
 Simon contends that the performance of interest should be approached based on a 
program of research that is marked by what he calls “progressive iteration.”  By this he 
means to imply a program of research comprised of a series of dependent experiments 
rather than a collection of independent experiments.  Within this series of experiments, 
later experiments build on those that precede them such that each new experiment is an 
extension of the experimental program as a whole.  The series begins with a screening 
experiment that is designed primarily to order known and suspected determinants of the 
performance of interest by magnitude of effect.  Typically, this first cut will use a 
fractional factorial study design in which all factors are represented by two levels.  With 
such an experiment as the starting point, the research program proceeds to locate and 
isolate two-way, and possibly even three-way, interactions where the basic experiment 
suggests they may have appreciable magnitudes of effect.  Some of the important factors 
may be nonlinear, in which case additional experiments are performed using three or 
more factor levels (i.e., central composite study designs) to describe their response 
surfaces.  Thus, the screening experiment allows for a potentially large number of 
possible continuations.  However, only one of these continuations will be realized, but it 
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should have been considered in advance and provisions made for it to be developed by 
extension from the original design.   
 In his approach, Simon emphasizes “economical multifactor design” (Simon, 
1973).  Accordingly, he argues that the minimum number of treatment conditions and 
data points be used to achieve the design objectives.  The overall objective of his 
progressive iteration is to describe performance as a function of its determinants, thereby 
making the researcher’s primary task one of parameter estimation rather than achieving 
statistical reliability.  This last assertion, however, has resulted in much criticism of 
Simon’s approach.  Nevertheless, his approach is useful when one is more interested in 
understanding broad, less precise relationships across a large multivariate space than in 
obtaining highly reliable information about a few points in small segment of the 
experimental region (Simon, 1970).  The former is clearly more relevant than the latter 
when considering capability tradeoff analyses.   Additionally, Simon appears to have 
appreciated the importance of tradeoff analyses and provided for it in his research 
strategy (Simon, 1970): 
Engineers will find the regression model more useful than the ANOVA 
models more frequently used in human factors study.  Regression 
equations can be used to…determine how equipment trade-offs should be 
made in order to optimize performance when one or more system 
parameters must be constrained (p. 5). 
3. Isoperformance Curves 
Simon’s research strategy was aimed at solving the methodological problem of 
developing functional models of performance when there are many determinants of 
potential importance.  In the 1980s, two other engineering psychologists, Robert Kennedy 
and Marshall Jones, working under sponsorship of the Army and Air Force, proposed 
using such formal models of performance to conduct the sort of tradeoff analyses that 
were conceptualized by DePuy and Bonder in their MPT capability tradeoff analysis 
(Jones, Kennedy, Turnage, Kuntz, & Jones, 1985; Jones, Kennedy, Kuntz, & Baltzley, 
1987; Kennedy, Jones, & Baltzley, 1988, 1989; Kennedy, Jones, & Turnage, 1990; 
Kennedy & Jones, 1992; Jones, Turnage, & Kennedy, 1993; Jones & Kennedy, 1996; 
Jones, 2000; Jones, Kennedy, & Stanney, 2004).   It appears that the work of Kennedy, 
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Jones and colleagues developed independently of that of DePuy and Bonder (e-mail from 
M. McCauley to R. Kennedy, January 29, 2010).  Kennedy attributes the idea largely to 
prior research developing “isoemesis” curves (Figure IV-14) for ship movement induced 
motion sickness (McCauley & Kennedy, 1976) and a large scale program of studies 
(1979–1987) of simulator design for training purposes utilizing the Visual Technology 
Research Simulator (VTRS), formerly the Aviation Wide Angle Visual System 
(AWAVS), at the Naval Training Systems Center in Orlando, Florida (Lintern, Nelson, 
Sheppard, Westra, & Kennedy, 1981).  The VTRS research was conducted primarily to 
identify simulator equipment features that best promoted acquisition of flying skills but 
also investigated variables associated with training and individual differences.  A primary 
finding from a meta-analysis of the VTRS research was the important contribution made 
by individual differences to performance—subjects accounted for 50-80% of the variance 
in performance as compared to 10-25% for trials and 15-20% for equipment (Jones, 
Kennedy, Baltzley, & Westra, 1988; cited in Kennedy, Jones, & Baltzley, 1989).  These 
results prompted Kennedy, Jones, and colleagues to contemplate the wisdom of trading 
off these main effects.  Their basic logic was simple:  in view of the fact that some pilots 
plainly have more ability than others, because repeated simulator sessions can be costly, 
and since expensive upgrades to equipment may have a minimal impact on performance, 
decision makers should focus on tradeoffs among these factors to obtain desired 
performance levels rather than trying to maximize any single factor (Turnage, Kennedy, 




Figure IV-14.  Equal motion sickness contours [From McCauley & Kennedy, 1976]. 
 
Given this genesis, the central reasoning behind their tradeoff methodology is the 
idea that, if one knows how performance varies as a function of its determinants, it is 
possible to derive equivalent combinations of the determinants.  By equivalent, Kennedy 
and Jones mean that all such combinations produce the same specified level of 
performance—hence, the term “isoperformance” which they used to describe their 
approach to tradeoff analyses. Kennedy and Jones focused on personnel-training 
interactions and developed their technique primarily to generate tradeoff functions 
between personnel abilities and factors such as training time and training system 
effectiveness. However, they emphasize the generalizability of the isoperformance 
methodology to training, equipment, and manpower tradeoffs. 
Isoperformance is ideally suited to problems that take the form of DePuy and 
Bonder's human/machine analysis, where a design engineer specifies a level of 
performance to be reached (e.g., the demand signal from the MPT front end analysis) 
regardless of the combinations of determinants used to do so (Jones, Kennedy, and 
Stanney, 2004).  Isoperformance is inherently an applied methodology based on Simon’s 
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(1996) notion of “satisficing,” and so fixes the amount of performance at an acceptable 
level and trades off the determinants with respect to each other (de Weck & Jones, 2006).  
By implication, while the isoperformance methodology is itself atheoretic, it does 
presuppose a functional model between the determinants and the desired performance.  
The first step in the isoperformance technique is some data-analytic procedure based on a 
model, which may include common multi-variable statistical techniques like ANOVA or 
regression analyses.   Such a model states the dependent variable(s) as a function of the 
determinants, parameters to be estimated, and error variations.  Once the parameters are 
estimated, usually using least squares or maximum likelihood, the isoperformance 
technique requires that the user specify a criterion and a level of confidence, which is 
called the assurance level.  The criterion is the level of performance desired by the user, 
and the assurance level is the probability of attaining that level of performance.  Based on 
the user’s choice of criterion and assurance level, the dependent variable is fixed and the 
resulting equation solved in terms of just the determinants; the determinants can now 
vary only in ways that will result in the same performance level.  In the simple case of 
just two determinants, plots of every pair of values, each of which will produce the same 
level of performance, yields an isoperformance curve.  Secondary criteria such as cost, 
safety, or feasibility are then used to identify a preferred solution(s) on the 
isoperformance curve (Jones & Kennedy, 1992; Jones & Kennedy, 1996; Jones 2000).  In 
the context of DePuy and Bonder’s human/machine analysis, such secondary criteria 
would include system proactive MPT constraints derived from the macro MPT planning 
analysis.   
4. Illustrative Example:  The Main Tank Gunner 
DePuy and Bonder provide a conceptual process to interface MPT supply and 
demand, both at the macro, multi-system level and the micro, system-specific level.  At 
the level of an individual system, the MPT supply and demand interface is accomplished 
through the human/machine analysis, which includes the MPT capability tradeoff 
analysis as a critical component.  However, DePuy and Bonder leave the details of the 
MPT capability analysis to be worked out by future research efforts.  While there is no 
indication that DePuy and Bonder were aware of the work of either Simon or Kennedy 
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and Jones, it is readily evident that the latter’s isoperformance approach will accomplish 
the purpose of the MPT capability tradeoff analysis.  To help illustrate this, what follows 
is a hypothetical demonstration of Kennedy and Jones’ isoperformance approach using 
the example of the main tank gunner discussed by DePuy and Bonder.   
You will recall that the MPT front end analysis hierarchically decomposes the 
functions allocated to the human in the human/machine tradeoff analysis into the 
supporting tasks, subtasks, and skill levels required to achieve the desired system 
performance.  Thus, for example, the MPT front end analysis might produce the 
hierarchical structure shown in Figure IV-15 for some combat vehicle system.  For the 
job of main tank gunner, we could have the following hierarchical decomposition: 
• Function:  Fire the gun at a moving target 
• Task:  Aim the gun 
• Subtask:  Track the target 
• Skill level:  Track with a 0.60 mil error or less 
The skill level requirement is derived from the system performance requirement that the 
single shot hit probability be 0.75 or higher.  The origin of the skill requirement 
highlights the point that the MPT front end analysis is accomplished without explicitly 
considering the impact of quality of personnel or training issues on the system.  It simply 
considers the performance level for each function that is necessary to obtain the desired 
overall system performance, irrespective of how those functional performance levels 
might be achieved (DePuy & Bonder, 1982).  To answer the question of “how,” we turn 




Figure IV-15. Function, task hierarchy for a hypothetical combat vehicle system [From 
DePuy & Bonder, 1982]. 
 
 An isoperformance analysis is based on the proposition that one knows how 
performance varies as a function of its determinants.  Since this is a hypothetical tradeoff 
analysis, we will use an empirical regularity, specifically the power law of practice, as a 
model to relate tracking error to personnel quality, expressed in terms of Armed Services 
Qualification Test (AFQT) score, and length of training.  AFQT score is chosen as the 
measure of personnel quality because it has been shown to be both a measure of 
trainability and a predictor of performance in the Army (Horne, 1986).  Accordingly, our 
model is of the following general form:  
bP aT −=                                                                                                                 (2) 
where P is our performance of interest (i.e., tracking error), a is an individual’s initial 
level of performance, T is the amount of training in weeks, and b is a learning rate 
parameter.  In practice, the parameters a and b are estimated based on empirical data.  For 
our purposes here, we assume that initial performance level, a, is an arbitrary but 
monotonically decreasing function of AFQT score: 
100
APFT score
a =                                                                                                     (3) 
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where the range of AFQT scores is [21,100], corresponding to a basic qualification for 
enlistment of AFQT category IVA.  Since law prohibits enlistments from AFPT category 
V, which encompasses AFPT scores in the range [0,9], we do not need to be concerned 
with the extreme case where a would be undefined because of division be zero.  We also 
assume that the rate of learning parameter, b, is an arbitrary monotonically increasing 
function of APFT score: 
( )ln AFQT score
10
b =                                                                                              (4) 
The choice of functions is made solely to ensure appropriate scaling of the parameters, a 
and b, over the range of AFQT score.  Consequently, personnel domain considerations 
(i.e., aptitude) can now be addressed in the power law through the values of the 
parameters a and b.   
 While DePuy and Bonder stipulate a tracking error requirement in their example 
of 0.60 mil, we will augment this requirement so that the format is more consistent with 
the manner in which the Defense Department specifies system requirements today.  
Accordingly, we assume that the requirement is for a maximum tracking error of 0.60 mil 
(threshold) / 0.40 mil (objective)—that is, tracking error must be less than 0.60 mil for 
the system to have military utility, but reducing the error to 0.40 mil will increase the 
military utility of the system.  However, further reduction of tracking error below 0.40 
provides no additional military utility—what is sometimes derisively referred to as “gold 
plating.”  We will also assume that there is a system proactive MPT training constraint, 
derived from the MPT planning analysis, for the length of training to be no greater than 
10 weeks.  Using the power law, the response surface between training time and 
individual aptitude is mapped out throughout the range of feasible values for a, b, and, T.  
The results are displayed in Figure IV-16, which is a surface chart showing tracking error 
as a function of AFQT score and training time.  Color coding is used to show areas on the 
plot where performance exceeded the objective (green) or threshold (yellow) 





Figure IV-16. Surface plot of tracking error as a function of AFQT score (personnel 
domain of HSI) and training time (training domain of HSI). 
 
  To derive an isoperformance curve, we need to reformulate the power law so that 
training time is expressed as a function of AFQT score for some given fixed tracking 
error.  The process to do this is relatively straightforward, but the steps are reviewed here 
for those who have not used algebra in a while.  We begin with the following model 
formulation: 
ˆ bP aT −=                                                                                                                 (6) 
where Pˆ  is our fixed performance requirement and the right hand side is as defined for 
Equation 2.  We next substitute in Equations 3 and 4 for the parameters a and b 
respectively: 




−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠                                                                           (7) 
Rearranging terms gives us the following: 




−⎛ ⎞ =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠                                                                           (8) 
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Converting the exponential equation to its logarithmic equivalent: 
( )ln AFQT score AFQT scoreˆlog
10 100T
P
− ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦                                                      (9) 










⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥− ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦=                                                   (10) 
Rearranging terms again to isolate the term with T on the left hand side: 








⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞− ⋅ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦=                                                           (11) 
Finally, we reformulate both sides of the equation as powers to the base 10, thereby 








⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞− ⋅ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
=                                                                                      (12) 
 Using Equation 12 to plot values of the two determinants, aptitude and training 
time, every pair of which produce the same level of performance, results in the 
isoperformance curves given in Figure IV-17.  Since we do not have information on the 
distribution of our performance of interest, we can only consider the case where the 
assurance level is 50%,  meaning we are ignoring the role of error in this analysis by 
limiting ourselves to considering combinations of determinants for which 50% of gunners 
will achieve the performance criterion.  That concession is not of great consequence here 
since error is only part of the story and, for applied purposes, often not a very important 
part (Jones & Kennedy, 1996).  Kennedy and Jones refer to a plot such as Figure IV-17 
as an isoperformance readout.  Nevertheless, Figure IV-17 looks quite similar to DePuy 
and Bonder’s conceptual capability tradeoff analysis shown earlier in Figure IV-12—so 




Figure IV-17. Isoperformance curves trading off aptitude (AFQT score) and training 
time with the criterion (tracking error) set at 0.60, 0.50, and 0.40 and level of assurance 
set at 0.50.   
 
 Isoperformance curves are read as tradeoff functions.  For example, given a 
soldier with an AFQT score of 80, after 5.3 weeks of training the probability is 0.50 that 
they will track a target with a 0.60 mil error—that is, meet the threshold system 
performance requirement.  A second soldier, who scores 65 on the AFQT, will take 9.5 
weeks to reach the same performance level with a 0.50 probability.  A drop of 15 points 
on the aptitude measure requires 4.2 weeks to make up.  In other words, it takes two days 
of training to make up the reduction in performance indicated by a drop of one point in 
aptitude.  Moreover, a soldier with an AFQT score of less than 64 will never be able to 
track a target with a 0.60 mil error with a probability of 0.50 given the constraint limiting 
training to less than ten weeks.  The implication of this training constraint is that main 
tank gunners will necessarily need to be selected from AFQT Categories I and II.  
However, it is very likely that soldiers in these higher aptitude categories will be in 
demand for other systems.  If it were determined that such higher quality soldiers will not 
be available in sufficient numbers, then it would become necessary to consider relaxing 
the training constraint, redesigning the task so that soldiers selected from lower AFQT 
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categories could achieve the performance criterion, or automating the task all together 
(i.e. revising the human/machine tradeoff analysis).  The situation for the objective 
system performance requirement, tracking a target with a 0.40 mil error, is even more 
constrained, with only AFQT Category I soldiers capable of meeting the criterion with a 
probability of 0.50 given less than ten weeks of training.  These latter types of 
considerations are issues for DePuy and Bonder’s skill comparison analysis, but they are 
critically dependent on the information derived from the isoperformance curves.   
E. ISOPERFORMANCE IN THE DESIGN OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS 
 Although the term “isoperformance” was originally coined in the area of human 
factors research, some have begun to advance the concept as an enabling methodology 
for a target-driven systems engineering process.  The following sections are based in 
large part on a paper published by Olivier de Weck and Marshall Jones (2006) in the 
journal Systems Engineering applying the isoperformance approach to the design of 
complex systems.  While their paper predominately focuses on the design of a satellite 
system, the methodology should generalize to other systems in which one or more 
humans contribute to overall system performance. 
1. Isoperformance as a System Design Philosophy  
Historically, system designers have sought the “best achievable” system 
performance, iteratively refining choices in the design space to maximize system 
objectives.  The dominant mode of thought among such system designers is that of 
“forward analysis,” where a vector of choices, x , in the design space is uniquely mapped 
to an expected outcome in the objective space, ( )x J x6 .  This paradigm has its roots in 
the mid 20th century when system performance was the prime driver for competitiveness 
and superiority.  However, de Weck and Jones (2006) assert that a more natural mode of 
thought is, instead, to accept system performance that is “good enough” as determined 
based on contractually specified requirements, the need to achieve robust functionality at 
the lowest cost, etc.  Such an approach results in desired performance levels becoming 
known quantities that can serve as targets for design engineers.  This mode of thought is 
one of “inverse design,” where a set of solutions are found in the design space that satisfy 
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as set of performance targets in the objective space, ( )J x J6 .  The main challenge for 
the system designer lies in the nonuniqueness of the problem as there may be many 
design vectors, ix , that satisfy the vector of performance targets, reqJ . 
De Weck and Jones (2006) offer isoperformance as a method for addressing this 
problem.  They describe isoperformance as an inverse design method that first obtains a 
performance invariant set of system design solutions and subsequently reduces these to 
an efficient set when evaluated against other criteria such as cost and risk.  Finding 
isoperformance solutions gives rise to three sequential issues.  First, we must find ways to 
systematically search the design space for acceptable solutions.  Second, once such 
solutions are obtained, we must find means to reduce the large set of alternatives to a 
smaller set that is suitable for presentation to decision makers.  And third, criteria for 
selecting a particular solution in the reduced set must be discussed.    
System performance requirements typically fall into one of three classes: 
“smaller-is-better” (SIB), “larger-is-better” (LIB), and “nominal is better” (Figure IV-18).  
The isoperformance approach assumes that desired performance targets, reqJ , are known, 
meaning that the key performance objectives are captured as NIB and that they must be 
achieved first.  The subset of solutions that strictly satisfy the NIB requirements are then 
extracted and analyzed for any potential engineering insight that might be gained from 
them.  The next step is to evaluate the performance invariant solutions in terms of their 
SIB and LIB objectives and to filter the set of solutions that are non-dominated according 
to the SIB and LIB objectives.  Finally, one or more designs are selected from this Pareto 




Figure IV-18. Normalized utility curves ui for the ith system objective Ji represented by 
monotonically decreasing (SIB), increasing (LIB) or concave function (NIB) [From de 
Weck & Jones, 2006]. 
 
2. Isoperformance Problem Formulation  
a. Notation 
   To properly formulate the isoperformance problem, it is first necessary to 
establish some concepts and associated notation.  A performance objective for a system is 
usually defined in terms of some statistical measure of system performance such as an 
average, maximum, minimum, root-mean-square, etc.  Given ( )z t as the time-varying 
system performance output signal, the performance of the system in terms of the system 
objective can be written as some statistical measure or function of the output signal:  
( )zJ f z=                                                                                                 (13) 
where z depends on the settings of the design variables ix , where 1, ,i n= … , as well as 
fixed parameters jp : 
( ),i jz h x p=                                                                                            (14) 
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Recalling our main gunner example from Section IV-D4, the system performance output 
signal, ( )z t , is tracking error, and the system objective, zJ , is described in terms of the 








zJ z z z z t dtT
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤= = = ⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠∫                                                    (15) 
where z is a function of training time, 1x , and AFQT score, 2x , and the fixed parameters 
in Equation 7.   
An isoperformance requirement can then be formulated as  
( ), ,       1, ,z iso i z reqJ x J i n≡ ∀ = …                                                               (16) 
whereby a two-sided tolerance band, τ , is allowed for practical and numerical reasons: 




τ τ− ≤                                                                             (17) 
Thus, ,iso ix  is any setting of the design variables such that the statistical measure of the 
output signal for system performance satisfies the specified system objective within some 
acceptable tolerance.  In our example, ,iso ix  is any combination of training time and 
AFQT score that produce a root mean square tracking within some percent difference (τ ) 
of the performance target (i.e., 0.60 mil error).   
 
b. Step 1:  Find the Performance Invariant Set 
Find all kiso iso⊆x X such that for an objective vector ,1 , Tz z z mJ J⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦J …  the following 
constraints are satisfied: 
( ) ,
,
,kz iso z req
z req
− ≤J x p J τ
J
 (Isoperformance constraints)                   (18) 
( , ) 0,  ( , ) 0k kiso iso≤ =g x p h x p  (Feasibility constraints)                           (19) 
, ,
k
i LB iso i UBx x x≤ ≤  (Side bounds)                                          (20) 
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In our example, we see that the isoperformance set for our threshold 
objective is described by the contour in Figure IV-17 labeled 0.60 mil.  For the sake of 
simplicity, we approximate Equation 12 with a fitted power function so that the contour 
is described over the region of interest by the following equation: 
( ) 2.711 2:    779684iso x x −= ⋅X                                                                    (21) 
where 1x  is training time in weeks and 2x  is AFQT score.  We extract from it a subset of 
three discrete isoperformance solutions (A, B, and C), k = 1, 2, 3: 
  1 2 3
3.44 6.36 9.54
,     ,     
94.69 75.46 64.96iso iso iso
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= = =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦x x x                                  (22) 
These satisfy the feasibility constraint that training time does not exceed 10 weeks: 
1 10
kx ≤                                                                                                     (23) 
They also satisfy the following side bounds: 
1, 0
k
LBx ≥                                                                                                    (24) 
2, 2 2,21 100
k k k
LB UBx x x= ≤ ≤ =                                                                     (25) 
The first side bound merely states that training time must be non-negative, while the 
second side bound restricts AFQT scores to those that are both technically achievable and 
consistent with public law. 
c. Step 2:  Find the Efficient Subset 
Find all * *l niso iso iso∈ ⊆ ⊆x X X \ such that for a vector of secondary (cost and risk) 
objectives ,1 , ,
T
cr cr cr rJ J⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦J …  there exists no other feasible design vector 
n
iso∈ ⊆x X \ such that 
 ( ) ( )*cr cr iso≤J x J x             (Non-inferiority constraint)                                 (26) 
 ( ) ( )*, ,cr j cr j isoJ J≤x x   (Component-wise non-inferiority constraint)      (27)
for all 1, ,j r= …  with strict inequality holding for at least one j.  Any feasibility 
constraints or side bounds on *isox have already been satisfied by virtue of step 1. 
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  In our main gunner example, the risk of a design might relate to the aptitude 
sensitivity of the tradeoff decision.   Accordingly, we introduce the following risk 
objective: 
  ( ),1 2'crJ f x=  where 12'
xf
x
∂= ∂ .                                                             (28) 
The cost, on the other hand, might be captured by aptitude since increased incentives are 
required to attract higher quality recruits: [ ],2 2logcrJ xβ= .  By setting 0.05β =  we 
normalize the cost of 2,LBx  to unity.  We can evaluate the three isoperformance designs, 
A, B, and C in terms of crJ and obtain     
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 30.10 0.23 0.40,    ,     0.65 0.56 0.49cr iso cr iso cr isoJ J J⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= = =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦x x x                 (29) 
All three solutions are nondominated or efficient points according to our non-inferiority 
constraint.  The first solution is the low risk, high cost option, the second is a compromise 
between risk and cost, and the third is the high risk, low cost option. 
d. Step 3:  Select the Final Design 
Select ** * niso iso iso∈ ⊆ ⊆x X X \  according to non-quantified objectives or criteria and 
stakeholder considerations.   
  
  It should be noted that steps 1 and 2 could be collapsed into a single multi-
objective optimization problem with two-sided inequality constraints on performance.  
For simple design problems, the results of either the isoperformance method or the all-in-
one optimization should be equivalent.  However, for complex design problems, de Weck 
and Jones claim two advantages of the isoperformance method.  First, engineering insight 
is obtained by solving the problem in steps, and inspecting and visualizing the 
intermediate results.  And second, as the tolerance is decreased, 0τ → , the 
isoperformance constraint can become difficult to solve using standard multiobjective 
techniques.   
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3. Deterministic Versus Empirical Isoperformance Models  
 It is self-evident that isoperformance requires some mathematical model that 
relates the vector of design variables, x , to both performance and cost/risk objectives, 
zJ and crJ , respectively.   The model can be derived from first principles and known 
empirical regularities (as was done in Equation 7) or obtained from experimental or field 
observation.  In the case of the former, which is the deterministic case, the model is 
developed and implemented directly.   In the latter case, an empirical model with 
embedded uncertainty must be developed first.  This, in turn, requires a dataset that 
relates experimental factors ( )x  to observed outcomes ( )J .  While it is often possible to 
make use of deterministic, physics-based models when considering the performance of 
technological systems, empirical models will likely predominate when zJ  incorporates 
the performance of humans.  Figure IV-19 illustrates these two general cases, and it is 
worth noting the isoperformance algorithms used to extract the performance invariant set, 
isoX , are the same in both cases. 
 
Figure IV-19. Deterministic versus empirical modeling approaches [From de Weck & 
Jones, 2006]. 
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F. COUPLING ISOPERFORMANCE WITH UTILITY ANALYSIS 
1. Problem Statement 
As it is usually presented, the isoperformance approach assumes that desired 
performance targets are known.  Nevertheless, an inevitable question is whether we can 
relax that assumption.  Kennedy and Jones published a short proposal in a SAE Technical 
Paper (Kennedy, Jones, & Turnage, 1990) describing a strategy to couple their 
isoperformance methodology with utility analysis.  Given their work from 1979 to 1987 
studying simulator design for training purposes, Kennedy and Jones’ paper primarily 
focuses on the application of the isoperformance method to a large simulator sickness 
database to create isoperformance curves for controlling the adverse consequence of 
exposure to simulators.  After discussing the importance of the isoperformance 
methodology in terms of tradeoff analysis, Kennedy and Jones take the next logical step 
of considering the role of isoperformance in decision analysis: 
…system development requires making human resource decisions that 
have substantial bottom line implications…decision makers have had great 
difficulty in determining the effectiveness or value of human resource 
decisions in the same manner that production and engineering decisions 
can be evaluated. […] One overlooked tool that has direct application to 
this problem is utility analysis [emphasis added] (p. 3). 
While isoperformance provides information on equivalent combinations of determinants 
that produce the same level of performance, Kennedy and Jones posit that utility analysis 
could guide the selection of the target performance level or criterion.   In their thinking, 
this last step, coupling the choice of target performance level to some utility (or value) 
trade space, is necessary if human performance considerations are to be explicitly 
included within the larger context of total system analyses and tradeoffs.   
 Kennedy and Jones hint towards the solution of this problem in their discussion of 
a “meta-model” using isoperformance and utility analysis, but they do not explicitly 
describe what general form such a meta-model should take.   To begin to address this 
issue, we need to make some assumptions about the nature of a problem that might 
involve coupling isoperformance and utility analysis.  Such a problem will likely involve 
a system, the latter being broadly understood to mean a complex set of human and/or 
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technological components that interact to achieve a desired function.  Performance is a 
quantitative measure of how well this function is executed, and utility is attained based 
on the quality of this performance.  The quality of performance is also a function of both 
individual aptitude and training.  Moreover, some selection criteria exist for identifying 
individual aptitude and utility benefits are gained by establishing selection criteria 
thresholds independent of the resulting performance.  Similarly, utility benefits can be 
accrued for training interventions independent of the resulting impacts on the quality of 
performance.  It is necessary that some utility be attained from selection policies and 
training independent of performance quality; otherwise, there is no need to consider 
either selection or training explicitly in a utility analysis.  Instead, one would simply 
consider the utility of the resulting performance.  However, it is often the case that there 
are significant organizational and logistical considerations involved in setting selection 
criteria and training times.  For example, the length of training may directly impact 
personnel availability as well as have indirect implications for the availability of training 
resources for other systems.  When such considerations exist, it is preferred to approach 
the problem from the perspective of multiple criteria optimization so that all dimensions 
of the solution space are adequately considered and the nature of tradeoffs between 
dimensions is understood.  
  Attempts to mathematically model multiple criteria optimization problems 
generally assume a similar approach:  decision dimensions are mapped onto a unitless 
scale of goodness and combined together into an overall measure of goodness.  Many of 
these methods are Archimedian or weight-based approaches that are very difficult to 
implement for realistic problems that comprise many weights.  Such methods typically 
require many iterations of the choice of weights and often provide inadequate guidance 
on how to converge on the right set of weights.  Additionally, in the case when objectives 
are nonlinearly dependent on the decision variables, the iterative development of weights 
can be quite problematic.  Even the choice of utility functions in utility theory can be 
interpreted as involving some implicit choice of weights.  Moreover, while it might be 
possible to determine the correct weights in a certain neighborhood of the solution space, 
there is no guarantee those weights will remain valid in a different neighborhood.  While 
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preemptive approaches avoid the choice of weights by explicitly ordering competing 
objectives, they suffer in that they allow higher priority objectives to dominate lower 
priority objectives and often explore only a portion of the potential solution space 
(Messac, 1996; Messac, Gupta, & Akbulut, 1996).   
 A framework for a meta-model combining isoperformance and utility analysis 
needs to allow the problem formulation to retain its multiobjective character, by which 
we mean that a decision maker should not be forced to form a weighted sum of several 
criteria.  It should also allow for the possibility of deliberate imprecision in the statement 
of preferences.  Messac and colleagues (1996) suggest that goal programming possesses 
the first feature, while physical programming possesses both.  A defining characteristic of 
physical optimization is that it exploits the availability of important information 
regarding the physical meaning of many of the problem parameters and criteria so as to 
remove the decision maker from the highly subjective task of choosing weights.  
Consequently, we will consider physical programming as a framework for specifying our 
meta-model coupling isoperformance and utility analysis. 
2. Physical Program Problem Formulation  
a. Notation and Model Specifications 
  We denote the decision variable vector as x  and the ith generic decision 
criterion as ( )ig x .  The value of the criterion under consideration, ig , is on the 
horizontal axis, and the function that will be minimized for that criterion, iz , called the 
class function, is on the vertical axis.  By convention, a lower value of the class function 
is better than a higher value, and the ideal value of the class function is zero.   
In physical programming, preference generically falls under three classes, 
each comprising two cases.  As depicted in Figure IV-20, the preference classes are 
referred to as follows:  1) class-1: smaller-is-better (SIB), 2) class-2: larger-is-better 
(LIB), and 3) class-3: nominal-is-better (NIB).  The two cases, hard and soft, refer to the 
sharpness of the preference.  The soft class functions provide a means for decision 
makers to express ranges of differing levels of preference for each criterion, resulting in a 
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deliberately imprecise framework.  In contrast, hard class functions are used only when 
one cares to stay within some limits.  The aggregate objective function (to be minimized) 
includes only soft class functions; hard class functions simply act as constraints. 
 
 
Figure IV-20. Preference function classification in physical programming [After Messac, 
1996]. 
 
  For the soft case, the physical programming lexicon comprises terms that 
characterize the degree of desirability of up to 10 ranges.  To illustrate the physical 
programming lexicon, consider the soft case of class-1 (class-1S) shown in Figure IV-21.  
The ranges are defined as follows, in order of preference: 
• Ideal ( )1;  range-1i ig t+≤ :  A range over which every value of the criterion is ideal 
(the most desirable possible).  Any two points of that range are of equal value to 
the decision maker. 
• Desirable ( )1 2;  range-2i i it g t+ +≤ ≤ :  An acceptable range that is desirable. 
• Tolerable ( )2 3;  range-3i i it g t+ +≤ ≤ :  An acceptable, tolerable range. 
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• Undesirable ( )3 4;  range-4i i it g t+ +≤ ≤ :  An acceptable range that is undesirable. 
• Highly undesirable ( )4 5;  range-5i i it g t+ +≤ ≤ :  An acceptable range that is highly 
undesirable. 
• Unacceptable ( )5;  range-6i ig t+≥ :  A range of values that the generic criterion 
may not take. 
The parameters/targets 1it
+  through 5it
+  are physically meaningful values that are specified 
by the decision maker to quantify the preference associated with the ith criterion.  They 
may be derived from organizational policies, planning forecasts, or system specifications.  
These parameters delineate the desirability ranges within each criterion, thereby 
determining the shape of the class function.   
 
Figure IV-21. Class function regions for the ith generic criterion [After Messac, Gupta, & 
Akbulut, 1996].  
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It is worth pointing out that the ideal range is defined such that any two 
points within this range are of equal value.  Thus, the class function is explicitly 
indifferent to values in the ideal range.  This behavior is complementary to the manner in 
which the Defense Department currently specifies system requirements.  In the Defense 
Department lexicon, performance must exceed a certain minimum threshold requirement, 
5it
+ , for the system to have military utility.  Failure to achieve this threshold calls into 
question whether the acquisition program should be continued or cancelled.  
Improvements in performance beyond the threshold are desirable up to some maximum 
value or objective, 1it
+ , after which further improvements in performance provide no 
additional military utility (i.e., performance beyond 1it
+  would qualify as “gold plating” in 
the Defense Department vernacular).  Consequently, setting physically meaningful 
targets should be relatively straightforward for systems engineers and program managers 
working on Defense Department programs. 
For a given criterion, once the decision maker decides to which class the 
criterion belongs and chooses the range targets, the intracriterion preference statement is 
complete.  Since this a multi-objective problem, there must also be intercriteria 
preferences.  Physical programming makes use of the “One versus Others” criteria rule 
(OVO rule) as an implicit form of intercriteria preference.  To understand the OVO rule, 
consider the following two options concerning class function values: 
• Option 1:  Full reduction for one criterion across a given range (range k, k = 3, 4, 
5). 
• Option 2:  Full reduction of all of the other criteria across the next better range 
[region (k – 1)]. 
The OVO rule states that Option 1 shall be preferred over Option 2.  In other words, it is 
considered better for one criterion to travel across, for example, the tolerable region than 
it is for all the other criteria to travel across the desirable region.  
  The next step is to develop the soft class functions.  All functions must 
have the following properties: 
1) A lower value of the class function is preferred over a higher value thereof. 
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2) A class function is strictly positive. 
3) A class function is continuous, piecewise linear, and convex. 
4) The value of a class function, iz , at a given range-intersection is the same for any 
class-type. 
5) The magnitude of a class function’s vertical excursion across any range must 
satisfy the OVO rule. 
The justifications for the preceding properties are provided in Messac, Gupta, and 
Akbulut (1996).  Based on these properties, they develop the following relationships for 
the ith criterion and the sth range intersection: 
1) From property (4): 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1  ;  2 5 ;  0s i is i isz z t z t i s z+ −≡ ≡ ∀ ≤ ≤ ≡                                           (30) 
2) The change in iz  that takes place as one travels across the s
th range, sz , is given 
by: 
( )1 1   2 5 ;  0s s sz z z s z−≡ − ≤ ≤ ≡                                                            (31) 
3) To enforce the OVO rule: 
( ) ( )11    3 5 ;  1;  1s ssc scz n z s nβ β−= − ≤ ≤ > >                                         (32) 
 where scn  is the number of soft criteria and β  is a convexity parameter.  To apply 
Equation 32, 2z is set to a small positive value such as 0.01. 
4) The length of the sth range on the ith criterion is defined as: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
1
-    2 5
-    2 5
is is i s
is is i s
t t t s








                                                                        (33) 
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As suggested by Equation 34, the slopes vary across ranges and criteria.  
Once the slopes are known, the convexity requirement in verified by the relationship: 









:  soft criteria
is is i s













⎧ ≤ ≤= − ⎨⎩=

                                                            (36) 
It should be noted that the quantities isw
+  and isw−  calculated in Equation 36 are exactly the 
weights that will be used in the physical optimization model of the class functions.  
Equation 35 states that so long as the weights are positive, the class function will be 
piecewise linear and convex.  Moreover, convexity can always be satisfied by simply 
increasing the magnitude of the convexity parameter, β , in Equation 32. 
b. Physical Programming Weight Algorithm 
The following algorithm evaluates the weights that are to be used in the 
physical program model of the class functions: 
1) Initialize: 
2
1 11.1;  0,  0;  0.1;  0;  1;   number of soft criteriai i scw w z i s nβ + −= = = = = = =  
2) Set 1i i= +  
3) Set 1s s= +  
  Evaluate in sequence min,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  
s
is is is is is isz t t w w w w w
+ − + − + +      
  If min 0.01w < , then increaseβ  by 0.01 and go to step 2. 
4) If 5s ≠  go to step 3. 
5) If sci n≠ , go to step 2. 
Using the weights obtained from the above algorithm, which were derived without any 
decision maker input other than the range targets ( )i.e., ,  is ist t+ − , it is now possible to 
formulate the physical programming problem model. 
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c. Physical Programming Problem Model 
Building on the previous development, the physical programming problem 
statement takes the following form: 
( )5
, , 1 2




is is is isd d x i s
J w d w d− +
− − + +
= =





5              for all  in classes 1S and 3S, 1,  2, , ,  2, ,5
0

















5              for all  in classes 2S and 3S, 1,  2, , ,  2, ,5
0













… …  
and 
( ),max                    for all  in class 1H, 1,  2, ,j j hcg t j j n≤ = …  
( ),min                    for all  in class 2H, 1,  2, ,j j hcg t j j n≥ = …  
( ),min ,max         for all  in class 2H, 1,  2, ,j j j hct g t j j n≤ ≤ = …  
min max         ≤ ≤x x x  
where isd
−  and isd
+  are deviational variables, x is the decision variable vector, ( )ig g= x , 
and hcn denotes the number of hard criteria.  Given the assumptions in our problem 
statement in Section IV-F1, one of the three soft class functions will apply to individual 
aptitude (i.e., personnel), training, and performance criteria derived from the 



















x                                                                                       (38) 
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Accordingly, the isoperformance analysis has been coupled with utility analysis in a 
physical optimization meta-model. 
3. Example 
 A simple problem is chosen in an effort to introduce the methodology without 
unduly obscuring its key features.  Recalling our main gunner example from Section IV-
D4, the quantities of interest—or criteria—for the person performing the human/machine 
analysis are as follows: 
  Training: 
1 1g x≡                                                                                                      (39) 
  Aptitude: 
2 2g x≡                                                                                                      (40) 








≡ = ⋅                                                                             (41) 
The decision variables are 
{ }1 2,x x=x                                                                                               (42) 
where 1x  is the length of training in weeks and 2x  is AFQT score. Various wishes are 
expressed by the pertinent stakeholders as follows: 
• Training:  Shorter is better to decrease resource utilization and ownership costs.   
• Aptitude:  The lower the score, the better, as the pool of potentially available 
soldiers in increased. 
• Tracking error:  Lower is better between the threshold and objective values as 
specified in the system requirement.   
Consequently, 1-S class functions are chosen for all three criteria.  The range limits that 
delineate degrees of desirability as expressed by the stakeholders are reported in Table 




Table IV-2. Physical programming region limits table. 






1x  1-S 2 5 8 9 10 
2x  1-S 21 30 49 64 92 
isop  1-S 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 
 
 
 The weights generated using the physical programming weight algorithm and the 
optimal decision results are presented in Table IV-3.  We see that the most utility is 
attained by accepting borderline tolerable/undesirable values for training time and 
tracking error and a highly undesirable value for aptitude (corresponding to AFQT 
category I and II personnel).  It is worth noting that Messac and colleagues’ lexicon for 
describing the target ranges sounds a bit odd as applied in this problem context, 
particularly for the tracking error criterion.  We maintained it here for the sake of 
consistency, but we suggest that other Likert-type ordinal listings of preference might be 
chosen based on the problem context.  That issue notwithstanding, this example clearly 
demonstrates an approach for selecting isoperformance thresholds based on the objective 
of optimizing overall utility. 
 
Table IV-3. Physical programming optimization results. 
 Weights  
ith criteria 
2iw
+  3iw+  4iw+  5iw+  Value 
1x  0.03 0.10 1.48 4.88 8 
2x  0.01 0.01 0.09 0.12 80 





G. BRINGING IT ALL TOGETHER  
To illustrate the key points in this chapter, we will use the following notional 
systems decision problem: the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) wants to 
acquire new technology to enhance the effectiveness of airline passenger screening.  The 
core of this example is an HSI trade space activity developed for use in one of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s HSI certificate courses. My intent in using this example is to help 
novice HSI practitioners visualize the process through which HSI tradeoff considerations 
can be addressed during the early phases of systems engineering and management.  Given 
the absence of a published case study that accomplishes this goal, we must content 
ourselves with a reasonable facsimile thereof.  The example presented in the following 
section is tailored with the objective of trading off complexity of detail and realism for 
the benefit of a cleaner, holistic perspective of the scenario.  This section borrows heavily 
from material presented in chapters 10–12 in Decision Making in Systems Engineering 
and Management (Parnell, Driscoll, & Henderson, 2008).  Interested readers can refer to 
that text for more detail on specific topics.    
1. Illustrative Example:  Enhancing Airline Passenger Screening 
There is no question that the airline security system failed in an extremely broad 
fashion on December 25, 2009.  A 23-year-old Nigerian man boarded a Detroit bound 
flight with explosive material hidden in his underwear.  He almost succeeded in killing 
289 people but for the quick actions of the passengers.  In the aftermath of this event, 
there have been calls for a variety of actions focused on improving intelligence 
collection, analysis, and dissemination as well as enhancing airline passenger screening.  
In the case of the latter, the TSA quickly opted for a materiel solution to the problem and 
announced a plan to deploy the latest in body scanning technologies.  However, within 
days of their announcement, vigorous debate emerged over the use of “full body 
scanners” at airports and the ramifications for passenger privacy (Figure IV-22).  Clearly, 
the initial problem statement of enhancing security was not a full statement of the 
problem from the perspective of all stakeholders.   
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Figure IV-22. Cartoon by Daryl Cagle from January 14, 2010, commenting on the 
heightened emphasis on security at the nation’s airports following the unsuccessful attack 
by the underwear bomber [From Cagle, 2010]. 
 
2. Problem Definition 
The following begins the work of developing our notional systems decision 
problem.  An integrated product team working for the Department of Homeland Security 
was formed and tasked with fielding a new airline passenger screening system for use by 
the TSA.  Given the pressure to rapidly field a solution, senior agency decision makers 
directed that the acquisition strategy focus on acquiring a non-developmental item (NDI) 
rather than pursuing the potentially lengthy development process required for a 
completely new solution.  Accordingly, a request for proposals (RFP) was quickly 
published and two companies responded with their technical solutions:  1) Virtually Nude 
and 2) Magic Eyes. 
Although the project manager wishes to move quickly to a source selection 
decision, their HSI consultant is equally fast to point out that acquiring a NDI-based 
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system represents a significant challenge because far more problems must be foreseen 
and forestalled rather than being detected and resolved during development.  The HSI 
consultant suggests that establishing some requirements will help ensure that a NDI-
based system is selected on a sound basis.  They also emphasize that HSI requirements, 
in particular, will help avoid the risk that cheaper equipment will lead to higher human-
related costs or poor overall system performance downstream.  Given the persuasiveness 
of the HSI consultant’s argument, the project manager acquiesces and the IPT goes about 
doing a quick stakeholder analysis and some requirements engineering, the results of 
which are summarized in Table IV-4.  The constructive scores for the objective 
“minimize privacy impact” have the following values: 
+1 Better than current system 
  0  Same as current system 
- 1 Marginally worse than current system 
- 2 Worse than current system 
- 3 Significantly worse than current system 
 
Table IV-4. Raw data matrix for airline passenger screening systems. 
  Solutions 
Objectives Measures of effectiveness Virtually Nude 
Magic 
Eyes Baseline 
Maximize reliability Number of missed threats/1000 passengers screened 1
* 3* 10 
Maximize capacity Number of passengers screened per hour 45 60 75 
Minimize privacy      
impact 
Constructive scale compared to 
current system† -2 -1 0 
Minimize manpower Number of operators 3 2 2 
*Reported by manufacturer with unspecified users. 
†Constructive scores 
 
 The question for the HSI consultant to consider at this point is whether the data 
provided in Table IV-4 are adequate for proceeding to source selection.  Since the scores 
reported for the reliability objective were obtained using unspecified users, the short 
answer to this question is that we do not know.  Given that we generally consider a 
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system as being comprised of liveware (i.e., humans), hardware, and software, if the 
users involved in the testing resemble TSA employees, then the reported reliability scores 
are probably accurate.  However, if the users involved in the testing differ from TSA 
employees in one or more attributes, then the TSA may get a very different system when 
they combine their employees with the hardware and software provided by either 
company.  In this situation, the reported scores for reliability in Table IV-4 may not be 
very accurate, in which case there is a need to do some type of experimentation, whether 
using modeling and simulation or human-in-the-loop testing, to generate more realistic 
estimates of system performance.   This, in turn, will inevitably lead to the issue of design 
of experiments, a topic we will discuss in more detail momentarily. 
3. Defining the HSI Solution Space 
As part of their analysis, the HSI consultant pays a visit to the TSA human 
resources director.  There they learn that the TSA administers an aptitude assessment, 
Screener-IQ, to potential employees.  A minimum score of 60 is required for 
employment.  Aptitude scores of hires are normally distributed with a mean score of 100 
and standard deviation of 10.  All employees that are hired complete a minimum of six 
hours of generic classroom instruction on the existing screening system before beginning 
practical training until they are proficient with the system.  It currently takes 
approximately 40 total hours before new hires reach proficiency.  Because the TSA 
experiences a high rate of turnover, there is also a desire to minimize training time for 
any replacement screening system.  Moreover, the TSA cannot accommodate any 
training program that is greater than 54 hours given the currently available training 
budget and resources. 
 Based on their visit with the human resources director, the HSI consultant can 
now augment the earlier top-level requirements engineering by providing supporting 
requirements for the personnel and training domains of HSI.  Such requirements might 
take the following general form: 
• Personnel domain:  The system shall be operable by users with a minimum 
Screener-IQ aptitude score of 80 (threshold) / 60 (objective). 
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• Training domain:  Initial training to use the system shall be no greater than 40 
hours (threshold) / 20 hours (objective).   
These requirements are themselves laden with stakeholders’ (e.g., human resources 
director) values and could conceivably be described in terms of degrees of preference—a 
point that will be taken up later.  However, for the moment, the HSI requirements are 
more easily thought of as providing MPT constraints on the potential solution space.  In 
the case of the personnel domain, it was decided, at a minimum, to accommodate users 
who are at least two standard deviations below the mean, but it is preferred to 
accommodate all users who could potentially be hired (i.e., achieve the minimum 
Screener-IQ score of 60).  Likewise, for the training domain, screener training time 
cannot exceed the available training hours, but it is preferred that training time be no 
longer than that of the legacy system.  Moreover, decreasing the training time relative to 
the legacy system would provide significant long-term logistical savings.  These types of 
MPT issues and constraints also feed into any subsequent design of experiments, 
providing important information regarding the necessary scope of experiments.  Such 
scope considerations should include the range of individual aptitudes, training times, and 
training media that should be considered.     
4. Evaluating Solutions 
Since the two responses to the RFP both report reliability for their respective 
system without providing any description of the corresponding users, the HSI consultant 
recognizes the need to quickly and economically develop some data to help inform the 
systems decision process. The HSI consultant turns to design of experiments (DOE) as a 
means to simultaneously study the individual and interactive effects of several factors, 
thereby keeping the number of experimental replications to a minimum.  Design of 
experiments addresses the basic question, “What is the average outcome (effect) when a 
factor is moved from a low level to a high level?” (West, 2008, p. 333).  Since more than 
one factor is often of some importance in a complex system, efficiencies are gained by 
moving combinations of factors simultaneously. 
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Let us take a moment to consider an experimental design for evaluating the new 
airline passenger screening systems described above.  The HSI consultant has initially 
identified three key factors that might influence performance:  individual aptitude, length 
of training, and equipment.  These factors correspond to the personnel, training, and 
human factors engineering domains of HSI respectively.  The HSI consultant has also 
determined approximate levels of interest for each factor:  aptitude scores ranging from 
60 to 100, training times ranging from 10 to 50 hours, and the two equipment designs 
being considered.    The primary measure of effectiveness is the “rate of missed threats.”  
This design can be displayed as a cube with the three factors, aptitude score (x), training 
time (y), and scanner (z), shown with both low (–1) and high (+1) levels corresponding to 
the lower and upper levels of interest (see Figure IV-23).  Eight conditions, or design 
points (DP), are possible in this design:  DP1 where x and y are set to their lower levels 
and z is set to its higher level, DP2 where x and z are set high and y is set low, and so on 
as shown in Figure IV-23.  This type of experimental design is called a 23 factorial design 
since it is based on three factors and each factor has two levels.  This also tells the 
experimenter how many design points exist:  23 = 2 x 2 x 2 = 8.   
 
 
Figure IV-23. Three-factor, two-level design. 
 
An additional strength of design of experiments is that it allows the experimenter 
to understand the interaction effects between factors.  These interaction effects show the 
synergistic relationships between factors by measuring how the effect of one factor may 
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depend on the level of one or more other factors.  A full 23 factorial design allows for the 
estimation of three main effects (i.e., x, y, and z in this example), three 2-way interactions 
(i.e., xy, xz, and yz), and one 3-way interaction (i.e., xyz).  Table IV-5 shows the design 
matrix for the airline passenger screening systems experiment that includes the 
interactions of the main effects.  The sign values for the interaction columns are 
determined by multiplying the signs of the factors of interest.  Note that for the main 
effects, the design moves one factor from its low to its high setting while holding the 
other factors constant. 
 
Table IV-5. 2 x 3 study design matrix. 
Design point x y z xy xz yz xyz Response 
DP1 –1 –1 –1 +1 +1 +1 –1 R1 
DP2 +1 –1 –1 –1 –1 +1 +1 R2 
DP3 –1 +1 –1 –1 +1 –1 +1 R3 
DP4 +1 +1 –1 +1 –1 –1 –1 R4 
DP5 –1 –1 +1 +1 –1 –1 +1 R5 
DP6 +1 –1 +1 –1 +1 –1 –1 R6 
DP7 –1 +1 +1 –1 –1 +1 –1 R7 
DP8 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 R8 
 
 The HSI consultant runs the 2 x 3 study design matrix as just discussed using 
eight judiciously chosen subjects.  Before proceeding further, however, a word of caution 
is warranted with regards to the choice of said subjects.  Such a study as described here 
lacks a key ingredient of classic design of experiments—random assignment.  As a result, 
the study design is really a quasi-experimental study design, which raises obvious 
potential problems of internal validity.  The biggest threat to internal validity is 
selection—that the subjects differ in other important ways besides the factors considered 
by the experimenter.  Additionally, since each subject individually represents a 
prespecified design point, it is imperative that they actually embody the corresponding 
combination of factor levels.  Consequently, one needs to be cognizant in opting for such 
a study of the implicit tradeoff between risk for threats to validity and economy of effort, 
both in terms of time and resources.    
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Mindful of these issues, the HSI consultant is duly vigilant for potential threats 
when selecting subjects and conducting the experiment.  The experiment yields the 
results shown in Table IV-6 where the response (R) is the calculated number of missed 
threats per thousand passengers screened.   
 
Table IV-6. Initial results for the airline passenger screening system experiment. 
Design point x y z xy xz yz xyz Response 
DP1 –1 –1 –1 +1 +1 +1 –1 8.0 
DP2 +1 –1 –1 –1 –1 +1 +1 2.3 
DP3 –1 +1 –1 –1 +1 –1 +1 5.7 
DP4 +1 +1 –1 +1 –1 –1 –1 0.2 
DP5 –1 –1 +1 +1 –1 –1 +1 9.0 
DP6 +1 –1 +1 –1 +1 –1 –1 3.0 
DP7 –1 +1 +1 –1 –1 +1 –1 6.9 
DP8 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 1.5 
 
The next step is to calculate effects sizes for each of the factors and the 
interactions between the factors.  As previously mentioned, the effect size is the average 
change in the response resulting from moving a factor from its (–1) to its (+1) level while 
holding all other factors fixed.  Effect size is also a convenient means for gauging the 
relative importance of factors.  A simple shortcut for calculating effect sizes is to apply 
the signs of the factor or interaction column to the corresponding response, sum them, 
and then divide by 2k–1, where k is the number of factors.  Effect size calculations for the 
three main effects, three 2-way interactions, and single 3-way interaction in the airline 
passenger screening systems experiment are shown below (Equations 43–49). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4
8.0 2.3 5.7 0.2 9.0 3.0 6.9 1.5   5.68
4
x
R R R R R R R Re − + − + − + − +=
− + − + − + − += = −
                                     (43) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4
8.0 2.3 5.7 0.2 9.0 3.0 6.9 1.5   1.98
4
y
R R R R R R R Re − − + + − − + +=
− − + + − − + += = −
                                     (44) 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4
8.0 2.3 5.7 0.2 9.0 3.0 6.9 1.5   1.08
4
z
R R R R R R R Re + + + − − − −=
+ + + − − − −= =
                                          (45) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4
8.0 2.3 5.7 0.2 9.0 3.0 6.9 1.5   = 0.20
4
xy
R R R R R R R Re − − + + − − +=
− − + + − − + =
                                         (46) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4
8.0 2.3 5.7 0.2 9.0 3.0 6.9 1.5   = 0.20
4
xz
R R R R R R R Re − + − − + − +=
− + − − + − + =
                                         (47) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4
8.0 2.3 5.7 0.2 9.0 3.0 6.9 1.5   = 0.20
4
yz
R R R R R R R Re + − − − − + +=
+ − − − − + + =
                                         (48) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4
8.0 2.3 5.7 0.2 9.0 3.0 6.9 1.5    = 0.10
4
xyz
R R R R R R R Re − + + − + − − +=
− + + − + − − + =
                                     (49) 
At this point, the HSI consultant has accomplished the first step in Simon’s 
research strategy, namely, conducting a screening factorial study.  The next step is to 
conduct a Pareto analysis to reduce the complexity of the solution space by eliminating 
those factors and interactions between factors that fail to make a meaningful contribution.  
Figure IV-24 displays the results of the full factorial airline passenger screening systems 




Figure IV-24. Pareto analysis of the airline passenger screening system experiment. 
 
It is evident from Figure IV-24 that individual aptitude (x) is the most important 
factor in explaining performance, followed by training time (y) and then equipment (z).  
This result confirms the HSI consultant’s original concern that user attributes could 
impact reported system reliability.  It also appears that the HSI consultant can safely 
disregard the interaction terms and focus just on the factors, thereby simplifying 
subsequent calculations. 
5. Defining a Tradeoff Function 
To quantitatively consider tradeoffs requires the formulation of some functional 
model relating a performance of interest to its determinants.  In the case of the airline 
passenger screening system experiment, it is possible to formulate a linear model directly 
from the study results in Table IV-6.  The model will be of the following general form: 
R ax by cz d= + + +                                                                                              (50) 
where R is the response, x is ±1 depending on choice of personnel domain factor level 
(i.e., aptitude score of 60 or 100), y is ±1 depending on choice of training domain factor 
level (i.e., training time of 10 or 50 hours), and z is ±1 depending on choice of equipment.  
The model parameters for each factor (i.e., a, b, and c) can be calculated in a manner that 
is similar to that used for calculating effect size.  Again, we apply the signs of the factor  
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column to the corresponding response (R), sum them, and this time divide by , where k 
is the number of factors.  For example, to calculate the model parameter associated with 
individual aptitude (a): 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
8
8.0 2.3 5.7 0.2 9.0 3.0 6.9 1.5  2.84
8
R R R R R R R Ra − + − + − + − +=
− + − + − + − += = −
                                      (51) 
The values for the parameters b and c are similarly calculated: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
8
8.0 2.3 5.7 0.2 9.0 3.0 6.9 1.5  0.99
8
R R R R R R R Rb − − + + − − + +=
− − + + − − + += = −
                                      (52) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
8
8.0 2.3 5.7 0.2 9.0 3.0 6.9 1.5  0.54
8
R R R R R R R Rc + + + − − − −=
+ + + − − − −= =
                                          (53) 
The value of the parameter d is simply the average response.  That is: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
8
8.0 2.3 5.7 0.2 9.0 3.0 6.9 1.5  4.57
8
R R R R R R R Rd + + + + + + +=
+ + + + + + += =
                                          (54) 
Now the HSI consultant can calculate an estimated response for any combination 
of the three factors at either of their two levels using the following linear regression 
model: 
2.84 0.99 0.54 4.57R x y z= − − + +                                                                       (55) 
Hence, the HSI consultant can provide the project manager with an estimate of how well 
a system comprised of a TSA employee with an aptitude score of 60 (x = –1) and 50 
hours of training (y = +1) using a Magic Eyes scanner (z = –1) will perform: 
( ) ( ) ( )2.84 1 0.99 1 0.54 1 4.57 5.8R = − − − + + − + =                                              (56) 
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But what about an employee with an aptitude score of 80 and 40 hours of 
training?  To answer these types of questions, the values of aptitude score and training 
must be scaled so they vary between –1 and +1 over the range between the low and high 
factor level settings.  For example, consider the following scaling for aptitude score: 
 80
20
scorex −=                                                                                                      (57) 
A score of 60 corresponds to x = –1 and a score of 100 corresponds to x = +1, which 
matches the low and high factor level settings respectively.  Similarly, an appropriate 
scaling for training would be: 
30
20
trainingy −=                                                                                                 (58) 
There is no need to scale the equipment factor as it is only defined for the values z = ±1. 




score trainingR a b c equipment d− −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + + +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠                                (59) 
where a, b, c, and d are the same model parameters calculated earlier.  Substituting the 
estimates for these model parameters into Equation 59 and using some simple algebra 
yields: 
( ) ( ) ( )0.14 0.05 0.54 17.41R score training equipment= − − + +                           (60) 
Equation 60 is a tradeoff function in terms of the personnel domain (aptitude score), 
training domain (training time), and human factors engineering domain (equipment) as 
they relate to system performance.  Using Equation 60, the HSI consultant can estimate 
system performance as a function of these three HSI domains for any point in the shaded 




Figure IV-25. Potential solution space, shown as shaded areas, for the airline passenger 
screening system experiment. 
 
6. Developing Isoperformance Curves  
 The idea of developing isoperformance curves among HSI domains was first 
advanced as a tradeoff methodology by Kennedy and Jones.  The central reasoning 
behind their isoperformance methodology is the idea that, almost always, a specified 
level of performance can be produced by more than one combination of factors.  Hence, 
isoperformance curves trace all combinations of two or more HSI domains that produce a 
specified level of performance.  Figure IV-26 depicts a hypothetical pair of 
isoperformance curves that might be produced by an experiment such as the one just 
performed to evaluate the airline passenger screening systems.  On the graph, training 
time is plotted on the abscissa and personnel aptitude score is plotted on the ordinate.  
The two lines correspond to combinations of personnel aptitude, training time, and 
equipment that produce equivalent performance, for example, 3 missed threats per 
thousand passengers screened.  Hence, performance at points R1, R2, and R3 is the same, 
but the contributions from various combinations formed by personnel, training, and 
equipment factors are different. All sorts of tradeoffs can be explored using these plots.  
As an example, for equipment A, if the aptitude of newly hired screeners is decreased 
from P2 to P1, then we will need to increase training from T1 to T2 to maintain system 
performance.  Alternatively, we could elect to adopt equipment B and continue to train 
only to T1.  This is exactly the type of information decision makers need to consider 
various courses of action. 
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Figure IV-26. Hypothetical isoperformance plots for two equipment configurations. 
 
 Isoperformance curves provide equivalent options in terms of the factors included 
in the underlying model.  However, other external factors such as cost, risk, or utility 
must then be used to make a final selection from among the range of equivalent solutions.  
For example, Figure IV-27 depicts the fact that there is an upper limit on the aptitude 
scores of potential new screeners.  Likewise, there is an upper limit on the amount of 
training that can be provided.  Given these constraints, we see that there are no feasible 
solutions involving equipment A.  Additionally, only a third of the solutions on the 




Figure IV-27. Hypothetical isoperformance plots for two equipment configurations with 
personnel and training domain feasibility constraints. 
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To create isoperformance curves for the airline passenger screening systems 
problem, it is necessary to first establish a target level of performance, Riso.  In so doing, 
the value of R in the linear regression model given by Equation 60 becomes fixed at Riso: 
( ) ( ) ( )0.14 0.05 0.54 17.41isoR score training equipment= − − + +                        (61) 
Recalling that equipment = 1 for Virtually Nude and –1 for Magic Eyes, two 
isoperformance equations can be formulated corresponding to the two equipment options: 
Virtually Nude: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0.14 0.05 0.54 1 17.41
     0.14 0.05 17.95
isoR score training
score training
= − − + + +
= − − +                         (62) 
Magic Eyes: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0.14 0.05 0.54 1 17.41
     0.14 0.05 16.87
isoR score training
score training
= − − + − +
= − − +                         (63) 
By simply rearranging terms, score can be expressed in terms of a simple linear function 
of training for each of the equipment options: 
 Virtually Nude: 
( )0.36 7.14 128.21isoscore training R= − − +                                            (64) 
 
Magic Eyes: 
( )0.36 7.14 120.50isoscore training R= − − +                                            (65) 
For those who find that these equations are not intuitive, it may help to recognize that 
they reduce to the following general form: 
 ( )score m training n= +                                                                                       (66) 
which is the formula for a line of slope m and intercept n.  It is also worth noting here 
that, given a specified level of performance (Riso), each of these equations describes 
equivalent combinations of the determinants, individual aptitude and training time, within 




Figure IV-28. Potential solution space, shown as shaded areas, for the airline passenger 
screening system experiment with corresponding isoperformance equations. 
 
By picking several representative values for training (e.g., 6, 12, 24, 30, 36, 42, 
48, and 54 hours) and using Equations 64 and 65, the HSI consultant can compute 
corresponding aptitude scores that will yield a performance of Riso for each equipment 
configuration.  The HSI consultant decides to create isoperformance curves for several 
performance levels:  high (Riso = 1), moderate (Riso = 3) and low (Riso = 5).  These 
performance levels correspond to system reliabilities of 0.999, 0.997, and 0.995 
respectively.  The resulting isoperformance readouts for each of the equipment options 















































Figure IV-29. Isoperformance curves for the two equipment options: a) Virtually Nude, 
b) Magic Eyes. 
 
The relative flat slope of the isoperformance curves suggest that performance is 
more sensitive to aptitude than training—so personnel domain considerations regarding 
the range of aptitudes to accommodate need to be taken into account during the systems 
decision process.  Given the aptitude and training constraints provided by the human 
resources director, it is readily evident that the reliability for Virtually Nude  (Figure IV-
29a) reported in the RFP (i.e., one missed threat per thousand passengers screened) is not 
obtainable, even when we consider a TSA employee of average aptitude.  If we consider 
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the suggested threshold-level personnel and training domain requirements, which you 
will recall was an aptitude score of 80 and a training time of 40 weeks, the best reliability 
that can be achieved with Virtually Nude is five missed threats per thousand passengers 
screened.  In the case of Magic Eyes (Figure IV-29b), a reliability of three missed threats 
per thousand passengers screened, as was claimed in the RFP, is achievable, but only 
with the maximum acceptable length of training.  Again, given the suggested threshold-
level personnel and training domain requirements, the best reliability that can be achieved 
is approximately four missed threats per thousand passengers screened.  As this quick 
analysis demonstrates, quite a bit of useful information can be extracted from graphical 
isoperformance readouts of the type illustrated in Figure IV-29. 
7. Designing a System Solution 
 It is finally possible to look at complete system solutions—complete in the sense 
that information is available about the liveware, hardware, and software components of 
the system and how their attributes contribute to overall system performance.  However, 
in considering the information provided by the isoperformance curves, the project team is 
faced with potentially conflicting objectives.  For example, the objective to maximize 
reliability would guide decision makers to select a system based on the performance 
achievable given the maximum feasible training time (i.e., 54 hours) and with minimal 
accommodation of the range of potential user aptitudes (i.e., assuming a minimum 
aptitude score of 80).  In contrast, the human resource director’s objectives would guide 
decision makers to accept a lower level of system reliability in exchange for minimizing 
training time and maximally accommodating the range of potential users—both 
considerations with significant implications for the cost of ownership for a system.  How 
then should the conflicting objectives in this decision problem be resolved?   
 At this point in the airline passenger screening systems problem, it is necessary to 
directly address the issue raised by Kennedy and Jones of coupling isoperformance and 
utility analysis—what is the acceptable level of performance for which we need to 
consider some combinations of equipment, user aptitude, and training?   In this problem 
context, the performance of interest is reliability and it can be described in terms of an 
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isoperformance model involving equipment, aptitude, and training.  The achieved level of 
reliability contributes to the overall utility of the solution, but aptitude and training do as 
well and not necessarily in a convergent manner.  This then brings us to the subject of 
multiple criteria decision making, where it is was shown in Section IV-F that physical 
programming provides an attractive methodology for integrating the isoperformance 
approach within an overarching utility analysis—and without requiring decision makers 
to undertake the dubious task of explicitly developing subjective weight schemes.   
  To make use of a physical program, we first need to reformulate Equation 61 so 
that z is redefined as a binary decision variable, taking on a value of 1 for Virtually Nude 
and 0 for Magic Eyes.  This is a slight change from the coding used previously in the 
design of experiments and is mainly for the convenience of modeling as most 
optimization software utilize binary indicator variables.  Accordingly, in the airline 
passenger screening systems source selection decision, the criteria of interest to the 
decision maker are as follows: 
  Aptitude: 
   1g y≡                                                                                                       (67) 
  Training: 
   2g x≡                                                                                                       (68) 
  Reliability: 
  3 0.14 0.05 1.08 16.87isog r x y z≡ = − − + +                                                (69) 
  Capacity: 
  ( )4 0 11g c z c z≡ − +                                                                                   (70) 
  Privacy: 
  ( )5 0 11g p z p z≡ − +                                                                                  (71) 
  Manpower: 
  ( )6 0 11g m z m z≡ − +                                                                                 (72) 
where x is training time in hours; y is aptitude score; z is choice of system; isor is 
estimated reliability in missed threats per thousand passengers screened; zc  is the 
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capacity in number of passengers per hour of system 0,1z = ; zp  is the privacy of system 
0,1z = ; and zm  is the number of operators needed for system 0,1z = .  The decision 
variables are 
 { }, ,x y zψ =  
 The various wishes and specifications expressed by the systems decision 
stakeholders are as follows: 
• Reliability:  In terms of the number of missed targets per thousand passengers 
screened, lower is better.  The rate of missed targets must be less than 7.5, 
representing a 25% improvement over the current system—otherwise there is no 
point to the acquisition. 
• Aptitude:  The lower the score the better as the pool of new hires that can be 
easily accommodated is increased. 
• Training:  Shorter is better to decrease resource utilization and ownership costs.   
• Capacity:  Higher is better to decrease the impact on airline passengers and airline 
operators. 
• Privacy:  In terms of the constructive scores, higher is better to ease concerns 
about the potential impact on passengers’ civil liberties. 
• Manpower:  Less is better, again to decrease ownership costs. 
The choice of class functions and the range limits that delineate degrees of desirability as 









Table IV-7. Physical programming region limits table. 









Aptitude 1-S 60 70 75 78 80 
Training 1-S 20 30 35 40 54 
Reliability 1-S 1 2 3 5 7.5 
Capacity 2-S 120 95 70 45 20 
Privacy 2-S 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
Manpower 1-S 0 1 2 3 4 
*  for class 1-S functions,  for class 2-S functions
is is is
t t t+ −=  
 
The physical programming problem statement takes the following form: 
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− − + +
= =





5              for all  in class 1S, 1, 2,3,6 ,  2, ,5
0

















5              for all  in class 2S, 4,5 ,  2, ,5
0
























We relaxed the binary constraint on z in Equation 73 so that the program can be 
solved as a linear physical program with the understanding that this approach is tenable 




would need to be solved as an integer linear program.  The weights generated using the 
physical programming weight algorithm and the optimal decision results are presented in 
Table IV-8.   
 
Table IV-8. Physical programming optimization results. 
 Weights  
ith criteria 
2iw
+  3iw+  4iw+  5iw+  Value 
Aptitude 0.03 0.25 1.24 1.46 70 
Training 0.03 0.25 2.25 18.28 41.9 
Reliability 0.25 1.13 2.41 12.86 7.5 
Capacity 0.01 0.05 0.25 1.36 60 
Privacy 0.25 1.13 6.19 34.03 -1 
Manpower 0.25 1.13 6.19 34.03 2 
 
 
 The optimal setting of the decision variables is { }* 41.9,70,0ψ = , which 
corresponds to selecting the Magic Eyes system, providing approximately 42 hours of 
training, and accommodating employees with a minimum aptitude score of 70.   It is 
worth noting that the most utility is attained by accepting the minimally tolerable 
performance increment in reliability (i.e., a miss rate of 7.5 targets per thousand 
passengers screened) rather than maximizing reliability at the expense of the personnel 
and training domains.  Moreover, the optimal system performance, given consideration of 
the HSI dimensions of the solution space, differs by a factor of 2.5 from that reported in 
the RFP.  Thus, this illustrates the importance of giving due regard to HSI considerations 
early in the systems decision process!   
It should also be noted that the reliability level attained through physical 
programming differs from what would have been anticipated had we only used the 
isoperformance readouts and considered the HSI domain issues solely as problem 
constraints.  For example, strictly considering the isoperformance readout for Magic Eyes 
(Figure IV-29) would have led to the conclusion that the reported reliability in the RFP of 
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three missed threats per thousand passengers screened is both reasonable and feasible.  
However, the necessary training time would have been highly undesirable from the 
perspective of the human resources department.  Likewise, personnel considerations 
would have been limited to accommodating only minus two standard deviations—that is, 
97.5 percent of employees.    Had we allowed performance considerations to dominate 
the systems decision process, the end result might have been an unbalanced solution that 
maximized operational effectiveness (at least, in the short term) at the expense of 
operational suitability.  However, the physical programming problem statement, by 
including HSI considerations directly in the problem objective function, suggested a more 
balanced solution that considered both operational effectiveness and suitability as 
independent dimensions of the solution space.  This observation reinforces the 
importance of coupling isoperformance with utility analysis as suggested by Kennedy 
and Jones.    
H. CONCLUSION 
A complete decision analysis should include, at a minimum, both a sensitivity 
analysis and a cost/benefit analysis.  Nonetheless, we will stop at this point in the airline 
passenger screening systems problem as the primary purpose of the example was to 
convey a more concrete, and therefore mentally tractable, image of the HSI trade space in 
contrast to the abstract perspective provided by the conceptual models introduced earlier 
in the chapter.  The example illustrates how we can take a significant step forward in 
deliberatively considering the HSI trade space in the systems decision process by 
integrating Simon’s research strategy, Kennedy and Jones’ isoperformance approach, and 
coupling isoperformance with utility analysis through such means as physical 
programming.  Hopefully, experienced HSI practitioners will take a moment to pause and 
reflect that, despite this being a simple “toy” problem, the choice of an isoperformance 
criterion that balanced operational effectiveness and suitability considerations was not 
intuitively self-evident.  Consequently, a systematic and disciplined process is needed 
when approaching the problem of planning and designing complex systems with desired 
outcomes.  
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With that said, we have only started the analysis of what DePuy and Bonder 
(1982) call the micro MPT supply and demand interface—or “little HSI” as my fellow 
HSI practitioner, John Burns, described it.  What should be self evident is that attending 
to the macro MPT supply and demand interface—or “big HSI” in Burn’s lexicon—will 
involve massive amounts of data.  Managing this interface can only be made tractable 
through the mathematical tools and methods of operations research, and probably, the 
incorporation of some elements of computational design at the level of little HSI.  Thus, 
it is promising that our little HSI process culminates in an operations research method—
physical programming—by which we can include considerations from the big HSI 
process in the form of Messac and colleagues’ (1996) hard type of constraints.   
From a more philosophical perspective, another outstanding issue that needs to be 
addressed is how we incorporate this macro/micro or big/little duality into our 
conceptualization of HSI.  Little HSI concentrates on individual technological systems 
and subsystems and, at least in its contemporary implementation, is strongly oriented 
towards human factors engineering (see Pew & Mavor, 2007), or what Meister (1999) 
terms “microergonomic,” considerations. In contrast, big HSI focuses on the 
development and utilization of human resources within organizations that own and 
operate technological systems that are, in turn, the subject matter of little HSI; it is 
concerned mainly with macroergonomic considerations of organizational and work-
system design.  While little HSI pursues local optima for individual systems, big HSI 
seeks a global optimum across systems.   Here, then, is the potential for little HSI to work 
at cross purposes with big HSI, because local optima do not always pave the way to a 
global optimum.  Accordingly, the overarching goal of HSI must be one of making 
organizationally net positive contributions, otherwise we risk creating solutions today 
that are tomorrow’s problems.   
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V. ISORELIABILITY MODELS FOR HUMAN SYSTEMS 
INTEGRATION DOMAIN TRADEOFFS – CHOOSING A 
PERSONNEL SUPPLY SOURCE FOR FUTURE UNMANNED 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM OPERATORS 
Since man is an integral part of the total system, his contributions must be 
included each and every time that such areas as system performance, 
system effectiveness, system dependability, system reliability, system 
capability, and cost effectiveness are considered (Weisz, 1967, p. 3). 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. Statement of the Problem 
Despite the recognized importance of human systems integration (HSI) domain 
tradeoffs in enhancing total system performance (Department of Defense [DoD], 1991), 
current HSI manuals and handbooks do not provide much guidance for making HSI 
tradeoffs (Barnes & Beevis, 2003).  Nor is there a well-established body of knowledge 
addressing HSI domain tradeoffs despite the obvious need for such information (Barnes 
& Beevis, 2003).  For example, Booher (1990, pp. 12, 42) makes only two references to 
“tradeoff,” and the National Research Council, through its Committee of Human Factors’ 
HSI report (Pew & Mavor, 2007, pp. 3, 19, 34, 140), makes only four references to 
“tradeoff,” none of which even begin to scratch the surface of the issue. 
While HSI domains may have important interactions with each other, these 
interactions are hard to predict and there is little quantitative information to support 
tradeoff decisions between domains (Barnes & Beevis, 2003).  For example, Beevis 
(1996) analyzed preexisting data on human factors affecting safety and performance in 
the Canadian F/A-18 Hornet aircraft in an attempt to qualitatively assess HSI domain 
interactions and their impact on performance.  Human factors were categorized into HSI 
domains, and using statistical structural analysis, factor interactions were assessed to 
identify important direct and indirect domain interactions.  The HSI domains were 
observed to share many statistically significant indirect interactions and relatively few 
direct interactions, with the personnel domain having the greatest number of interactions  
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in comparison to the other HSI domains.  Overall, the analysis showed that the pattern of 
HSI domain interactions is complex and does not lead to simple generalizations about 
tradeoffs among the HSI domains.   
In contrast, Jones and Kennedy, along with various other colleagues (Jones, 
Kennedy, Turnage, Kuntz, & Jones, 1985; Jones, Kennedy, Kuntz, & Baltzley, 1987; 
Kennedy, Jones, & Baltzley, 1988, 1989; Kennedy & Jones, 1992; Jones, Turnage, & 
Kennedy, 1993; Jones & Kennedy, 1996; Jones, 2000) advanced a more quantitative 
tradeoff methodology based on the idea of developing isoperformance curves among the 
HSI domains.  The central reasoning behind their isoperformance methodology is the 
idea that, almost always, a specified level of performance can be produced by more than 
one combination of determinants.  Hence, the isoperformance curves trace all 
combinations of two or more HSI domains that produce a specified level of performance.  
Jones and Kennedy focused on personnel-training interactions and developed their 
technique primarily to generate tradeoff functions between personnel abilities and factors 
such as training time and training system effectiveness.   However, they emphasize the 
generalizability of the isoperformance methodology to training, equipment, and 
manpower tradeoffs. 
Only a relative handful of studies have either established a pattern of HSI domain 
interactions that relate to system performance (Beevis, 1996) or developed quantitative 
domain tradeoff functions (Jones and Kennedy and colleagues).  In the case of Beevis, 
the interactions examined provided qualitative information about tradeoffs among the 
HSI domains, but the systems engineering process requires quantitative information for 
tradeoff analyses.  Ideally, such tradeoff analyses should describe equal-cost or equal-
performance options (Barnes & Beevis, 2003).  The isoperformance methodology 
advocated by Jones, Kennedy, and colleagues addresses the equal-performance tradeoff 
analysis, but their only real world isoperformance curves are mainly limited to 
applications involving personnel and training domain tradeoffs in terms of paper and 
pencil test performance (Jones & Kennedy, 1992; Jones, 2000).  Additionally, their 
demonstrations of isoperformance curves for HSI applications are of small scale, which is 
to say single function performance.  They do not address the higher dimensionality of the 
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problem of complex system design (i.e., the curse of dimensionality (Bellman, 1961)), or 
the need to consider performance across multiple, independent functions.  While the 
isoperformance methodology has been extended to the analysis and design of complex 
technical systems such as satellite design (de Weck & Jones, 2006), its applicability for 
more complex HSI problem sets remains an open question.   
Unfortunately, most information in the armed services concerning the human 
system is not well organized or easily located, which hampers program managers, system 
engineers, and HSI practitioners in meeting military requirements and advancing 
efficiency goals.  Nor do the armed services routinely archive data that would support the 
generation of isoperformance curves, necessitating that any attempt to construct such 
curves must be opportunistic (Jones & Kennedy, 1992).  This scarcity of data for 
developing isoperformance curves is regrettable because it is the sort of evidence that 
program managers and systems engineers appear to require if they are to support the 
armed services’ organizational goals for HSI within their individual system acquisition 
programs. 
This study attempted to contribute to the base of knowledge for HSI domain 
tradeoffs by exploring the application of the isoperformance methodology to the 
personnel and training domains in the setting of a multi-dimensional problem.  Our study 
used the opportunistic dataset from the work by Schreiber, Lyon, Martin, and Confer 
(2002) evaluating the impact of prior flight experience on learning RQ-1 Predator 
unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operator skills.  Schreiber and colleagues’ study was 
conducted to help inform senior decision makers working to develop the best policy for 
selection and training of Air Force UAS operators.  They specifically examined the effect 
of personnel category, defined in terms of prior flight training and experience, on time to 
train Predator pilot skills and performance accomplishing a reconnaissance objective.  
We proposed a simple regression-based analysis for relating the personnel and training 
domains of HSI to the proportion of proficient people, which allowed us to express 




Fabrycky, 2006, pp 369-413).  This set the stage for integrating several functional 
isoreliability models into the systems engineering process using the construct of 
reliability allocation. 
2. Purpose of This Study 
The purpose of this study was to adapt the isoperformance concept to relate the 
HSI personnel and training domains and their interaction to system reliability, using the 
RQ-1 Predator UAS as our use case.  Personnel categories consisted of six groups from 
which future Air Force UAS operators could potentially be recruited:  experienced Air 
Force pilots, new Air Force fighter/bomber pilots, new Air Force airlift/tanker pilots, 
civilian instrument-rated private pilots, civilian non-instrument rated private pilots, and 
Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) cadets.  Participants’ training time 
until reaching criterion performance was examined for three Predator UAS functions:  
basic maneuver, landing, and reconnaissance.  We used data from 93 participants in 
Schreiber and colleagues’ (2002) study to answer these questions:  
1) Can we adapt Jones, Kennedy, and colleagues’ isoperformance methodology to 
consider personnel and training domain tradeoffs in terms of the expected 
proportion of participants that are proficient relative to a fixed level on some 
performance criterion?  That is, can we consider isoreliability rather than 
isoperformance?    
2) Can we quantitatively assess the relative importance of the personnel and training 
domains and their interaction in terms of explaining the expected proportion of 
participants that are proficient for a system function? 
3) Can we aggregate our isoreliability curves across system functions to link 
personnel and training domain considerations to total system reliability? 
 3. Theoretical Perspective 
Conducting personnel and training domain tradeoff analyses—that is, tracing 
equivalent combinations of personnel qualities and training that yield a specified level of 
performance—is a highly applied problem.  As described by Jones, Kennedy, and 
Stanney (2004), it is often the case that there are no known empirical regularities or 
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theories upon which one can rely when making manipulations in the real-world.  
Accordingly, in practice, system developers and decision makers must hypothesize about 
human performance-related tradeoffs and then carry out experiments or tests to assess the 
veracity of their hypotheses.  This is not to say that empirical regularities and sound 
theory are not helpful in performing tradeoff analyses.   For example, as was discussed in 
some detail in Chapter IV, both the power law of practice (i.e., an empirical regularity) 
and aptitude-treatment interaction (ATI) theory provide us potentially useful insights into 
the personnel and training factors (determinants) thought to contribute to task 
performance.   However, if control of system performance is to be achieved, it can only 
be by studying empirically how reliability, or any other “performance” of interest, varies 
as a function of its determinants in the system-of-interest.    
 In applying the power law of practice and ATI theory to this study of the 
acquisition of Predator UAS operator skills, the two major factors in skill acquisition that 
were recorded by Schreiber and colleagues (2002), practice and experience, are defined 
in the following manner: 
• Practice is the number of trials or total time required to meet criterion 
performance on a target task. 
• Experience is the state of having gained knowledge and skill through direct 
participation in specific activities related to membership in recognized personnel 
categories from which future Air Force UAS operators could potentially be 
recruited. 
With these specific definitions, we can now operationalize the HSI training domain in 
terms of the variable, “practice,” and the personnel domain in terms of the variable, 
“experience.”  The decision to describe experience in terms of personnel categories 
relates to the original purpose of Schreiber and colleagues’ (2002) study, which was to 
inform senior decision makers in their selection of a personnel source for the Predator 
UAS training pipeline.  For example, experienced Air Force pilots represent the historical 
source personnel category.  Recent decisions to also use graduates from the two major 
tracks in the Air Force’s specialized undergraduate pilot training pipeline correspond to 
choices to select from the new Air Force fighter/bomber and airlift/tanker pilot personnel 
 264
categories.  Other personnel categories considered from a policy perspective have 
included officer accessions with civilian pilot training and non-pilot officer accessions.  
Clearly, all these groups differ in multiple dimensions to include human aptitudes, skills, 
and experiences, but these individual dimensions are too fine grained to be useful 
variables for senior Air Force leaders on which to base decisions. 
The following statement represents the underlying logic for the study.  If we 
specify an a priori performance criterion for a task and we can:  1) measure the amount 
of practice a participant requires to achieve that criterion performance and 2) specify the 
proportion proficient for a task as a function of practice, experience, and their interaction, 
then we can develop a quantitative tradeoff function for the HSI training and personnel 
domains in terms of isoreliability.  It is worth calling attention to the fact that 
isoreliability is not exactly synonymous with Jones, Kennedy, and colleagues’ concept of 
isoperformance, although it borrows heavily from their methodology.  Additionally, this 
study uses a nominal categorical determinant, while Jones, Kennedy, and colleagues only 
considered integer and continuous determinants.  For these reasons, we believe it is 
worthwhile to discuss here our modification of their isoperformance methodology even 
though, using their own words, “[isoperformance] does not lead to theory, latent factors, 
or hypothetical constructs” (Jones & Kennedy, 1996, p. 180). 
As previously described, isoperformance is an operational method based on 
Simon’s (1996) notion of “satisficing,” and so fixes the amount of performance at an 
acceptable level and trades off the determinants with respect to each other (de Weck & 
Jones, 2006).  By implication then, while the isoperformance methodology is itself 
atheoretic, it does presuppose a theoretic causal model between the determinants and the 
desired performance.  The first step in the isoperformance technique is some data-
analytic procedure based on a model, ANOVA or regression analyses included.   Such a 
model states the dependent variable(s) as a function of the determinants, parameters to be 
estimated, and error variations.  Once the parameters are estimated, usually using least 
squares or maximum likelihood statistical techniques, the isoperformance technique 
requires that the user specify a criterion and a level of confidence, which is called the 
assurance level.  The criterion is the level of performance desired by the user, and the 
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assurance level is the probability of attaining that level of performance.  Based on the 
user’s choice of criterion and assurance level, the dependent variable is fixed and the 
resulting equation solved in terms of just the determinants; the determinants can now 
vary only in ways that will result in the same performance level.  In the simple case of 
just two determinants, plots of every pair of values, each of which will produce the same 
level of performance, yields an isoperformance curve.  Secondary criteria such as cost, 
safety, or feasibility are then used to identify a preferred solution(s) on the 
isoperformance curve (Jones & Kennedy, 1992; Jones & Kennedy, 1996; Jones 2000).   
In explaining their methodology, Jones, Kennedy, and colleagues often present an 
example of an isoperformance analysis of the tradeoff between aptitude, as assessed by 
measured ability, and time on the job for a fixed level of soldier performance, defined in 
terms of skill qualification test (SQT) scores (Jones & Kennedy, 1996; Jones, 2000).  The 
question they seek to answer is what combinations of aptitude and time on the job are 
sufficient to achieve a passing SQT score of 60 with 90% certainty.  To answer this 
question, they take the first step of proposing the following model: 
( ) ( )it t i t i itSQT m T b APT APT cT APT APT ε= + + − + − +                                     (1) 
where itSQT is the performance of the i
th soldier after t years at the entry skill level.  
iAPT  is the soldier’s measured ability, and tT  is the effect of time on the job on mean 
level of performance.  APT  is the mean aptitude score for all soldiers in the dataset and 
itε is the normally distributed error term, with mean of zero and variance equal to 2.εσ  
This model allows for two main effects on SQT, aptitude and time on the job, and an 
interaction between aptitude and time.  The model parameters, m corresponding to the 
general mean, b the regression coefficient for SQT on aptitude, and c the coefficient for 
the interaction term, along with the error variance, 2 ,εσ are all estimated in the course of 
fitting the model to the data.  The next step is to obtain an expression for the expected 
performance of the ith soldier: 
[ ] ( ) ( )it t i t iE SQT m T b APT APT cT APT APT= + + − + −                                      (2) 
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The right hand side of this equation differs from that of the full model only by the 
absence of the error term, so now the expected performance for the ith soldier depends 
only on the determinants, iAPT  and .tT   
 The final step is to determine what the expected performance for the ith soldier 
must be if the probability of achieving the specified performance is to equal the desired 
assurance level, in this case 0.90.  The performance specifications are met if the expected 
performance for the ith soldier is: 
[ ] specE itSQT SQT z εσ= +                                                                                        (3) 
where specSPT is the specified level of performance and z equals 1.28 from tables of the 
standard normal curve.20  Hence, if SQT score is to equal or exceed 60 with a probability 
of 0.90, then the expected SQT score for the ith soldier must equal 60 1.28 .εσ+   The last 
step is to combine Equations 2 and 3; rearranging terms so that tT  appears as a functions 








SQT z m b APT APT
T
c APT APT
εσ+ − − −= + −                                                               (4) 
Using Equation 4 to plot values of the two determinants, aptitude and time on the job, 
every pair of which produces the same level of performance, results in the 
isoperformance curve given in Figure V-1.  
 
                                                 
20 It is important to note that the assurance level described by Kennedy, Jones, and colleagues ignores 
an important source of uncertainty, namely that associated with the estimation of the fitted model 
parameters.  Ideally, one should use the prediction interval rather than the confidence interval when 
establishing the assurance level, because the predictor interval for any setting of the determinants will 
always be wider than the confidence interval (Montgomery, Peck, & Vining, 2006).  However, computation 
of the prediction interval necessarily requires access to the original data from which the fitted model was 
derived.  For the purpose of historical accuracy, the original description of the method is presented here—
and this may well be all that can be done when working from a model published in the literature.  However, 
in subsequent derivations of their method, we make use of the prediction interval unless noted otherwise.   
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Figure V-1. Isoperformance curve trading off aptitude and time on the job, setting the 
SQT criterion level at 60 and the assurance level at 0.90 [From Jones & Kennedy, 1996]. 
 
In the application of the isoperformance methodology to this study, rather than 
fixing the level of performance as done by Jones, Kennedy, and colleagues, we propose 
fixing the proportion of the population of interest that is proficient relative to a reference 
performance criterion.  The question we then seek to answer is what combinations of 
training and experience are sufficient to achieve a specified proportion proficient with a 
desired degree of confidence?  For the sake of illustration, consider the simple scenario 
where we have two potential personnel categories, category A and category B, from 
which we might draw trainees for the job of a system operator.  After an arbitrary amount 
of practice, we can assess whether the ith trainee is proficient.  Our response variable, ,iy  
will take on only two possible values, 1 or 0, depending on whether the ith trainee is or is 
not proficient respectively.  A reasonable probability model for iy  is the binomial with 
( )1 ,i iP y π= =  so to answer our question we start with the following model: 
( )
( )0 1 1 2 2 12 1 20 1 1 2 2 12 1 2
exp
1 exp
i i i i
i i
i i i i
x x x x
y
x x x x
β β β β εβ β β β
+ + += ++ + + +                                                        (5) 
where 1ix  is the number of practice trials accomplished by the i
th trainee, 2ix  is an 
indicator variable for the ith trainee’s personnel category, which takes on a value of one 
 268
when the personnel category is B and zero otherwise, and iε  is the shifted binomially 
distributed error term with a mean of zero and variance ( )2 1 .
iy i i
σ π π= −   This model 
allows for two main effects on iy , practice and experience, and an interaction between 
practice and experience.  The s,β  or regression coefficients, are parameters estimated in 
the course of fitting the model to the data.  The next step is to obtain an expression for the 
expected response for the ith trainee: 
 ( ) ( )( )0 1 1 2 2 12 1 20 1 1 2 2 12 1 2
exp
1 exp
i i i i
i i
i i i i
x x x x
E y
x x x x
β β β βπ β β β β
+ + += = + + + +                                                (6) 
One should note that the expected response is just the probability that the response 
variable takes on the value one, which is also the probability the ith trainee is proficient. 
Since the probability the ith trainee is proficient is an expected value, which 
implies an underlying distribution, we need to determine what iπ  should be so that the ith 




























                                         (7) 
where specπ is the specified probability the ith trainee is proficient, zα is a lookup from 
tables of the standard normal curve, and ( )' ˆVar ix β  is the variance of the linear predictor 
with the predictor expressed in matrix notation (that is ' 0 1 1 2 2 12 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆi x x x xβ β β β= + + +x β ).  
The last step is to combine Equations 6 and 7; rearranging terms:  







⎛ ⎞ = −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
x xβ β                                                                       (8) 
where [ ]' 1 2 1 21, , ,i x x x x=x  is a vector with [ )1 0,x = ∞  and { }2 0,1x =  
and ' 0 1 2 12ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,β β β β⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦β  is a vector of regression coefficients.  Observe that the variables 
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1x  and 2x  are our two determinants; as will be shown, all the elements in Equation 8 are 
known, either as constants or as expressions in terms of the determinants.   
Everything done up to this point closely mirrors Jones, Kennedy, and colleagues’ 
example analysis of soldier performance.  However, we now must address our adaptation 
to use a logistic regression model with a nominal determinant.  First, let us consider the 
simpler case where a trainee is recruited from personnel category A, in which case 
[ ]' 11, ,0,0 .i x=x  We first calculate the variance of the linear predictor: 
( ) ( ) 1' 'ˆVar 'i i i−=x β x X VX x                                                                                      (9) 
where X is a matrix of the levels of the regressor variables and V is a diagonal matrix 
containing the estimated variance of each observation on the main diagonal.  The 
term ( )'X VX is also known as the covariance matrix of the model parameters and can 
often be obtained directly from commercial statistical software packages.  Assuming a 
given ' 1( )−X VX  and computing the variance of the linear predictor in terms of 1 :x  
( ) [ ]
( )
1,1 1,2 1,3 1,4
1 2,1 2,2 2,3 2,4 1' '
1
3,1 3,2 3,3 3,4
4,1 4,2 4,3 4,4
2





                      
i i
a a a a
a a a a x
x
a a a a
a a a a
a a a x a x
−
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
= + + +
x X VX x
                                      (10) 
where the a’s are constants representing the values of the elements of the inverted 
covariance matrix. Substituting this new expression for the variance of the linear 
predictor into Equation 8 and performing the vector multiplication for ' ˆ :ix β  
spec 2
0 1 1 1,1 1,2 2,1 1 2,2 1
spec
ˆ ˆlog ( )
1
x z a a a x a xα
π β βπ
⎛ ⎞ = + − + + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
                                 (11) 
Rearranging terms and taking the square of both sides, we can rewrite the above equality 
as follows: 
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πβ β β β π
πβ π
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− + − − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟+ − − =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
                       (12) 
Recognizing this is simply a quadratic equation in terms of 1,x  we use the quadratic 
formula and solve for  1x  in terms of the discriminant, :Δ  
( ) ( )
spec 2 2
0 1 1 1,2 2,1
spec
1 spec 0 1 2 2 2
1 2,2
ˆ ˆ ˆ2 2 log
1ˆ ˆ, , , 0
ˆ2





πβ β β ππ α β β β
⎛ ⎞− + + + ± Δ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠= = = −









1 2,2 0 1,1
spec




z a z a
z a z a
α α
α α
πβ β β π
πβ β π
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞Δ = − − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟− − − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
                                          (14) 
Equation 13 allows us to calculate the minimum necessary training needed for a trainee 
from personnel category A as a function of both the specified probability proficient and 
assurance level, given the fitted model parameters.   
Now we examine the complementary case where the trainee is recruited from 
personnel category B, in which case [ ]' 1 11, ,1, .i x x=x   Our method remains the same 
although the calculations become slightly more burdensome.   We start again by 
computing the variance of the linear predictor in terms of 1,x  assuming a given 
' 1( ) :−X VX   
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( ) [ ]
( )
1,1 1,2 1,3 1,4
1 2,1 2,2 2,3 2,4 1' '
1 1
3,1 3,2 3,3 3,4
4,1 4,2 4,3 4,4 1




                                                         
        
i i
a a a a
a a a a x
x x
a a a a
a a a a x
a a a a
−
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
= + + +
x X VX x
( )
( )
1,2 1,4 2,1 2,3 3,2 3,4 4,1 4,3 1
2
2,2 2,4 4,2 4,4 1
              
                      
a a a a a a a a x
a a a a x
+ + + + + + + +
+ + + +
                   (15) 
The result of the matrix multiplication is simply a quadratic in terms of 1;x  we propose 
the following change of variables for simplicity of notation: 
1 1,1 1,3 3,1 3,3
2 1,2 1,4 2,1 2,3 3,2 3,4 4,1 4,3
3 2,2 2,4 4,2 4,4
c a a a a
c a a a a a a a a
c a a a a
= + + +
= + + + + + + +
= + + +
                                                 (16) 
Substituting our new expression for the variance of the linear predictor into Equation 8, 
performing the vector multiplication for ' ˆi ,x β and collecting the constant terms: 
( ) ( )spec 20 2 1 12 1 1 2 1 3 1
spec
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆlog
1
x z c c x c xα
π β β β βπ
⎛ ⎞ = + + + − + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
                            (17) 
By rearranging terms and taking the squares of both sides, we can rewrite the above 
equality as follows: 
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πβ β β β β βπ
πβ β π
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎜ ⎟+ − + + − + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ −⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟+ + − − =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
        (18) 
Once again we have a familiar quadratic equation in terms of 1,x  allowing us to use the 
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spec
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ2 log
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ4 log
1
z c
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α
α α
πβ β β βπ
πβ β β β π
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟Δ = + − + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟− + − + − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ −⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
                           (20) 
Equation 19 allows us to calculate the minimum necessary training needed for a trainee 
from personnel category B as a function of both the specified proportion proficient and 
assurance level, given the fitted model parameters.  Using Equations 13 and 19, we can 
compute equivalent combinations of the two determinants, training and personnel 
category, which yield the same probability that a trainee is proficient.   
 Recalling that our original question asked about the proportion of the population 
of interest that is proficient and not the probability that a given trainee is proficient, we 
now show that these two terms are in fact synonymous: 
th
th
number of proficient traineesProportion proficient  
total number of trainees
probability  trainee is proficient × total number of trainees
total number of trainees







= = =  proficient
 
Since proficiency is the “present ability to perform representative tasks” (Matthews, 
Davies, Westerman, & Stammers, 2000, p. 242), the proportion of proficient trainees, ,iπ  
equates to the conditional probability that a new system operator, selected at random 
from a population of recently trained operators, will satisfactorily accomplish a set of 
prescribed tasks given some combination of training and prior experience.  In view of the 
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fact that reliability may be defined simply “as the probability that a system or product 
will accomplish its designated mission in a satisfactory manner” (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 
2006, p. 370), we propose that the proportion of the population of interest that is 
proficient is a canonical measure of the reliability of performance for those system 
functions that are allocated to the human.  Hence, Equations 13 and 19 allow us to 
compute combinations of training and personnel category that are equivalent in terms of 
reliability—that is, isoreliability curves.  Figure V-2 displays a pair of hypothetical 
isoreliability curves that might be generated using Equations 13 and 19 to tradeoff time 
spent training and personnel category for two distinct and independent tasks performed 
by a system operator.   
 
 
Figure V-2. Hypothetical isoreliability curves trading off time spent training and 
personnel category for two distinct and independent tasks performed by a system 
operator. 
 
Figure V-2 illustrates how important information on personnel sensitivity is 
conveyed using a relatively simple isoreliability readout.  Personnel sensitivity, which 
may include elements of aptitude and prior experience, refers to the general shape of the 
isoreliability curve.  When a curve approaches the horizontal, it is maximally sensitive to 
personnel category and time spent training is without effect.  The opposite extreme, when 
a curve is vertical, indicates complete insensitivity to personnel category; performance 
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reliability is determined solely by time spent training.  ATI theory suggests that these two 
extreme cases are unlikely, but they might occur to moderate degrees when decision 
makers arbitrarily constrain the trade space.  For example, a nearly vertical curve, such as 
is observed in Figure V-2 for task 1, could occur if decision makers considered only 
closely related personnel categories such as fighter/bomber pilots and tanker/airlift pilots.  
Likewise, if decision makers sharply truncate the time available for training, it may be 
that no individuals in certain personnel categories can achieve task proficiency in the 
allowed range of time spent training.  However, the majority of isoreliability curves 
should resemble that illustrated in Figure V-2 for task 2, where there is a tradeoff 
between time spent training and personnel category.   
While Jones (2000) describes aptitude sensitivity in terms of the first derivate of 
his isoperformance curves trading off measured ability and training, we cannot 
quantitatively calculate slopes for our curves because one of our determinants, personnel 
category, is a categorical variable.   Instead, we propose quantitatively considering 
personnel sensitivity in terms of training time relative to a reference personnel category, 
much in the same way the indicator variable for personnel category was coded in our 
logistic regression model: 





−= ∀ ≠                               (21) 
where jT  is the training time for some personnel category, j, and iT  is the training time 
for a reference personnel category, i, such that iT  and jT  are read from the same 
isoreliability curve.  Just as aptitude sensitivity is defined only at a point and may vary 
from point to point on an isoperformance curve (Jones, 2000), personnel sensitivity is 
defined for a specific personnel category and may vary across other personnel categories 
on an isoreliability curve. 
While Jones, Kennedy, and colleagues repeatedly discuss the need for tradeoff 
analysis in addressing many HSI problems, they do not elaborate on how their 
isoperformance methodology helps systems engineers begin to see human performance 
and technical tradeoffs together, rather than as a hodge-podge of human factors and 
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specialty engineering analyses.  To help bridge this gap, we begin by looking at Figure 
V-3, which illustrates the manpower, personnel, and training domains, and by implication 
of task design, the human factors engineering domain within the context of a system 
structure (Hay Systems, 1991, as reproduced in Archer, Headley, & Allender, 2003).   As 
a basic system integration model for HSI, Figure V-3 shows that a particular system 
design concept determines the human tasks that are required, and these tasks in turn drive 
the requirements for manning, personnel attributes, and needed training.  In the 
description accompanying their model, the original authors suggest several “-ilities,” to 
include reliability, as emergent properties that both result from domain interactions and 
link individual domain considerations to total system performance:   
Human performance is the product of the interactions of tasks with 
manpower, personnel, and training.  The combination of human 
performance with the system design, in terms, for example of lethality, 
mobility, vulnerability, reliability, maintainability, and availability drives 
systems performance [emphasis added] (Hay Systems, 1991, pp. 1,3, as 
reproduced in Archer, Headley, & Allender, 2003). 
The model also implies that the HSI domains, through their contribution to system 
performance, determine system effectiveness, which is concerned with how well the 





Figure V-3. Manpower, personnel, and training domains within a system structure 
[From Hay Systems, 1991, as reproduced in Archer, Headley, & Allender, 2003]. 
 
 In discussing system effectiveness, Pohl (2008) states that “the key system level 
measures for complex systems that appear in value hierarchies for most complex systems 
are reliability, availability, and capability” (p. 198).  Since capabilities are expressed in 
terms of system performance thresholds, formulating domain tradeoffs in terms of 
isoreliability allows us to address two of the three key system level measures while taking 
advantage of the existing mathematical models in reliability.  As mentioned earlier, in 
simple terms, “reliability is nothing more than the probability that the system under study 
operates properly for a specified period of time” (Pohl, 2008, p. 198).  Mathematical 
models of reliability focus on items that can be in one of two states at time t: 
• working ( )( )1X t =  and 
• not working ( )( )0X t = . 
Now suppose we have 0N  of such items working at time zero (i.e., 
( )0 1,iX = 0 1 to )i N=  and we define the number of items working at time t as ( )sN t .  If 
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we let ( )fN t be a random variable representing the number of items that have failed by 
time t, then ( ) ( )0f sN t N N t= −  and the reliability at time t,  ( ) ,R t  can be expressed as: 
( ) ( )
0
E sN tR t
N
⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦=                                                                                                 (22) 
where ( )E sN t⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  is the expected number of items working at time t.  Likewise, the 
unreliability of an item, ( ) ,F t  can be expressed as: 
( ) ( )
0
E fN tF t
N
⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦=                                                                                                (23) 
where ( )E fN t⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  is the expected number of items that have failed at time t.   It should be 
obvious that we can establish the following relationship: 
( ) ( )1R t F t= −                                                                                                     (24) 
Reliability functions are commonly modeled as continuous time-to-failure 
distributions.  However, certain components or systems have performance characteristics 
that make it desirable to model their reliability using a discrete distribution.  For example, 
a satellite launch vehicle is better characterized by whether it either launches successfully 
or does not; time to failure is not an adequate measure to describe the performance of the 
launch vehicle.  Likewise, a pilot’s performance is better characterized by whether they 
successfully land the aircraft or crash.  In such cases, an item’s (component, subsystem, 
or system) performance can be characterized in terms of a Bernoulli trial where 
performance is a random variable that has one of two outcomes: it either works (i.e., a 
success) or it fails (i.e., a failure) when needed.  The probability of success, and hence 
failure, is constant for each trial, making the binomial or geometric distributions useful 
for these types of reliability calculations.   
We can now consider how formulating domain tradeoffs in terms of reliability 
allows us to directly link personnel and training domain considerations with total system 
reliability.  Returning to our earlier example of the hypothetical system operator, we 
focus on the operator as being in one of two states: 
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• proficient ( )( )1 2, 1X x x =  and 
• not proficient ( )( )1 2, 0X x x =  
where 1x  is training time and 2x  is personnel category.   Now suppose we have ( )20,N x  
initial trainees and we define the number of proficient graduating trainees after some 
period of training, 1x , as ( )1 2,sN x x .  Consequently, the human reliability can be 
expressed in terms of training time and personnel category as: 












π⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦= =                                                                          (25)                               
where iπ  is simply the probability the ith trainee is proficient.  We can again factor in our 
assurance level, ,α  and rewrite Equation 8 to express our human reliability function as 
follows: 
( ) ( )1 2
1,
ˆ ˆ1 exp Var
hR x x
zα
= ⎛ ⎞+ − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠x xβ β
                                                       (26)                              
It is also possible to define the following relationship: 
( ) ( )1 2 1 2, 1 ,h hR x x F x x= −                                                                                     (27)   
where ( )1 2,hF x x  is the conditional probability that our system operator will fail given a 
specified training time and personnel category.    Hence, ( )1 2,hF x x  is basically the 
human unreliability function, and it can be defined as follows: 
( ) ( )( )1 2
ˆ ˆexp Var
,












                                                       (28) 
 Since the performance of many system functions involve a human operator 
interacting with some device, the overall probability that these functions are successfully 
performed should reflect the contributions of both the human component and the 
equipment component.  Accordingly, the overall reliability (or the probability of 
successful performance) of a system function, f, can be defined as follows: 
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( ), , 1 2,f e f h fR R R x x= ⋅                                                                                          (29) 
where ,e fR is the reliability of the equipment used by the system operator in performing 
function f and ( ), 1 2,h fR x x is the human reliability for performing function f as previously 
defined.  Figure V-4, taken from Nelson, Schmitz, and Promisel (1984), illustrates how 
human and equipment reliability affect overall system function reliability.  The horizontal 
and vertical axes represent measures of human and equipment reliability, respectively.  
Each curve indicates the relationship between human and equipment reliability at certain 
levels of overall system function reliability.  Hence, this figure depicts system function 
reliability as a mathematical function of both human and equipment reliability. 
 
 
Figure V-4. Effect of human and equipment reliability on overall function reliability 
[From Nelson, Schmitz, & Promisel, 1984]. 
 
A significant advantage in working with reliability rather than performance is the 
ability to avail ourselves of basic system models.  Reliability analysis is generally 
performed at the lowest levels and results are aggregated into a system level estimate.   
Usually, a system’s functional and physical decompositions can be used to construct a 
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system level reliability block diagram, the structure of which is used to compute 
reliability in terms of component and subsystem reliabilities.  For example, assume we 
have a system consisting of N functionally independent components, with individual 
measures of reliability 1 2, , , nR R R…  for some period of time, t.  If the set of components 
comprise a series system, then the series system reliability, which is the probability of 
system success, is given as follows: 





R t R t R t R t R t
=
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =∏…                                                           (30) 
If instead, the set of components comprise a parallel system, then the system reliability is 
given by: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1 2
1




R t R t R t R t R t
=
⎡ ⎤= − − − − = − −⎣ ⎦ ∏…                   (31) 
K-out-of-N systems provide a very general modeling structure in which we assume that a 
system consists of N functionally independent components and the success of the system 
depends on having at least K components operating successfully.  Mathematically, this 
can be modeled as an application of the binomial distribution: 







⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑                                                                                     (32) 
Overall, most systems are complex combinations of series and parallel system structures 
of components and subsystems, and system reliability can be constructed by the method 
of system decomposition.   
Although Equation 29 requires reliabilities be specified as probabilities of 
successful performance, it is entirely possible to express ( )1 2,hR x x in more familiar terms 
such as expected (mean) time to failure or failure rate.  Remember that ( )1 2,R x x  is a 
probability and it represents the conditional probability that a system operator’s 
performance is satisfactory (i.e., a success) given they have received 1x  training and are 
from the 2x  personnel category.  A similar statement applies to ( )1 2,F x x  except that this 
probability represents the conditional probability that a system operator’s performance is 
unsatisfactory (i.e., a failure).  Once we decide on a personnel selection and training 
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policy, ( )* *1 2, ,x x we have a fixed probability of success, ( )* *1 2, ,p R x x=  and a fixed 
probability of failure, ( )* *1 2, .q F x x=   The geometric distribution is commonly used to 
model the number of cycles to failure for items that have a fixed probability of failure 
associated with each cycle.  The probability density function for the geometric 
distribution is given by: 
{ } ( ) 11    1, 2,nP N n q q n−= = − ∀ = …                                                                   (33) 
where N is the number of the cycle on which the first failure occurs.  If system cycle 
lengths, ,iC  are independent and identically distributed random variables with an 
expected cycle length of [ ]E ,C  then a reasonable model for the time until the first 







=∑                                                                                                              (34) 
The expected time until the first human failure, [ ]E ,T  can then be easily computed as 
follows: 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ( )( ) [ ]
* *
* *
ˆ ˆ1 exp Var1E E E E E
ˆ ˆexp Var
z









              (35) 
Hence, the expected frequency of system operator failures, [ ]E ,Y or human failure rate, 
can be expressed as follows: 
[ ] [ ]
( )















                                   (36)  
 
We can further extend the concept of human failure rate by next defining a 
severity rating, s, in terms of the seriousness of the effects or impact of a system 
operator’s failure to satisfactorily perform a function or task.  For purpose of illustration, 
the degree of severity may be expressed quantitatively on a scale of 1 to 10 with regards 
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to the potential for injury or damage with minor effects being 1, low effects being 2 to 3, 
moderate effects being 4 to 6, high effects being 7 to 8, and very high effects being 9 to 
10 (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2006, p. 399).  We now have the traditional safety and risk 
management elements of risk likelihood and severity, which can be expressed in terms of 
a risk assessment value (RAV), defined as: 
[ ]RAV E Y s= ⋅                                                                                                    (37) 
where [ ]E Y  is the expected failure frequency and s is the failure severity rating.  Hence, 
the RAV for a system function is a possible canonical measure for the safety domain of 
HSI.   
Finally, it is worth taking a moment to note two interesting implications of the 
preceding discussion for any proposed model of the HSI process.  First, the safety domain 
can be conceptualized as a function of the human factors engineering, personnel, and 
training domains.  Second, safety is probabilistically related to the presence of 
satisfactory performance, which can be expressed in terms of human reliability, and by 
way of the compliment, mishaps are probabilistically related to the absence of 
satisfactory performance. Collectively, these observations suggest a hierarchical 
relationship of domains as displayed in the updated basic system integration model for 




Figure V-5. Manpower, personnel, training, and safety domains within a system 
structure. 
 
 4. Research Questions and Study Hypotheses 
 The following hypotheses guide the quantitative first phase of this study 
developing the regression models that are subsequently extended into isoreliability 
tradeoff functions: 
H1:  Personnel category is related to the proportion of participants that are proficient on 
each of three Predator UAS functions:  basic maneuver, landing, and reconnaissance.   
H2:  Training time is related to the proportion of participants that are proficient on each of 
three Predator UAS functions:  basic maneuver, landing, and reconnaissance.  
H3:  There is an interaction between personnel category and training time in terms of the 
proportion of participants that are proficient on each of three Predator UAS functions:  
basic maneuver, landing, and reconnaissance.  
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 The qualitative second phase of this study focuses on the individual isoreliability 
tradeoff functions and asks two questions: 
Q1:  What do the isoreliability tradeoff functions tell us about the relationship between 
the personnel and training domains of HSI with regards to the RQ-1 Predator UAS 
mission? 
Q2:  Can we aggregate isoreliability tradeoffs across system functions to link personnel 
and training domain considerations to total system reliability? 
 5. Definition of Terms 
Although we defined terms as they have been introduced in the prior sections, we 
now provide formal definitions from authoritative sources to strip away any potential 
multiplicity of meaning from certain words in the interest of precision: 
• Personnel:  Those human aptitudes (i.e., cognitive, physical, and sensory 
capabilities), knowledge, skills, abilities, and experience levels that are needed to 
properly perform job tasks (DAU, 2009, p. 7).  
• Reliability:  The ability of a system and its parts to perform its mission without 
failure, degradation, or demand on the support system (DAU, 2005, B-138). 
• Safety:  Freedom from conditions that can cause death, injury, occupational 
illness, damage/loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment 
(DAU, 2005, p. B-144). 
• Training:  The learning process by which personnel individually or collectively 
acquire or enhance pre-determined job-relevant knowledge, skills, and abilities by 
developing their cognitive, physical, sensory, and team dynamic abilities (DAU, 
2009, p. 9).   
 6. Delimitations and Limitations 
A delimitation:   
We will confine ourselves to the specifics of Schreiber and colleagues’ study and 
their data, which are valid only for the Air Force’s RQ-1 Predator mission.  Their study 
focuses on basic aptitudes and skills relevant to piloting the Predator aircraft and does not  
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address other occupationally significant factors such as leadership, communication skills, 
general aviation knowledge or familiarity with military operations (Schreiber et al., 2002, 
pp. 1–2).   
A limitation:  
Our study involves mining an opportune dataset to identify patterns consistent 
with HSI domain tradeoff functions (Jones & Kennedy, 1992).  Since the original data 
was collected on convenience samples, the discovery of a particular pattern of domain 
tradeoffs in the dataset does not necessarily mean that pattern is representative of the 
whole population from which the data were drawn.    
A limitation:  
Any patterns discovered in this data could be subject to alternative interpretations. 
B. METHODS 
1. Participants 
 The participants were 93 pilots or students expressing a desire to become pilots 
who were representative of groups from which future Air Force UAS operators could 
potentially be recruited:  experienced Air Force pilots (“Predator selectees”), new Air 
Force fighter/bomber pilots (“T-38 graduates”), new Air Force airlift/tanker pilots (“T-1 
graduates”), civilian instrument-rated private pilots (“Civil instrument pilots”), civilian 
non-instrument rated private pilots (“Civil private pilots”), and Air Force Reserve Officer 
Training Corps (ROTC) cadets (“Cadets”).  The study used a convenience sample of 
volunteers recruited from pre-existing, “naturally formed” groups: 
1) Predator selectees:  Eighteen participants were recruited from the population of 
experienced Air Force pilots assigned to Predator UAS duties and awaiting the 
start of their training.  Eight participants had experience in fighter/attack aircraft; 
the remainder had tanker, transport, or bomber aircraft experience.  Participants 
consisted of 17 men, ages ranged from 26 to 43 years, and flight experience 
ranged from 417 to 3,010 hours with all having at least one prior tour of duty in 
an operational aircraft squadron.   
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2) T-38 graduates:  Fifteen participants were recruited from the population of 
students graduating from the Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training (SUPT) 
fighter/bomber track at an Air Force training site.  Participants consisted of 13 
men, ages ranged from 23 to 29 years, and flight experience ranged from 195 to 
215 hours, with approximately 120 flight hours in the T-38 Talon. 
3) T-1 graduates:  Sixteen participants were recruited from the population of 
students graduating from the SUPT tanker/airlift track at an Air Force training 
site.  Participants consisted of 14 men, ages ranged from 23 to 28 years, and flight 
experience ranged from 195 to 215 hours, with approximately 105 hours in the   
T-1 Jayhawk. 
4) Civil instrument pilots:  Fifteen participants were recruited from the population of 
pilots recently completing training for an instrument rating at a civil flight school.  
Participants were all men, ages ranged from 20 to 31 years, and flight experience 
ranged from 120 to 177 hours, typically in the Cessna model 172 Skyhawk and 
Beechcraft model 76 Duchess aircraft. 
5) Civil private pilots:  Thirteen participants were recruited from the population of 
pilots recently completing training for a single-engine private pilot certificate at a 
civil flight school.  Participants were all men, ages ranged from 18 to 25 years, 
and flight experience ranged from 45 to 80 hours, typically in the Cessna model 
172 Skyhawk aircraft. 
6) Cadets:  Sixteen participants were recruited from a population of Air Force ROTC 
cadets at a civilian university.  Participants were all men, ages ranged from 19 to 
22 years, and none had any fight experience although all intended to pursue Air 
Force pilot training.    
Almost all participants held a bachelor’s or higher degree or were enrolled in an 
academic program leading to a bachelor’s degree.  All active duty military participants, 
comprising study groups 1-3, took part in the study as part of their normal Air Force 
duties.  The remaining participants, who were civilians, were compensated for their time 
at the rate of $15 per hour (Schreiber et al., 2002, pp. 3-4).   
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Six participants were also recruited from the population of experienced Predator 
UAS pilots at an operational UAS squadron.  Participants were all men, ages ranged from 
29 to 43 years, and flight experience ranged from 1,680 to 2,942 hours, with 
approximately 80 to 340 hours flying the MQ-1 Predator UAS (Schreiber et al., 2002, p. 
3).  This personnel category is not a group from which future Air Force UAS operators 
could potentially be recruited and so was not included in the study as a comparison 
group.  However, data from these participants was used to establish a performance 
criterion for one of the study tasks.    
2. Research Design 
This was a mixed methods study.  The first-phase quantitative portion of the study 
used a quasi-experimental, posttest-only with nonequivalent groups design.  The 
independent variables were defined as follows: 
• The categorical variable, personnel category, was a measured variable consisting 
of six levels based on the participants’ aviation background:  Predator selectees, 
T-38 graduates, T-1 graduates, civil instrument pilots, civil private pilots, and 
cadets.   
• The continuous variable, training, was the treatment variable and was expressed 
in terms of practice trials or total practice time.   
The dependent variable, proficient, was a dichotomous variable defined in terms of 
participant performance relative to the performance criterion set for each experimental 
task.  Participants were classified as “not proficient” if their performance on an 
experimental task was below the criterion; otherwise, they were classified as “proficient.” 
The second-phase qualitative portion of the study used graphical analysis of isoreliability 
plots and basic reliability block diagrams. 
3. Instruments 
Participants’ performance was assessed using a modified version of the Air Force 
Research Laboratory’s unmanned aerial vehicle synthetic task environment.  This 
synthetic task environment was based on a simulation of the flight dynamics of the RQ-
1A Predator UAS, an early, unarmed variant of the current Predator UAS.   The core 
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aerodynamics model of this simulation was used in a multitask trainer employed by the 
Air Force to train Predator pilots.  Built on top of this Predator model were three 
synthetic tasks: 1) a basic maneuvering task, 2) a landing task, and 3) a reconnaissance 
task.  These tasks were developed by analyzing real Predator mission tasks and then 
systematically modifying them to produce synthetic tasks.  This was accomplished by 
conducting extensive structured interviews with expert task performers as part of a 
cognitive task analysis.  The goals, cognitive demands, and required resources for major 
tasks were identified, and those portions of tasks that were high skill or workload drivers 
were singled out.  These portions were then decoupled from the context of the overall 
mission for construction into synthetic tasks.  The result was a series of synthetic tasks 
that tapped complex Predator-specific cognitive skills beyond basic stick-and-rudder 
proficiency, such as sophisticated spatial reasoning and temporal prediction.  The overall 
design philosophy and developmental methodology for the synthetic task environment 
are described in Martin, Lyon, and Schreiber (1998). 
The basic maneuvering task was derived from an instrument flight task designed 
at the University of Illinois to study expertise-related effects of pilots’ visual scan 
patterns (Wickens, Bellenkes, & Kramer, 1995).  The task required participants to fly 
seven distinct maneuvers while trying to minimize root-mean-squared deviation (RMSD) 
from ideal performance on airspeed, altitude, and heading.  Participants were provided a 
display of the Predator’s legacy head-up display flight symbology overlaid on a black 
background, hence requiring flight by instrument reference only (Figure V-6).  Each 
maneuver began with a 10-second lead-in during which the participant maintained 
straight and level flight.  A timed maneuver, lasting either 60 or 90 seconds, followed 
requiring the participant to achieve a target aircraft state by making constant rate changes 
to one or more of the three flight performance parameters.  The initial three maneuvers 
required the participant to change one flight performance parameter while holding the 
other two constant.  Subsequent maneuvers progressively increased in complexity, 
requiring the participant to make constant rate changes along two and then three axes of 
flight.  Participants flew each segment repeatedly until simultaneously achieving the  
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RMSD criterion for all three flight performance parameters.  Participants completed the 
overall task by successfully achieving criterion performance on all seven of the maneuver 
segments (Schreiber et al., 2002, pp. 7, 40–42)    
 
 
Figure V-6. Display for the synthetic basic maneuvering task [From Schreiber et al., 
2002]. 
 
The landing task was designed to incorporate many of the challenges of the actual 
task, such as control latency, high gain of control inputs, aircraft sensitivity to winds, and 
impoverished sensory feedback in terms of absent vestibular cues and diminished optical 
flow caused by a limited field-of-view.  The task required participants to fly a technical 
order “typical landing pattern” while trying to meet the criterion on 13 measures of 
performance:   landing pattern ground track RMSD, altitude at three pattern gates, final 
approach ground track RMSD, final approach glideslope RMSD, touchdown bank angle, 
touchdown pitch angle, touchdown groundspeed, instantaneous sink rate at touchdown, 
heading relative to the runway at touchdown, displacement from runway centerline at 
touchdown, and lateral velocity at touchdown.  Each landing trial began with the aircraft 
located on the downwind leg of the landing pattern and abeam the touchdown point at an 
altitude of 800 feet above ground level. Participants were provided a display of the 
Predator’s head-up display flight symbology overlaid on simulated imagery from a 30-
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degree field-of-view nose camera and a tracker map (Figure V-7).  For each trial, 
participants flew the approach pattern, maintained glideslope, and either landed the 
aircraft or initiated a go-around.  Participants flew repeated landings until simultaneously 
achieving all 13 criterion measures of performance during a single landing.  Participants 
first achieved criterion performance landing in a no-wind condition; they then achieved 
criterion performance with a 13-knot crosswind, which was randomly presented during 
each landing from one of four directions.  Participants completed the overall task by 
successfully achieving criterion performance under both no-wind and crosswind 
conditions (Schreiber et al., 2002, pp. 7, 43–44).    
 
 
Figure V-7. Primary flight display (left) and tracker map (right) for the synthetic 
landing task [After Schreiber et al., 2002]. 
 
The reconnaissance task was designed to assess participants’ aviation-related 
spatial reasoning skills and was considered the most difficult of the three tasks.  The task 
required participants to maneuver their aircraft so that its payload camera pointed toward 
a target through a small break in the clouds.  Participants were provided a display of the 
Predator’s head-up display flight symbology overlaid on simulated imagery from the 
payload camera (Figure V-8) or nose camera as well as a tracker map.  Participants 
switched between the nose camera view, to search for the cloud hole, and the payload 
camera view, to accrue time on the target.  Each scenario began with the aircraft on the 
edge of the target area, which was completely obscured except for a single break in the 
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clouds.   Participants flew 30 scenarios, each with a fixed duration of ten minutes, during 
which they attempted to maximize their time-on-target while taking into account various 
constraints such as no-fly zones, altitude restrictions, and camera gimbal limits.  
Scenarios differed in both wind direction and speed and placement of no-fly zones 
relative to the cloud hole.  The primary measure of performance was a participant’s total 
time-on-target.  Violations of constraints resulted in penalty time that was subtracted 
from total time-on-target (Schreiber et al., 2002, pp. 8–9, 45–47).   
 
 
Figure V-8. Primary flight display symbology overlaid on payload camera imagery for 
the synthetic reconnaissance task [From Schreiber et al., 2002]. 
  
The synthetic task environment ran on a dual-Pentium desktop computer 
networked to a second desktop computer that served as the experimental control station.  
Figure V-9 illustrates the equipment used in the study.  Tasks were presented on two 
side-by-side 19-inch monitors: the left monitor provided the head-up display flight 
symbology overlaid on task appropriate background imagery, and the right monitor 
provided the tracker map display and any additional task relevant information.  
Participants controlled the simulated Predator aircraft using a joystick, throttle, and 
rudder pedals.  The simulation software was modified to measure participants’  
 
 292
performance on the three synthetic tasks and provided feedback at the end of each trial 




Figure V-9. Synthetic task environment equipment setup [From Schreiber et al., 2002]. 
 
4. Procedures 
All experimental sessions were conducted at the various participant recruiting 
sites.  After being briefed on the study purpose, each participant viewed a self-paced, 
computer-based tutorial providing declarative and procedural knowledge about the 
Predator simulation and the particular synthetic task to be flown, starting with the basic 
maneuvering task.  At the end of the tutorial, participants completed a written test; for 
incorrect responses, participants reviewed the tutorial and reworked the test until 
obtaining a score of 100 percent.  Participants were shown the controls and displays for 
the basic maneuvering task, provided written reference sheets for the task, and walked 
through a practice trial by the experimenter with feedback provided using graphical and 
text displays. Participants then repeated the basic maneuvering task with computerized 
feedback until criterion performance was achieved.  The same general procedure was 
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used for the landing and reconnaissance tasks:  computer-based tutorial, written test, walk 
through and practice trial, and performance with feedback on the task itself.  However, 
unlike the basic maneuvering and landing tasks, the reconnaissance task was 
administered for a fixed number of trials rather than until criterion performance was 
achieved.  All participants accomplished the tasks in the same order starting with the 
basic maneuvering task and finishing with the reconnaissance task.  Task sequencing was 
designed to bring all participants up to a common minimum proficiency on stick-and-
rudder skills prior to advancing to the next task.  Participants required from 12 to 30 
hours to complete the study depending on time spent on tutorial materials and number of 
trials required to achieve criterion performance on the basic maneuvering and landing 
tasks (Schreiber et al., 2002, pp. 5–7).    
5. Data Analysis Procedures 
One of the Air Force Research Laboratory study investigators (D.L.) was 
contacted and agreed to provide the original study dataset.  The dataset was received via 
e-mail as three Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) databases, one for each 
of the study tasks.  Schreiber and colleagues (2002) compared groups on the combined 
total number of training trials required to achieve criterion performance for the basic 
maneuvering and landing tasks and total time-on-target for the reconnaissance task 
(Schreiber et al., 2002, pp. 10–12).  Hence, in their study the independent variable was 
personnel category and the dependent variables were training and time-on-target.  Given 
our theoretical perspective, we extracted data for the independent variables, personnel 
category and training, and we calculated a new dependent variable, proficient.  Data for 
these variables were copied into version 8.0 of the S-Plus (TIBCO Software Inc., Palo 
Alto, CA) statistical software package. 
Using this opportune dataset, we formulated isoreliability models for each of the 
study tasks.  The general procedure is outlined here, saving discussion of task specific 
details for the results section.  Our dependent or response variable, ,jy took on only two 
possible values, 1 or 0, depending on whether the jth participant was or was not proficient 
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respectively.  A reasonable probability model for jy  was the binomial with 
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where 1 jx  was the length of training accomplished by the j
th participant, | 2ij ix ≥  were 
indicator variables collectively denoting the personnel category of the jth participant, and 
jε  was the shifted binomially distributed error term with a mean of zero and variance 
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σ π π= −   Fitting the model to the data using S-Plus, we obtained the following 
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Next we determined what jπ  should be so that the jth participant achieved a specified 
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where specπ was the specified probability the jth participant was proficient and zα was a 
lookup from tables of the standard normal curve.  Combining Equations 39 and 40, 
rearranging terms, and using matrix notation: 







⎛ ⎞ = −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
x xβ β                                                                   (41)                               
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where ' 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 61, , , , , , , , , , ,j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j jx x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦x  was a vector with 
1 [0, )jx = +∞  and { } { }0,1   2,3,4,5,6 ,ijx i= ∀ = and βˆ  was a vector of estimated 
regression coefficients. 
We used Equation 41 to express 1 jx  as a function of spec ,  ,π α  and personnel 
category, k, such that { }, ,1 and 0  2,3,4,5,6 .i k j i k jx x k= ≠= = ∀ =   In effect, we were fixing 
all the values in Equation 41 other than 1 jx  and simply solving for 1 .jx   Taking the 
generic case where the personnel category was 2k k ≥ , the vector 
'
1 11, 1j j jx x⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦… … …x  had the number one occupying the first and k+1th positions and 
the variable 1 jx  occupying the second and k+6
th positions in the vector, with the 
remaining positions simply containing zeros.  We first calculated the variance of the 
linear predictor, ( ) ( ) 1' ' 'ˆVar j j j−=x x X VX xβ , in terms of 1 jx  given the covariance matrix 
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(42) 









1,1 1,2 2,1 1 2,2 1
1
1, ,0, ,0 0
0




a a a x
x
a a a
a a a x a x
−
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥= ⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
= + + +
x X VX x
"
… # # % #
" #                           (43) 
In either case, the result of the matrix multiplication was simply a quadratic in terms 
of 1 .jx   Continuing with the generic case for the moment, we collected the constants and 
proposed a change of variables: 
1 1,1 1,1 1, 1 1, 1
2 2,1 6,1 1,2 1,2 2, 1 6, 1 1, 6 1, 6
3 2,2 6,2 2, 6 6, 6
k k k k k
k k k k k k k k k
k k k k k
c a a a a
c a a a a a a a a
c a a a a
+ + + +
+ + + + + + + +
+ + + +
= + + +
= + + + + + + +
= + + +
                            (44) 
This simplified the expression for the variance of the linear predictor, which was now 
defined as: 
( ) ( ) 1' ' ' 21 2 1 3 1ˆVar j j j k k j k jc c x c x−= = + +x x X VX xβ                                                 (45) 
Substituting this new expression into Equation 41 and performing the vector 
multiplication for ' ˆ :jx β  
spec 2
0 1 1 5 1 1 2 1 3 1
spec
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆlog
1 j k k j k k j k j
x x z c c x c xα
π β β β βπ +
⎛ ⎞ = + + + − + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
                     (46) 













1 5 3 1
ˆ ˆ log
1

















⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪+ − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟−⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪+ + − + −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟−⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
⎡ ⎤+ + − =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
                                       (47) 
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Recognizing this as simply a quadratic equation in terms of 1 ,jx we resorted to the 
quadratic formula and solve for  1 jx  using the discriminant, Δ.  
     As a result, for each personnel category, k, on the ordinate, we calculated 
corresponding training times of the abscissa that were equivalent in terms of specified 
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ˆ ˆ2 log
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1
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⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪− − − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟−⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
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⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪Δ = + − + −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟−⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
− +( ) 22 spec2 25 3 0 1
spec
ˆ ˆ log
1k k k k
z c z cα α
πβ β π+
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪⎡ ⎤− + − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥ ⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ −⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
                       (51) 
These expressions may appear cumbersome, but the values for the many constants were 
easily obtained from the vector of estimated regression coefficients and the covariance 
matrix of model parameters provided by S-Plus.   
C. RESULTS 
1. Basic Maneuvering Task 
Schreiber and colleagues present data concerning the number of trials required for 
participant proficiency on the sequence of seven segments comprising the basic 
maneuver task.  In the study, each iteration of a segment is counted as a trial and 
participants were required to achieve criterion performance on a segment prior to 
attempting the next segment in the overall sequence.  That is, they repeated a segment 
and accrued trials until they met criterion performance.  Since the temporal length of each 
segment was fixed but not uniform and the relative difficulty of each segment varied, we 
computed an overall time to reach proficiency on the basic maneuver task: 
{ }7 ,
1
    1, 2,...,93j j s s
s
x n t j
=
= ∀ ∈∑                                                                           (52) 
where jx  is the total time for participant j to reach proficiency, ,j sn  is the number of trials 
needed by participant j to reach proficiency on segment s, and st  is the temporal length of 
segment s.  We assert that jx  is a better measure of merit than number of trials because it 
accounts for the fact that the more difficult segments were also the longer segments.  A 
graph of our response variable of interest, y, the proportion of participants in each 
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personnel category who achieve proficiency on the basic maneuver task, versus the total 
time to reach proficiency (x) is shown in Figure V-10.   
 
 
Figure V-10. Scatter plot of the raw basic maneuvering task data. 
 
Given our theoretical perspective, the independent variables were the continuous 
variable, Time, corresponding to the time to reach proficiency and hence the training 
domain of HSI, and the categorical variable, Group, corresponding to personnel category 
and thus, the personnel domain of HSI.  The dependent variable was the proportion 
proficient, y, which was a measure of human performance relative to an a priori standard 
of performance and was the resulting synthesis of the training and personnel domains of 
HSI.  The basic logistic regression model related the proportion proficient to the three 
potential predictor variables, Time, Group, and their interaction, .Time Group×  The 
categorical variable, Group, was dummy variable coded for inclusion in the regression 
analysis.  Linear and additive regression models, the latter using spline functions to 
perform piecewise polynomial fitting, were examined and plots of the models were used 
to assess the fit, determine the influence of outliers, and assure regression assumptions 
were not violated (see the chapter appendix for details).   
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Overall, we found that the first order model with interaction based on a linear fit 
and using the logit link function was the most parsimonious, resulting in the final fitted 
logistic regression model of: 
1 2 3 4
5 6 1 2 1 3 1 4
1 5 1 6
ˆ
log 3.7966 0.0708 1.6245 1.8577 3.7123
ˆ1
                    1.4358 0.7665 0.0555 0.0412 0.0998
                    0.0318 0.0253
y x x x x
y
x x x x x x x x
x x x x
⎛ ⎞ = − + − − −⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
− − + + +
+ +
     (53) 
where:  
1x =Time [0,+∞) 
2x = Civil instrument pilots {0,1} 
3x =Civil private pilots {0,1} 
4x = Predator selectees {0,1} 
5x =T-1 graduates {0,1} 
6x = T-38 graduates {0,1} 
Table V-1 summarizes the estimated regression coefficients and standard errors for the 
final fitted logistic regression model of the basic maneuvering task data.  A graph of the 
fitted response variable ˆ( )y  versus total time to reach proficiency (x) by personnel 












Table V-1. Estimated regression coefficients and standard errors for the final fitted 
model of the basic maneuvering task data. 
Variable βˆ  ( )ˆse β  Z p-value 
Constant 
Time 
Group(Civil instrument pilots) 




Time x Group(Civil instrument pilots) 
Time x Group(Civil private pilots) 
Time x Group(Predator selectees) 
Time x Group(T-1 graduates) 




















































Figure V-11. Plot of the fitted basic maneuvering task data. 
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We next calculated a system of training-reliability equations, one equation for 
each personnel category, k, from which we then generated the final isoreliability curves.  
To calculate these training-reliability equations, we used the inverted covariance matrix 
of model parameters, which was obtained from the S-Plus output: 
 
0.33713 -0.00617 -0.33713 -0.33713 -0.33713 -0.33713 -0.33713 0.00617 0.00617 0.00617 0.00617 0.00617 
-0.00617 0.00012 0.00617 0.00617 0.00617 0.00617 0.00617 -0.00012 -0.00012 -0.00012 -0.00012 -0.00012 
-0.33713 0.00617 0.96078 0.33713 0.33713 0.33713 0.33713 -0.02002 -0.00617 -0.00617 -0.00617 -0.00617 
-0.33713 0.00617 0.33713 1.39720 0.33713 0.33713 0.33713 -0.00617 -0.02686 -0.00617 -0.00617 -0.00617 
-0.33713 0.00617 0.33713 0.33713 1.24643 0.33713 0.33713 -0.00617 -0.00617 -0.02572 -0.00617 -0.00617 
-0.33713 0.00617 0.33713 0.33713 0.33713 0.85824 0.33713 -0.00617 -0.00617 -0.00617 -0.01609 -0.00617 
-0.33713 0.00617 0.33713 0.33713 0.33713 0.33713 0.79169 -0.00617 -0.00617 -0.00617 -0.00617 -0.01504 
0.00617 -0.00012 -0.02002 -0.00617 -0.00617 -0.00617 -0.00617 0.00044 0.00012 0.00012 0.00012 0.00012 
0.00617 -0.00012 -0.00617 -0.02686 -0.00617 -0.00617 -0.00617 0.00012 0.00054 0.00012 0.00012 0.00012 
0.00617 -0.00012 -0.00617 -0.00617 -0.02572 -0.00617 -0.00617 0.00012 0.00012 0.00055 0.00012 0.00012 
0.00617 -0.00012 -0.00617 -0.00617 -0.00617 -0.01609 -0.00617 0.00012 0.00012 0.00012 0.00032 0.00012 
0.00617 -0.00012 -0.00617 -0.00617 -0.00617 -0.00617 -0.01504 0.00012 0.00012 0.00012 0.00012 0.00030 
 
Fixing the assurance level at 0.90, we then created the following system of equations: 
 





0.90, 1 53.74591 14.71080 log
1






⎛ ⎞= = = = + ⋅ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ + ⋅ + ⋅⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
                    (54) 





0.90, 2 42.93723 8.19299 log
1






⎛ ⎞= = = = + ⋅ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ − ⋅ + ⋅⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
                   (55) 





0.90, 3 50.54336 9.44603 log
1






⎛ ⎞= = = = + ⋅ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ + ⋅ + ⋅⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
                   (56) 
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0.90, 4 43.99287 6.00950 log
1






⎛ ⎞= = = = + ⋅ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ − ⋅ + ⋅⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
                    (57) 





0.90, 5 51.05349 10.06281 log
1






⎛ ⎞= = = = + ⋅ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ + ⋅ + ⋅⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
                   (58) 





0.90, 6 47.45217 10.75663 log
1






⎛ ⎞= = = = + ⋅ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ − ⋅ + ⋅⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
                   (59) 
Solving this system of equations for a particular specified proportion proficient 
yielded an isoreliability solution set.  Figure V-12 provides a graphical display of the 
resulting isoreliability model for the basic maneuvering task data.  The logistic regression 
analysis of this same data indicates that the beta weights for personnel category and 
training time were both significant with training time being the more important predictor.  
The isoreliability curve took the analysis a step further, by tracing all combinations of the 
two determinants sufficient to provide a specified level of reliability.  In this case, these 
specifications were equivalent to setting the expected proportion proficient equal to 0.50, 
0.70, 0.90, 0.95, and 0.99.  For example, any combination of personnel category and 
training time that lay on the curve for 0.95 sufficed to produce an expected proportion 




Figure V-12. Isoreliability curves trading off aptitude (personnel category) and training 
time with the proportion proficient set at 0.50, 0.75, 0.90, 0.95, and 0.99 and level of 
assurance set at 0.90 for all criterion settings. 
 
Figure V-13 displays the percent difference in training time for each personnel 
category relative to a reference personnel category, in this case Predator selectees, for 
various settings of the reliability criterion—a construct that was previously defined as 
personnel sensitivity.  Reliability on the basic maneuvering task appeared insensitive to 
personnel category when the criterion level was set relatively low, that is 0.50.  However, 
increasing the criterion level was associated with a monotonic increase in personnel 
sensitivity, although there was a divergent pattern across subsets of personnel categories.   
For instance, personnel sensitivity increased relatively sharply at higher reliability 
criterion levels for the cadet category but was relatively flat across the range of criterion 
levels for the civil instrument pilot category.  Between these two extremes was the set of 
personnel categories comprised of civil private pilots, T-38 graduates, and T-1 graduates, 






Figure V-13. Personnel sensitivity, expressed in terms of the percent difference in 
training time for each personnel category relative to the Predator selectee category, for 
various settings of the reliability criterion on the basic maneuvering task. 
 
2. Landing Task 
Schreiber and colleagues presented data concerning 13 criteria assessed during the 
landing task and the number of trials required until proficiency simultaneously was 
achieved on all criteria.  The response variable of interest, y, was the proportion of 
participants in each personnel category who achieved proficiency on the landing task.  A 
graph of the response variable versus the number of trials is shown in Figure V-14.  As in 
the case of the basic maneuvering task, a reasonable probability model for the number of 
proficient participants was the binomial; therefore a logistic regression model was fitted 
to the data. 
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Figure V-14. Scatter plot of the landing task data. 
 
The independent variables were the continuous variable, Trial, corresponding to 
the number of trials to reach proficiency and the categorical variable, Group, 
corresponding to personnel category.  The dependent variable was the proportion 
proficient, y, which was a measure of human performance on the landing task relative to 
an a priori standard of performance.  The basic logistic model related the proportion 
proficient to the three potential predictor variables, Trial, Group, and their interaction, 
.Trial Group×  The categorical variable, Group, was dummy variable coded for inclusion 
in the regression analysis.  Linear and additive regression models were examined and 
plots of the models were used to assess the fit, determine the influence of outliers, and 
assure regression assumptions were not violated (see the chapter appendix for details).     
We again found that the first order model with interaction based on a linear fit and 
using the logit link function was the most parsimonious, resulting in the final fitted 
logistic regression model of: 
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1 2 3 4
5 6 1 2 1 3 1 4
1 5 1 6
ˆ
log 3.5976 0.0325 0.8351 1.8278 0.4717
ˆ1
                     1.5178 0.7784 0.0317 0.0025 0.0531
                     0.0054 0.0200
y x x x x
y
x x x x x x x x
x x x x
⎛ ⎞ = − + + + −⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
+ + + − +
− +
     (60) 
where:  
1x =Trials [0,+∞) 
2x = Civil instrument pilots {0,1} 
3x =Civil private pilots {0,1} 
4x = Predator selectees {0,1} 
5x =T-1 graduates {0,1} 
6x = T-38 graduates {0,1} 
Table V-2 summarizes the estimated regression coefficients and standard errors for the 
final fitted logistic regression model of the landing task data.  A graph of the fitted 
response variable ˆ( )y  versus number of trials to reach proficiency (x) by personnel 













Table V-2. Estimated regression coefficients and standard errors for the final fitted 
model of the landing task data. 
Variable βˆ  ( )ˆse β  Z p-value 
Constant 
Trial 
Group(Civil instrument pilots) 




Trial x Group(Civil instrument pilots) 
Trial x Group(Civil private pilots) 
Trial x Group(Predator selectees) 
Trial x Group(T-1 graduates) 




















































Figure V-15. Plot of the fitted landing task data. 
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We again calculated a system of training-reliability equations—one equation for 
each personnel category—using the coefficient vector and the inverted covariance matrix 
of model parameters, the latter of which is shown below:  
 
0.28796 -0.00248 -0.28796 -0.28796 -0.28796 -0.28796 -0.28796 0.00248 0.00248 0.00248 0.00248 0.00248 
-0.00248 0.00002 0.00248 0.00248 0.00248 0.00248 0.00248 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 
-0.28796 0.00248 0.60191 0.28796 0.28796 0.28796 0.28796 -0.00909 -0.00248 -0.00248 -0.00248 -0.00248 
-0.28796 0.00248 0.28796 0.39644 0.28796 0.28796 0.28796 -0.00248 -0.00379 -0.00248 -0.00248 -0.00248 
-0.28796 0.00248 0.28796 0.28796 0.55542 0.28796 0.28796 -0.00248 -0.00248 -0.00776 -0.00248 -0.00248 
-0.28796 0.00248 0.28796 0.28796 0.28796 0.38038 0.28796 -0.00248 -0.00248 -0.00248 -0.00342 -0.00248 
-0.28796 0.00248 0.28796 0.28796 0.28796 0.28796 0.46950 -0.00248 -0.00248 -0.00248 -0.00248 -0.00541 
0.00248 -0.00002 -0.00909 -0.00248 -0.00248 -0.00248 -0.00248 0.00018 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 
0.00248 -0.00002 -0.00248 -0.00379 -0.00248 -0.00248 -0.00248 0.00002 0.00005 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 
0.00248 -0.00002 -0.00248 -0.00248 -0.00776 -0.00248 -0.00248 0.00002 0.00002 0.00014 0.00002 0.00002 
0.00248 -0.00002 -0.00248 -0.00248 -0.00248 -0.00342 -0.00248 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 0.00004 0.00002 
0.00248 -0.00002 -0.00248 -0.00248 -0.00248 -0.00248 -0.00541 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 0.00008 
 
Fixing the assurance level at 0.90, we then created the following system of equations: 
 





0.90, 1 110.73590 31.88856 log
1






⎛ ⎞= = = = + ⋅ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ + ⋅ + ⋅⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
              (61) 





0.90, 2 43.01196 16.58483 log
1






⎛ ⎞= = = = + ⋅ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ − ⋅ + ⋅⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
                (62) 





0.90, 3 59.06788 34.78748 log
1






⎛ ⎞= = = = + ⋅ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ + ⋅ + ⋅⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
               (63) 
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0.90, 4 47.52709 11.97743 log
1






⎛ ⎞= = = = + ⋅ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ + ⋅ + ⋅⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
                  (64) 





0.90, 5 76.79456 37.97085 log
1






⎛ ⎞= = = = + ⋅ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ + ⋅ + ⋅⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
               (65) 





0.90, 6 53.73450 19.70057 log
1






⎛ ⎞= = = = + ⋅ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ + ⋅ + ⋅⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
                (66) 
Using the same method described for the basic maneuver task data, we traced all 
combinations of the two determinants, training and personnel, sufficient to provide a 
specified level of performance.  We set these specifications, given in terms of proportion 
proficient, equal to 0.50, 0.70, 0.90, 0.95, and 0.99.  Figure V-16 provides a graphical 
display of the resulting isoreliability model for the landing task data.  The logistic 
regression analysis of this same data indicates that the beta weights for personnel 
category and number of trials (i.e., training) were both significant with training being the 
more important predictor.  The isoreliability curves showed that the landing task, in 
contrast to the basic maneuvering task, was more sensitive to personnel factors. 
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Figure V-16. Isoreliability curves trading off aptitude (personnel category) and training 
trials with the proportion proficient set at 0.50, 0.75, 0.90, 0.95, and 0.99 and level of 
assurance set at 0.90 for all criterion settings. 
 
Figure V-17 displays the personnel sensitivity, expressed in terms of the percent 
difference in training time for each personnel category relative to the Predator selectee 
category, for various settings of the reliability criterion.  Making the criterion for 
reliability more stringent, which equates to moving rightward across the graphical 
display, was associated with an increase in the relative personnel sensitivity of the 
landing task.  We saw distinct monotonically increasing trends in personnel sensitivity 
between the set of categories comprised of civil instrument pilots and T-38 graduates, the 
set formed of civil private pilots and T-1 graduates, and the set consisting solely of 
cadets.  It is interesting to note that the personnel sensitivity of civil private pilots and T-1 




Figure V-17. Personnel sensitivity, expressed in terms of the percent difference in 
training time for each personnel category relative to the Predator selectee category, for 
various settings of the reliability criterion on the landing task. 
 
3. Reconnaissance Task 
Schreiber and colleagues (2002) presented data on the total time on target for each 
trial, with all participants completing thirty 10-minute trials.  Unlike the previous tasks, 
no a priori performance criterion was specified in the original study, hence requiring us 
to develop a criterion given the available data.  This task was accomplished using the data 
collected from six experienced Predator pilots.  Figure V-18 displays a scatter plot, by 
pilot, of the total time for each trial that the sensor camera was viewing the target through 
the cloud hole.  We next checked for a bivariate relationship between Time and Trial 
using the rank-based Spearman’s measure of correlation.  Although it was not obvious in 
the scatter plot, there was a weak positive correlation (ρ = 0.196, p-value = 0.009) 
between Time and Trial.  Since we expected that the performance of experienced 
Predator pilots should approach an asymptote over the 30 trials, the data were fit using 
both a logarithmic and an inverse model. 
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Figure V-18. Scatter plot of the reconnaissance task data for six Predator pilots. 
 
Our initial regression models related Time to the predictor variable, Trial, using 
either a logarithmic and inverse transformation of Trial.  Table V-3 summarizes the fit of 
these linear models and Figure V-19 displays the predicted observations from the two 
models relative to a scatter plot of the actual observations.  Both models appeared 
comparable, so we selected the inverse model as it had the advantage over the 
logarithmic model of a finite limit: 
( ) 98.4929 12.4195 log( )
lim ( )
Trial
Time f Trial Trial
f Trial→∞
= = + ×
= ∞                                               (67) 
1( ) 136.5474 53.6727





= = − ×
=
                                                   (68) 
The asymptotic limit of the average performance of Predator pilots, namely 136.547 
seconds on target, was used henceforth as the criterion level of performance for the 
reconnaissance task.   
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Table V-3. Estimated regression coefficients and standard errors for the final fitted 
model of the landing task data. 
Logarithmic model†  Inverse model‡ 
Variable βˆ  ( )ˆse β  t-value  βˆ  ( )ˆse β  t-value 
Constant 
log(Trial) 



















†F1,178 = 14.57, p = 0.0002, R2 = 0.07566 
‡F1,178 = 13.97, p = 0.0003, R2 = 0.07278 





Figure V-19. Scatter plot of the reconnaissance task data for experienced Predator pilots 
versus the fitted models. 
  
Using our newly defined performance criterion, we converted participants’ data 
on the total time on target per trial for each of 30 trials into the number of trials required 




then the proportion of participants in each personnel category who achieved proficiency 
on the reconnaissance task.  A graph of the response variable versus the number of trials 
is shown in Figure V-20.   
 
 
Figure V-20. Scatter plot of the reconnaissance task data. 
 
 
The independent variables were the continuous variable, Trial, corresponding to 
the number of trials to reach proficiency and the categorical variable, Group, 
corresponding to personnel category.  The dependent variable was the proportion 
proficient, y, which was a measure of human performance on the reconnaissance task 
relative to the derived standard of performance.  The basic logistic model related the 
proportion proficient to the three potential predictor variables, Trial, Group, and their 
interaction, .Trial Group×  The categorical variable, Group, was dummy variable coded 




examined and plots of the models were used to assess the fit, determine the influence of 
outliers, and assure regression assumptions were not violated (see the chapter appendix 
for details).     
We found that the first order model with interaction and a logarithmic 
transformation of the predictor, Trials, based on a linear fit and using the logit link 
function, was the most parsimonious, resulting in the final fitted logistic regression model 
of: 
1 2 3 4
              5 6 1 2 1 3
         1 4 1 5
ˆ
log 3.0463 0.8110log( ) 0.5714 0.3496 1.3588
ˆ1
            0.9234 0.4258 0.6327 log( ) 0.6604log( )
               1.4636log( ) 1.1904log( ) 0.7
y x x x x
y
x x x x x x
x x x x
⎛ ⎞ = − + − − −⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
− + + +
+ + + 1 6887 log( )x x
        (69) 
where:  
1x =Trials [0,+∞) 
2x = Civil instrument pilots {0,1} 
3x =Civil private pilots {0,1} 
4x = Predator selectees {0,1} 
5x =T-1 graduates {0,1} 
6x = T-38 graduates {0,1} 
Table V-4 summarizes the estimated regression coefficients and standard errors for the 
final fitted logistic regression model of the reconnaissance task data.  A graph of the 
fitted response variable ˆ( )y versus number of trials to reach proficiency (x) by personnel 












Table V-4. Estimated regression coefficients and standard errors for the final fitted 
model of the reconnaissance task data. 
Variable βˆ  ( )ˆse β  Z p-value 
Constant 
Time 
Group(Civil instrument pilots) 




Time x Group(Civil instrument pilots) 
Time x Group(Civil private pilots) 
Time x Group(Predator selectees) 
Time x Group(T-1 graduates) 



















































Figure V-21. Plot of the fitted reconnaissance task data. 
 
We next calculated a system of training-reliability equations—one equation for 
each personnel category—using the coefficient vector and the inverted covariance matrix 
of model parameters, the latter of which is shown below:  
 
0.61277 -0.22526 -0.61277 -0.61277 -0.61277 -0.61277 -0.61277 0.22526 0.22526 0.22526 0.22526 0.22526 
-0.22526 0.09251 0.22526 0.22526 0.22526 0.22526 0.22526 -0.09251 -0.09251 -0.09251 -0.09251 -0.09251 
-0.61277 0.22526 1.21505 0.61277 0.61277 0.61277 0.61277 -0.46492 -0.22526 -0.22526 -0.22526 -0.22526 
-0.61277 0.22526 0.61277 1.90256 0.61277 0.61277 0.61277 -0.22526 -0.77591 -0.22526 -0.22526 -0.22526 
-0.61277 0.22526 0.61277 0.61277 1.25541 0.61277 0.61277 -0.22526 -0.22526 -0.51193 -0.22526 -0.22526 
-0.61277 0.22526 0.61277 0.61277 0.61277 1.46028 0.61277 -0.22526 -0.22526 -0.22526 -0.59728 -0.22526 
-0.61277 0.22526 0.61277 0.61277 0.61277 0.61277 1.04955 -0.22526 -0.22526 -0.22526 -0.22526 -0.41303 
0.22526 -0.09251 -0.46492 -0.22526 -0.22526 -0.22526 -0.22526 0.19336 0.09251 0.09251 0.09251 0.09251 
0.22526 -0.09251 -0.22526 -0.77591 -0.22526 -0.22526 -0.22526 0.09251 0.34166 0.09251 0.09251 0.09251 
0.22526 -0.09251 -0.22526 -0.22526 -0.51193 -0.22526 -0.22526 0.09251 0.09251 0.22742 0.09251 0.09251 
0.22526 -0.09251 -0.22526 -0.22526 -0.22526 -0.59728 -0.22526 0.09251 0.09251 0.09251 0.26639 0.09251 
0.22526 -0.09251 -0.22526 -0.22526 -0.22526 -0.22526 -0.41303 0.09251 0.09251 0.09251 0.09251 0.18309 
 
Fixing the assurance level at 0.90, we then created the following system of equations, 
noting that we must address the log transformation of 1:x  
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exp 0.90, 1 exp 4.15297 1.60340 log
1






⎧ ⎛ ⎞⎪= = = = + ⋅ ⎜ ⎟⎨ ⎜ ⎟−⎪ ⎝ ⎠⎩
⎫⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎪+ + ⋅ + ⋅⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− − ⎪⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎭
     (70) 





exp 0.90, 2 exp 2.51688 0.75242 log
1






⎧ ⎛ ⎞⎪= = = = + ⋅ ⎜ ⎟⎨ ⎜ ⎟−⎪ ⎝ ⎠⎩
⎫⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎪+ + ⋅ + ⋅⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− − ⎪⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎭
    (71) 





exp 0.90, 3 exp 2.33070 0.83801 log
1






⎧ ⎛ ⎞⎪= = = = + ⋅ ⎜ ⎟⎨ ⎜ ⎟−⎪ ⎝ ⎠⎩
⎫⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎪+ + ⋅ + ⋅⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− − ⎪⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎭
     (72) 





exp 0.90, 4 exp 1.92817 0.45930 log
1






⎧ ⎛ ⎞⎪= = = = + ⋅ ⎜ ⎟⎨ ⎜ ⎟−⎪ ⎝ ⎠⎩
⎫⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎪+ − ⋅ + ⋅⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− − ⎪⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎭
    (73) 





exp 0.90, 5 exp 1.97141 0.53798 log
1






⎧ ⎛ ⎞⎪= = = = + ⋅ ⎜ ⎟⎨ ⎜ ⎟−⎪ ⎝ ⎠⎩
⎫⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎪+ − ⋅ + ⋅⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− − ⎪⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎭
     (74) 





exp 0.90, 6 exp 1.61127 0.66369 log
1






⎧ ⎛ ⎞⎪= = = = + ⋅ ⎜ ⎟⎨ ⎜ ⎟−⎪ ⎝ ⎠⎩
⎫⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎪+ ⋅ + ⋅⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− − ⎪⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎭
    (75) 
 320
 Again, we traced all combinations of the two determinants, training and 
personnel, sufficient to provide a specified level of reliability.  We set these 
specifications, given in terms of proportion proficient, equal to 0.50, 0.70, 0.90, 0.95, and 
0.99.  Figure V-22 provides a graphical display of the resulting isoreliability model for 
the reconnaissance task data.  As with the other tasks, the logistic regression analysis of 
the reconnaissance task data indicates that personnel category and number of trials (i.e., 
training) were both significant with training being the more important predictor.  
However, the isoreliability curves show that the reconnaissance task, as compared to the 
basic maneuvering and landing tasks, was by far the most sensitive to personnel.   
 
Figure V-22. Isoreliability curves trading off aptitude (personnel category) and training 
trials with the proportion proficient set at 0.50, 0.75, 0.90, 0.95, and 0.99 and level of 
assurance set at 0.90 for all criterion settings.  
  
 Figure V-23 displays the personnel sensitivity, expressed in terms of the percent 
difference in training time for each personnel category relative to the Predator selectee 
category, for various settings of the reliability criterion.  In the case of the cadet category, 
personnel sensitivity was only shown for the 0.50 reliability level; personnel sensitivity 
was otherwise two to three orders of magnitude greater than that of the next highest 
category for the remaining reliability levels.  For the first time, there is a distinct break 
 321
between the set of personnel categories comprised of military pilots and the 
complementary set formed of civil pilots and non-pilot cadets.  The personnel categories 
corresponding to military pilots appeared to be relatively insensitive, while those 
corresponding to the non-military pilots exhibited a monotonically increasing trend in 
personnel sensitivity with increasing reliability criterion levels.  This pattern was 
suggestive of an individual aptitude selected during military pilot screening, a skill 
gained during military pilot training, or both, that are significant enablers in performing 
the reconnaissance task. 
 
 
Figure V-23. Personnel sensitivity, expressed in terms of the percent difference in 
training time for each personnel category relative to the Predator selectee category, for 
various settings of the reliability criterion on the reconnaissance task. 
 
D. AGGREGATE ISORELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
1. Mathematical Programming Formulation 
 In this section, a method for forming an aggregate isoreliability model was 
developed.  As we discussed earlier, a significant advantage in working with reliability 
rather than performance is the ability to avail ourselves of basic system models.  A 
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system’s functional and physical decomposition can be used to construct a system-level 
reliability block diagram, the structure of which is used to compute reliability in terms of 
component and subsystem reliabilities.  In the case of our Predator operator, we might 
consider the reliability block diagram shown in Figure V-24.  This diagram was derived, 
with some adaptation, from a front end analysis of the workflow of a MQ-1 Predator pilot 
(Nagy, Kalita, & Eaton, 2006).    It was simplified such that the functions depicted could 
be reasonably matched with those tasks assessed by Schreiber and colleagues in their 
study.   Thus, functions 3.2 and 3.4 correspond to the basic maneuvering task, function 
3.3 corresponds to the reconnaissance task, and function 3.5 matches up with the landing 
task.  If we assume that functions 3.2 to 3.5 are functionally independent, then the set of 
functions constitutes a series system.  Accordingly, the series system reliability, which is 
the probability of overall system success, is given by 
( )3.5 , , 1 2
3.2
,s f e f h
f
R R R x x
=
= ∏                                                                                      (76) 
 
Figure V-24. Reliability block diagram. 
 
A good plan for choosing a Predator operator, particularly from a system 
sustainability perspective, is to seek a solution that most effectively utilizes personnel 
given total system reliability and training resource constraints.  In such a situation, the 
quality of feasible solutions then might be judged in terms of maximizing total system 






: personnel category Predator selectee, ,cadet








the following symbolic constants parameterize the objective: 
: the equipment reliability for function 
: the personnel costs for an operator from personnel category 
: the hourly cost for training task 









Then with the binary and nonnegative decision variables  
1, : the amount of training provided for task tx t  
2,
1 if an operator from personnel category  is selected
:
0 otherwise                                                                p
p
x ⎧⎨⎩  
, :  carrier variable for the human reliability value for function  given 




:  carrier variable for amount of training provided for function fw f  
:  carrier variable for training time (in hours) for task ty t  
we have the following objective: 
, 2,
2,
max   
f f p p
f p
p p t t
p t
e h x
m x c y
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞∏ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
+
∑
∑ ∑                                                                                  (77) 
The numerator simply reduces to Equation 76 once a personnel category is chosen.   
To complete the model, we must enforce several constraints.  Again, we define 
symbolic parameters 
: the lower limit on acceptable total system reliability




The first system of constraints relates the amount of training provided for task t as 
defined in the study by Schreiber and colleagues to the corresponding function(s) f as 











                                                                                           (78) 
The second system of constraints relates the personnel and training domains to functional 
reliability using our empirically derived isoreliability curves: 
( ), ,     ,f p f p fh g w f p= ∀                                                                                      (79) 
Our third constraint is a partitioning constraint requiring that exactly one personnel 
category be chosen in the solution: 
2, 1.p
p
x =∑                                                                                                            (80) 
The fourth constraint enforces the lower limit on total system reliability given a choice of 
personnel category: 
, 2,f f p p
f p
r e h x
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞≤ ∏ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦∑                                                                                      (81) 
The next system of constraints simply relates the amount of training for each task to the 




















                                                                                              (82) 
Our last constraint enforces the upper limit on training time: 
t
t
t y≥∑                                                                                                              (83) 
 For the sake of tractability, we formulate the system of equations indicated by 
( ),f p fg w  starting directly from Equation 46: 
spec 2
0 1 1 5 1 1 2 1 3 1
spec
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆlog
1 k k k k k
x x z c c x c xα
π β β β βπ +
⎛ ⎞ = + + + − + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
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It may help to recall from our earlier derivation of Equation 46 that specπ  is the specified 
reliability, 1x  is the amount of training provided, the sβ  are regression coefficients, and k 
indexes personnel category such that { }2,3, 4,5,6k = .  Additionally, 1kc , 2kc , and 3kc  are 
constants calculated from elements of the regression covariance matrix according to 
Equation 44.  It should also be recalled that in the special case where 1k = , there are no 
ˆ
kβ  or 5ˆkβ +  terms in Equation 46 and 1,1c , 2,1c , and 3,1c  can be inferred from Equation 43.  
However, we will fold this special case into the more generic formulation shortly.    
As we are no longer fixing specπ π= , we can rewrite Equation 46 so that we 
simply have the variable π on the left hand side: 
1
1 e d
π −= +                                                                                                            (84) 
where 
2
0 1 1 5 1 1 2 1 3 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
k k k k kd x x z c c x c xαβ β β β += + + + − + +                                              (85) 
It should be obvious that we will have a unique equation for d for each personnel 
category, and so we can think of Equations 84-85 as actually being a family of personnel 
category-specific equations.  Accordingly, we can re-index Equations 84-85 in terms of p 
and directly include all k personnel categories by stipulating that 5 0k kβ β += =  when 
1k = , thereby eliminating the need to track a special case: 
1
1 ep d
π −= +                                                                                                          (86) 
where 
2
0 1 1 2 3 1 1 2 1 3 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
p p p p pd x x z c c x c xαβ β β β= + + + − + +                                             (87) 
It should also be noted that the regression coefficients are specific to the model fitted for 
data from some task, t, which corresponds to one or more functions, f.  Thus, it is also 
possible to specify a unique equation for d for each function, f:  
,
1
1 ef p d




0 1 1 2 3 1 1 2 1 3 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
f f fp fp fp fp fpd x x z c c x c xαβ β β β= + + + − + +                                     (89) 
Examining Equations 88-89, it should be evident that, with the exception of 1x , all the 
terms on the right hand side of the equation are constants: their values are obtained from 
the corresponding vector of estimated regression coefficients or the covariance matrix of 
model parameters.  In terms of our formulation of an aggregate isoreliability model, they 
are simply elements stored in a data matrix, D.  Consequently: 
 
                 (90) 
    
     
where we now denote the amount of training provided for function, f, using the variable 
fw  rather than the more generic 1x .   
2. Example 
 The Predator operator selection problem is idealized to consider just functions 3.2 
to 3.5 as shown in Figure V-24.  The overall objective is to maximize (larger-is-better) 
cost effectiveness in terms of system reliability relative to personnel costs.  The reliability 
of the equipment, fe , is taken as a given in this case, meaning 1  fe f= ∀ .  Reasonable 
specifications that might be expressed by a decision maker are as follows:  1) total system 
reliability must be no less than 0.90 ( )0.90r = , and 2) simulator availability per trainee 
is limited to no more than 40 hours ( )40t = .  With regards to the training simulator, the 
average time for a landing trial is 5 minutes ( )5l = . Estimates for personnel costs, pm , 
are summarized in Table V-5.  Hourly simulator rates, tc , are estimated at $40 per hour 
for the maneuvering and landing tasks and $65 per hour for the reconnaissance task.  
These rates are derived from the fee schedule for the light aircraft simulator used in 
Kansas State University’s aviation training program.  The rates for the maneuvering and 
landing tasks assume solo training, while that for the reconnaissance task assumes dual 
instruction with an advanced flight instructor.  The choice of different rates reflects the 
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fact that explicit performance feedback is available for the maneuvering and landing tasks 
in the synthetic task environment used by Schreiber and colleagues, while the 
reconnaissance task is more freeform.  These rates were normalized as per the personnel 
costs in Table V-5:  maneuver landing 0.004c c= =  and recon 0.006c = .   
 
Table V-5. Personnel cost estimates. 














$785,934   
73.783 






































Cadet SMCR1 Cadet $10,6526 1.000 
1SMCR = Standard military compensation rate 
2SUPT = Specialized undergraduate pilot training  
3IQT = Initial qualification training 
4IFT = Initial flight training 
5Source: Dahlman, 2005 
6Source:  DoD Comptroller, 2010 
7Source:  Hoffman & Kamps, 2005 
8Relative to cadet 
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Below is the nonlinear integer program for our Predator operator selection 
problem.  To simplify notation, we use the following abbreviations in the indexing for 
personnel category:  S = Predator selectee, T38 = T-38 graduate, T1 = T-1 graduate, I = 
civil instrument pilot, P = civil private pilot, C = cadet.  Similarly, we use the following 




3.2,S 2,S 3.2,T38 2,T38 3.2,T1 2,T1 3.2,I 2,I 3.2,P 2,P 3.2,C 2,C
3.3,S 2,S 3.3,T38 2,T38 3.3,T1 2,T1 3.3,I 2,I 3.3,P 2,P 3.3,C 2,C
3.4,S 2,S 3.4,T38 2,T38 3.4,T1 2,T1 3.4,I 2,I
max   
h x h x h x h x h x h x
h x h x h x h x h x h x
h x h x h x h x h
+ + + + + ⋅
+ + + + + ⋅
+ + + +( )
( )
3.4,P 2,P 3.4,C 2,C
3.5,S 2,S 3.5,T38 2,T38 3.5,T1 2,T1 3.5,I 2,I 3.5,P 2,P 3.5,C 2,C
2,S 2,T38 2,T1 2,I 2,P 2,C
M L R
73.783 42.794 42.794 7.039 6.429
0.004 0.004 0.006
x h x
h x h x h x h x h x h x
x x x x x x
y y y
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥+ ⋅⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥+ + + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
+ + + + +⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟+ + +⎝ ⎠
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3.2,S 3.7966 0.0708 3.7123 0.0998 1.2816 0.9093 0.0391 0.0004
3.2,T38 3.7966 0.0708 0.766
s.t.      
          
          
1          
1 e
1          
1 e















+ 23.2 3.2 3.2
2
3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2
3.2 3.2
5 0.0253 1.2816 0.4546 0.0177 0.0002
3.2,T1 3.7966 0.0708 1.4358 0.0318 1.2816 0.5211 0.0198 0.0002
3.2,I 3.7966 0.0708 1.6245 0.0555 1.
1          
1 e
1          
1 e
w w w




− + − +
− + − + − +






3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2
2
3.2 3.2 3.2
2816 0.6236 0.0277 0.0003
3.2,P 3.7966 0.0708 1.8577 0.0412 1.2816 1.0601 0.0414 0.0004
3.2,C 3.7966 0.0708 1.2816 0.3371 0.0123 0.0001
1          
1 e
1          
1 e
w w





− + − + − +







( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3
3.3 3.3 3.3
3.3,S
3.0463 0.8110log 1.3588 1.4636log 1.2816 0.6426 0.5733log 0.1349 log
3.3,T38
3.0463 0.8110log 0.4258 0.7887log 1.2816 0.4368 0.3755log 0.
1            
1 e
1          
1 e




− + − + − +




+ ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )








3.0463 0.8110log 0.9234 1.1904log 1.2816 0.8475 0.7440log 0.1739 log
3.3,I
3.0463 0.8110log 0.5714 0.6327log 1.2816 0.6023 0.4793l
1          
1 e
1          
1 e
w




− + − + − +




+ ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )








3.0463 0.8110log 0.3496 0.6604log 1.2816 1.2898 1.1013log 0.2491 log
3.3,C
3.0463 0.8110log 1.2816 0.6128 0.4505log 0.0925
1          
1 e
1          
1 e
w w





− + − + − +




+ ( )( )23.3
2
3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4
2
3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4
log
3.4,S 3.7966 0.0708 3.7123 0.0998 1.2816 0.9093 0.0391 0.0004
3.4,T38 3.7966 0.0708 0.7665 0.0253 1.2816 0.4546 0.0177 0.0002
1          
1 e
1          
1 e
      
w
w w w w
w w w w
h
h
− + − + − +






3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4
2
3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4
3.4,T1 3.7966 0.0708 1.4358 0.0318 1.2816 0.5211 0.0198 0.0002
3.4,I 3.7966 0.0708 1.6245 0.0555 1.2816 0.6236 0.0277 0.0003
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The optimal solution has the following applicable non-zero variables: 
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Figure V-25 shows the plot of cost versus total reliability for alternative feasible 
solutions, with the maximum attainable objective values for cost effectiveness given in 
parentheses.   The solution using T-1 graduates is dominated by the solution using T-38 
graduates, leaving only three solutions comprising an efficient set with regards to the two 
major elements of the objective function:  civilian instrument pilot, T-38 graduate, and 
Predator selectee.  The optimal solution in terms of cost effectiveness is to select civilian 
instrument pilots and provide 2.6 hours of simulator training for the maneuver task, 13.6 
hours of training for the landing task, and 23.8 hours of training for the reconnaissance 
task.  The resulting functional reliabilities are 1.0000 for maneuver (i.e., functions 3.2 
and 3.4), 0.9220 for reconnaissance (i.e., function 3.3), and 0.9970 for landing (i.e., 




Figure V-25. Cost versus total reliability plot of feasible solutions for the Predator 
operator selection problem (cost effectiveness objective values given in parentheses).    
 
E. DISCUSSION 
 Dr. John Weisz (1967), an early pioneer in the field of HSI, advocated that human 
factors* contributions should be included directly among those factors considered in the 
“system analytic thinking process” and not treated separately.  By system analytic 
thinking process, Weisz was likely referring to the RAND style systems analysis that was 
being transferred to the Defense Department by then Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara.  Thus, Weisz intended for the inclusion of human factors contributions in 
analyses comparing, contrasting, and evaluating proposed system concepts, particularly 
when dealing with weapon systems.  Moreover, such analyses were likely to use the 
quantitative techniques being advanced by the proponents of operations research 
(Hughes, 1998).  Weisz (1967) noted that the challenge for the human factors field was to 
transfer the research being conducted in the behavioral sciences and human factors 
engineering fields utilizing experimental psychology methodologies and multi-variable 
                                                 
* The term “HSI” did not come into the Defense Department lexicon until the early 1990s.  At the time 
that Weisz was writing about incorporating human factors considerations in system analyses, he was also 
advocating for a more broad interpretation of human factors to include those areas that would eventually 
comprise the U.S. Army’s MANPRINT program, the forerunner of the Defense Department’s HSI 
program.  Thus, it is reasonable to consider human factors and HSI as synonyms in Weisz’s writings.   
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statistical techniques into the operations research techniques employed in weapon system 
analysis.  He subsequently called out four areas for which human factors could plausibly 
make contributions to systems analysis:  manpower requirements, training requirements, 
performance requirements, and system design.  Ideally, in this analytic paradigm, the 
human factors team could show tradeoff results between these subcomponents of the 
human component(s) of the overall system (Weisz, 1968).  
 This study of Predator UAS personnel requirements directly answers Weisz’s 
challenge, taking an experiment from the behavioral sciences field and transferring the 
results into mathematical models that lend themselves to analysis utilizing the 
optimization techniques of operations research.  The resulting system analysis 
collectively considers manpower, training, and performance requirements in selecting a 
personnel category, allocating task training times, and determining the resulting system 
reliability and cost effectiveness.  While it would have been possible to also consider 
system design in this system analysis, it was not addressed because proposed system 
concepts only involved changes in the human component of the system and not the 
human-machine interface technology.  Overall, the study clearly illustrates a general 
framework around which a detailed model can be developed to permit HSI factors to be 
effectively introduced into system analysis studies.  
 Besides allowing HSI factors to be considered in the initial system concept 
comparison, the underlying mathematical models can be directly used by analysts to 
assist decision makers who may want to conduct tradeoff studies.  This process allows 
the HSI team to show tradeoff results between domain-related decision variables that 
contribute to human performance.  It is very likely, for example, that decreasing 
personnel quality will decrease personnel-related costs but necessitate an increase in one 
or more elements of training, thereby increasing support costs.  Additionally, total-system 
analysts could perform tradeoffs between major areas contributing to the system analysis, 
for example by changing equipment reliabilities or elements of the reliability block 
diagram itself, until some optimum combination of all areas is achieved.  Furthermore, 
the optimum combination can be sought for wartime conditions when the cost of training 
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and, especially, the time available for such training on a mass basis may make certain 
personnel and training solutions infeasible (Weisz, 1968).     
 As mentioned earlier, the primary challenge to bringing behavioral science and 
human factors engineering experimental results into system analyses is the necessity of 
formulating the results of such experiments as mathematical models that are tractable to 
the techniques of operations research.  The isoperformance methodology described by 
Jones, Kennedy, and their colleagues provides an intuitively simple but highly useful 
approach for making such a transfer.  In particular, the motivation for suggesting 
isoperformance is to make HSI domain tradeoff decisions more mathematically tractable, 
and hence, explicit—an idea that should clearly resonate with system analysis 
practitioners.  However, their demonstrations of the isoperformance method are limited to 
single-function cases with continuous decision variables.  The reality, as typified by the 
Predator operator selection problem, is that many critical decision problems in 
engineering and management include logical decisions that cannot be modeled validly as 
continuous and/or are concerned with performance of aggregates of functions, which is to 
say systems.  Thus, an important finding of this study is the feasibility of 1) including 
logical decision variables in isoperformance models and 2) the ability to transfer those 
models into discrete optimization models that can then be used to analyze aggregated 
functions, at least in terms of the construct of human reliability.  It should also come as 
no surprise that in so doing, we necessarily increase the complexity of problem 
formulation and diminish the tractability of the resulting optimization models.   
While we have used the term “human reliability” as if it were a novel discovery, 
the truth is that interest in human reliability can be traced back to the middle 1950s, along 
with, or perhaps as one aspect of, the then growing interest in systems theory.  As an 
activity, human reliability involves the quantitative analysis, prediction, and evaluation of 
procedural, goal-directed human performance in human-machine systems in such terms 
as error likelihood, probability of task accomplishment, and response time (Meister, 
1985).  As described in Pew’s (2008) 50-year retrospect on human performance model 
development, Swain and his group at Sandia National Laboratories were major 
innovators in this area, creating the well known technique for human error rate 
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prediction, or simply THERP.  While there are other tools for human reliability analysis 
and prediction, such as Siegel/Wolf models, which are the basis for IMPRINT21, we will 
confine ourselves chiefly with THERP as the archetype for these methods.  Briefly, 
THERP recognizes that performing typical human tasks involves the serial aggregation of 
collections of elemental actions, and as task analysis reveals, the aggregation involves a 
contingent branching structure of possible paths through a network of such actions. 
Accordingly, THERP decomposes human tasks into their elemental actions, assigns 
probabilities of error for each element, and through serial aggregation, calculates the 
probability of error for a task (Pew, 2008).   
A number of factors complicate this apparently straightforward procedure, not the 
least of which is the determination of possible error rates and relative influence of factors 
that affect error likelihood, the latter being called performance shaping factors. A 
primary consideration in conducting a human reliability analysis is the variability of the 
performance of interest.  Because of this variability, the reliability of human performance 
usually is not predicted solely as a point estimate, but is considered to lie within a range 
of uncertainty.  To arrive at a point estimate for human error probability, a point value is 
chosen from within a given range based on an analyst’s assessment of the impact of 
performance shaping factors.  For example, if an analyst believes a performance-shaping 
factor exists that will increase the likelihood of error, they would select a human error 
probability closer to the upper bound of the uncertainty range for the nominal value 
(Meister, 1985).  In the case of Siegel/Wolf models, the issue of performance variability 
is handled by creating Monte Carlo simulations of reliability networks and performance- 
shaping factors are implemented as scale factors (Meister, 1985; Pew, 2008).  
                                                 
21 The U.S. Air Force used Siegel’s modeling approach to develop SAINT (Systems Analysis of 
Integrated Networks of Tasks), which was a general-purpose discrete simulation language written in 
FORTRAN.  Micro Analysis and Design (MAAD) subsequently developed a PC version in 1986 (Micro 
Saint) written in C, which then spawned a family of special-purpose applications.  The most prominent 
thread in this lineage is contained in the IMPRINT series of applications, mostly sponsored by the U.S. 
Army, which is widely used to model operator workload and task performance.  A major thrust in the 
evolution of IMPRINT has been the modeling of the dynamic relationship between mental workload, as 
predicted based on Wickens’ Multiple Resource Theory, and performance (McCracken & Aldrich, 1984; 
Mitchell, 2000; Pew, 2008).   
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HSI practitioners looking at THERP (or Siegel/Wolf models for that matter) 
would likely nominate personnel and training domain considerations as being key, 
modifiable performance shaping factors.  However, when using THERP, the impact of 
these factors on system reliability is largely left to the judgment of the analyst performing 
the human reliability analysis.  Tradeoffs between performance shaping factors must be 
addressed by selecting various values for a given parameter from the distribution of error 
probabilities available and modifying these by some aggregate performance shaping 
“fudge” factor—a clumsy process at best.  The task simulation method, made possible by 
Siegel/Wolf models, has the advantage that one can experimentally vary performance 
shaping factor levels to determine their effect on system reliability, but the validity of the 
results will obviously depend on the correctness of the algorithms that make up the model 
architecture (i.e., how accurately the performance shaping factors and their interaction are 
implemented).  Moreover, in the end, such simulations are little more than a source of 
data and it still remains for an analyst to derive some mathematical tradeoff function 
linking performance shaping factor levels to organizational objectives.  Thus, the relative 
contribution of our adaptation of Jones and Kennedy’s isoperformance methodology to 
human reliability analysis should be evident, particularly when an analyst is seeking to 
explicitly include HSI domain considerations within larger system analyses.   
Returning to the case of the Predator UAS, personnel quality issues were not 
addressed early in the acquisition process because it was simply assumed at the outset 
that experienced, rated Air Force aviators would be the system operators.  Only as the 
growth in the number of systems outpaced the available personnel resources has the Air 
Force recognized the necessity to reconsider personnel quality requirements for the 
Predator UAS.  Necessarily limiting ourselves to the ex post facto data generated by 
Schreiber and colleagues, the analyses performed in this study indicate that some less 
capable personnel may be considered for the Predator operator job while still meeting or 
exceeding the desired level of total system reliability.  As was shown in the tradeoff 
analysis, experienced Air Force aviators are still an ideal choice in terms of overall 
system reliability, but their associated personnel costs make them a sub-optimal choice 
with regards to cost effectiveness.  A similar statement can be made with regards to rated 
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aviators graduating from the fighter/bomber track of specialized undergraduate pilot 
training.  Therefore, the use of rated Air Force aviators as Predator UAS operators might 
be construed as an example of “gold plating,” a term that is derisively used more often 
with regards to technical system components to convey the notion of excess capability.   
An analysis, similar to that performed in this study, could have estimated these 
personnel quality requirements early in the acquisition process of this weapon system.   
These analyses might well have been employed to more cost effectively achieve system 
reliability requirements by either designing the equipment to be less complex, decreasing 
standards for personnel capability, or by a combination of both.  Addressing system 
reliability requirements via the equipment would require the engineers to redesign the 
system to reduce the complexity of the tasks that are performed by the operators.  Using 
this method often leads to the equipment becoming more complex internally, and hence, 
more expensive.   
Care must also be taken not to diminish overall system reliability by decreasing 
equipment reliability for gains in human reliability.  Moreover, it is very important to 
appreciate the relative aptitude sensitivity of those tasks and functions allocated to the 
system operator so that efforts to reduce task complexity are appropriately targeted.  This 
last point is well illustrated by the isoplots constructed in this study, which clearly show 
the reconnaissance task to be the major limitation when attempting to relax personnel 
capability requirements.  Given ever present financial resource constraints, efforts to 
reduce task complexity might be better focused on decision aiding during the 
reconnaissance task rather than fielding an automatic landing system.  Again, such 
system concepts should be subjected to some type of system analysis so that a more 
optimal solution is chosen. 
It should be noted that the tasks analyzed by Schreiber and colleagues are not 
representative of all the tasks and functions relevant to operation of the Predator UAS.  
Nor did the cognitive task analysis on which Martin and Schreiber (1998) based the 
development of their synthetic task environment consider the mission of armed 
reconnaissance as this was not part of the Predator mission set until 2001.  Consequently, 
the analyses performed in this study likely underestimate the amount of training required 
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for less capable personnel to fill the current job of Predator operator.  As more training 
requirements are identified, the cost of these less capable personnel will increase 
accordingly, thereby decreasing the observed difference between them and experienced, 
rated Air Force aviators in terms of overall cost effectiveness.   
While the observed difference in cost effectiveness between the optimal and the 
other feasible solutions was an order of magnitude, it would be prudent to perform a 
sensitivity analysis to predict the effects of model parameter changes on the choice of an 
optimal solution.  As an example, cutting the training time limit in half (i.e., tightening 
the constraint) makes Predator selectees the optimal choice, while doubling the limit (i.e., 
relaxing the constraint) makes civil private pilots the optimal choice.  Since the choice of 
many of these parameters is arbitrary for the purpose of demonstrating the analysis, it is 
beyond the scope of this discussion to consider an exhaustive sensitivity analysis.  
Nonetheless, these issues are quite important in practice because we often have 
incomplete knowledge of the data related to the problem (Rardin, 1998).   
These types of issues will inevitably cause analysis problems for other systems, 
particularly if human-related data are obtained from simulation-based experiments 
employing parameterized human performance models rather than human-in-the-loop 
experiments.  Nevertheless, despite these problems, a relatively straightforward example 
of the type of HSI related research and analysis that needs to be conducted to improve 
personnel utilization is provided in this study.  A demonstration of the need for feedback 
of personnel factors to designers in the early stages of the acquisition process is also 
provided.  To summarize, this study illustrates the importance of integrating human 
factors research and experimentation with system analysis so that Air Force personnel 
managers may improve total service performance through optimized selection, recruiting, 
and allocation policies.   
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F. APPENDIX  
1. Basic Maneuvering Task Regression Model 
Our initial logistic regression model relates the proportion proficient to the two 
predictor variables, Time and Group, as well as their interaction, Time:Group.  We fit the 
general linear model using glm as follows: 
> bmtask.glm.all <- glm(y ~ Time + Group + Time:Group, weight = Weight,      
+ family = binomial(logit), data = bmtask.df)  
The summary of the resulting fit: 
> summary(bmtask.glm.all) 
 
Call: glm(formula = y ~ Time + Group + Time:Group, family = 
binomial(logit), data = bmtask.df, weights = Weight) 
Deviance Residuals: 
       Min         1Q       Median        3Q      Max  
 -1.455336 -0.3584625 -0.008955164 0.3422195 1.392584 
 
Coefficients: 
                             Value Std. Error    t value  
           (Intercept) -3.79655561 0.58062723 -6.5387144 
                  Time  0.07078031 0.01099094  6.4398757 
       GroupCivil_inst -1.62448130 0.98019136 -1.6573104 
       GroupCivil_priv -1.85765153 1.18203188 -1.5715748 
    GroupPred_selectee -3.71232676 1.11643460 -3.3251628 
          GroupT1_grad -1.43579321 0.92641172 -1.5498435 
         GroupT38_grad -0.76651247 0.88977081 -0.8614718 
   TimeGroupCivil_inst  0.05546095 0.02103663  2.6363990 
   TimeGroupCivil_priv  0.04120973 0.02320528  1.7758772 
TimeGroupPred_selectee  0.09976107 0.02346270  4.2519012 
      TimeGroupT1_grad  0.03177690 0.01787354  1.7778734 
     TimeGroupT38_grad  0.02532952 0.01745794  1.4508885 
 
(Dispersion Parameter for Binomial family taken to be 1 ) 
 
    Null Deviance: 557.0008 on 90 degrees of freedom 
 
Residual Deviance: 25.35335 on 79 degrees of freedom 
 
Number of Fisher Scoring Iterations: 5 
The test that all slopes are zero, G = 531.6475, DF = 11, and P-value < 0.001, indicates 
the model is adequate.  The partial t-tests show that Time is important even after adjusting 
for Group and the interaction terms, but they provide less information on Groups or the 
interaction although these too seem to be important. 
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 We next examine the bivariate relationships between the proportion proficient and 
each of the predictors by fitting a “null” model and then adding each of the terms, one at 
a time: 
> bmtask.glm.null <- glm(y ~ 1, weight = Weight, family =                
+ binomial(logit), data = bmtask.df) 
 
> add1(bmtask.glm.null, ~ . + Time + Group) 
 
Single term additions 
 
Model: 
y ~ 1 
       Df Sum of Sq      RSS       Cp  
<none>              475.8387 486.4129 
  Time  1  309.1494 166.6893 187.8377 
 Group  5    0.2506 475.5882 539.0333  
Using the Cp statistic to compare the models, Time is clearly the best single variable to 
use in a linear model.  However, to examine the contribution of Group and the interaction 
term to the full model, we produce an analysis of deviance for the sequential addition of 
each variable by using the anova function and specifying the chi-square test to evaluate 
for differences between models: 
> anova(bmtask.glm.all, test = "Chisq") 
 






Terms added sequentially (first to last) 
           Df Deviance Resid. Df Resid. Dev      Pr(Chi)  
      NULL                    90   557.0008              
      Time  1 468.9139        89    88.0869 0.0000000000 
     Group  5  40.7733        84    47.3136 0.0000001043 
Time:Group  5  21.9603        79    25.3534 0.0005327781  
Here we see that Group is important after adjusting for Time, and the interaction term, 
Time:Group, is important after adjusting for both Time and Group.   
These statistical conclusions are subsequently verified by looking at graphical 
displays of the fitted values and residuals (Figure V-26).  There does not appear to be 
significant systemic curvature or other patterns in the plot of residuals against fitted 
values (Figure V-26A).  There also does not appear to be any large residuals suggesting 
outlying observations that might skew the analysis.  The plot of the absolute residuals 
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against predicted values suggests the assumed variance function is adequate (Figure V-
26B).  The normal quantile plot indicates the left tail of the distribution is light (Figure V-
26D), suggesting some problems with the model fit, but this must be tempered in the non-
linear context.   
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Figure V-26. Plots of the generalized linear model of Proficient (y) predicted by 
Time, Group, and Time:Group. 
 
Tables V-6 thru V-8 contain the output from S-Plus, including the leverages 
calculated using the lm function: 
> h.i. <-lm.influence(bmtask.glm.all)$hat  
The maximum standardized deviance residual is 1.47574 and the maximum standardized 
pearson residual is 1.33038, suggesting there are no outliers in the dataset.  Likewise, the 
maximum observed leverage is 0.23674, which is below the calculated hmax = 0.26374 
threshold where one becomes concerned about “excessive” leverage.  Likewise,  
A                                                                       B 
C                                                                       D 
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looking at Cook’s D, Dmax for the entire dataset is 0.05545, which is well below  
the threshold for concern for an unduly influential observation.   
 
Table V-6. Residuals for the basic maneuvering task data. 











1 Pred_selectee 27.25 0.05556 0.05408 0.02991 0.03004 0.14973 0.00001 
2 Pred_selectee 30.50 0.11111 0.09051 0.32427 0.33471 0.17210 0.00194 
3 Pred_selectee 32.75 0.22222 0.12745 1.22282 1.33038 0.17875 0.03210 
4 Pred_selectee 38.75 0.27778 0.28897 -0.11363 -0.11319 0.14412 0.00018 
5 Pred_selectee 39.25 0.33333 0.30680 0.26098 0.26298 0.13847 0.00093 
6 Pred_selectee 41.75 0.38889 0.40401 -0.13888 -0.13859 0.11012 0.00020 
7 Pred_selectee 45.50 0.44444 0.56236 -1.04916 -1.05464 0.08565 0.00868 
8 Pred_selectee 45.75 0.50000 0.57282 -0.64956 -0.65306 0.08527 0.00331 
9 Pred_selectee 46.00 0.55556 0.58322 -0.24816 -0.24887 0.08504 0.00048 
10 Pred_selectee 46.75 0.61111 0.61395 -0.02582 -0.02584 0.08530 0.00001 
11 Pred_selectee 49.25 0.66667 0.70895 -0.40944 -0.41488 0.09413 0.00149 
12 Pred_selectee 50.00 0.72222 0.73462 -0.12486 -0.12546 0.09825 0.00014 
13 Pred_selectee 51.50 0.77778 0.78143 -0.03953 -0.03961 0.10684 0.00002 
14 Pred_selectee 53.50 0.83333 0.83412 -0.00953 -0.00953 0.11648 0.00000 
15 Pred_selectee 54.25 0.88889 0.85107 0.49922 0.48022 0.11900 0.00260 
16 Pred_selectee 55.25 0.94444 0.87142 1.09709 0.98732 0.12122 0.01121 
17 Pred_selectee 61.00 1.00000 0.94756 1.47574 1.05772 0.10952 0.01147 
18 T38_grad 22.75 0.06667 0.08498 -0.28920 -0.27915 0.17034 0.00133 
19 T38_grad 29.75 0.13333 0.15397 -0.24855 -0.24380 0.17474 0.00105 
20 T38_grad 33.50 0.20000 0.20695 -0.07300 -0.07269 0.16375 0.00009 
21 T38_grad 35.00 0.26667 0.23161 0.34479 0.35053 0.15696 0.00191 
22 T38_grad 35.25 0.33333 0.23592 0.92913 0.96710 0.15572 0.01438 
23 T38_grad 41.50 0.40000 0.36020 0.33995 0.34246 0.12073 0.00134 
24 T38_grad 48.50 0.46667 0.52454 -0.47263 -0.47299 0.09953 0.00206 
25 T38_grad 52.00 0.53333 0.60698 -0.61166 -0.61717 0.10451 0.00370 
26 T38_grad 56.00 0.60000 0.69404 -0.82255 -0.84259 0.12007 0.00807 
27 T38_grad 57.25 0.66667 0.71894 -0.47353 -0.48173 0.12596 0.00279 
28 T38_grad 58.75 0.73333 0.74713 -0.13133 -0.13210 0.13305 0.00022 
29 T38_grad 60.00 0.80000 0.76915 0.31063 0.30552 0.13870 0.00125 
30 T38_grad 62.00 0.86667 0.80151 0.71859 0.68496 0.14670 0.00672 
31 T38_grad 67.00 0.93333 0.86718 0.89843 0.82260 0.15791 0.01057 
32 T38_grad 107.50 1.00000 0.99689 0.31079 0.21993 0.03133 0.00013 
33 T1_grad 31.25 0.06250 0.11635 -0.79401 -0.73143 0.15642 0.00827 
34 T1_grad 36.25 0.12500 0.18025 -0.65228 -0.62316 0.14879 0.00566 
35 T1_grad 36.75 0.18750 0.18795 -0.00502 -0.00501 0.14717 0.00000 
36 T1_grad 41.25 0.25000 0.26858 -0.18088 -0.17952 0.12796 0.00039 
37 T1_grad 42.50 0.31250 0.29449 0.16769 0.16866 0.12202 0.00033 
38 T1_grad 45.50 0.37500 0.36216 0.11295 0.11323 0.10952 0.00013 
39 T1_grad 46.00 0.43750 0.37409 0.54959 0.55498 0.10789 0.00310 
40 T1_grad 52.00 0.56250 0.52514 0.31709 0.31654 0.10600 0.00099 
41 T1_grad 53.00 0.62500 0.55062 0.63819 0.63371 0.10922 0.00410 
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Table V-7. Residuals for the basic maneuvering task data (continued). 











42 T1_grad 58.00 0.68750 0.67172 0.14526 0.14465 0.13633 0.00028 
43 T1_grad 61.75 0.75000 0.75036 -0.00368 -0.00368 0.16019 0.00000 
44 T1_grad 69.75 0.81250 0.87225 -0.74902 -0.79306 0.18491 0.01189 
45 T1_grad 72.00 0.87500 0.89583 -0.29359 -0.30178 0.18280 0.00170 
46 T1_grad 81.25 0.93750 0.95691 -0.38850 -0.41363 0.14548 0.00243 
47 T1_grad 99.75 1.00000 0.99329 0.47748 0.33820 0.05530 0.00056 
48 Civil_inst 23.75 0.06667 0.08145 -0.23585 -0.22899 0.16474 0.00086 
49 Civil_inst 28.75 0.13333 0.14288 -0.11710 -0.11599 0.17020 0.00023 
50 Civil_inst 33.75 0.20000 0.23860 -0.38780 -0.38012 0.14878 0.00210 
51 Civil_inst 34.50 0.26667 0.25622 0.09976 0.10020 0.14373 0.00014 
52 Civil_inst 35.75 0.33333 0.28743 0.41621 0.42233 0.13481 0.00232 
53 Civil_inst 39.00 0.40000 0.37810 0.18504 0.18571 0.11271 0.00037 
54 Civil_inst 39.50 0.46667 0.39305 0.61325 0.61877 0.10995 0.00394 
55 Civil_inst 45.75 0.53333 0.58771 -0.44979 -0.45227 0.10506 0.00200 
56 Civil_inst 49.25 0.60000 0.68919 -0.78031 -0.79785 0.12488 0.00757 
57 Civil_inst 50.50 0.66667 0.72195 -0.50395 -0.51333 0.13349 0.00338 
58 Civil_inst 51.00 0.73333 0.73444 -0.01047 -0.01048 0.13692 0.00000 
59 Civil_inst 51.50 0.80000 0.74657 0.52653 0.51311 0.14029 0.00358 
60 Civil_inst 54.00 0.86667 0.80155 0.72174 0.68798 0.15507 0.00724 
61 Civil_inst 67.25 0.93333 0.95558 -0.42034 -0.45021 0.13663 0.00267 
62 Civil_inst 76.25 1.00000 0.98530 0.69603 0.49399 0.08272 0.00183 
63 Civil_priv 31.75 0.07692 0.10924 -0.44172 -0.42069 0.21148 0.00396 
64 Civil_priv 37.50 0.15385 0.18930 -0.37217 -0.36263 0.19059 0.00258 
65 Civil_priv 42.75 0.23077 0.29596 -0.57110 -0.55746 0.14692 0.00446 
66 Civil_priv 44.50 0.30769 0.33835 -0.25286 -0.25089 0.13269 0.00080 
67 Civil_priv 46.50 0.38462 0.39015 -0.04364 -0.04360 0.12015 0.00002 
68 Civil_priv 46.75 0.46154 0.39683 0.50412 0.50804 0.11897 0.00290 
69 Civil_priv 48.00 0.53846 0.43078 0.82820 0.83330 0.11467 0.00750 
70 Civil_priv 52.25 0.61538 0.54916 0.51530 0.51224 0.12247 0.00305 
71 Civil_priv 58.75 0.69231 0.71610 -0.20919 -0.21089 0.18609 0.00085 
72 Civil_priv 62.75 0.76923 0.79789 -0.28770 -0.29253 0.22614 0.00208 
73 Civil_priv 64.25 0.84615 0.82363 0.24816 0.24383 0.23674 0.00154 
74 Civil_priv 79.50 0.92308 0.96264 -0.73532 -0.83646 0.19166 0.01382 
75 Civil_priv 143.50 1.00000 0.99997 0.02792 0.01974 0.00145 0.00000 
76 Cadet 33.00 0.06250 0.18834 -1.57956 -1.39735 0.15111 0.02896 
77 Cadet 33.50 0.12500 0.19381 -0.79597 -0.75489 0.14908 0.00832 
78 Cadet 36.50 0.18750 0.22916 -0.43645 -0.42645 0.13568 0.00238 
79 Cadet 39.50 0.25000 0.26880 -0.18231 -0.18092 0.12126 0.00038 
80 Cadet 41.50 0.31250 0.29751 0.13850 0.13916 0.11192 0.00020 
81 Cadet 44.75 0.37500 0.34771 0.24011 0.24150 0.09891 0.00053 
82 Cadet 49.00 0.43750 0.41865 0.15986 0.16018 0.08950 0.00021 
83 Cadet 52.00 0.50000 0.47104 0.24310 0.24331 0.09008 0.00049 
84 Cadet 52.75 0.56250 0.48428 0.65701 0.65674 0.09126 0.00361 
85 Cadet 54.75 0.62500 0.51966 0.89314 0.88727 0.09645 0.00700 
86 Cadet 64.75 0.68750 0.68707 0.00401 0.00401 0.15550 0.00000 
 343
Table V-8. Residuals for the basic maneuvering task data (continued). 











87 Cadet 65.25 0.75000 0.69463 0.53440 0.52442 0.15914 0.00434 
88 Cadet 70.25 0.81250 0.76418 0.52029 0.50691 0.19341 0.00513 
89 Cadet 96.50 0.87500 0.95408 -1.39855 -1.67982 0.19081 0.05545 
90 Cadet 113.00 0.93750 0.98525 -1.25523 -1.68233 0.11308 0.03007 
91 Cadet 131.00 1.00000 0.99583 0.37573 0.26596 0.05282 0.00033 
 
We next examine several alternative models with different link functions and 
scaling of predictors to determine if the model fit can be improved.  We fit models using 
the complementary log-log (cloglog) and probit link functions: 
> bmtask.glm.cloglog <- glm(y ~ Time + Group + Time:Group, weight =     
+ Weight, family = binomial(cloglog), data = bmtask.df) 
 
> bmtask.glm.probit <- glm(y ~ Time + Group + Time:Group, weight =     
+ Weight, family = binomial(probit), data = bmtask.df) 
We also evaluate rescaling the predictor variable, Time, using a log transformation: 
> bmtask.glm.logtime <- glm(y ~ log(Time) + Group + log(Time):Group,   
+ weight = Weight, family = binomial(logit), data = bmtask.df) 
We then use the anova function to compare these models and look at the graphical 
displays of the fitted values and residuals: 
> anova(bmtask.glm.all, bmtask.glm.logtime, bmtask.glm.cloglog,  
+ bmtask.glm.probit) 
 




                                Terms Resid. Df Resid. Dev      
1           Time + Group + Time:Group        79   25.35335                      
2 log(Time) + Group + log(Time):Group        79   25.40528  
3           Time + Group + Time:Group        79   39.11041  
4           Time + Group + Time:Group        79   26.70424    
The residual deviances suggest that the model using the logit link function (#1) is the 
best, although the models using the rescaled predictor, log(Time), (#2) and the probit 
link function (#4) are comparable.  Examining the graphical displays for the model with 
the rescaled predictor (Figure V-27), we see from the normal quantile plot (Figure V-
27D) that the problem of the light tailed distribution is not improved.  Also, introduction  
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of the rescaled parameter has led to some systemic curvature in the plot of residuals 
against fitted values (Figure V-27A).  Overall, our best fit appears to be obtained with the 
initial model.   
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Figure V-27. Plots of the generalized linear model of Proficient (y) predicted by 
log(Time), Group, and log(Time):Group. 
 
 So far, we have examined only linear relationships between the predictors and the 
proportion proficient.  We now assess the validity of the linear assumption by fitting an 
additive model with relationships estimated by smoothing operations, and then 
comparing the linear fit.  We first use the gam function to fit an additive model, indicating 
Time as an argument to the s function, to estimate a “smoothed” relationship as follows: 
> bmtask.gam.all <- gam(y ~ s(Time) + Group + s(Time):Group, weight =  
+ Weight, family = binomial(logit), data = bmtask.df) 
A summary of the fit is: 
A                                                                        B 




Call: gam(formula = y ~ s(Time) + Group + s(Time):Group, family = 
binomial(logit), data = bmtask.df, weights = Weight) 
Deviance Residuals: 
      
  Min         1Q      Median        3Q      Max  
 -1.146995 -0.2885017 -0.02004951 0.3320611 1.431841 
 
(Dispersion Parameter for Binomial family taken to be 1 ) 
 
    Null Deviance: 557.0008 on 90 degrees of freedom 
 
Residual Deviance: 21.26504 on 76.06075 degrees of freedom 
 
Number of Local Scoring Iterations: 6  
 
DF for Terms and Chi-squares for Nonparametric Effects 
 
              Df Npar Df Npar Chisq   P(Chi)  
  (Intercept)  1                             
      s(Time)  1     2.9   4.544914 0.201098 
        Group  5                             
s(Time):Group  5                      
Since the non-parametric tests do not inform us about the contribution of Group and the 
interaction term in the presence of a smooth of Time, we fit two additional models that 
build on a base model: one with the Group variable and one with a smooth of the 
Time:Group variable. 
> bmtask.gam.time <- gam(y ~ s(Time), weight = Weight, family =        
+ binomial(logit), data = bmtask.df) 
 
> bmtask.gam.time.group <- gam(y ~ s(Time) + Group, weight = Weight,    
+ family = binomial(logit), data = bmtask.df) 
We then produce the following analysis of deviance table: 
> anova(bmtask.gam.time, bmtask.gam.time.group, bmtask.gam.all, test = 
+ "Chisq") 
 




                            Terms Resid. Df Resid. Dev              
1                         s(Time)  86.04682   72.07984                                 
2                 s(Time) + Group  81.04223   33.98506          
3 s(Time) + Group + s(Time):Group  76.06075   21.26504  
 
Test                 Df Deviance    Pr(Chi)  
+Group     5.004587 38.09478 0.00000036 
+s(Time):Group 4.981476 12.72001 0.0258325 
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The indication is that Group is important in the model even with Time included, and the 
interaction term, Time:Group, is important even in the presence of both Time and Group.  
Figure V-28 shows the graphical displays for the plots of the partial residuals (Figure V-
28A) and the pointwise confidence intervals for the model that includes the Time and 
Group variables and interaction term (Figure V-28B).  The plots suggest a possible 
piecewise linear relationship for Time.   
 






























Figure V-28. The partial fits for the generalized additive logistic regression model of 
Proficient (y) with Time, Group, and Time:Group as predictors. 
 
 We next use the anova function to compare the linear fit bmtask.glm.all with 
the additive fit bmtask.gam.all to investigate whether it may be worthwhile proceeding 
to develop a more complex model: 
> anova(bmtask.glm.all, bmtask.gam.all, test = "Chisq") 
 




                            Terms Resid. Df Resid. Dev     
1       Time + Group + Time:Group  79.00000   25.35335                                 
2 s(Time) + Group + s(Time):Group  76.06075   21.26504  
 
   Test       Df Deviance   Pr(Chi)  
 
1 vs. 2 2.939245 4.088307 0.2438847 
We see that the linear fit is more parsimonious.  The effective degrees of freedom are 79 
with the linear model and approximately 76 in the additive model with smooths.  The 
A                                                                         B 
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residual deviance in the linear fit is not significantly higher than the residual deviance in 
the additive fit.  In addition, with the linear fit, we can produce an analytical expression 
for the model, which cannot be done for an additive model with smooth fits.  Given these 
considerations, we decide to use the linear fit to develop our subsequent model.   
2. Landing Task Regression Model 
Our initial logistic regression model relates the proportion proficient to the two 
predictor variables, Group and Trials, as well as their interaction, Trials:Group.  We 
fit the general linear model using glm as follows: 
> landing.glm.all <- glm(y ~ Trials + Group + Trials:Group, weight =    
+ Weight, family = binomial(logit), data = landing.task.df) 
The summary of the resulting fit: 
> summary(landing.glm.all) 
 
Call: glm(formula = y ~ Trials + Group + Trials:Group, weight = Weight,  
+ family = binomial(logit), data = landing.task.df) 
Deviance Residuals: 
      Min         1Q     Median        3Q      Max  
 -2.10377 -0.3117453 0.01403171 0.3196447 1.365283 
 
Coefficients: 
                                Value  Std. Error    t value  
             (Intercept) -3.597614482 0.536623518 -6.7041685 
                  Trials  0.032536538 0.004829464  6.7370912 
         GroupCivil_inst  0.835137384 0.775831095  1.0764423 
         GroupCivil_priv  1.827838889 0.629637465  2.9030021 
      GroupPred_selectee -0.471719851 0.745265420 -0.6329555 
            GroupT1_grad  1.517845511 0.616748497  2.4610445 
           GroupT38_grad  0.778441653 0.685203581  1.1360735 
   TrialsGroupCivil_inst  0.031685596 0.013298311  2.3826782 
   TrialsGroupCivil_priv -0.002508798 0.006838017 -0.3668896 
TrialsGroupPred_selectee  0.053102199 0.011633863  4.5644511 
      TrialsGroupT1_grad -0.005418159 0.006020155 -0.9000031 
     TrialsGroupT38_grad  0.019976847 0.008910008  2.2420683 
 
(Dispersion Parameter for Binomial family taken to be 1 ) 
 
    Null Deviance: 551.8535 on 88 degrees of freedom 
 
Residual Deviance: 30.27233 on 77 degrees of freedom 
 
Number of Fisher Scoring Iterations: 5 
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The test that all slopes are zero, G = 521.5812, DF = 11, and P-value < 0.001, indicates 
the model is adequate.  The partial t-tests show that Trials is important even after 
adjusting for Group and the interaction terms, but they provide little information on 
Groups or the interaction.   
 We next examine the bivariate relationships between the proportion proficient and 
each of the predictors by fitting a “null” model and then adding each of the terms, one at 
a time.  Our null model has a single intercept term and is specified with the formula: y ~ 
1: 
> landing.glm.null <- glm(y ~ 1, weight = Weight, family =             
+ binomial(logit), data = landing.task.df) 
 
> add1(landing.glm.null, ~ . + Trials + Group) 
 
Single term additions 
 
Model: y ~ 1 
       Df Sum of Sq      RSS       Cp  
<none>              470.2589 480.9466 
Trials  1  283.7513 186.5076 207.8830 
 Group  5    1.8372 468.4217 532.5479 
The Cp statistic is used to compare the models.  A small Cp value corresponds to a better 
model in the sense of a smaller residual deviance penalized by the numbers of parameters 
that are estimated in fitting the model.  From the above analysis, Trials is clearly the 
best single variable to use in a linear model.  However, to examine the contribution of 
Group and the interaction term to the full model, we produce an analysis of deviance for 
the sequential addition of each variable by using the anova function and specifying the 
chi-square test to evaluate for differences between models: 
> anova(landing.glm.all, test = "Chisq") 
 






Terms added sequentially (first to last) 
             Df Deviance Resid. Df Resid. Dev       Pr(Chi)  
        NULL                    88   551.8535               
      Trials  1 341.8164        87   210.0372 0.000000e+000 
       Group  5 132.5372        82    77.5000 0.000000e+000 
Trials:Group  5  47.2276        77    30.2723 5.105621e-009 
 349
Here we see that Group is important after adjusting for Trials, and the interaction term, 
Trials:Group, is important after adjusting for both Trials and Group.   
These statistical conclusions are subsequently verified by looking at graphical 
displays (Figure V-29) of the fitted values and residuals.  The plots indicate there may be 
some problems with the model fit.  The slight systematic curvature in the plot of deviance 
residuals versus the estimated proportion proficient (Figure V-29A) may be indicative of 
problems in the choice of link, the wrong scale for a predictor, or an omission of a 
quadratic term in the predictor.  There do not appear to be large residuals suggesting 
outlying observations that might skew the analysis.  The plot of the absolute residuals 
against predicted values (Figure V-29B) suggests the assumed variance function is 
adequate.  The normal quantile plot (Figure V-29D) indicates one possible extreme 
observation, but this must be tempered in the non-linear context.   
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Figure V-29. Plots of the generalized linear model of Proficient (y) predicted by 
Trials, Group, and Trials:Group. 
A                                                                      B 
C                                                                      D 
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To help interpret this observation, it is useful to compare leverages and residuals 
since observations with large leverages and large residuals are likely to be influential.  
Tables V-9 and V-10 contain the output from S-Plus, including the leverages calculated 
using the lm function: 
> h.i. <-lm.influence(landing.glm.all)$hat 
The apparently extreme observation is observation 60, corresponding to y = 0.93333, 
which is not an outlier observation for  GroupCivil_inst.   Additionally, the leverage 
for this observation, h60 = 0.05618, is well below hmax = 0.26966 and so is not considered 
“excessive.” There is only one observation with excessive leverage: h49 = 0.28119.  
However, observation 49 corresponds to y = 0.75000, and hence is not an outlier 
observation for GroupT1_grad.  Cook’s D (Di) is another statistic used to assess the 
influence of an individual observation.  We usually consider observations for which Di > 
1 to be influential.  In this case, Dmax for the entire dataset is 0.11124, which is well 
























Table V-9. Residuals for the landing task data. 











1 Pred_selectee 21 0.05556 0.09356 -0.64342 -0.59875 0.14510 0.00507 
2 Pred_selectee 22 0.11111 0.10108 0.15062 0.15277 0.14607 0.00033 
3 Pred_selectee 30 0.16667 0.18240 -0.18830 -0.18613 0.13801 0.00046 
4 Pred_selectee 32 0.22222 0.20934 0.14306 0.14411 0.13162 0.00026 
5 Pred_selectee 34 0.27778 0.23910 0.40403 0.41105 0.12392 0.00199 
6 Pred_selectee 42 0.33333 0.38402 -0.46827 -0.46390 0.09135 0.00180 
7 Pred_selectee 43 0.38889 0.40447 -0.14139 -0.14108 0.08851 0.00016 
8 Pred_selectee 44 0.44444 0.42526 0.17190 0.17222 0.08622 0.00023 
9 Pred_selectee 46 0.50000 0.46756 0.28786 0.28816 0.08352 0.00063 
10 Pred_selectee 50 0.55556 0.55295 0.02329 0.02329 0.08635 0.00000 
11 Pred_selectee 51 0.61111 0.57401 0.33484 0.33342 0.08873 0.00090 
12 Pred_selectee 57 0.66667 0.69255 -0.25074 -0.25261 0.11259 0.00067 
13 Pred_selectee 60 0.72222 0.74440 -0.22881 -0.23091 0.12675 0.00064 
14 Pred_selectee 61 0.77778 0.76036 0.18740 0.18580 0.13121 0.00043 
15 Pred_selectee 65 0.83333 0.81715 0.19440 0.19210 0.14581 0.00052 
16 Pred_selectee 72 0.88889 0.89058 -0.02488 -0.02493 0.15385 0.00001 
17 Pred_selectee 85 0.94444 0.96121 -0.36961 -0.39275 0.12017 0.00176 
18 Pred_selectee 189 1.00000 0.99999 0.01403 0.00992 0.00022 0.00000 
19 T38_grad 11 0.06667 0.09608 -0.44443 -0.42210 0.16139 0.00286 
20 T38_grad 16 0.13333 0.12143 0.15220 0.15428 0.16348 0.00039 
21 T38_grad 31 0.20000 0.23303 -0.33294 -0.32714 0.14425 0.00150 
22 T38_grad 36 0.26667 0.28319 -0.15334 -0.15241 0.13183 0.00029 
23 T38_grad 39 0.33333 0.31623 0.15149 0.15220 0.12433 0.00027 
24 T38_grad 42 0.40000 0.35124 0.41715 0.42116 0.11752 0.00197 
25 T38_grad 53 0.46667 0.49101 -0.19964 -0.19954 0.10694 0.00040 
26 T38_grad 54 0.53333 0.50414 0.23947 0.23936 0.10749 0.00058 
27 T38_grad 55 0.60000 0.51726 0.68201 0.67913 0.10832 0.00467 
28 T38_grad 69 0.66667 0.69088 -0.21753 -0.21903 0.14168 0.00066 
29 T38_grad 85 0.73333 0.83814 -1.13473 -1.21736 0.18037 0.02718 
30 T38_grad 93 0.86667 0.88741 -0.27406 -0.28104 0.18225 0.00147 
31 T38_grad 103 0.93333 0.93020 0.05260 0.05223 0.16841 0.00005 
32 T38_grad 106 1.00000 0.93976 1.49121 1.07104 0.16176 0.01845 
33 T1_grad 16 0.06250 0.16167 -1.30140 -1.16317 0.14191 0.01865 
34 T1_grad 18 0.12500 0.16915 -0.52828 -0.50820 0.14062 0.00352 
35 T1_grad 25 0.18750 0.19753 -0.10904 -0.10833 0.13486 0.00015 
36 T1_grad 43 0.25000 0.28625 -0.34546 -0.34081 0.11416 0.00125 
37 T1_grad 46 0.31250 0.30315 0.08600 0.08624 0.11051 0.00008 
38 T1_grad 48 0.37500 0.31473 0.54126 0.54966 0.10814 0.00305 
39 T1_grad 52 0.43750 0.33858 0.86614 0.88313 0.10368 0.00752 
40 T1_grad 80 0.50000 0.52241 -0.18851 -0.18860 0.09458 0.00031 
41 T1_grad 82 0.56250 0.53592 0.22453 0.22419 0.09587 0.00044 
42 T1_grad 87 0.62500 0.56943 0.47627 0.47324 0.10022 0.00208 
43 T1_grad 92 0.68750 0.60232 0.74755 0.73631 0.10595 0.00535 
44 T1_grad 131 0.75000 0.81347 -0.68458 -0.71146 0.16070 0.00808 
45 T1_grad 138 0.81250 0.84058 -0.32854 -0.33594 0.16567 0.00187 
46 T1_grad 174 0.87500 0.93332 -0.91390 -1.01640 0.15358 0.01562 
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Table V-10. Residuals for the landing task data (continued). 











47 T1_grad 189 0.93750 0.95459 -0.33498 -0.35330 0.13607 0.00164 
48 T1_grad 191 1.00000 0.95689 1.27574 0.91212 0.13349 0.01068 
49 Civil_inst 12 0.06667 0.12007 -0.81109 -0.75042 0.28119 0.01836 
50 Civil_inst 28 0.13333 0.27603 -1.47913 -1.37569 0.19239 0.03757 
51 Civil_inst 35 0.26667 0.37409 -0.94933 -0.92618 0.13822 0.01147 
52 Civil_inst 36 0.40000 0.38925 0.09154 0.09169 0.13207 0.00011 
53 Civil_inst 37 0.46667 0.40462 0.52038 0.52392 0.12656 0.00331 
54 Civil_inst 39 0.53333 0.43590 0.80594 0.81015 0.11774 0.00730 
55 Civil_inst 45 0.60000 0.53184 0.56397 0.56143 0.11198 0.00331 
56 Civil_inst 49 0.66667 0.59494 0.61233 0.60534 0.12591 0.00440 
57 Civil_inst 59 0.73333 0.73626 -0.02876 -0.02880 0.19937 0.00002 
58 Civil_inst 64 0.80000 0.79376 0.06867 0.06841 0.23763 0.00012 
59 Civil_inst 66 0.86667 0.81400 0.63109 0.60555 0.25038 0.01021 
60 Civil_inst 134 0.93333 0.99711 -2.16548 -4.73563 0.05618 0.11124 
61 Civil_inst 148 1.00000 0.99882 0.19100 0.13509 0.03037 0.00005 
62 Civil_priv 9 0.07692 0.18250 -1.19471 -1.08060 0.16824 0.01968 
63 Civil_priv 24 0.15385 0.25940 -0.99337 -0.94021 0.14724 0.01272 
64 Civil_priv 25 0.23077 0.26521 -0.30882 -0.30429 0.14561 0.00131 
65 Civil_priv 27 0.30769 0.27707 0.26349 0.26634 0.14234 0.00098 
66 Civil_priv 34 0.38462 0.32108 0.51842 0.52646 0.13117 0.00349 
67 Civil_priv 39 0.46154 0.35464 0.84556 0.86083 0.12411 0.00875 
68 Civil_priv 43 0.53846 0.38259 1.21174 1.23228 0.11944 0.01716 
69 Civil_priv 75 0.61538 0.61829 -0.02320 -0.02321 0.13302 0.00001 
70 Civil_priv 101 0.69231 0.77955 -0.80665 -0.83989 0.18391 0.01325 
71 Civil_priv 106 0.76923 0.80426 -0.34665 -0.35402 0.19124 0.00247 
72 Civil_priv 121 0.84615 0.86571 -0.22717 -0.23163 0.20229 0.00113 
73 Civil_priv 136 0.92308 0.91003 0.18774 0.18348 0.19670 0.00069 
74 Civil_priv 188 1.00000 0.97968 0.77654 0.55193 0.11469 0.00329 
75 Cadet 39 0.06250 0.08877 -0.42606 -0.40526 0.16858 0.00278 
76 Cadet 52 0.12500 0.12946 -0.05861 -0.05832 0.16850 0.00006 
77 Cadet 67 0.18750 0.19503 -0.08297 -0.08256 0.15265 0.00010 
78 Cadet 84 0.25000 0.29639 -0.44077 -0.43355 0.12156 0.00217 
79 Cadet 94 0.31250 0.36838 -0.49590 -0.49001 0.10577 0.00237 
80 Cadet 95 0.37500 0.37598 -0.00856 -0.00856 0.10461 0.00000 
81 Cadet 101 0.43750 0.42277 0.12555 0.12574 0.09985 0.00015 
82 Cadet 108 0.50000 0.47910 0.17635 0.17643 0.09990 0.00029 
83 Cadet 114 0.56250 0.52786 0.29391 0.29341 0.10513 0.00084 
84 Cadet 121 0.62500 0.58402 0.35577 0.35387 0.11683 0.00138 
85 Cadet 137 0.75000 0.70264 0.45915 0.45151 0.15739 0.00317 
86 Cadet 142 0.81250 0.73547 0.79541 0.76707 0.17073 0.01010 
87 Cadet 202 0.87500 0.95142 -1.32072 -1.56711 0.17676 0.04394 
88 Cadet 220 0.93750 0.97236 -0.79011 -0.91748 0.14063 0.01148 
89 Cadet 235 1.00000 0.98285 0.78913 0.56042 0.11109 0.00327 
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 We next examine several alternative models with different link functions and 
scaling of predictors to determine if the model fit can be improved.  We fit models using 
the complementary log-log (cloglog) and probit link functions: 
> landing.glm.cloglog <- glm(y ~ Trials + Group + Trials:Group, weight  
+ = Weight, family = binomial(cloglog), data = landing.task.df) 
 
> landing.glm.probit <- glm(y ~ Trials + Group + Trials:Group, weight =  
+ Weight, family = binomial(probit), data = landing.task.df) 
We also evaluate rescaling the predictor variable, Trials, using a log transformation: 
> landing.glm.logtrial <- glm(y ~ log(Trials) + Group                  
+ log(Trials):Group, weight = Weight, family = binomial(logit), data = 
+ landing.task.df) 
We then use the anova function to compare these models and look at the graphical 
displays of the fitted values and residuals: 
> anova(landing.glm.all, landing.glm.logtrial, landing.glm.cloglog,  
+ landing.glm.probit) 
 




                                    Terms Resid. Df Resid. Dev     
1           Trials + Group + Trials:Group        77   30.27233                      
2 log(Trials) + Group + log(Trials):Group        77   31.99915  
3           Trials + Group + Trials:Group        77   57.65410  
4           Trials + Group + Trials:Group        77   34.50005        
 
The residual deviances suggest that the model using the logit link function (#1) is the 
best, although the models using the rescaled predictor, log(Trials), (#2) and the probit 
link function (#4) are comparable.  Examining the graphical displays (Figure V-30) for 
the model with the rescaled predictor, we see that the systematic curvature in the residual 
plots is still present (Figure V-30A), but we no longer can detect an extreme observation 
on the normal quantile plot (Figure V-30D).   
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Figure V-30. Plots of the generalized linear model of Proficient (y) predicted by 
log(Trials), Group, and log(Trials):Group. 
 
The graphical displays (Figure V-31) for the model with the probit link function 
show no improvement in the systematic curvature in the residual plot (Figure V-31A) or 
the extreme observation on the normal quantile plot (Figure V-31B). 
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Figure V-31. Plots of the generalized linear model of Proficient (y) predicted by 
Trials, Group, and Trials:Group, using probit link function. 
 
 So far we have examined only linear relationships between the predictors and the 
proportion proficient.  We now assess the validity of the linear assumption by fitting an 
additive model with relationships estimated by smoothing operations, and then 
comparing the linear fit.  We first use the gam function to fit an additive model as follows: 
> landing.gam.all <- gam(y ~ s(Trials) + Group + s(Trials):Group,       
+ weight = Weight, family = binomial(logit), data = landing.task.df) 
Indicating a predictor variable as an argument to the s function instructs gam to estimate 
the “smoothed” relationships with each predictor by using cubic B-splines.  A summary 
of the fit is: 
> summary(landing.gam.all) 
 
Call: gam(formula = y ~ s(Trials) + Group + s(Trials):Group, family = 
binomial(logit), data = landing.task.dfa, weights = Weight) 
Deviance Residuals: 
       Min         1Q     Median        3Q      Max  
 -1.647109 -0.3010428 0.03344566 0.3292322 1.532508 
 
(Dispersion Parameter for Binomial family taken to be 1 ) 
 
    Null Deviance: 551.8535 on 88 degrees of freedom 
 
Residual Deviance: 23.71869 on 74.14184 degrees of freedom 
 
Number of Local Scoring Iterations: 6  
 




A                                                                     B 
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                Df Npar Df Npar Chisq     P(Chi)  
    (Intercept)  1                               
      s(Trials)  1     2.9   6.495466 0.08111034 
          Group  5                               
s(Trials):Group  5   
Since the non-parametric tests do not inform us about the contribution of Group and the 
interaction term in the presence of a smooth of Trials, we fit two additional models that 
build on a base model: one with the Group variable and one with a smooth of the 
Trials:Group variable. 
> landing.gam.trial <- gam(y ~ s(Trials), weight = Weight, family =  
+ binomial(logit), data = landing.task.df) 
 
> landing.gam.trial.group <- gam(y ~ s(Trials) + Group, weight =       
+ Weight, family = binomial(logit), data = landing.task.df) 
 
> landing.gam.all <- gam(y ~ s(Trials) + Group + s(Trials):Group,      
+ weight = Weight, family = binomial(logit), data = landing.task.df) 
We then produce the following analysis of deviance table: 
> anova(landing.gam.trial, landing.gam.trial.group, landing.gam.all,   
+ test = "Chisq") 
 




                                Terms Resid. Df Resid. Dev       Df    
1                           s(Trials)  84.05436   160.0074                             
2                   s(Trials) + Group  79.12215    47.7865 4.932211  
3 s(Trials) + Group + s(Trials):Group  74.14184    23.7187 4.980315   
 
  Deviance             Test       Pr(Chi) 
1                                    
2 112.2209          + Group  0.0000000000 
3  24.0678 +s(Trials):Group  0.0002068479 
The indication is that Group is important in the model even with Trials included, and 
the interaction term, Trials:Group, is important even in the presence of both Trials 
and Group.  Figure V-32 shows the graphical displays for the plots of the partial residuals 
(Figure V-32A) and the pointwise confidence intervals for the model that includes the 
Trials and Group variables and interaction term (Figure V-32B).  The plots suggest a 
possible piecewise linear relationship for Trials.   
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Figure V-32. The partial fits for the generalized additive logistic regression model of 
Proficient (y) with Trials, Group, and Trials:Group as predictors. 
 
 We next use the anova function to compare the linear fit landing.glm.all with 
the additive fit landing.gam.all to investigate whether if it may be worthwhile 
proceeding to develop a more complex model: 
> anova(landing.glm.all, landing.gam.all, test = "Chisq") 
 




                                Terms Resid. Df Resid. Dev     
1       Trials + Group + Trials:Group  77.00000   30.27233                             
2 s(Trials) + Group + s(Trials):Group  74.14184   23.71869  
 
     Test       Df   Deviance    Pr(Chi) 
1  
2 1 vs. 2 2.858162   6.553645 0.07902184 
From the previous table we see that the linear fit is more parsimonious.  The effective 
degrees of freedom are 77 with the linear model and approximately 74 in the additive 
model with smooths.  The residual deviance in the linear fit is not significantly higher 
than the residual deviance in the additive fit.  In addition, with the linear fit, we can 
produce an analytical expression for the model, which cannot be done for an additive 
model with smooth fits.  Given these considerations, we decide to use the linear fit to 
develop our subsequent isoperformance model.  We have already shown that the logit 
link function provides the best fitting model.  The only remaining question is whether to 
use the model with the log transformation of the predictor, Trials.  While the variable 
transformation improves the appearance of the normal quantile plot by apparently 
resolving a possible extreme observation, in contrast, the systematic curvature in the 
A                                                                      B 
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residual plots appears to be exacerbated and the plot of the absolute residuals against 
predicted values suggests the assumed variance function is less adequate with the 
transformation.  Since we already demonstrated that none of the observations are 
excessively influential, we elect to use the model without the transformed predictor.   
3. Reconnaissance Task Regression Model 
Our initial logistic regression model relates the proportion proficient to the two 
predictor variables, Trial and Group and, as well as their interaction, Trial:Group.  We 
fit the general linear model as follows: 
> recon.glm.all <- glm(y ~ Trial + Group + Trial:Group, weight =       
+ Weight, family = binomial(logit), data = recon.task.df) 
The summary of the resulting fit: 
> summary(recon.glm.all) 
 
Call: glm(formula = y ~ Trial + Group + Trial:Group, family = 
binomial(logit), data = recon.task.df, weights = Weight) 
Deviance Residuals: 
       Min         1Q      Median        3Q      Max  
 -1.937115 -0.3732629 -0.05083308 0.4065998 1.222877 
 
Coefficients: 
                              Value Std. Error    t value  
            (Intercept) -2.17731719 0.47230069 -4.6100233 
                  Trial  0.07274783 0.02699650  2.6947134 
        GroupCivil_inst  0.25482440 0.61709330  0.4129431 
        GroupCivil_priv  0.75942388 0.71394647  1.0636986 
     GroupPred_selectee -0.09795261 0.63980274 -0.1530981 
           GroupT1_grad  0.82612780 0.63836094  1.2941390 
          GroupT38_grad  0.89584150 0.62351721  1.4367551 
   TrialGroupCivil_inst  0.06607400 0.04007844  1.6486172 
   TrialGroupCivil_priv  0.04723454 0.05281837  0.8942824 
TrialGroupPred_selectee  0.21569902 0.05315532  4.0579009 
      TrialGroupT1_grad  0.09406102 0.04683788  2.0082255 
     TrialGroupT38_grad  0.12591415 0.04650693  2.7074278 
 
(Dispersion Parameter for Binomial family taken to be 1 ) 
 
    Null Deviance: 252.6496 on 46 degrees of freedom 
 
Residual Deviance: 18.88778 on 35 degrees of freedom 
 
Number of Fisher Scoring Iterations: 4 
The test that all slopes are zero, G = 233.7618, DF = 11, and P-value < 0.001, indicates 
the model is adequate.  The partial t-tests show that Trial is important even after 
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adjusting for Group and the interaction terms, but they provide less information on 
Groups or the interaction although these too seem to be important. 
 We next examine the bivariate relationships between the proportion proficient and 
each of the predictors by fitting a “null” model and then adding each of the terms, one at 
a time: 
> recon.glm.null <- glm(y ~ 1, weight = Weight, family =               
+ binomial(logit), data = recon.task.df) 
 
> add1(recon.glm.null, ~ . + Trial + Group) 
 
Single term additions 
 
Model: 
y ~ 1 
       Df Sum of Sq      RSS       Cp  
<none>              222.7744 232.4603 
 Trial  1  121.4583 101.3161 120.6878 
 Group  5   63.0341 159.7404 217.855 
Using the Cp statistic to compare the models, Trial is clearly the best single variable to 
use in a linear model.  However, to examine the contribution of Group and the interaction 
term to the full model, we produce an analysis of deviance for the sequential addition of 
each variable by using the anova function and specifying the chi-square test to evaluate 
for differences between models: 
> anova(recon.glm.all, test = "Chisq") 
 






Terms added sequentially (first to last) 
            Df Deviance Resid. Df Resid. Dev      Pr(Chi)  
       NULL                    46   252.6496              
      Trial  1 130.7356        45   121.9140 0.0000000000 
      Group  5  81.9029        40    40.0111 0.0000000000 
Trial:Group  5  21.1233        35    18.8878 0.0007677269 
Here we see that Group is important after adjusting for Trial, and the interaction term, 
Trial:Group, is important after adjusting for both Trial and Group.   
These statistical conclusions are subsequently verified by looking at graphical 
displays of the fitted values and residuals (Figure V-33).  The plots indicate there may be 
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some problems with the model fit.  A systemic curvature in the plot of deviance residuals 
versus the estimated proportion proficient (Figure V-33A) may be indicative of problems 
in the choice of link, the wrong scale for the predictor, or an omission of a quadratic term 
in the predictor.  There does not appear to be large residuals suggesting outlying 
observations that might skew the analysis.  The plot of the absolute residuals against 
predicted values (Figure V-33B) suggests the assumed variance function is adequate.  
The normal quantile plot (Figure V-33D) does not suggest any problem with normality.   
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Figure V-33. Plots of the generalized linear model of Proficient (y) predicted by 
Time, Group, and Trial:Group. 
 
 We next examine several alternative models with different link functions and 
scaling of predictors to determine if the model fit can be improved.  We fit models using 
the complementary log-log (cloglog) and probit link functions: 
A                                                                        B 
C                                                                        D 
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> recon.glm.cloglog <- glm(y ~ Trial + Group + Trial:Group, weight =    
+ Weight, family = binomial(cloglog), data = recon.task.df) 
 
> recon.glm.probit <- glm(y ~ Trial + Group + Trial:Group, weight =     
+ Weight, family = binomial(probit), data = recon.task.df) 
We also evaluate rescaling the predictor variable, Trial, using a log transformation: 
> recon.glm.logtrial<- glm(y ~ log(Trial) + Group + log(Trial):Group,   
+ weight = Weight, family = binomial(logit), data = recon.task.df) 
We then use the anova function to compare these models and look at the graphical 
displays of the fitted values and residuals: 
> anova(recon.glm.all, recon.glm.logtrial, recon.glm.cloglog,  
+ recon.glm.probit) 
 




                                  Terms Resid. Df Resid. Dev    
1           Trial + Group + Trial:Group        35   18.88778                      
2 log(Trial) + Group + log(Trial):Group        35   11.39551  
3           Trial + Group + Trial:Group        35   26.10293  
4           Trial + Group + Trial:Group        35   19.42642     
The residual deviances suggest that the model using the rescaled predictor, log(Trial), 
(#2) is the best, and the models using the logit (#1) and probit (#4) link functions appear 
comparable.   Examining the graphical displays (Figure V-34) for the model with the 
rescaled predictor, we see that the introduction of the rescaled predictor resolves the 
systemic curvature in the plot of deviance residuals versus the estimated proportion 
proficient (Figure V-34A).  It also appears to improve the fit between the observed and 
estimated proportion proficient (Figure V-34C), particularly for lower values of the 
response variable.  However, the normal quantile plot (Figure V-34D) now suggests a 
light tailed distribution.  Overall, our best fit appears to be obtained with the model using 
the rescaled predictor.   
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Figure V-34. Plots of the generalized linear model of Proficient (y) predicted by 
log(Trial), Group, and log(Trial):Group 
 
 So far we have examined only linear relationships between the predictors and the 
proportion proficient.  We now assess the validity of the linear assumption by fitting an 
additive model with relationships estimated by smoothing operations, and then 
comparing the linear fit.  We first use the gam function to fit an additive model, indicating 
Trial as an argument to the s function, to estimate a “smoothed” relationship as follows: 
> recon.gam.all <- gam(y ~ s(Trial) + Group + s(Trial):Group, weight =       
+ Weight, family = binomial(logit), data = recon.task.df)  
A summary of the fit is: 
> summary(recon.gam.all) 
 
Call: gam(formula = y ~ s(Trial) + Group + s(Trial):Group, family = 
binomial(logit), data = recon.task.df, weights = Weight) 
Deviance Residuals: 
       Min         1Q     Median        3Q      Max  
 -1.314452 -0.2170973 0.01017454 0.2258426 1.351369 
 
(Dispersion Parameter for Binomial family taken to be 1 ) 
A                                                                      B 
C                                                                      D 
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Null Deviance: 252.6496 on 46 degrees of freedom 
 
Residual Deviance: 8.226457 on 32.05234 degrees of freedom 
 
Number of Local Scoring Iterations: 5  
 
DF for Terms and Chi-squares for Nonparametric Effects 
 
               Df Npar Df Npar Chisq    P(Chi)  
   (Intercept)  1                              
      s(Trial)  1     2.9   10.29804 0.0154536 
         Group  5                              
s(Trial):Group  5                              
Since the non-parametric tests do not inform us about the contribution of Group and the 
interaction term in the presence of a smooth of Trial, we fit two additional models that 
build on a base model: one with the Group variable and one with a smooth of the 
Trial:Group variable. 
> recon.gam.trial <- gam(y ~ s(Trial), weight = Weight, family =             
+ binomial(logit), data = recon.task.df) 
 
> recon.gam.trial.group <- gam(y ~ s(Trial) + Group, weight = Weight,    
+ family = binomial(logit), data = recon.task.df)  
We then produce the following analysis of deviance table: 
> anova(recon.gam.trial, recon.gam.trial.group, recon.gam.all, test =        
+ "Chisq") 
 




                              Terms Resid. Df Resid. Dev            
1                          s(Trial)  41.91442   86.30809                               
2                  s(Trial) + Group  37.01329   20.93000           
3 s(Trial) + Group + s(Trial):Group  32.05234    8.22646  
 
           Test       Df Deviance    Pr(Chi)  
 
+Group          4.901128 65.37809 0.00000000 
+s(Trial):Group 4.960953 12.70354 0.02565417  
The indication is that Group is important in the model even with Trial included, and the 
interaction term, Trial:Group, is important even in the presence of both Trial and 
Group.  Figure V-35 shows the graphical displays for the plots of the partial residuals 
(Figure V-35A) and the pointwise confidence intervals for the model that includes the 
Trial and Group variables and interaction term (Figure V-35B).  The plots suggest a 
possible piecewise linear or logarithmic relationship for Trial.   
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Figure V-35. The partial fits for the generalized additive logistic regression model of 
Proficient (y) with Trial, Group, and Trial:Group as predictors. 
 
 We next use the anova function to compare the linear fit recon.glm.all with the 
additive fit recon.gam.all to investigate whether if it may be worthwhile proceeding to 
develop a more complex model: 
> anova(recon.glm.all, recon.gam.all, test = "Chisq") 
 




                              Terms Resid. Df Resid. Dev    
1       Trial + Group + Trial:Group  35.00000   18.88778                               
2 s(Trial) + Group + s(Trial):Group  32.05234    8.22646  
 
   Test       Df Deviance    Pr(Chi)  
 
1 vs. 2 2.947661 10.66132 0.01306783 
The additive fit appears to be significantly better than the linear fit, prompting us to next 
compare the linear fit using the rescaled predictor, recon.glm.logtrial, with the 
additive fit recon,gam.all: 
> anova(recon.glm.logtrial, recon.gam.all, test = "Chisq") 
 




                                  Terms Resid. Df Resid. Dev    
1 log(Trial) + Group + log(Trial):Group  35.00000   11.39551                           
2     s(Trial) + Group + s(Trial):Group  32.05234    8.22646  
 
   Test       Df Deviance   Pr(Chi) 
 
1 vs. 2 2.947661  3.16905 0.3575525 
A                                                               B 
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We see that the linear fit with the rescaled predictor is more parsimonious.  The effective 
degrees of freedom are 35 with the linear model and approximately 32 in the additive 
model with smooth fit.  The residual deviance in the linear fit is not significantly higher 
than the residual deviance in the additive fit.  In addition, with the linear fit, we can 
produce an analytical expression for the model, which cannot be done for an additive 
model with smooth fits.   
The summary of linear fit with the transformed predictor is as follows: 
> summary(recon.glm.logtrial) 
 
Call: glm(formula = y ~ log(Trial) + Group + log(Trial):Group, family = 
binomial(logit), data = recon.task.df, weights = Weight) 
Deviance Residuals: 
       Min        1Q     Median        3Q      Max  
 -1.088666 -0.253434 0.03289063 0.2514632 1.673539 
 
Coefficients: 
                                  Value Std. Error    t value  
                 (Intercept) -3.0462734  0.7827949 -3.8915343 
                  log(Trial)  0.8110230  0.3041620  2.6664181 
             GroupCivil_inst -0.5714157  1.1022920 -0.5183887 
             GroupCivil_priv -0.3495750  1.3793327 -0.2534378 
          GroupPred_selectee -1.3587575  1.1204495 -1.2126897 
                GroupT1_grad -0.9234459  1.2084209 -0.7641757 
               GroupT38_grad  0.4257632  1.0244731  0.4155923 
   log(Trial)GroupCivil_inst  0.6327380  0.4397222  1.4389494 
   log(Trial)GroupCivil_priv  0.6603719  0.5845181  1.1297715 
log(Trial)GroupPred_selectee  1.4636003  0.4768907  3.0690480 
      log(Trial)GroupT1_grad  1.1904494  0.5161305  2.3064892 
     log(Trial)GroupT38_grad  0.7886912  0.4278881  1.8432186 
 
(Dispersion Parameter for Binomial family taken to be 1 ) 
 
    Null Deviance: 252.6496 on 46 degrees of freedom 
 
Residual Deviance: 11.39551 on 35 degrees of freedom 
 
Number of Fisher Scoring Iterations: 4  
We have already examined the graphical displays for this model, and Tables V-11 
and V-12 contain the S-Plus output for the residual analysis.  The maximum standardized 
deviance residual is 1.83934 and the maximum standardized pearson residual is 1.34513, 
suggesting there are no outliers in the dataset.  However, three observations (#37, 41, and 
47) have leverages greater than twice h , that is hi > 0.51064, suggesting they are 
influential.  Two of these observations correspond to the last observed participants within 
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the civil private pilot and cadet groups to become proficient during the 30 trials.  
However, Dmax for the entire dataset is 0.12601, which is well below the threshold for 
concern, which is unity.  Since there is no reason to doubt the validity of these influential 
observations, there is no justification for their removal (Montgomery, Peck, & Vining, 
2006) and we decide to use the full linear fit with the rescaled predictor to develop our 
subsequent model. 
    
Table V-11. Residuals for the reconnaissance task data. 











1 Pred_selectee 2 0.11111 0.05581 1.07971 1.21648 0.29409 0.05138 
2 Pred_selectee 4 0.22222 0.22240 -0.00225 -0.00225 0.33340 0.00000 
3 Pred_selectee 6 0.33333 0.41837 -0.83437 -0.82415 0.21234 0.01526 
4 Pred_selectee 7 0.44444 0.50530 -0.56736 -0.56690 0.17021 0.00549 
5 Pred_selectee 9 0.66667 0.64401 0.21771 0.21663 0.14119 0.00064 
6 Pred_selectee 10 0.72222 0.69688 0.25487 0.25277 0.14361 0.00089 
7 Pred_selectee 12 0.77778 0.77681 0.01074 0.01073 0.15914 0.00000 
8 Pred_selectee 14 0.83333 0.83171 0.02018 0.02016 0.17428 0.00001 
9 Pred_selectee 17 0.88889 0.88488 0.05939 0.05909 0.18556 0.00007 
10 Pred_selectee 19 0.94444 0.90825 0.63210 0.58959 0.18618 0.00663 
11 T38_grad 2 0.20000 0.18069 0.26817 0.27177 0.48852 0.00588 
12 T38_grad 4 0.40000 0.40063 -0.00607 -0.00607 0.32503 0.00000 
13 T38_grad 6 0.60000 0.56114 0.34078 0.33950 0.20200 0.00243 
14 T38_grad 9 0.66667 0.70980 -0.39412 -0.39949 0.15112 0.00237 
15 T38_grad 14 0.73333 0.83219 -1.04858 -1.11811 0.16030 0.01989 
16 T38_grad 15 0.80000 0.84704 -0.53291 -0.55338 0.16330 0.00498 
17 T38_grad 16 0.86667 0.85995 0.08273 0.08217 0.16590 0.00011 
18 T38_grad 20 0.93333 0.89769 0.53107 0.50046 0.17168 0.00433 
19 T38_grad 22 1.00000 0.91087 1.83934 1.33156 0.17216 0.03073 
20 T1_grad 4 0.12500 0.23235 -1.44029 -1.34513 0.42866 0.11313 
21 T1_grad 6 0.43750 0.40527 0.30828 0.30947 0.27989 0.00310 
22 T1_grad 7 0.56250 0.48125 0.74232 0.74219 0.23193 0.01386 
23 T1_grad 9 0.68750 0.60539 0.76223 0.75095 0.19922 0.01169 
24 T1_grad 17 0.75000 0.84565 -1.16686 -1.25008 0.28236 0.05124 
25 T1_grad 19 0.87500 0.87253 0.03535 0.03525 0.29217 0.00004 
26 T1_grad 27 0.93750 0.93257 0.09419 0.09310 0.28576 0.00029 
27 Civil_inst 2 0.06667 0.06806 -0.02560 -0.02552 0.30300 0.00002 
28 Civil_inst 5 0.20000 0.21517 -0.16470 -0.16326 0.23317 0.00068 
29 Civil_inst 6 0.26667 0.26293 0.03667 0.03672 0.19532 0.00003 
30 Civil_inst 7 0.33333 0.30826 0.22837 0.23001 0.16442 0.00087 
31 Civil_inst 9 0.40000 0.39045 0.08109 0.08121 0.12831 0.00008 
32 Civil_inst 11 0.46667 0.46115 0.04573 0.04575 0.12204 0.00002 
33 Civil_inst 15 0.53333 0.57251 -0.33367 -0.33479 0.16070 0.00179 
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Table V-12. Residuals for the reconnaissance task data (continued). 











34 Civil_inst 18 0.60000 0.63537 -0.31738 -0.31941 0.20612 0.00221 
35 Civil_inst 19 0.66667 0.65325 0.12412 0.12373 0.22156 0.00036 
36 Civil_inst 22 0.73333 0.69953 0.33701 0.33318 0.26536 0.00334 
37 Civil_priv 4 0.15385 0.20488 -0.67568 -0.65275 0.51227 0.03729 
38 Civil_priv 6 0.30769 0.31876 -0.10489 -0.10456 0.32861 0.00045 
39 Civil_priv 9 0.53846 0.45937 0.65283 0.65427 0.23517 0.01097 
40 Civil_priv 12 0.61538 0.56474 0.44025 0.43789 0.29274 0.00661 
41 Civil_priv 22 0.69231 0.75993 -0.91359 -0.93993 0.63120 0.12601 
42 Cadet 2 0.06250 0.07698 -0.28741 -0.27869 0.39214 0.00418 
43 Cadet 4 0.12500 0.12764 -0.03787 -0.03776 0.29576 0.00005 
44 Cadet 5 0.18750 0.14919 0.48370 0.49954 0.25857 0.00725 
45 Cadet 12 0.25000 0.26290 -0.13175 -0.13104 0.20003 0.00036 
46 Cadet 20 0.31250 0.35054 -0.39615 -0.39259 0.34016 0.00662 
47 Cadet 27 0.43750 0.40775 0.34592 0.34712 0.51334 0.01059 
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VI. HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION DOMAIN TRADEOFFS IN 
NON-TECHNICAL SYSTEMS – IMPROVING SOLDIER BASIC 
COMBAT TRAINING 
The bed is a bundle of paradoxes:  we go to it with reluctance, yet we quit 
it with regret; we make up our minds every night to leave it early, but we 
make up our bodies every morning to keep it late (Colton, 1837, p. 164). 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Is human systems integration (HSI) mainly an adjunct or enabler to the systems 
engineering and management process as asserted by Booher (2003), and more recently 
Deal (2007)?  Or is it primarily the incorporation of domain concerns that are relevant to 
system design within human factors engineering activities as suggested by Pew and 
Mavor (2007)?  If we examine Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition guidance, HSI 
is championed by an acquisition program manager and executed within the framework of 
systems engineering (Defense Acquisition University [DAU], 2009; DoD, 2008).  
However, in juxtaposition to this view is the reality that Defense Department strategic 
planning guidance directs the conduct of analyses across HSI domains when evaluating 
both materiel and non-materiel options for satisfying identified functional needs (DoD, 
2009).  Decisions to pursue non-materiel solutions do not involve the Defense 
Department acquisition system or the systems engineering framework, thereby 
necessitating that HSI considerations be managed independent of the system acquisition 
process.   
Such contradictions drive debate (at times, intense) about the very nature of HSI, 
which frustrates subsequent efforts to expound upon the concept.  In response, our earlier 
case history of the Human Performance Integration Directorate (Chapter II) used soft 
systems methodology to first define HSI as a set of purposeful activities occurring within 
a human performance-generating operation.  One of the main activities identified in the 
study, conducting human performance/HSI analyses, involved the decomposition of 
human performance criteria into multi-domain solution sets as a precondition for 
scientific research and engineering potential solutions.   
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In Chapter V, we built upon this Weltanschauung of HSI by showing that human 
performance could be described in terms of human factors engineering, manpower, 
personnel, and training domain solution sets.  Additionally, these same domain sets were 
shown to be determinants of reliability and the safety domain of HSI.  We now wish to 
extend our HSI model to include the personnel survivability domain, at least as it pertains 
to issues of physical and mental fatigue (Zigler & Weiss, 2003).  We do so by examining 
a problem situation concerning a human performance-generating operation involving 
non-technical systems—Basic Combat Training—as a process for engineering human 
weapon systems (Deuster et al., 2007; Tvaryanas, Brown & Miller, 2009), which is to 
say, U.S. Army Soldiers.  We deliberately chose this use case to gain insight into the 
applicability of our emerging HSI model in a non-materiel context.  Is HSI an adjunct to 
systems engineering of technical systems or a more general systems approach to 
problematic situations involving human performance?  We start by considering the 
narrower question of the role of fatigue, and hence, the survivability domain, as a 
determinant of Soldier performance during Basic Combat Training. 
B. EFFECTS OF SLEEP ON TRAINING EFFECTIVENESS IN SOLDIERS 
AT FORT LEONARD WOOD 
1. Statement of the Problem 
Military training regimes often include some degree of sleep deprivation, whether 
it is by design or unintentional.  Several studies have demonstrated that sleep deprivation 
is prevalent in military training and education programs.  For example, Killgore and 
colleagues (2008), using actigraphy to assess sleep in Soldiers attending military training 
at the Noncommissioned Officer Academy and the Warrant Officer Candidate School, 
reported Soldiers obtained an average of 5.8 hours of sleep per night.  Miller and 
colleagues (2008), reporting on the preliminary results of a 4-year longitudinal study of 
sleep in U.S Military Academy (USMA) cadets based on actigraphy data, found that 
cadets averaged 5.4 hours of sleep per night.  This is substantially less than the 
approximately eight hours of sleep per night required by healthy adults to maintain 
cognitive effectiveness (Anch et al., 1988).  Additionally, this is more than two hours less 
sleep per night than cadets stated receiving prior to arriving at the USMA (Miller, 2005).  
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It is also important to recognize that military recruits are adolescents or young adults in 
their late teens and early twenties.  Biologically driven sleep-wake patterns in this age 
group differ from those of more mature adults, with delayed bedtimes, later awakenings, 
and longer sleep periods (i.e., on the order of 0.5 to 1.25 more hours of sleep per night) 
(Carskadon et al., 1997, 1998; Wolfson & Carskadon, 2003).  Thus, the general 
population of military recruits may actually require from 8.5 to 9.25 hours of sleep per 
night for optimal performance (Miller & Shattuck, 2005). 
Chronic sleep deprivation from multiple nights of less than eight hours of sleep 
will cause sleep debt and fatigue.  A vast body of research has shown that the effects of 
fatigue include decreased vigilance, adverse mood changes, perceptual and cognitive 
decrements (Krueger, 1990; Belenky et al., 2003; Van Dongen et al., 2003), impaired 
judgment and increased risk taking (Killgore, Balkin, & Wesensten, 2006), and even 
decreased marksmanship (Tharion, Shukitt-Hale, & Lieberman, 2003; McLellan et al., 
2005).  Contrary to popular opinion in the military, research has shown that motivation 
can only partially compensate for the adverse effects of sleep deprivation (Pigeau, Angus, 
& O’Neil, 1995).   
Of particular relevance to military training, the ability of individuals to learn and 
retain information is reduced by sleep deprivation (literature summarized in Miller, 
Matsangas, & Shattuck, 2007).  For example, Graham (2000) reports that learning curves 
drop dramatically for adolescents obtaining 4–6 hours of sleep relative to those obtaining 
eight hours per night.  In the military training environment, Andrews (2004) conducted a 
retrospective comparison of the academic performance of Navy recruits before and after 
the training command leadership changed the sleep regime from six to eight hours per 
night.  It was observed that recruits who received eight hours of sleep per night scored on 
average 11% higher than their counterparts who received only six hours of sleep, 
although Andrews was unable to discount the impact of other, concurrent changes at the 
training command.  In contrast, Baldus (2002) collected actigraphic data on 31 Navy 
recruits at the same training command who were all assigned to two sleep conditions 
(9:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.) in a cross-over study design.  It was  
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shown that recruits obtained an additional 22 minutes of sleep when on the 1-hour phase-
delayed sleep schedule, but no attempt was made to correlate this observation with 
measures of recruit performance.     
However, Killgore and colleagues (2008), evaluating the effectiveness of 
actigraphy as a predictor of cognitive performance, found significant positive correlations 
between Soldier academic exam scores in six military education programs (i.e., programs 
of instruction at the Noncommissioned Officer Academy and Warrant Officer Candidate 
School at Fort Rucker, AL) and the following sleep indices:  average hours of sleep per 
night and hours slept in the 24 and 48 hour periods preceding an exam.  They also report 
that the average amount of sleep obtained by Soldiers accounted for approximately 40% 
of the variance in exam scores—a finding that underscores the impact of fatigue on 
learning and memory.  A similar result was reported by Trickel and colleagues (2000) 
who found that sleep habits accounted for most of the variance in the academic 
performance of freshman college students.   
Physical health is an equally important concern in military recruit populations, 
particularly because the close living conditions are conducive to the spread of 
communicable disease.  Individual physical health, and in turn, public health, also 
depends on individuals receiving adequate amounts of sleep.  Research has shown that 
disturbances of sleep-wake homeostasis are accompanied by alterations in the 
immunological, neuroendocrine, and thermoregulatory functions of the body, and hence, 
contribute to pathological processes such as infectious disease (Moldofsky, 1995).  Lange 
and colleagues (2003) also report that sleep enhances antibody production and the 
immune response to vaccination.  Besides illness, sleep deprivation threatens health by 
increasing the risk for injuries resulting from accidents.  For example, Thorne and 
colleagues (1992) demonstrated that accidents increase progressively as sleep duration 
decreases to 7, 5, and 3 hours per night over a period of one week.   
Scientific literature suggests there is a high prevalence of fatigue in military 
recruits, which has important implications for Soldier training, health, and safety.  Well-
controlled laboratory experiments have demonstrated a convincing dose-response 
relationship between sleep deprivation and degraded cognitive performance (Belenky et 
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al., 2003; Driskell, Hughes, Willis, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 1991; Driskell & Salas, 
1996;  Hursh & Bell, 2001; Van Dongen et al., 2003) (as discussed in Miller, Matsangas, 
& Shattuck, 2007).  However, the design of prior studies of fatigue in military training 
environments has been primarily descriptive in nature, limited to correlations between 
sleep and academic test performance, and many of the recommendations for follow-on 
research have yet to be followed.  The only field study to directly examine the effect of a 
phase-delayed sleep scheduling intervention in the military training environment (Baldus, 
2002) did not include any assessment of performance outcomes.  Thus, whether 
designing schedules to minimize fatigue would have a direct effect on outcomes in the 
military training environment remains an open question.   
The scarcity of information on the benefit of sleep scheduling interventions for 
military training is regrettable because it is the sort of evidence that senior decision-
makers require if they are to support fatigue-sensitive revisions to training regimes.  If 
sleep scheduling is found to have a significant effect on overall training effectiveness and 
recruit attrition, health, and safety, then two options become available for the military 
training community: 
• Performance thresholds of achievement for basic military training can be 
increased while maintaining the present length of training (optimizing training 
effectiveness), or 
• Thresholds of achievement can be maintained and the length of training decreased 
(optimizing training efficiency). 
Preliminary evidence suggests that sleep, and conversely fatigue, may account for nearly 
half the variability in academic performance during military training (Killgore et al., 
2008).  Additionally, implementing a phase-delayed sleep scheduling intervention during 
military training appears to result in measurable increases in total daily sleep (Baldus, 
2002).  Collectively, these  observations suggest that sleep scheduling is a potentially 
powerful lever for manipulating the performance of military training programs—and one 
that is immediately within our grasp without making a significant investment in new 
technologies. Since training is a potential bottleneck in meeting wartime manpower needs 
as well as a recurring life-cycle cost for all weapon systems, even a more modest 10% 
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improvement in trainee performance as suggested by Andrews (2004) is significant when 
one considers the cumulative impact across military training programs. 
 This study attempts to contribute to the knowledge base by exploring the 
influence of sleep scheduling in the Basic Combat Training environment on Soldiers’ 
achievement of entry-level standards and combat skills.  This study examines the direct 
effect of sleep scheduling on motivation and mood state and training, health, and safety 
outcomes while controlling for such individual differences as sleep habits, personality, 
and personnel aptitudes.   
2. Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of alterations in the timing of 
sleep within the circadian cycle on the amount of total nightly sleep and its influence on 
various indicators of mood and performance of U.S. Army Soldiers attending Basic 
Combat Training at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.  The study design compares Soldiers 
assigned to one of two training companies:  a company using the standard Basic Combat 
Training sleep regimen (i.e., sleep period 8:30 p.m. to 4:30 a.m.) or a company using a 
phase-delayed sleep regimen (i.e., sleep period 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.), the latter being 
more in line with the biologically driven sleep-wake patterns of adolescents.   
To account for some of the myriad factors that are assumed to play a role in 
daytime functioning, a number of factors are selected as control variables or covariates 
(Table VI-1).  These control variables include background information about each Soldier 
(e.g., age, sex, caffeine and tobacco habits, prior experience with firearms, etc.) and 
information about their sleep habits, personality, resilience, and personnel aptitudes.  The 
inclusion of these individual characteristics is important to this study because we predict 
that sleep timing will have a small, but measurable influence on daytime functioning even 
after controlling for the contributions of the usual variables thought to affect mood state 




Table VI-1. Summary of study variables. 
Independent variables Dependent variables 
Age 
Caffeine and tobacco habits  
Personality  
Personnel aptitude  




Sleep schedule  
Attrition 




Consequently, at weekly intervals, Soldiers are asked to identify their mood state 
over the prior week of training.  Mood state is defined by six general factors identified in 
the Profile of Mood States (POMS) (McNair, Lorr, & Droppleman, 1981).  These six 
factors are tension-anxiety, depression-dejection, anger-hostility, vigor-activity, fatigue-
inertia, and confusion-bewilderment.  These six factors can also be aggregated into a total 
mood disorder score.  The study primarily examines three major performance outcomes 
of concern to the military training organization:  attrition, basic rifle marksmanship, and 
physical fitness. 
3. Theoretical Perspective and HSI Model Elaboration 
In formulating a theoretical perspective for considering the survivability domain 
of HSI in concert with the manpower, personnel, training, and safety domains within a 
systems context, fatigue models provide a useful prototype.  Besides the typical 
survivability characteristics of susceptibility, vulnerability, and recoverability, personnel 
survivability includes issues related to physical and mental fatigue (Zigler & Weiss, 
2003).  To that end, the Defense Department has long pursued applied research 
concerning fatigue in military operations and has developed several fatigue models.  One 
of these models, known as the Sleep, Activity, Fatigue, and Task Effectiveness (SAFTE) 
 378
Model, has achieved relatively wide acceptance and has seen practical application within 
the Fatigue Avoidance Scheduling Tool (FAST) (Hursh et al., 2004).   
The SAFTE model is shown in Figure VI-1 using a system dynamics modeling 
stock and flow diagram.  The conceptual architecture of the SAFTE model centers on a 
sleep reservoir, representing sleep-dependent processes that govern the capacity to 
perform cognitive work.  Using the language of system dynamics modeling, the stock of 
this reservoir is cognitive work capacity.  Sleep is a replenishing flow into the reservoir, 
while wakefulness is a depleting flow out of the reservoir.  Replenishment, in terms of 
sleep accumulation, is determined by information about the time-of-day of sleep, 
reservoir level (i.e., sleep debt), and sleep quality (i.e., sleep fragmentation).  The system 
modeled in Figure VI-1 provides output in terms of performance effectiveness, which is 




Figure VI-1. Stock and flow diagram of the SAFTE model. 
 
The SAFTE model has been shown to predict changes in cognitive capacity as 
measured by standard laboratory tests of cognitive performance with reported coefficients 
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of determination ranging from 89%-94%.  It is presumed that these cognitive tasks 
measure changes in the fundamental capacity to perform a variety of real world tasks that 
rely on such cognitive skills as discrimination, reaction time, mental processing, 
reasoning, and language comprehension and production.  Although specific military tasks 
may vary in their reliance on these skills, Hursh and colleagues assert that it is reasonable 
to assume that changes in military task performance will correlate with changes in the 
underlying cognitive effectiveness.  Hence, there is an expected direct relationship 
between measured changes in cognitive effectiveness and military task performance.  
Based on this reasoning, the SAFTE model can be used to predict variations in any task 
or component of a task, given appropriate data, using the following expression for 




RTE A B C I
R
⎛ ⎞= ⋅ + + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
              (1) 




 is the reservoir level at time t expressed as a 
proportion of capacity, B  is the linear component intercept, I  is the transient sleep inertia 
term, and  tC  is computed from the circadian process as follows: 
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π π⎡ ⎤′⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⋅ − ⋅ − −= ⋅ + ⋅⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
                                   (2) 
where T  is the time of day in hours, p  is the time of the peak of the 24-hour circadian 
rhythm, p′  is the relative time of the 12-hour peak, and 1C  and 2C  are the 24- and 12-
hour circadian weighting factors, respectively (Hursh et al., 2004).   
 Cognitive task effectiveness, as calculated by Equation 1, is the level of 
performance, expressed as a percent of some baseline.  This construct can be generally 
related to the personnel and training domains of HSI through the latter’s combined 
contribution to defining some performance baseline.   A convenient and ubiquitous 
means for considering the personnel and training domains as determinants of 
performance is the power law of practice (Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981).  This empirical 
regularity relates the personnel and training domain as determinants of performance: 
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( ) rP a b N E −= + ⋅ +                                                                                               (3)                               
where P is the time taken to perform a task, a is the asymptote or highest level of 
performance obtainable, b is the performance on the first trial, N is the amount of practice 
in terms of trials, E is the transfer from prior experience or learning required to attain 
entry level performance, and r is a learning rate parameter.  With respect to the training 
domain, the quantity of training is directly reflected in the N variable and factors 
impacting training effectiveness are reflected by the value of the r parameter.  In terms of 
the HSI personnel domain, to the extent that an individual’s experience with prior tasks is 
similar to the target task, positive transfer occurs (Wickens & Hollands, 2000) as 
captured by the variable E.  Also, since aptitude tests predict proficiency on various tasks 
and propensity for a variety of types of learning (Matthews, Davies, Westerman, & 
Stammers, 2000), individual aptitudes will influence the values for the a, b, and r 
parameters. 
While the power law of practice is generally viewed as associated with 
perceptual-motor skills, it appears to hold for practice learning of all kinds.  The law 
shows up everywhere in psychological behavior and cannot be easily circumscribed as 
applying to only some part of human operations (Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981).  Overall 
then, the power law provides a general construct for modeling baseline performance in 
terms of the training and personnel domains of HSI and their interaction.  Furthermore, it 
is a relatively simple matter to adjust baseline performance for circadian effects and level 
of the sleep reservoir as follows: 
( ) rt t
c
RP TE P A B C I a b N E
R
−⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤′ = ⋅ = ⋅ + + + ⋅ + ⋅ +⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
                                      (4)                
where P′  is the adjusted task performance and the other factors in Equation 4 are as 
previously described for the SAFTE model and power law of practice.  In so doing, we 
have defined a performance solution set in terms of the personnel, training, and 
survivability domains of HSI.   
 Although the power law provides a simple mathematical construct that is easily 
modified to account for fatigue-related survivability domain considerations, further 
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elaboration is required if we are to examine the survivability domain within a broader 
systems context.  Based on the structure of the SAFTE model, the reservoir or stock of 
cognitive work capability, shown in Figure VI-1, will reach a time-averaged equilibrium 
state provided an individual remains on a constant schedule (Hursh et al., 2004).   
Additionally, our stock and flow diagram of the SAFTE model shows that sleep 
accumulation is dependent on information regarding “sleep quality,” which is modeled as 
the continuity, or conversely, fragmentation of sleep.  The software implementation of 
the SAFTE model, the Fatigue Avoidance Scheduling Tool (FAST), addresses sleep 
quality in terms of the sleep environment and the average number of interruptions to 
sleep expected in that environment.  The FAST software provides the following ordinal 
scale for describing sleep environments: 
• Excellent:   0 interruptions per hour 
• Good:   1-2 interruptions per hour 
• Fair:    3-5 interruptions per hour 
• Poor:    6 or more interruptions per hour 
These values are equated to 60, 50, 40, and 30 minutes of effective sleep per hour, 
respectively. 
Given the implications of the SAFTE model structure, it is clear that two classes 
of variables must be considered:  schedule and sleep environment.  The schedule 
determines the timing and duration of sleep and wakefulness, and in conjunction with 
sleep quality, determines the equilibrium state of the reservoir.  In principle, the 
equilibrium state of the reservoir correlates inversely to the degree to which an individual 
is fatigued, the latter being a direct concern of the survivability domain of HSI.   
Likewise, the sleep environment is a determinant of sleep quality, which modulates sleep 
accumulation, and in turn, the equilibrium state of the reservoir.  Since the sleep 
environment is shaped by the physical environment of sleeping or berthing areas (e.g., 
adequate space, temperature and lighting control, and noise attenuation), it is a direct 
consideration of the habitability domain of HSI.  Consequently, the habitability domain, 
in terms of sleep environment and sleep quality, is a determinant of the survivability 
domain.  
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In the application of the synthesis of the power law and the SAFTE modeling 
framework to our emerging conceptualization of HSI, two new major determinants of 
skilled performance, besides training and personnel issues, are defined as follows: 
• Schedule is a predetermined, recurring cycle of periods of wakefulness and sleep 
that is established by an organization for its workforce. 
• Sleep environment is a physical space or berthing area that is designed or 
organizationally designated for sleeping, the adequacy of which is described in 
terms of sleep quality. 
With these specific definitions, we can now operationalize the HSI survivability domain 
in terms of the variable, “schedule,” and the habitability domain in terms of the variable, 
“sleep environment.”  The decision to describe the survivability domain using the term, 
schedule, reflects the predominant role of a schedule in determining the equilibrium state 
of the reservoir, and in turn, fatigue.  Additionally, organizational planners and decision 
makers are likely to appreciate schedules as being within their purview but would 
struggle with the notion of setting fatigue levels.  Furthermore, decision makers often 
must consider external, real-world demands or requirements to perform and available 
manpower resources when designing or choosing a schedule—the implication being that 
the manpower domain of HSI also influences the survivability domain, although 
modeling this concept is outside the scope of the current discussion.   
 Now it is possible to consider both the survivability and habitability domains of 
HSI within a broader system context using the Weltanschauung provided by the 
isoreliability construct developed in Chapter V, albeit with some modification.  
Previously, we classified a hypothetical system operator as being in one of two states, 
proficient or not proficient, if their performance, ,P  met or exceeded some a priori 
performance criterion, ref .P  We now reclassify our system operator based on whether 
refP P′ ≥  where P TE P′ = ⋅  and TE  is a function of schedule and sleep environment.  In 
other words, given some training time, 1,x  personnel aptitude measure, 2 ,x  schedule of 
work and sleep, 3 ,x and sleep environment, 4 ,x  we focus on the operator being in one of 
two states: 
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• proficient ( )( )1 2 3 4, , , 1X x x x x =  and 
• not proficient ( )( )1 2 3 4, , , 0 .X x x x x =  
Now suppose we have ( )2 3 40, , ,N x x x  initial trainees and we define the number of 
proficient graduating trainees after some period of training, 1x , as ( )1 2 3 4, , ,sN x x x x .  
Consequently, the human reliability can now be expressed in terms of training time, 
aptitude, schedule, and sleep environment: 
( ) ( )( )
1 2 3 4







E N x x x x
R x x x x
N x x x
π⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦= =                                                                               
where iπ  is simply the probability the ith trainee is proficient.  Assuming a logistic 
regression model as we did in Chapter V, we can factor in our assurance level, ,α  and 
express our human reliability function as follows: 
( ) ( )1 2 3 4
1, , ,
ˆ ˆ1 exp Var
R x x x x
zα
= ⎛ ⎞+ − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠x xβ β
                                                                
Once fitted to data, human reliability is modeled as the probability of satisfactory 
operator performance, or conversely, the probability of unsatisfactory operator 
performance.  Given the latter, we can make statistical inferences relevant to the safety 
domain of HSI.  All of this then allows us to extend our basic systems integration model 
for HSI, as proposed in Chapter V (see Figure V-5), so that it now includes the 





Figure VI-2. Manpower, personnel, training, safety, survivability, and habitability 
domains within a system structure. 
 
In the application of our expanded HSI model to this study of Basic Combat 
Training, we have a somewhat simpler constrained problem.  Specifically, two of the 
classes of variables discussed in the reliability formulation, training and sleep 
environment, are fixed as follows: 
• Training:  The duration and content of the basic military training program are 
fixed based on the Army’s official program of instruction (POI)—that is, 
1 POI.x x=    
• Habitability:  The choice of sleep environment is dictated by the existing training 
barracks—that is, 4 .Barracksx x=  
Therefore, the following statement represents the underlying logic for designing and 
conducting this study.  If we design a schedule so the timing of sleep-wake periods 
improves the overall equilibrium state of Soldiers’ reservoirs—and consequently 
cognitive task effectiveness—then 1) individual Soldier task performance should improve 
resulting in a greater proportion of recruits who meet specified performance criteria, and 
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2) this effect should be greater for those Soldiers with lower personnel aptitudes as their 
performance margin relative to the specified performance criteria is expected to be 
smaller.   
The predicted relationship between personnel aptitude, schedule, and their 
interaction and the outcome, proportion of the population that is proficient, is illustrated 
in Figure VI-3.  As shown, Schedule 2 results in a more favorable equilibrium state of 
Soldiers’ reservoirs than Schedule 1, which is to say that Schedule 2 is more 
complementary to Soldiers’ natural circadian cycles.  Hence, Schedule 2 is more effective 
overall, but it is particularly beneficial for recruits on the lower end of the personnel 
aptitude spectrum.   
 
 
Figure VI-3. Hypothetical interactive effects of aptitude and two training schedules on 
learning outcomes.  
 
It is worth noting that if we replaced the word “schedule” with “treatment” in 
Figure VI-3, we would have the depiction of an ordinal aptitude treatment interaction 
(ATI) as described in ATI theory (Whitener, 1989), which is yet another Weltanschauung 
for considering this study.  The underlying premise of ATI theory is that learning, and 
subsequent performance, is higher when the learning method, or treatment, capitalizes on 
an individual’s cognitive aptitudes (Snow, 1978).  In a twist on ATI theory, this study 
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involves no change in learning methods per se, but rather, the treatment changes the 
relative availability of cognitive resources.  Again, the underling logic for this study 
would suggest that if a schedule enhances cognitive resources, then 1) this should be 
manifest by increased performance on learning tasks, and 2) performance enhancements 
should be greater for those with less aptitude given their overall higher demand for 
cognitive resources during training.   
4. Study Hypotheses 
 The following hypotheses guide this study: 
H1:  Participants on the modified, phase-delayed sleep schedule will obtain more daily 
sleep than participants following the standard Basic Combat Training schedule.   
H2:  Participants on the modified sleep schedule will have less decrement in mood state 
than participants following the standard Basic Combat Training sleep schedule.   
H3:  Participants on the modified sleep schedule will exhibit greater improvement in basic 
rifle marksmanship scores than participants following the standard Basic Combat 
Training sleep schedule.   
H4:  Participants on the modified sleep schedule will exhibit greater improvement in 
physical fitness scores than participants following the standard Basic Combat Training 
sleep schedule.   
H5: The likelihood of participants on the modified sleep schedule reporting 
occupationally significant fatigue will be lower than that for participants following the 
standard Basic Combat Training sleep schedule.   
H6:  The likelihood of participants on the modified sleep schedule reporting poor sleep 
quality will be lower than that for participants following the standard Basic Combat 
Training sleep schedule.   
H7:  The likelihood of participants on the modified sleep schedule attriting from training 
will be lower than that for participants following the standard Basic Combat Training 




5. Delimitations and Limitations 
A delimitation:   
This study is confined to assessing and observing U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to 
two companies within a combat support training battalion at Fort Leonard Wood, 
Missouri.   
Limitations:  
The study sample consists of Soldier accessions into military occupational 
specialties within the U.S. Army’s combat support branch.  Since combat support units 
may differ from combat arms and combat service support units in terms of the 
distributions of sex and personnel aptitudes, this study may not be generalizable to all 
Army training programs. 
 The study sample consists of Soldier accessions into the U.S. Army in the month 
of August.  Since the demographics of Soldiers entering Basic Combat Training exhibit a 
seasonal variation, the findings of this study may not directly apply to other Basic 
Combat Training classes at the study location.   
C. METHODS 
1. Research Design 
The study protocol was approved by the Naval Postgraduate School Institutional 
Review Board in accordance with 32 Code of Federal Regulations 219 and SECNAV 
Instruction 3900.39D.  The study used a quasi-experimental study design that was 
embedded within the Army’s 63-day Basic Combat Training program of instruction.  The 
intervention and comparison groups were selected without random assignment, although 
group assignment to the treatment condition was random.  Participant assignment to 
group was made by the U.S. Army based on factors that were unobservable by the 
research team, but which were not altered for the purpose of this study.  That is, the 
research team took the groups as they were created by the U.S. Army based on their 
normal mode of operations for managing Basic Combat Training.  The study intervention 
consisted of a modification of the timing of sleep and wake periods; otherwise, no change 
was made to the content, instructional methods, or sequence of Basic Combat Training 
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events.  The intervention group used a phase-delayed (i.e., 11:00 p.m. – 7:00 a.m.) sleep 
regimen with opportune midday naps, while the comparison group maintained the 
standard (i.e. 8:30 p.m. – 4:30 a.m.) sleep regimen.  The barracks used by the intervention 
group were modified with black-out curtains to mitigate the effect of morning light; no 
modifications were made to the barracks used by the comparison group. 
2. Participants 
Participants for the comparison group were solicited from among those Soldiers 
starting Basic Combat Training on August 14, 2009, and assigned to Charlie Company, 
3rd Battalion, 10th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Chemical Brigade (C/3-10 IN BN), Fort 
Leonard Wood, Missouri.  Similarly, participants for the intervention group were 
solicited from among those Soldiers starting Basic Combat Training on August 21, 2009, 
and assigned to Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion, 10th Infantry Regiment (B/3-10 IN BN).  
Participants for both groups were solicited during Basic Combat Training in-processing 
by a civilian member of the research team to mitigate the potential for implied coercion 
by rank.  Soldiers who chose not to participant in the study (less than 1%) still followed 
the training company’s schedule and accomplished all training events, but they did not 
complete any of the study-related instruments.  
3. Data Collection Instruments and Variables 
a. Actiwatch 
The Actiwatch® (Model AW-64, Philips Respironics, Bend, Oregon) is a  
16-gram, 28 x 27 x 10-millimeter wristwatch-like device worn on the nondominant wrist 
that objectively measures activity and rest patterns.  With each participant movement, a 
highly sensitive accelerometer generates a variable voltage that is digitally processed and 
sampled at a frequency of 32 Hertz.  The signal is integrated over a user-selected epoch 
and a value expressed as activity counts is recorded in the on-board memory.  Data are 
downloaded to a computer and may be expressed graphically as an actogram or reported 
in American standard code for information interchange (ASCII) format numerically as 
total activity counts per epoch. 
 389
b. Basic Rifle Marksmanship 
  Objective evaluation of rifle marksmanship skill was made based on 
“record fire” score.  During a Basic Combat Training record fire, Soldiers are given an 
M16/M4 series rifle and 40 rounds of ammunition and presented with 40 timed target 
exposures at ranges from 50 to 300 meters.  Twenty targets are engaged with 20 rounds 
from the prone supported position, ten targets are engaged with ten rounds from the prone 
unsupported position, and ten targets are engaged with ten rounds from the kneeling 
position—while wearing a helmet and load-bearing equipment.  The standard is to obtain 
at least 23 target hits on the 40 targets exposed.  Soldiers complete a practice record fire 
on days 29 and 30 of Basic Combat Training and an official record fire on day 32 of 
Basic Combat Training, for a total of three sequential record fires (Directorate Basic 
Combat Training Doctrine and Training Development, 2008, March). 
c. General Technical Aptitude 
  Objective evaluation of individual aptitude was made based on General 
Technical (GT) score as derived from the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery 
(ASVAB).  The ASVAB is a 216-item inventory containing nine separately timed 
subtests:  General Science, Arithmetic Reasoning, Word Knowledge, Paragraph 
Comprehension, Auto and Shop, Mathematics Knowledge, Mechanical Comprehension, 
Electronics Information, and Assembling Objects.  The ASVAB is not an intelligence 
test, but rather, is specifically designed to measure an individual’s aptitude to be trained 
in specific jobs.  GT score is a composite of the Arithmetic Reasoning, Word Knowledge, 
and Paragraph Comprehension subtests, and it is often a major determinant of the 
occupational specialties for which a person can be considered in the military. 
d. Mood State 
Subjective evaluation of mood was made with the Profile of Mood States 
(POMS) (McNair, Lorr, & Droppleman, 1981).  The POMS is a 65-item questionnaire 
that measures affect or mood on 6 scales:  1) tension-anxiety, 2) depression-dejection, 3) 
anger-hostility, 4) vigor-activity, 5) fatigue-inertia, and 6) confusion-bewilderment.  An 
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aggregate mood disturbance score is calculated by summing the scores on the six scales 
and negatively weighting the vigor-activity score. 
e. Personality 
  A personality assessment was accomplished using the Neuroticism-
Extroversion-Openness Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI) (Costa & McCrae, 1992).  The 
NEO-FFI is essentially a short form of the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-
R).  It consists of 60 items from the NEO-PI-R that are used to score the five domains:   
1) neuroticism, 2) extraversion, 3) openness, 4) agreeableness, and 5) conscientiousness.  
It does not contain the items for assessing the facets within each domain.  The NEO-FFI 
is designed for use in circumstances in which time is too limited to present the entire 
NEO-PI-R or only scores on the five domains are required (Weiner & Greene, 2008). 
f. Physical Fitness 
Objective evaluation of physical fitness was made based on Army 
Physical Fitness Test (APFT) score.  Soldiers complete a physical fitness assessment 
consisting of three measured events:  push-ups, sit-ups, and a timed 2-mile run.  Raw 
scores are scaled for both age and sex.  Soldiers must earn a score of 150 points or higher 
on the end-of-training APFT with 50 points or more in each event to graduate from Basic 
Combat Training (Directorate Basic Combat Training Doctrine and Training 
Development, 2008).  Soldiers complete two diagnostic APFTs during the third and sixth 
weeks of Basic Combat Training and a final APFT in the eighth week of training. 
g. Resilience 
  Assessment of resilience to stress was accomplished using the Response to 
Stressful Experiences Scale (RSES) (Johnson et al., 2008).  The RSES was developed by 
researchers with the National Center for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder to rate 
psychological traits that promote resilience, which is the ability to undergo stress and still 
retain mental health and well-being.  It consists of 22 items and identifies six factors that 
are key to psychological resilience: 1) positive outlook, 2) spirituality, 3) active coping, 
4) self-confidence, 5) learning and making meaning, and 6) acceptance of limits.  The 
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RSES has been tested on more than 1,000 active-duty military personnel (Naval Center 
for Combat and Operational Stress Control, 2009). 
h. Sleep Habits 
  Subjective assessments of sleep habits were made using three validated 
survey instruments.  The first instrument was the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI), 
a self-rated questionnaire designed to measure sleep quality in clinical populations by 
looking at sleep in the previous month.  Nineteen individual items generate the following 
seven scores:  1) subjective sleep quality, 2) sleep latency, 3) sleep duration, 4) habitual 
sleep efficiency, 5) sleep disturbances, 6) use of sleeping medications, and 7) daytime 
dysfunction.  A review of this survey’s reliability asserts that the PSQI is useful to both 
psychiatric clinical practice and research activities (Buysse, Reynolds, Monk, Berman, 
and Kupfer, 1989). 
The second instrument was the Epworth Sleepiness Scale (ESS) (Johns, 
1991), an 8-item scale commonly used to diagnose sleep disorders and considered a valid 
and reliable self-report of sleepiness.  Participants use an integer number from 0 to 3, 
corresponding to the likelihood (never, slight, moderate, and high, respectively) that they 
would fall asleep in eight situations such as sitting and reading, watching television, as a 
passenger in a car for an hour, etc.  Ratings above 10 out of a possible 24 are cause for 
concern with respect to an underlying sleep disorder. 
The third instrument was the Morningness-Eveningness Questionnaire 
(MEQ) published by Horne and Ostberg (1976), which contains 19 questions aimed at 
determining when, during the daily temporal span, individuals have the maximum 
propensity to be active.  Most questions are preferential, in the sense that the respondent 
is asked to indicate when they would prefer, rather than when they actually do, wake up 
or begin sleep.  Questions are multiple-choice and each answer is assigned a value such 
that their sum gives a score ranging from 16 to 86, with lower values corresponding to 
evening chronotypes and higher values indicating morning chronotypes.   
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i. Study Questionnaires 
The pre-study questionnaire contained ten questions aimed at potential 
covariates that could influence study outcome measures.  Four questions asked 
participants for their age, sex, height, and weight.  One question asked participants to 
quantify their frequency of exercise during the preceding month, both in terms of the 
number and duration of exercise sessions.  Another question asked whether participants 
regularly used firearm(s), and if so, to characterize the type of firearm(s), reason(s) for 
use, and frequency of use.  Three questions addressed use of caffeinated beverages, 
tobacco, and medications.  Lastly, one question asked participants to quantify the amount 
of sleep per day they required to feel ready to start the day. 
The post-study questionnaire consisted of six questions.  Similar to the 
pre-test questionnaire, two questions addressed use of caffeinated beverages and 
medications, and one question asked participants to quantify the amount of sleep per day 
they required to feel ready to start the day.   One question asked participants about the 
frequency with which they fell asleep during activities.  Another question asked 
participants to provide an ordinal ranking on a 5-item Likert scale of the adequacy of 
both their sleep and that of their peers during Basic Combat Training.  The final question 
asked participants’ preference for the timing of daily physical training. 
4. Procedures 
a. General 
Prior to beginning the study, each participant received a full briefing on 
the purposes of the study and assurances about the confidentiality of the data.  Once 
informed consent was obtained, each participant completed the pre-study questionnaire 
followed by the Epworth Sleepiness Scale (ESS), Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI), 
Morningness-Eveningness Questionnaire (MEQ), Response to Stressful Experiences 
Scale (RSES), Profile of Mood States (POMS), and Neuroticism-Extroversion-Openness 
(NEO) Five Factor Inventory (Table VI-2).  Participants subsequently accomplished the 
POMS at weekly intervals throughout Basic Combat Training.  At the completion of 
Basic Combat Training, participants received an out-briefing and completed the post-
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study questionnaire followed by the ESS, PSQI, and the final POMS.  For each 
participant, data were collected on general technical aptitude, basic rifle marksmanship, 
and physical fitness scores from preexisting local databases.  Attritions were determined 
from training company graduation rosters. 
 
Table VI-2. Schedule for data-generating events. 
*Actigraphy data was collected on a random subsample of the study participants. 
 
b. Actigraphy 
A random sample comprising approximately 20% of participants in each 
study group was selected for actigraphic data collection.  Participants agreeing to 
actigraphic data collection were issued an Actiwatch® on Day 1 to track sleep and 
activity patterns in a relatively unobtrusive fashion.  Participants were asked to wear the 
Actiwatch® continuously on the wrist of their nondominant hand during all waking and 
sleeping periods and not to remove it for showering.  The Actiwatch® was collected from 
each participant during Week 4 (intervention group) or Week 5 (comparison group) for 
downloading of data and reinitialization of the Actiwatch® data collection mode.  Once 
↓Data Event                         Week→ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Actigraphy* X X X X X X X X X 
Army Physical Fitness Test   X   X  X  
Basic Rifle Marksmanship     X     
Epworth Sleepiness Scale X        X 
Morningness-Eveningness 
Questionnaire 
X         
NEO Five-Factor Inventory  X         
Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index X        X 
Profile of Mood States X X X X X X X X X 
Response to Stressful Experiences 
Scale 
X         
Study Questionnaires X        X 
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the data collection period was complete, the data were taken back to the laboratory and, 
using Actiware® version 5.57.0006 software, scored for sleep times.   
c. Statistical Analysis 
For the pre-study and post-study questionnaires and the ESS, PSQI, MEQ, 
and RSES survey instruments, item nonresponse was handled using stochastic regression 
imputation to reduce the bias that could be caused by ignoring records with missing data 
(Kim & Curry, 1977; Brick & Kalton, 1996).  For the NEO-FFI and the POMS survey 
instruments, item nonresponse was handled per the guidance in the associated survey 
technical manuals.  In the case of the weekly POMS, which were administered 
repetitively throughout the course of training, no attempt was made to address unit or 
partial nonresponses.  Microsoft® Office Excel® 2007 was used to develop the study 
database; histograms of the actigraphy data were created using the Analysis ToolPak add-
in.  Analyses were undertaken with the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 
version 11.  All data were assessed for normalcy, and parametric and nonparametric 
approaches were used accordingly for descriptive statistical analyses.  Separate univariate 
and repeated measures analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) were used to test major 
hypotheses involving measures with one dependent variable.  Repeated measures were 
analyzed using a univariate approach with a fixed effect for time when there were a 
substantial number of unit nonresponses, thereby reducing the danger of biased repeated 
measures estimates of treatment effects caused by ignoring records with missing 
responses.  ANCOVA results were examined to determine whether there were sphericity 
violations of sufficient magnitude to warrant the use of Huynh-Feldt adjusted degrees of 
freedom.  Multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was used to test hypotheses 
involving measures with more than one dependent variable.  Box's and Levene's tests 
were used to assure the multivariate assumptions of equality of covariance matrices and 
that equality of error variances across groups was not violated.  Lastly, logistic regression 
was used to test major hypotheses involving measures with a binary dependent variable. 
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D. RESULTS 
1. Participants (n = 392) 
The study sample was comprised of 392 participants, 209 in the intervention 
group and 183 in the comparison group.  Participants’ responses on the pre-study 
questionnaire and survey instruments are summarized in Tables VI-3 through VI-5 by 
treatment condition, that being either assignment to the intervention or comparison group.  
Figures VI-4 through VI-6 display histograms for a select subset of questions from the 
PSQI asking participants about their baseline sleep schedule.  From the outset of the 
study, the intervention and comparison groups were generally comparable, although they 
did differ on some of the measured variables: 
1) Participants in the intervention group tended to have a higher body mass index 
(i.e., body weight corrected for height) than those in the comparison group.   
2) A greater proportion of participants in the intervention group were in the National 
Guard/Reserves as compared to the comparison group.  
3) Participants in the comparison group reported higher levels of neuroticism on the 
NEO-FFI, while participants in the intervention group reported higher levels of 
conscientiousness.   
4) Participants in the comparison group tended to have higher global scores on the 
pre-study PSQI, mainly because of increased daytime dysfunction.  Also, a 
greater proportion of participants in the comparison group met the threshold score 
for being classified as potentially having poor quality sleep.   
5) Participants in the intervention group had higher levels of spirituality, active 
coping, and self-efficacy, and hence, overall resilience, as assessed by the RSES 










Table VI-3. Summary of intervention and comparison study groups at outset of study. 
 Group  
Variable Intervention     
(n = 209) 
Comparison      
(n = 183) 
p-value 
Age (yrs), median (IQR) 20 (18-23) 20 (18-24) 0.762M 
Body mass index (kg·m-2), median (IQR) 25.4 (22.9-28.4) 23.6 (21.6-26.8) 0.002M* 
Body mass index category, no. (%)    
     Underweight 5 (2.4) 6 (3.3) 
     Normal 87 (41.6) 102 (55.7) 
     Overweight 81 (38.8) 57 (31.1) 
     Obese 36 (17.2) 18 (9.8) 
0.021C* 
Caffeine     
     Consume caffeinated beverages, no. (%) 116 (55.5) 110 (60.1) 0.357C 
     Caffeine use (mg·d-1), median (IQR) 39.0 (0-157.5) 61.0 (0-177.0) 0.248M 
Component, no. (%)    
     National Guard 72 (34.4) 58 (31.7) 
     Regular 82 (39.2) 109 (59.6) 
     Reserves 55 (26.3) 16 (8.7) 
< 0.001C* 
Epworth Sleepiness Scale    
     Total score, median (IQR) 8 (6-11) 9 (6-11) 0.562M 
     Excessive fatigue (score > 10), no. (%) 52 (24.9) 52 (28.4) 0.429C 
Exercise frequency (hrs·wk-1), median (IQR) 2.5 (1.0-4.5) 3.0 (1.5-5.9) 0.071M 
Firearms    
     Regularly use firearm, no. (%) 51 (24.4) 39 (21.3) 0.468C 
     Type of firearm, no. (%)    
          Rifle 44 (21.1) 31(16.9) 0.302C 
          Handgun 28 (13.4) 23 (12.6) 0.808C 
     Use of firearm, no. (%)    
          Hunting 36 (17.2) 28 (15.3) 0.607C 
          Sport shooting 32 (15.3) 28(15.3) 0.998C 
          Other 7 (3.8) 4 (1.9) 0.253C 
     Frequency of use (days·yr-1), median (IQR) 0 (0-0) 0 (0-0) 0.540M 
*Significant at ≤ 0.05 level. 
CChi square statistic, MMann-Whitney U. 





Table VI-4. Summary of intervention and comparison study groups at outset of study 
(continued). 
  Group    
Variable Intervention    
(n = 209) 
Comparison      
(n = 183) 
p-value 
GT score, median (IQR) 105 (96-114) 108 (99-116) 0.057M 
Morningness-Eveningness Questionnaire     
     Total score, median (IQR) 50 (45-55) 49 (42-56) 0.498M 
     Chronotype, no (%)    
          Evening type 39 (18.7) 34 (18.6) 
          Neither type 140 (67.0) 112 (61.2) 
          Morning type 30 (14.3) 37 (20.2) 
0.291C 
NEO Five Factor Inventory, median (IQR)    
     Neuroticism 52 (45-59) 55 (47-63) 0.012M* 
     Extraversion 53 (46-61) 53 (46-60) 0.601M 
     Openness to experience 48 (41-58) 50 (41-57) 0.712M 
     Agreeableness 46 (36-53) 44 (36-52) 0.224M 
     Conscientiousness 50 (43-57) 46 (38-53) 0.003M* 
Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index    
     Global score, median (IQR) 6 (4-9) 7 (5-10) 0.048M* 
     Poor sleep quality (score > 5), no. (%) 123 (58.9%) 129 (70.5%) 0.016C* 
     Component scores, median (IQR)    
          Subjective sleep quality 1 (1-1) 1 (1-2) 0.190M 
          Sleep latency 2 (1-4) 2 (1-4) 0.817M 
          Sleep duration 0 (0-2) 0 (0-2) 0.430M 
          Habitual sleep efficiency 0 (0-0) 0 (0-0) 0.203M 
          Sleep disturbances 1 (1-2) 1 (1-2) 0.399M 
          Use of sleeping medication 0 (0-0) 0 (0-0) 0.400M 
          Daytime dysfunction 1 (0-1) 1 (1-1) 0.001M* 
Rank, no (%)    
     E01 82 (39.2) 62 (33.9) 
     E02 69 (33.0) 58 (31.7) 
     E03 43 (20.6) 48 (26.2) 
     E04 15 (7.2) 15 (8.2) 
0.514C 
*Significant at ≤ 0.05 level. 
CChi square statistic, MMann-Whitney U. 




Table VI-5. Summary of intervention and comparison study groups at outset of study 
(continued). 
  Group    
Variable Intervention     
(n = 209) 
Comparison      
(n = 183) 
p-value 
Response to Stressful Experiences Scale    
     Global score, median (IQR) 69 (60-78) 67 (58-75) 0.008M* 
     Factor scores, median (IQR)    
          Positive appraisal 7.3 (6.2-8.3) 7.0 (5.9-8.0) 0.141M 
          Spirituality 2.9 (2.9-3.8) 2.9 (2.7-3.8) 0.001M* 
          Active coping 10.8 (8.9-12.2) 10.2 (8.2-11.5) 0.001M* 
          Self-efficacy 3.2 (2.4-3.2) 2.4 (2.4-3.2) 0.029M* 
          Learning and meaning-making 6.6 (5.4-8.0) 6.5 (5.1-7.3) 0.025M* 
          Acceptance of limitations 4.9 (3.5-5.6) 4.3 (3.5-5.0) 0.055M* 
Sex, no. (%)      
     Female 67 (32.1) 52 (28.4) 
     Male 142 (67.9) 131 (71.6) 0.434
C 
Tobacco    
     Regularly use tobacco, no (%) 81 (38.8) 68 (37.2) 0.745C 
     Frequency of use (cigs·wk-1), median 
(IQR) 
0 (0-28) 0 (0-16) 0.519M 
*Significant at ≤ 0.05 level. 
CChi square statistic, MMann-Whitney U. 






Figure VI-4. Histogram of participants’ reported usual bed time (PSQI question 1). 
 
 





Figure VI-6. Histogram of participants’ reported hours of sleep per night (PSQI 
question 4). 
 
2. Actigraphy Subsample 
a. Participants (n = 95) 
What follows in this subsection is limited to the subsample of 95 
participants, 53 in the intervention group and 42 in the comparison group, randomly 
selected to wear Actiwatches®.  Due to unexplained technical difficulties, data were not 
recorded on Actiwatches® given to one participant in the comparison group.  
Consequently, this participant’s other data were censored in the subsequent analysis, 
thereby leaving us with a subsample of 94 participants.  Across the subsample, on 
average, 83.8 (standard deviation 9.6; range 36-92) participants had a valid Actiware® 
score for any given day of Basic Combat Training.  A one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was used to compare the number of participants per day with a valid 
Actiware® score by week of training.  Overall, there was a significant difference in week 
(F8,52 = 3.205, p = 0.005), but Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed that this difference was 
only between Week 2 (mean 90.7 participants) and Week 9 (mean 73.4 participants). 
Participants’ responses on the study questionnaire and survey instruments 
are summarized in Tables VI-6 through VI-8 by treatment condition, that being either 
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assignment to the intervention or comparison group.  Figures VI-7 through VI-9 display 
histograms for a select subset of questions from the PSQI asking participants about their 
baseline sleep schedule.  From the outset of the study, the intervention and comparison 
groups were comparable on practically all measured variables.  The only statistically 
significant difference between groups was the percentage of those handling firearms who 
reported using a rifle.  All the participants in the intervention group who reported 
handling firearms used a rifle, while slightly more than half of those in the comparison 
group did so.  There was also a tendency for participants in the intervention group to have 
a higher body mass index than those in the comparison group, but this difference was not 
statistically significant.  Likewise, there was a tendency for a greater proportion of 
participants in the intervention group to be in the National Guard/Reserves as compared 
















Table VI-6. Summary of intervention and comparison study groups for actigraphy 
subsample at outset of study. 
 Group  
Variable Intervention      
(n = 53, 25%) 
Comparison      
(n = 41, 22%) 
p-value 
Age (yrs), median (IQR) 19 (18-23) 20 (18-24) 0.320M 
Body mass index (kg·m-2), median (IQR) 25.1 (22.2-27.8) 23.1 (21.4-26.0) 0.074M 
Body mass index category, no. (%)    
     Underweight 1 (1.9) 1 (2.4) 
     Normal 24 (45.3) 27 (65.9) 
     Overweight 18 (34.0) 9 (22.0) 
     Obese 10 (18.9) 4 (9.8) 
0.232V 
Caffeine    
     Consume caffeinated beverages, no. (%) 35 (66.0) 20 (48.8) 0.092C 
     Caffeine use (mg·d-1), median (IQR) 164 (108-288) 144 (72-305) 0.327M 
Component, no. (%)    
     National Guard/Reserve 30 (56.6) 16 (39.0) 
     Regular 23 (43.4) 25 (61.0) 
0.091C 
Epworth Sleepiness Scale    
     Total score, mean (SD) 7.9 (3.2) 7.4 (3.5) 0.473T  
     Excessive fatigue (score > 10), no. (%) 9 (17.0) 7 (17.1) 0.991C 
Exercise frequency (hrs·wk-1), median (IQR) 2.0 (1.4-4.2) 3.0 (1.4-6) 0.226M 
Firearms    
     Regularly use firearm, no. (%) 11 (20.8)  7 (17.1) 0.653C 
     Type of firearm, no. (%)    
          Rifle 11 (100) 4 (57.1) 0.043F* 
          Handgun 4 (36.4) 4 (57.1) 0.630F 
     Use of firearm, no. (%)    
          Hunting 7 (63.6) 3 (42.9) 0.630F 
          Sport shooting 8 (72.7) 4 (57.1) 0.627F 
          Other 0 (0) 2(28.6) 0.137F 
     Frequency of use (days·yr-1), median (IQR) 30 (20-45) 45 (25-50) 0.340M 
*Significant at ≤ 0.05 level. 
CChi square statistic, FFisher’s Exact Test, MMann-Whitney U, TStudent’s t-test, VCramer’s V. 
Notes:  IQR = interquartile range; SD = standard deviation. 
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Table VI-7. Summary of intervention and comparison study groups for actigraphy 
subsample at outset of study (continued). 
 Group  
Variable Intervention     
(n = 53, 25%) 
Comparison     
(n = 41, 22%) 
p-value 
GT score, median (IQR) 108 (96-116) 110 (99-121) 0.354M 
Morningness-Eveningness Questionnaire     
     Total score, mean (SD) 50.6 (8.9) 47.2 (9.7) 0.086T 
     Chronotype, no (%)    
          Evening type 11 (20.8) 15 (36.6) 
          Neither type 31 (58.5) 20 (48.8) 
          Morning type 11 (20.8) 6 (14.6) 
0.226C 
NEO Five Factor Inventory    
     Neuroticism, median (IQR) 52 (44-56) 51 (46-63) 0.706M 
     Extraversion, mean (SD) 53.5 (11.5) 54.1 (9.0) 0.786T 
     Openness to experience, mean (SD) 50.7 (12.6) 49.7 (11.1) 0.683T 
     Agreeableness, mean (SD) 45.4 (11.4) 43.7 (11.4) 0.495T 
     Conscientiousness, median (IQR) 46 (42-59) 48 (41-53) 0.359M 
Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index    
     Global score, mean (SD) 6.3 (2.5) 6.71 (2.8) 0.468T 
     Poor sleep quality (score > 5), no. (%) 32 (60.4) 28 (68.3) 0.428C 
     Component scores, median (IQR)    
          Subjective sleep quality 1 (1-1) 1 (1-2) 0.147M 
          Sleep latency 2 (1-4) 2 (1-3) 0.745M 
          Sleep duration 0 (0-1) 0 (0-1) 0.504M 
          Habitual sleep efficiency 0 (0-0) 0 (0-0) 0.211M 
          Sleep disturbances 1 (1-2) 1 (1-2) 0.114M 
          Use of sleeping medication 0 (0-0) 0 (0-0) 0.699M 
          Daytime dysfunction 1 (0-1) 1 (0-1) 0.378M 
Rank, no (%)    
     E01 18 (34.0) 16 (39.0) 
     E02 20 (37.7) 12 (29.3) 
     E03 12 (22.6) 9 (22.0) 
     E04 3 (5.7) 4 (9.8) 
0.759C 
CChi square statistic, MMann-Whitney U, TStudent’s t-test. 






Table VI-8. Summary of intervention and comparison study groups for actigraphy 
subsample at outset of study (continued). 
 Group  
Variable Intervention     
(n = 53, 25%) 
Comparison     
(n = 41, 22%) 
p-value 
Response to Stressful Experiences Scale    
     Global score, mean (SD) 68.3 (12.0) 65.1 (13.0) 0.233T 
     Factor scores, median (IQR)    
          Positive appraisal 7.6 (6.1-8.3) 6.8 (6.2-8.5) 0.819M 
          Spirituality 2.9 (2.9-3.8) 2.9 (2.9-3.8) 0.716M 
          Active coping 8.7 (10.2-11.9) 10.2 (8.4-11.5) 0.778M 
          Self-efficacy 3.2 (2.4-3.2) 2.4 (2.4-3.2) 0.778M 
          Learning and meaning-making 7.2 (5.0-8.0) 6.5 (5.4-8.3) 0.310M 
          Acceptance of limitations 4.3 (3.5-5.6) 4.3 (3.5-5.6) 0.816M 
Sex, no. (%)    
     Female 20 (37.7) 15 (36.6) 
     Male 33 (62.3) 26 (63.4) 0.909
C 
Tobacco    
     Regularly use tobacco, no (%) 22 (41.5) 15 (36.6) 0.628C 
     Frequency of use (cigs·wk-1), median 
(IQR) 
49 (19-101) 35 (8-105) 0.577M 
CChi square statistic, MMann-Whitney U, TStudent’s t-test. 











Figure VI-8. Histogram of participants’ reported usual getting up time (PSQI question 






Figure VI-9. Histogram of participants’ reported hours of sleep per night (PSQI 
question 4) in actigraphy subsample. 
 
b. Total Sleep Time 
Figure VI-10 shows the distribution and the parameters obtained from the 
distribution for daily total sleep obtained per night for all sleep observations gathered 
during Basic Combat Training according to treatment condition.  The spike at 3 hours in 
both histograms was believed to be attributable to participants performing night watch 
duties.  The median total sleep obtained per night across all weeks of Basic Combat 
Training was significantly greater for participants in the intervention versus comparison 
group (intervention group mean rank = 2,884.0; comparison group mean rank = 2,105.9; 
p < 0.001 based on Mann-Whitney U test).  The National Sleep Foundation (NSF) 
recommends that adults obtain 7–9 hours of sleep per night.  In this study, 15.5% of sleep 
observations in the intervention group satisfied the NSF recommendation versus only 
4.6% in the comparison group—a significant difference ( 21χ  = 152.282, p < 0.001).  
Restated, the likelihood or odds of an episode of total daily sleep being less than the 
NSF’s recommendation was 3.802 (95% CI: 3.037, 4.761) for the comparison group 
relative to the intervention group–—i.e., they were nearly four times as likely to be sleep 
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Figure VI-10. Histograms of total sleep obtained at night for all sleep observations 
gathered during Basic Combat Training according to treatment condition. 
 
We examined how daily total sleep related to the treatment condition over 
the course of Basic Combat Training while accounting for potential covariates and the 
aforementioned differences between the study groups.  However, any approach to 
analyzing total sleep time needed to address the issue that participants did not necessarily 
have valid Actiware® scores for every day of Basic Combat Training.  This issue was 
remedied by first computing a weekly average sleep for each participant and then 
analyzing the dataset as a repeated cross-section design rather than a within-participant 
repeated measures design.  A 1% significance level (or alpha of 0.01) was also used to 
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counter the resulting increased power of statistical tests.  Accordingly, an ANCOVA of 
weekly average sleep was accomplished using treatment condition, week, and chronotype 
as fixed effects.  Age, caffeine and tobacco use, component, firearm use, fitness factors 
(body mass index (BMI) and exercise frequency), GT score, personality component 
scores (NEO-FFI neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, and 
conscientiousness scores), resilience (RSES score), sex, and sleep factors (ESS and PSQI 
scores) were covariates. 
Table VI-9 provides the results of the univariate analysis of weekly 
average sleep.  There was a significant fixed effect for treatment condition with an 
estimated marginal mean sleep for the intervention group of 5.876 (99% CI: 5.806, 
5.945) versus 5.359 (99% CI: 5.276, 5.442) for the comparison group.  That is, 
controlling for other variables, the intervention group obtained 31 minutes more sleep 
















Table VI-9. Univariate tests for weekly average sleep. 
Source MS df F p η2 
Condition 32.384 1 140.162 <0.001* 0.163 
Week 15.138 8 65.518 <0.001* 0.422 
Chronotype 2.383 2 10.312 <0.001* 0.028 
Condition x Week 2.555 8 11.059 <0.001* 0.110 
Condition x Chronotype 0.323 2 1.399 0.247 0.004 
Chronotype x Week 0.321 16 1.390 0.140 0.030 
Condition x Chronotype x Week 0.116 16 0.502 0.947 0.011 
Age 2.569 1 11.118 0.001* 0.015 
Body mass index 1.476 1 6.390 0.012 0.009 
Caffeine use (referent no) 2.490 1 10.779 0.001* 0.015 
Component (referent regular) 0.232 1 1.004 0.317 0.001 
Epworth Sleepiness Scale 2.491 1 10.781 0.001* 0.015 
Exercise frequency 1.860 1 8.052 0.005* 0.011 
Firearm use (referent no) 0.301 1 1.301 0.254 0.002 
GT score 0.438 1 1.895 0.169 0.003 
NEO-FFI      
     Neuroticism 0.541 1 2.341 0.126 0.003 
     Extraversion 0.926 1 4.006 0.046 0.006 
     Openness to experience 0.090 1 0.387 0.534 0.001 
     Agreeableness 0.052 1 0.224 0.636 <0.001 
     Conscientiousness 0.937 1 4.055 0.044 0.006 
Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index 0.357 1 1.545 0.214 0.002 
RSES 0.307 1 1.327 0.250 0.002 
Sex (referent male) 2.376 1 10.285 0.001* 0.014 
Tobacco use (referent no) 0.125 1 0.539 0.463 0.001 
Error 0.231 718    
*Significant at ≤ 0.01 level. 
Notes:  GT score = General technical aptitude score; MS = Mean square; NEO-FFI = NEO Five-Factor 




There was also a significant fixed effect for week (Figure VI-11), with 
pairwise differences occurring between week 1 versus weeks 6–9  (p < 0.001); week 2 
versus weeks 6–9 (p ≤ 0.002); week 3 versus week 6 and weeks 8–9 (p < 0.001); week 4 
versus week 6 and weeks 8–9 (p < 0.001); week 5 versus weeks 6–9  (p ≤ 0.004); week 6 
versus week 7 (p < 0.001); and week 7 versus weeks 8–9 (p < 0.001).   
 
 
Figure VI-11. Estimated marginal means for sleep by week of training (error bars are for 










For the significant fixed effect of chronotype (Figure VI-12), the pairwise 
differences occurred between morning chronotype versus both evening and indeterminate 
chronotypes (p ≤ 0.001).   
 
 
Figure VI-12. Estimated marginal means for sleep by chronotype (error bars are for 99% 
confidence intervals). 
 
Additionally, there was a significant interaction effect between treatment 
condition and week (Figure VI-13), with participants in the intervention group getting 
more sleep than those in the comparison group during the first 6 weeks of training.  
During the latter three weeks of training, participants in the intervention group got 
notably less sleep such that there was no longer a difference between the intervention and 
comparison groups.  This observation was attributed to the field exercises that were 
conducted throughout the last three weeks of training, during which participants moved 
from the barracks to an encampment.  There was no interaction effect between treatment 
condition and chronotype or between chronotype and week.  Significant covariates 




Figure VI-13. Estimated marginal means for sleep by treatment condition and week of 
training (error bars are for 99% confidence intervals). 
 
c. Sleep Efficiency 
Sleep efficiency was calculated as the ratio of a participant’s total sleep 
time to total time in bed; it represents the proportion of time that a participant was 
assumed to be “in bed” or attempting sleep that was actually spent asleep (Paquet, 
Kawinska, & Carrier, 2007).  Figure VI-14 shows the distribution and distributional 
parameters for sleep efficiency for all sleep observations gathered during Basic Combat 










































Figure VI-14. Histograms of sleep efficiency for all sleep observations by treatment 
condition. 
 
The median sleep efficiency across all weeks of Basic Combat Training 
was significantly greater for participants in the intervention vice comparison study group 
(intervention group mean rank = 2,614.3; comparison group mean rank = 2,479.0; p < 
0.001 based on Mann-Whitney test).  Nevertheless, the practical significance of a 
difference in median sleep efficiency of 0.010 is questionable.  However, the histograms 
suggest that the distributions of sleep efficiency for the two groups differed slightly.  This 
impression was investigated further by estimating the population moments using the 
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sample kth moments (Table VI-10).  While the 95% confidence intervals overlapped for 
the first and second moments, there was a significant difference in the third and fourth 
moments, which are functions of the distributions’ skewness (i.e., symmetry) and kurtosis 
(i.e., peakedness), respectively. 
 
Table VI-10. Population moment estimates based on sample kth moments. 
Note:  CI = confidence interval. 
 
d. Activity Counts During Sleep 
Activity counts reflect movements during sleep and may be a function of 
the stage of sleep (Monk, Buysse, & Rose, 1999).  Figure VI-15 shows the distribution 
and distributional parameters for mean activity counts for all sleep observations gathered 
during Basic Combat Training according to treatment condition.  The median activity 
count during sleep across all weeks of Basic Combat Training was significantly less for 
participants in the intervention versus comparison study group (intervention group mean 
rank = 2,504.8; comparison group mean rank = 2,630.4; p < 0.001 based on Mann-
Whitney test).  However, the histograms appear quite similar; as in the analysis of the 
sleep efficiency data, population moments were estimated for each distribution using the 
kth sample moments.  It was found that the 95% confidence intervals overlapped for the 
first four moments of each sample distribution, thereby suggesting that the observed 
distributions do not significantly differ.   
 
 Intervention group  Comparison group 
kth moment Estimate 95% CI  Estimate 95% CI 
First 0.821 (0.817, 0.825)  0.814 (0.810, 0.818) 
Second 0.684 (0.678, 0.690)  0.672 (0.666, 0.679) 
Third 0.577 (0.571, 0.584)  0.562 (0.555, 0.570) 
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Figure VI-15. Histograms of mean activity counts for all sleep observations by  
treatment condition. 
 
3.  Profile of Mood States 
The study examined how Profile of Mood States (POMS) factor scores related to 
the treatment condition over the course of Basic Combat Training while accounting for 
potential covariates and the known differences between the study groups.  However, any 
approach to modeling the POMS factor scores needed to address several issues.  First, a 
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MANCOVA of the pre-study POMS factor scores with treatment condition as a fixed 
effect and age, caffeine and tobacco use, component, GT score, firearm use, fitness 
factors (BMI and exercise frequency), NEO personality component scores, RSES score, 
sex, and sleep factors (ESS and PSQI scores) as covariates found a significant effect for 
treatment condition (Wilks’ λ = 0.769, F6,367 = 18.393, p < 0.001).  An examination of the 
univariate ANCOVAs showed that there were significant fixed effects for treatment 
condition on T-factor (tension-anxiety) scores (F1,372 = 42.094, p < 0.001), D-factor 
(depression-dejection) scores (F1,372 = 30.305, p < 0.001), A-factor (anger-hostility) 
scores (F1,372 = 39.278, p < 0.001), V-factor (vigor-activity) scores (F1,372 = 6.961, p = 
0.009), F-factor (fatigue-inertia) scores (F1,372 = 100.803, p < 0.001), and C-factor 
(confusion-bewilderment) scores (F1,372 = 22.397, p < 0.001).  It was clearly observed 
from Figure VI-16 that the pre-study POMS factor scores, prior to any exposure to the 
treatment, differed between the study groups.   
 
 
Figure VI-16. Comparison of estimated marginal means and associated 95% confidence 
intervals for pre-study POMS factor scores by study group. 
 
These results suggested that the two study groups were not directly comparable at 
baseline in terms of subjective mood.  This issue was remedied by calculating the “delta 
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from baseline” score for each factor—that is, subtracting a participant’s pre-study POMS 
factor score from all their subsequent POMS factor scores.  This subtraction had the 
effect of making all participants’ pre-study POMS factor scores zero, while still 
preserving the magnitude and directionality of variations in their subsequent POMS 
factor scores.  Another issue was the observation that most participants (70.4%) did not 
have a POMS questionnaire for every week of training.  This issue was addressed by 
analyzing the POMS dataset as a repeated cross-section design rather than a within-
participant repeated measures design and using a 1% significance level to counter the 
resulting increased power of statistical tests.   
A MANCOVA of the POMS factor delta from baseline scores was accomplished 
using treatment condition, week, and chronotype as fixed effects and age, caffeine and 
tobacco use, component, firearm use, fitness factors (BMI and exercise frequency), GT 
score, NEO personality component scores, RSES score, sex, and sleep factors (ESS and 
PSQI scores) as covariates.  Table VI-11 summarizes the results of the multivariate tests.  
There were significant fixed effects for treatment condition, week, and chronotype as 
well as significant interaction effects between treatment condition and both week and 
chronotype.  With the exception of exercise frequency, firearm use, NEO extraversion 
component score, and RSES score, there were significant effects for all the measured 











Table VI-11. Multivariate tests for POMS delta from baseline scores. 
Source Wilks’ λ   F df1   df2 p η2 
Condition 0.992 4.261 6 3037 <0.001* 0.008 
Week 0.944 3.694 48 14947 <0.001* 0.010 
Chronotype 0.984 4.217 12 6074 <0.001* 0.008 
Condition x Week 0.974 1.673 48 14947 0.002* 0.004 
Condition x Chronotype 0.990 2.628 12 6074 0.002* 0.005 
Chronotype x Week 0.985 0.466 96 17213 1.000 0.002 
Condition x Chronotype x Week 0.981 0.617 96 17213 0.999 0.003 
Age 0.967 17.008 6 3037 <0.001* 0.033 
Body mass index 0.980 10.084 6 3037 <0.001* 0.020 
Caffeine use (referent no) 0.981 9.842 6 3037 <0.001* 0.019 
Component (referent regular) 0.989 5.812 6 3037 <0.001* 0.011 
Epworth Sleepiness Scale 0.956 23.510 6 3037 <0.001* 0.044 
Exercise frequency 0.995 2.628 6 3037 0.015 0.005 
Firearm use (referent no) 0.996 1.951 6 3037 0.069 0.004 
GT score 0.968 16.607 6 3037 <0.001* 0.032 
NEO-FFI       
     Neuroticism 0.966 17.934 6 3037 <0.001* 0.034 
     Extraversion 0.995 2.318 6 3037 0.031 0.005 
     Openness to experience 0.985 7.631 6 3037 <0.001* 0.015 
     Agreeableness 0.973 14.192 6 3037 <0.001* 0.027 
     Conscientiousness 0.982 9.075 6 3037 <0.001* 0.018 
Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index 0.984 8.108 6 3037 <0.001* 0.016 
RSES 0.995 2.583 6 3037 0.017 0.005 
Sex (referent male) 0.973 13.883 6 3037 <0.001* 0.027 
Tobacco use (referent no) 0.988 6.158 6 3037 <0.001* 0.012 
*Significant at ≤ 0.01 level. 
Notes:  GT score = General technical aptitude score; NEO-FFI = NEO Five-Factor Inventory; RSES = 
Response to Stressful Experiences Scale. 
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a. Tension-Anxiety (T) Factor 
  Table VI-12 provides the results of the relevant univariate tests of 
between-participant effects for the POMS T-factor delta from baseline scores.  There was 
no significant fixed effect for treatment condition or chronotype.   
 
Table VI-12. Univariate tests of between-participant effects for POMS T-factor delta 
from baseline scores. 
Source MS   df F p η2 
Condition 60.636 1 1.359 0.244 <0.001 
Week 335.619 8 7.521 <0.001* 0.019 
Chronotype 31.538 2 0.707 0.493 <0.001 
Condition x Week 78.945 8 1.769 0.078 0.005 
Condition x Chronotype 49.363 2 1.106 0.331 0.001 
Age 555.040 1 12.439 <0.001* 0.004 
Body mass index 1243.017 1 27.857 <0.001* 0.009 
Caffeine use (referent no) 814.800 1 18.260 <0.001* 0.006 
Component (referent regular) 219.848 1 4.927 0.027 0.002 
Epworth Sleepiness Scale 124.464 1 2.789 0.095 0.001 
GT score 1474.994 1 33.055 <0.001* 0.011 
NEO-FFI      
     Neuroticism 1379.661 1 30.919 <0.001* 0.010 
     Openness to experience 80.314 1 1.800 0.180 0.001 
     Agreeableness 14.529 1 0.326 0.568 <0.001 
     Conscientiousness 20.671 1 0.463 0.496 <0.001 
Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index 762.339 1 17.084 <0.001* 0.006 
Sex (referent male) 298.227 1 6.683 0.010* 0.002 
Tobacco use (referent no) 706.302 1 15.829 <0.001* 0.005 
Error 44.622 3042    
*Significant at ≤ 0.01 level. 




 There was a significant fixed effect for week (Figure VI-17), with the 
main pairwise differences occurring between week 1 versus weeks 4–7 and week 9 (p ≤ 
0.001) and between week 3 versus week 6 (p = 0.006).   
 
 
Figure VI-17. Estimated marginal means for POMS T-factor delta from baseline scores 
by week of training (error bars are for 99% confidence intervals). 
 
There was no significant interaction effect between treatment condition 
and either week or chronotype.  Thus, the general trend was for T-factor scores to 
decrease during the first six weeks of training followed by a spike in T-factor scores 
during weeks 7–8.  Significant covariates included age, BMI, caffeine and tobacco use, 
GT score, NEO neuroticism component score, PSQI score, and sex, but only GT score, 
and neuroticism had effect sizes of at least 1% as measured using eta squared.   
b. Depression-Dejection (D) Factor 
Table VI-13 provides the results of the univariate tests of between-
participant effects for the POMS D-factor delta from baseline scores.  Again, there was 





Table VI-13. Univariate tests of between-participant effects for POMS D-factor delta 
from baseline scores. 
Source MS   df F p η2 
Condition 132.618 1 0.989 0.320 <0.001 
Week 1208.472 8 9.015 <0.001* 0.023 
Chronotype 299.645 2 2.235 0.107 0.001 
Condition x Week 158.458 8 1.182 0.306 0.003 
Condition x Chronotype 245.889 2 1.834 0.160 0.001 
Age 1014.065 1 7.565 0.006* 0.002 
Body mass index 5334.391 1 39.793 <0.001* 0.013 
Caffeine use (referent no) 2135.415 1 15.930 <0.001* 0.005 
Component (referent regular) 146.044 1 1.089 0.297 <0.001 
Epworth Sleepiness Scale 0.044 1 0.000 0.985 <0.001 
GT score 856.795 1 6.391 0.012 0.002 
NEO-FFI      
     Neuroticism 6150.683 1 45.882 <0.001* 0.015 
     Openness to experience 577.989 1 4.312 0.038 0.001 
     Agreeableness 2046.344 1 15.265 <0.001* 0.005 
     Conscientiousness 708.772 1 5.287 0.022 0.002 
Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index 233.218 1 1.740 0.187 0.001 
Sex (referent male) 165.777 1 1.237 0.266 <0.001 
Tobacco use (referent no) 518.436 1 3.867 0.049 0.001 
Error 134.054 3042    
*Significant at ≤ 0.01 level. 








There was a significant fixed effect for week (Figure VI-18), with pairwise 
differences occurring between week 1 versus weeks 4–9 (p ≤ 0.002), week 2 versus week 
9 (p = 0.001), and week 3 versus week 9 (p = 0.003).   
 
 
Figure VI-18. Estimated marginal means for POMS D-factor delta from baseline scores 
by week of training (error bars are for 99% confidence intervals). 
 
There was no significant interaction effect between treatment condition 
and either week or chronotype.   Thus, the general trend was for D-factor scores to 
decrease during the course of training, with lower scores meaning less of a depressed 
mood.  Significant covariates included age, BMI, caffeine use, and NEO neuroticism and 
agreeableness component scores, but only BMI and neuroticism had effect sizes of at 
least 1%.   
c. Anger-Hostility (A) Factor 
Table VI-14 provides the results of the univariate tests of between-
participant effects for the POMS A-factor delta from baseline scores.  There was no 






Table VI-14. Univariate tests of between-participant effects for POMS A-factor delta 
from baseline scores. 
Source MS   df F p η2 
Condition 5.447 1 0.062 0.803 <0.001 
Week 718.227 8 8.172 <0.001* 0.021 
Chronotype 118.510 2 1.348 0.260 0.001 
Condition x Week 235.186 8 2.676 0.006* 0.007 
Condition x Chronotype 200.591 2 2.282 0.102 0.001 
Age 1553.745 1 17.679 <0.001* 0.006 
Body mass index 1822.769 1 20.740 <0.001* 0.007 
Caffeine use (referent no) 538.882 1 6.131 0.013 0.002 
Component (referent regular) 38.695 1 0.440 0.507 <0.001 
Epworth Sleepiness Scale 34.238 1 0.390 0.533 <0.001 
GT score 1301.170 1 14.805 <0.001* 0.005 
NEO-FFI      
     Neuroticism 176.461 1 2.008 0.157 0.001 
     Openness to experience 1270.906 1 14.461 <0.001* 0.005 
     Agreeableness 7.572 1 0.086 0.769 <0.001 
     Conscientiousness 252.873 1 2.877 0.090 0.001 
Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index 158.508 1 1.804 0.179 0.001 
Sex (referent male) 3035.072 1 34.533 <0.001* 0.011 
Tobacco use (referent no) 963.306 1 10.961 0.001* 0.004 
Error 87.888 3042    
*Significant at ≤ 0.01 level. 








There was a significant fixed effect for week (Figure VI-19), with the 
pairwise differences occurring between week 1 versus week 4 and weeks 6–9 (p ≤ 0.005), 
week 2 versus week 9 (p = 0.001), week 3 versus week 9 (p < 0.001), and week 5 versus 
week 9  (p = 0.002).   
 
 
Figure VI-19. Estimated marginal means for POMS A-factor delta from baseline scores 














There was a significant interaction effect between treatment condition and 
week (Figure VI-20), but not between treatment condition and chronotype.    
 
Figure VI-20. Estimated marginal means for POMS A-factor delta from baseline scores 
by treatment condition and week of training (error bars are for 99% confidence intervals). 
 
Thus, the comparison group started out with higher A-factor delta from 
baseline scores but had a greater rate of decrease in scores over training as compared to 
the intervention group.  Significant covariates included age, BMI, GT score, NEO 
openness to experience component score, sex, and tobacco use, but only sex had an effect 
size of at least 1%.   
d. Vigor-Activity (V) Factor 
Table VI-15 provides the results of the univariate tests of between-
participant effects for the POMS V-factor delta from baseline scores.  There was a 
significant fixed effect for treatment condition with an estimated marginal mean score for 
the intervention group of 1.229 (99% CI: 0.830, 1.628) versus 0.098 (99% CI: –0.347, 
0.543) for the comparison group.  That is, controlling for other variables, the intervention 
group exhibited a mood of greater vigorousness and ebullience and higher energy than 





Table VI-15.  Univariate tests of between-participant effects for POMS V-factor delta 
from baseline scores. 
Source MS   df F p η2 
Condition 394.489 1 10.232 0.001* 0.003 
Week 17.975 8 0.466 0.881 0.001 
Chronotype 574.906 2 14.911 <0.001* 0.010 
Condition x Week 78.426 8 2.034 0.039 0.005 
Condition x Chronotype 94.740 2 2.457 0.086 0.002 
Age 3039.636 1 78.838 <0.001* 0.025 
Body mass index 571.114 1 14.813 <0.001* 0.005 
Caffeine use (referent no) 377.387 1 9.788 0.002* 0.003 
Component (referent regular) 494.366 1 12.822 <0.001* 0.004 
Epworth Sleepiness Scale 2844.343 1 73.773 <0.001* 0.024 
GT score 1283.601 1 33.292 <0.001* 0.011 
NEO-FFI      
     Neuroticism 1037.429 1 26.907 <0.001* 0.009 
     Openness to experience 479.607 1 12.439 <0.001* 0.004 
     Agreeableness 224.950 1 5.834 0.016 0.002 
     Conscientiousness 378.944 1 9.829 0.002* 0.003 
Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index 395.210 1 10.250 0.001* 0.003 
Sex (referent male) 561.431 1 14.562 <0.001* 0.005 
Tobacco use (referent no) 40.373 1 1.047 0.306 <0.001 
Error 38.555 3042    
*Significant at ≤ 0.01 level. 







There was no significant fixed effect for week, but there was a significant 
effect for chronotype (Figure IV-21), with the main pairwise difference occurring 
between evening and indeterminate chronotypes (p < 0.001).   
 
 
Figure VI-21. Estimated marginal means for POMS V-factor delta from baseline scores 
by chronotype (error bars are for 99% confidence intervals). 
 
Significant covariates included age, BMI, caffeine use, component, ESS 
score, GT score, NEO (neuroticism, openness to experience, and agreeableness 
component scores), PSQI score, and sex.  Only age, ESS score, and GT score had effect 
sizes of at least 1%.   
e. Fatigue-Inertia (F) Factor 
Table VI-16 provides the results of the univariate tests of between-
participant effects for the POMS F-factor delta from baseline scores.  There were no 
significant fixed effects of either treatment condition or chronotype.  However, there was 
a significant fixed effect of week as well as a significant interaction effect between 








Table VI-16. Univariate tests of between-participant effects for POMS F-factor delta 
from baseline scores. 
Source MS   df F p η2 
Condition 119.754 1 3.092 0.079 0.001 
Week 401.350 8 10.362 <0.001* 0.027 
Chronotype 23.846 2 0.616 0.540 <0.001 
Condition x Week 163.341 8 4.217 <0.001* 0.011 
Condition x Chronotype 111.529 2 2.880 0.056 0.002 
Age 1100.898 1 28.424 <0.001* 0.009 
Body mass index 1451.967 1 37.488 <0.001* 0.012 
Caffeine use (referent no) 112.819 1 2.913 0.088 0.001 
Component (referent regular) 16.907 1 0.437 0.509 <0.001 
Epworth Sleepiness Scale 2118.381 1 54.694 <0.001* 0.018 
GT score 753.970 1 19.467 <0.001* 0.006 
NEO-FFI      
     Neuroticism 627.055 1 16.190 <0.001* 0.005 
     Openness to experience 8.629 1 0.223 0.637 <0.001 
     Agreeableness 1108.981 1 28.633 <0.001* 0.009 
     Conscientiousness 899.462 1 23.223 <0.001* 0.008 
Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index 33.364 1 0.861 0.353 <0.001 
Sex (referent male) 472.120 1 12.190 <0.001* 0.004 
Tobacco use (referent no) 33.269 1 0.859 0.354 <0.001 
Error 38.731 3042    
*Significant at ≤ 0.01 level. 








For the fixed effect of week (Figure VI-22), the pairwise differences 
occurred between week 1 versus week 4 and weeks 6–9 (p < 0.001); week 2 versus week 
7 (p = 0.009); week 3 versus weeks 6, 7, and 9 (p ≤ 0.009); and week 5 versus weeks 4, 
6–7, and 9 (p ≤ 0.005).   
 
 
Figure VI-22. Estimated marginal means for POMS F-factor delta from baseline scores 














In terms of the significant interaction effect (Figure VI-23), the 
comparison group started out with a higher mean F-factor score but had a greater rate of 
decrease in scores over training as compared to the intervention group.   
 
 
Figure VI-23. Estimated marginal means for POMS F-factor delta from baseline scores 
by treatment condition and week of training (error bars are for 99% confidence intervals). 
 
Significant covariates included age, BMI, ESS score, GT score, NEO 
(neuroticism, agreeableness, and conscientiousness component scores), and sex.  Only 
BMI and ESS score had effect sizes of at least 1%.   
f. Confusion-Bewilderment (C) Factor 
Table VI-17 provides the results of the univariate tests of between-
participant effects for the POMS C-factor delta from baseline scores.  There was no 










Table VI-17.  Univariate tests of between-participant effects for POMS C-factor delta 
from baseline scores. 
Source MS df F p η2 
Condition 26.964 1 1.117 0.291 <0.001 
Week 274.662 8 11.383 <0.001* 0.029 
Chronotype 5.940 2 0.246 0.782 <0.001 
Condition x Week 27.565 8 1.142 0.331 0.003 
Condition x Chronotype 27.612 2 1.144 0.319 0.001 
Age 30.062 1 1.246 0.264 <0.001 
Body mass index 790.474 1 32.760 <0.001* 0.011 
Caffeine use (referent no) 38.958 1 1.615 0.204 0.001 
Component (referent regular) 274.152 1 11.362 0.001* 0.004 
Epworth Sleepiness Scale 248.181 1 10.286 0.001* 0.003 
GT score 72.149 1 2.990 0.084 0.001 
NEO-FFI      
     Neuroticism 181.822 1 7.535 0.006* 0.002 
     Openness to experience 2.737 1 0.113 0.736 <0.001 
     Agreeableness 92.860 1 3.848 0.050 0.001 
     Conscientiousness 286.123 1 11.858 0.001* 0.004 
Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index 449.225 1 18.618 <0.001* 0.006 
Sex (referent male) 57.315 1 2.375 0.123 0.001 
Tobacco use (referent no) 446.382 1 18.500 <0.001* 0.006 
Error 24.129 3042    
*Significant at ≤ 0.01 level. 







There was a significant fixed effect for week (Figure VI-24), with pairwise 
differences occurring between week 1 versus weeks 3–9 (p < 0.006) and week 2 versus 
weeks 6–9 (p ≤ 0.005).   
 
 
Figure VI-24. Estimated marginal means for POMS C-factor delta from baseline scores 
by week of training (error bars are for 99% confidence intervals). 
 
There was no significant interaction effect between treatment condition 
and either week or chronotype.   Thus, the trend was for C-factor scores to decrease 
during the course of training.  Significant covariates included BMI, component, ESS 
score, NEO neuroticism and conscientiousness component scores, PSQI score, and 
tobacco use, but only BMI had an effect size of at least 1%.   
g. Total Mood Disturbance Score 
A total mood disturbance (TMD) score was obtained from the POMS by 
simply summing the scores across all six factors while negatively weighting vigor.  
Accordingly, the TMD score provides a single global estimate of affective state (McNair 
& Heuchert, 2005).  An ANCOVA of TMD delta from baseline scores was accomplished 
using treatment condition, week, and chronotype as fixed effects and age, caffeine and 





score, personality component scores, RSES score, sex, and sleep factors (ESS and PSQI 
scores) as covariates (Table VI-18). 
   
Table VI-18. Univariate tests for Total Mood Disturbance delta from baseline scores. 
Source MS   df F p η2 
Condition 253.538 1 0.221 0.638 <0.001 
Week 12915.545 8 11.276 <0.001* 0.029 
Chronotype 1400.551 2 1.223 0.295 0.001 
Condition x Week 3306.386 8 2.887 0.003* 0.008 
Condition x Chronotype 2040.045 2 1.781 0.169 0.001 
Chronotype x Week 839.027 16 0.733 0.763 0.004 
Condition x Chronotype x Week 1137.775 16 0.993 0.461 0.005 
Age 36498.019 1 31.865 <0.001* 0.010 
Body mass index 58619.151 1 51.178 <0.001* 0.017 
Caffeine use (referent no) 5566.435 1 4.860 0.028 0.002 
Component (referent regular) 153.641 1 0.134 0.714 <0.001 
Epworth Sleepiness Scale 17536.589 1 15.311 <0.001* 0.005 
Exercise frequency 2809.579 1 2.453 0.117 0.001 
Firearm use (referent no) 557.135 1 0.486 0.486 <0.001 
GT score 10973.626 1 9.581 0.002* 0.003 
NEO-FFI      
     Neuroticism 40202.835 1 35.100 <0.001* 0.011 
     Extraversion 2535.015 1 2.213 0.137 0.001 
     Openness to experience 5919.692 1 5.168 0.023 0.002 
     Agreeableness 9377.554 1 8.187 0.004* 0.003 
     Conscientiousness 10897.472 1 9.514 0.002* 0.003 
Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index 2656.198 1 2.319 0.128 0.001 
RSES 7.987 1 0.007 0.933 <0.001 
Sex (referent male) 8096.891 1 7.069 0.008* 0.002 
Tobacco use (referent no) 12866.257 1 11.233 0.001* 0.004 
Error 1145.388 3039    
*Significant at ≤ 0.01 level. 
Notes:  GT score = General technical aptitude score; MS = Mean square; NEO-FFI = NEO Five-Factor 
Inventory; RSES = Response to Stressful Experiences Scale. 
 434
There were no significant fixed effects for treatment condition or 
chronotype.  However, there was a significant fixed effect for week as well as a 
significant interaction effect between treatment condition and week.  For the fixed effect 
of week (Figure VI-25), pairwise differences occurred between week 1 versus weeks 4–9 
(p ≤ 0.004), week 2 versus week 9 (p < 0.001), week 3 versus week 9 (p < 0.001), and 
week 5 versus week 9 (p = 0.007).   
 
 
Figure VI-25. Estimated marginal means for POMS Total Mood Disturbance (TMD) 













As shown in Figure VI-26, the comparison group started out with a higher 
mean TMD score but had a greater rate of decrease in scores over the course of training 
relative to the intervention group.   
 
 
Figure VI-26. Estimated marginal means for POMS Total Mood Disturbance (TMD) 
delta from baseline scores by treatment condition and week of training (error bars are for 
99% confidence intervals). 
 
Significant covariates included age, BMI, ESS score, GT score, NEO 
(neuroticism, agreeableness, and conscientiousness component scores), sex, and tobacco 
use.  Only age, BMI, and neuroticism had effect sizes of at least 1%.   
h. Actigraphy Subsample 
The analysis of the POMS data was repeated for the subsample of 
participants for which actigraphy data was available.  The same analytic approach was 
used with the exception that weekly average hours slept was used as the covariate.  Table 
VI-19 summarizes the results of the multivariate tests.  There was no significant fixed 
effect of treatment condition or week, but there was a significant fixed effect of 






chronotype.  There was also a significant multivariate effect of the covariate, weekly 
average hours slept, but the covariate was not significant in any of the subsequent 
univariate tests.   
 
Table VI-19. Multivariate tests for POMS delta from baseline scores for actigraphy 
subsample. 
Source Wilks’ λ F df1 df2 P η2 
Condition 0.989 1.258 6 686 0.275 0.011 
Week 0.907 1.415 48 3379 0.032 0.016 
Chronotype 0.863 8.749 12 1372 <0.001* 0.071 
Condition x Week 0.960 0.584 48 3379 0.990 0.007 
Condition x Chronotype 0.874 7.945 12 1372 <0.001* 0.065 
Chronotype x Week 0.942 0.429 96 3893 1.000 0.010 
Condition x Chronotype x Week 0.947 0.394 96 3893 1.000 0.009 
Average weekly sleep 0.971 3.458 6 686 0.002* 0.029 
*Significant at ≤ 0.01 level. 
Note:  MS = Mean square. 
 
 
The analysis of the respective univariate tests revealed significant fixed 
effects of chronotype for T-factor (F2,691 = 15.888, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.044), D-factor (F2,691 
= 14.710, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.041), A-factor (F2,691 = 9.508, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.027), V-factor 
(F2,691 = 7.730, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.022), F-factor (F2,691 = 16.262, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.045), 
and C-factor (F2,691 = 21.489, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.059).  In the case of T-factor, D-factor, 
and F-factor, pairwise differences occurred between indeterminate versus both evening 
and morning chronotypes; the basic pattern was as shown in Figure VI-27 for T-factor.    
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Figure VI-27. Estimated marginal means for POMS T-factor delta from baseline scores 
by chronotype for actigraphy subsample (error bars are for 99% confidence intervals). 
 
For A-factor, the pairwise difference occurred between indeterminate and 
morning chronotypes (Figure VI-28), whereas the pairwise difference occurred between 
evening versus morning chronotypes for V-factor (Figure VI-29).  
 
 
Figure VI-28. Estimated marginal means for POMS A-factor delta from baseline scores 










Figure VI-29. Estimated marginal means for POMS V-factor delta from baseline scores 
by chronotype for actigraphy subsample (error bars are for 99% confidence intervals). 
 
In the case of C-factor, the pairwise differences occurred between evening 




Figure VI-30. Estimated marginal means for POMS C-factor delta from baseline scores 










The univariate tests also revealed significant interaction effects between 
treatment condition and chronotype for T-factor (F2,691 = 14.882, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.041), 
D-factor (F2,691 = 18.472,  p < 0.001, η2 = 0.051), A-factor (F2,691 = 6.264, p = 0.002, η2 = 
0.018), V-factor (F2,691 = 9.716, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.027), and C-factor (F2,691 = 19.404, p < 
0.001, η2 = 0.053).  Figure VI-31 illustrates the interaction effect for D-factor; T-factor, 
A-factor, and C-factor followed similar patterns with evening and indeterminate 
chronotype participants having lower scores in the intervention group versus the 
comparison group, while the opposite was true for morning chronotype participants.   
 
 
Figure VI-31. Estimated marginal means for POMS D-factor delta from baseline scores 












Figure VI-32 illustrates the interaction effect for V-factor, with evening 
chronotype participants having lower scores in the intervention group versus the 
comparison group, while the opposite was true for intermediate and morning chronotype 
participants.   
 
 
Figure VI-32. Estimated marginal means for POMS V-factor delta from baseline scores 















The univariate analysis of TMD delta from baseline scores for the 
subsample of participants with actigraphy data (Table VI-20) showed significant fixed 
effects for week and chronotype but not for treatment condition.   
 
 
Table VI-20. Univariate tests of between-participant effects for Total Mood Disturbance 
delta from baseline scores for actigraphy subsample. 
Source MS   df F p η2 
Condition 2.322 1 0.003 0.960 <0.001 
Week 2623.315 8 2.889 0.004* 0.032 
Chronotype 16401.755 2 18.060 <0.001* 0.050 
Condition x Week 1065.655 8 1.173 0.313 0.013 
Condition x Chronotype 11831.703 2 13.028 <0.001* 0.036 
Chronotype x Week 305.067 16 0.336 0.993 0.008 
Condition x Chronotype x Week 387.332 16 0.426 0.976 0.010 
Average weekly sleep 35.315 1 0.039 0.844 <0.001 
Error 908.191 690    
*Significant at ≤ 0.01 level. 












For the fixed effect of week (Figure VI-33), the pairwise difference 
occurred between week 1 versus week 9 (p = 0.009).  
 
 
Figure VI-33. Estimated marginal means for POMS Total Mood Disturbance (TMD) 
delta from baseline scores by week of training for the actigraphy subsample (error bars 














For the fixed effect of chronotype (Figure VI-34), pairwise differences 
occurred between indeterminate versus both evening and morning chronotypes (p < 
0.001).   
 
 
Figure VI-34. Estimated marginal means for POMS Total Mood Disturbance (TMD) 
delta from baseline scores by chronotype for actigraphy subsample (error bars are for 















There was also a significant interaction effect between treatment condition 
and chronotype (Figure VI-35), with evening and indeterminate chronotype participants 
having lower scores in the intervention group versus the comparison group, while the 
opposite was true for morning chronotype participants.  There was no significant effect of 




Figure VI-35. Estimated marginal means for POMS Total Mood Disturbance (TMD) 
delta from baseline scores by study condition and chronotype for actigraphy subsample 
(error bars are for 99% confidence intervals). 
 
4. Basic Rifle Marksmanship 
We assessed how participants’ basic rifle marksmanship performance (on record 
fires) was related to treatment condition and chronotype while accounting for potential 
covariates.  However, when the marksmanship database was received from each 
company, several issues needed to be addressed prior to choosing an analytical approach.  
First, although both companies were issued the same number of rounds per participant for 
basic rifle marksmanship training, each company fired those rounds at a different rate.  
The intervention group accomplished record fires on four separate days, while the 





four scores for each participant in the database for the intervention group and three scores 
per participant in the database for the comparison group.  Additionally, not every 
participant accomplished the available maximum number of record fires.   
These issues were addressed by analyzing the marksmanship scores using a 
simple pre/post repeated measures design in which the first recorded marksmanship score 
for each participant was denoted as the pre score and the last score was denoted as the 
post score.  A repeated measures ANCOVA of marksmanship score was accomplished 
using practice as a within-participant effect; study condition and chronotype as fixed 
between-participant effects; and age, caffeine and tobacco use, component, firearm use, 
GT score, personality component scores, RSES score, sex, and sleep factors (ESS and 
PSQI scores) as covariates.  In addition, given that marksmanship fundamentals were 
taught during the week prior to the record fires, POMS measurements from the week 
prior to (t* – 1) and the week of (t*) the record fires were also included as covariates.   
A total of 372 participants, 201 in the intervention group (90% of the initial 
cohort) and 171 in the comparison group (87% of the initial cohort), had at least two 
observations recorded in the marksmanship databases.  Tables VI-21 and VI-22 display 
the results for the within-participant model.  Based on a 5% significance level, there was 










Table VI-21. Within-participant effects for marksmanship score. 
Source MS   df F p η2 
Practice 53.799 1 2.662 0.104 0.008 
Practice x Condition 196.757 1 9.737 0.002* 0.030 
Practice x Chronotype 5.314 2 0.263 0.769 0.002 
Practice x Condition x Chronotype 1.235 2 0.061 0.941 <0.001 
Practice x Age 0.777 1 0.038 0.845 <0.001 
Practice x Body mass index 14.825 1 0.734 0.392 0.002 
Practice x Caffeine use (referent no) 25.043 1 1.239 0.266 0.004 
Practice x Component (referent regular) 2.255 1 0.112 0.739 <0.001 
Practice x Epworth Sleepiness Scale 11.565 1 0.572 0.450 0.002 
Practice x Firearm use (referent no) 2.682 1 0.133 0.716 <0.001 
Practice x GT score 45.644 1 2.259 0.134 0.007 
Practice x NEO neuroticism 50.031 1 2.476 0.117 0.008 
Practice x NEO extraversion 74.857 1 3.705 0.055 0.012 
Practice x NEO openness to experience 8.837 1 0.437 0.509 0.001 
Practice x NEO agreeableness 7.876 1 0.390 0.533 0.001 
Practice x NEO conscientiousness 0.163 1 0.008 0.928 <0.001 
Practice x PSQI 6.056 1 0.300 0.584 0.001 
Practice x POMS week t* – 1 T-factor 3.562 1 0.176 0.675 0.001 
Practice x POMS week t* – 1 D-factor 0.810 1 0.040 0.841 <0.001 
Practice x POMS week t* – 1 A-factor 27.994 1 1.385 0.240 0.004 
Practice x POMS week t* – 1 V-factor 0.865 1 0.043 0.836 <0.001 
Practice x POMS week t* – 1 F-factor 18.454 1 0.913 0.340 0.003 
Practice x POMS week t* – 1 C-factor 20.848 1 1.032 0.311 0.003 
*Significant at ≤ 0.05 level. 
Notes:  GT score = General technical aptitude score; MS = Mean square; PSQI = Pittsburgh Sleep 








Table VI-22. Within-participant effects for marksmanship score (continued). 
Source MS   df F p η2 
Practice x POMS week t* T-factor 6.477 1 0.321 0.572 0.001 
Practice x POMS week t* D-factor 0.014 1 0.001 0.979 <0.001 
Practice x POMS week t* A-factor 16.824 1 0.833 0.362 0.003 
Practice x POMS week t* V-factor 8.999 1 0.445 0.505 0.001 
Practice x POMS week t* F-factor 17.276 1 0.855 0.356 0.003 
Practice x POMS week t* C-factor 83.390 1 4.127 0.043* 0.013 
Practice x RSES 0.680 1 0.034 0.855 <0.001 
Practice x Sex (referent male) 10.100 1 0.500 0.480 0.002 
Practice x Tobacco use (referent no) 0.740 1 0.037 0.848 <0.001 
Error 20.206 313    
*Significant at ≤ 0.05 level. 
















There was a significant interaction effect between practice and treatment 
condition, but there was no interaction effect between practice and chronotype. 
Participants in the intervention group had significantly lower initial scores than 
participants in the comparison group, but participants in the intervention group had 
greater improvement in scores with practice such that their final scores were equivalent to 
those of participants in the comparison group (Figure VI-36).  There was also a 
significant within-participant interaction between practice and t* week POMS C-factor 
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Figure VI-36. Estimated marginal means for first and last marksmanship scores by 












In terms of the between-participant model (Tables VI-23 and VI-24), there was a 
significant fixed effect for treatment condition, with an estimated marginal mean score 
for the intervention group of 24.872 (95% CI: 23.973, 25.453) versus 26.425 (95% CI: 
25.772, 27.397) for the comparison group.  Fixed effect of chronotype was not 
significant, nor was there an interaction effect between treatment condition and 
chronotype.  The only significant covariates were prior use of firearms and sex. 
 
Table VI-23. Between-participant effects for marksmanship score. 
Source MS   df F p η2 
Condition 153.391 1 4.183 0.042* 0.013 
Chronotype 5.402 2 0.147 0.863 0.001 
Condition x Chronotype 43.510 2 1.186 0.307 0.008 
Age 0.078 1 0.002 0.963 0.000 
Body mass index 30.719 1 0.838 0.361 0.003 
Caffeine use (referent no) 55.449 1 1.512 0.220 0.005 
Component (referent regular) 23.717 1 0.647 0.422 0.002 
Epworth Sleepiness Scale 74.759 1 2.039 0.154 0.006 
Firearm use (referent no) 173.043 1 4.719 0.031* 0.015 
GT score 84.001 1 2.291 0.131 0.007 
NEO-FFI      
     Neuroticism 11.672 1 0.318 0.573 0.001 
     Extraversion 5.767 1 0.157 0.692 0.001 
     Openness to experience 77.751 1 2.120 0.146 0.007 
     Agreeableness 41.375 1 1.128 0.289 0.004 
     Conscientiousness 16.079 1 0.438 0.508 0.001 
Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index 38.364 1 1.046 0.307 0.003 
*Significant at ≤ 0.05 level. 






Table VI-24. Between-participant effects for marksmanship score (continued). 
Source MS   df F p η2 
Week t* – 1 Profile of Mood States      
T-factor 86.493 1 2.359 0.126 0.007 
D-factor 27.612 1 0.753 0.386 0.002 
A-factor 0.089 1 0.002 0.961 0.000 
V-factor 0.902 1 0.025 0.876 0.000 
F-factor 129.144 1 3.522 0.062 0.011 
C-factor 22.697 1 0.619 0.432 0.002 
Week t* Profile of Mood States      
T-factor 0.415 1 0.011 0.915 0.000 
D-factor 57.535 1 1.569 0.211 0.005 
A-factor 5.613 1 0.153 0.696 0.000 
V-factor 46.526 1 1.269 0.261 0.004 
F-factor 15.798 1 0.431 0.512 0.001 
C-factor 0.325 1 0.009 0.925 0.000 
RSES 10.603 1 0.289 0.591 0.001 
Sex (referent male) 434.120 1 11.838 0.001* 0.036 
Tobacco use (referent no) 7.273 1 0.198 0.656 0.001 
Error 36.673 313    
*Significant at ≤ 0.05 level. 
Notes:  MS = Mean square; RSES = Response to Stressful Experiences Scale. 
 
The analysis was repeated for the subsample of participants for which actigraphy 
data was available.  The same general analytic approach was used except that the average 
hours slept during the week prior to (t* – 1) and the week of (t*) the record fires were 
used as the covariates.  A total of 90 participants, 52 (98% of the initial sub-cohort) in the 
intervention group and 38 (93% of the initial sub-cohort) in the comparison group, had at 
least two observations recorded in the marksmanship databases.  Table VI-25 displays the 
results for the within-participant model.  Again using a 5% significance level, there was 
no significant within-participant effect of practice, but there was a significant interaction 
effect between practice and treatment condition.   
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Table VI-25. Within-participant effects for marksmanship score for the actigraphy 
subsample. 
Source MS   df F p η2 
Practice 5.079 1 0.289 0.593 0.004 
Practice x Condition 105.668 1 6.003 0.017* 0.071 
Practice x Chronotype 1.681 2 0.095 0.909 0.002 
Practice x Condition x Chronotype 3.893 2 0.221 0.802 0.006 
Practice x Week t* – 1 average sleep 65.360 1 3.713 0.058 0.045 
Practice x Week t* average sleep 21.476 1 1.220 0.273 0.015 
Error 17.602 78    
*Significant at ≤ 0.05 level. 
Note:  MS = Mean square. 
 
Although the intervention and comparison groups did not differ in terms of mean 
initial and final scores, there was a trend for participants in the intervention group to have 
a greater improvement in scores with practice than participants in the comparison group 
(Figure VI-37).  There was no interaction effect between practice and chronotype, nor 
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Figure VI-37. Estimated marginal means for first and last marksmanship scores by 






In terms of the between-participant model (Table VI-26), there was no significant 
fixed effect of treatment condition in the presence of the sleep covariates.  Additionally, 
there was no significant fixed effect for chronotype, nor was there an interaction effect 
between treatment condition and chronotype.  There was, however, a significant effect 
for the covariate, week t* – 1 average sleep, but not week t* average sleep. 
 
Table VI-26. Between-participant effects for marksmanship score for the actigraphy 
subsample. 
Source MS   df F p η2 
Condition 62.723 1 1.439 0.234 0.018 
Chronotype 5.237 2 0.120 0.887 0.003 
Condition x Chronotype 56.897 2 1.305 0.277 0.032 
Week t* – 1 average sleep 177.670 1 4.076 0.047* 0.050 
Week t* average sleep 48.316 1 1.108 0.296 0.014 
Error 43.589 78    
*Significant at ≤ 0.05 level. 
Note:  MS = Mean square. 
 
5. Physical Fitness  
It was of interest to determine how participants’ performance on the Army 
Physical Fitness Test related to treatment condition and chronotype while accounting for 
potential covariates.  However, an issue was identified upon receipt of the physical 
fitness database from each company that needed to be addressed prior to choosing an 
analytic approach.  Forty-nine (12.5%) participants had no scores reported for any of the 
three physical fitness tests, 10.2% of the remaining 343 participants had no scores 
reported for either one or two of the physical fitness tests.  This issue was addressed by 
analyzing the physical fitness dataset as a repeated cross-section design rather than a 
within-participant repeated measures design and using a 1% significance level to counter 
the resulting increased power of statistical tests.   
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A MANCOVA of the component physical fitness scores (push-ups, sit-ups, and 
run) was accomplished using treatment condition, week, and chronotype as fixed effects 
and age, caffeine and tobacco use, component, fitness factors (BMI and exercise 
frequency), GT score, personality component scores, RSES score, sex, and sleep factors 
(ESS and PSQI scores) as covariates.  In addition, POMS measurements from the week 
of the corresponding physical fitness test were also included as covariates.  Tables VI-27 
and VI-28 summarize the results of the multivariate tests.  There were significant fixed 
effects for treatment condition, week, and chronotype as well as a significant interaction 
effect between treatment condition and week.  There were also significant effects for the 
covariates age, BMI, exercise frequency, GT score, NEO neuroticism component score, 
POMS A-factor score, and sex. 
 
Table VI-27. Multivariate tests for physical fitness component scores. 
Source Wilks’ λ   F df1   df2 p η2 
Condition 0.964 11.037 3 884 <0.001* 0.036 
Week 0.955 6.868 6 1768 <0.001* 0.023 
Chronotype 0.963 5.676 6 1768 <0.001* 0.019 
Condition x Week 0.978 3.317 6 1768 0.003* 0.011 
Condition x Chronotype 0.994 0.838 6 1768 0.540 0.003 
Chronotype x Week 0.995 0.396 12 2339 0.966 0.002 
Condition x Chronotype x Week 0.994 0.425 12 2339 0.954 0.002 
Age 0.952 14.765 3 884 <0.001* 0.048 
Body mass index 0.887 37.504 3 884 <0.001* 0.113 
Caffeine use (referent no) 1.000 0.045 3 884 0.987 <0.001 
Component (referent regular) 0.996 1.201 3 884 0.308 0.004 
Epworth Sleepiness Scale 0.997 0.919 3 884 0.431 0.003 
Exercise frequency 0.981 5.601 3 884 0.001* 0.019 
GT score 0.976 7.391 3 884 <0.001* 0.024 
*Significant at ≤ 0.01 level. 
Notes:  GT score = General technical aptitude score. 
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Table VI-28. Multivariate tests for physical fitness component scores (continued). 
Source Wilks’ λ   F df1   df2 p η2 
NEO-FFI       
     Neuroticism 0.975 7.442 3 884 <0.001* 0.025 
     Extraversion 0.990 3.011 3 884 0.029 0.010 
     Openness to experience 0.999 0.196 3 884 0.899 0.001 
     Agreeableness 0.999 0.376 3 884 0.770 0.001 
     Conscientiousness 0.990 2.840 3 884 0.037 0.010 
Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index 0.991 2.758 3 884 0.041 0.009 
Profile of Mood States       
     T-factor 0.994 1.645 3 884 0.177 0.006 
     D-factor 0.996 1.120 3 884 0.340 0.004 
     A-factor 0.976 7.167 3 884 <0.001* 0.024 
     V-factor 0.995 1.465 3 884 0.223 0.005 
     F-factor 0.993 2.177 3 884 0.089 0.007 
     C-factor 0.997 0.918 3 884 0.432 0.003 
RSES 0.993 1.948 3 884 0.120 0.007 
Sex (referent male) 0.944 17.607 3 884 <0.001* 0.056 
Tobacco use (referent no) 0.999 0.242 3 884 0.867 0.001 
*Significant at ≤ 0.01 level. 











Table VI-29 provides the results of the relevant univariate tests of between-
participant effects for push-up score.  There were significant fixed effects for treatment 
condition and week as well as a significant interaction effect between condition and 
week.  The estimated marginal mean push-up score for the intervention group was 76.404 
(99% CI: 73.992, 78.816) versus 70.475 (99% CI: 67.921, 73.028) for the comparison 
group.   
 
Table VI-29. Univariate tests of between-participant effects for push-up score. 
Source MS   df F p η2 
Condition 3727.319 1 16.107 <0.001* 0.018 
Week 3250.914 2 14.048 <0.001* 0.031 
Chronotype 333.852 2 1.443 0.237 0.003 
Condition x Week 1588.026 2 6.862 0.001* 0.015 
Age 920.453 1 3.978 0.046 0.004 
Body mass index 6508.729 1 28.126 <0.001* 0.031 
Exercise frequency 3338.788 1 14.428 <0.001* 0.016 
GT score 1573.779 1 6.801 0.009* 0.008 
NEO-FFI neuroticism 994.902 1 4.299 0.038 0.005 
POMS A-factor 842.023 1 3.639 0.057 0.004 
Sex (referent male) 1622.487 1 7.011 0.008* 0.008 
Error 231.413 886    
*Significant at ≤ 0.01 level. 
Notes:  GT score = General technical aptitude score; MS = Mean square; NEO-FFI = NEO Five-Factor 









For the fixed effect of week (Figure VI-38), the pairwise difference occurred 
between week 3 versus week 8 (p < 0.001).   Note that physical fitness assessments were 
















Week of training  
Figure VI-38. Estimated marginal means for push-up score by week of training (error 
















Regarding the interaction effect (Figure VI-39), the intervention and comparison 
groups differed in mean push-up score at week 3, but participants in the comparison 
group improved at a faster rate than those in the intervention group such that there were 



















Figure VI-39. Estimated marginal means for push-up score by treatment condition and 
week of training (error bars are for 99% confidence intervals). 
 
Significant covariates included age, BMI, exercise frequency, GT score, and sex, 
although BMI and exercise frequency had effect sizes that were two to four times greater 










Table VI-30 provides the results of the relevant univariate tests of between-
participant effects for sit-up score.  There were significant fixed effects for treatment 
condition, week, and chronotype as well as a significant interaction effect between 
treatment condition and week.  The estimated marginal mean push-up score for the 
intervention group was 73.128 (99% CI: 70.840, 75.416) versus 68.353 (99% CI:  65.930, 
70.775) for the comparison group.   
 
Table VI-30. Univariate tests of between-participant effects for sit-up score. 
Source MS   df F p η2 
Condition 2417.448 1 11.610 0.001* 0.013 
Week 2642.599 2 12.691 <0.001* 0.028 
Chronotype 1071.267 2 5.145 0.006* 0.011 
Condition x Week 1196.870 2 5.748 0.003* 0.013 
Age 159.669 1 0.767 0.381 0.001 
Body mass index 9580.624 1 46.010 <0.001* 0.049 
Exercise frequency 1782.953 1 8.563 0.004* 0.010 
GT score 4162.000 1 19.988 <0.001* 0.022 
NEO-FFI neuroticism 2535.853 1 12.178 0.001* 0.014 
POMS A-factor 236.754 1 1.137 0.287 0.001 
Sex (referent male) 4519.173 1 21.703 <0.001* 0.024 
Error 208.227 886    
*Significant at ≤ 0.01 level. 
Notes:  GT score = General technical aptitude score; MS = Mean square; NEO-FFI = NEO Five-Factor 







For the fixed effect of week (Figure VI-40), the pairwise difference occurred 















Week of training  
Figure VI-40. Estimated marginal means for sit-up score by week of training (error bars 
















For the fixed effect of chronotype (Figure VI-41), the pairwise difference 

















Evening-type                 Indeterminate                 Morning-type
 
Figure VI-41. Estimated marginal means for sit-up score by chronotype (error bars are 
















Regarding the interaction effect (Figure VI-42), the intervention and comparison 
groups differed in mean sit-up score at week 3, but participants in the comparison group 
improved at a faster rate than those in the intervention group such that there were no 



















Figure VI-42. Estimated marginal means for sit-up score by treatment condition and 
week of training (error bars are for 99% confidence intervals). 
 
Significant covariates included BMI, exercise frequency, GT score, NEO 
neuroticism score, and sex.  Body mass index was the most important covariate in terms 











Table VI-31 provides the results of the relevant univariate tests of between-
participant effects for the physical fitness test run score.  There was no significant fixed 
effect for treatment condition, but there were significant fixed effects for week and 
chronotype.   
 
Table VI-31. Univariate tests of between-participant effects for run score. 
Source MS   df F p η2 
Condition 435.740 1 1.680 0.195 0.002 
Week 2423.699 2 9.346 <0.001* 0.021 
Chronotype 3811.444 2 14.697 <0.001* 0.032 
Condition x Week 740.598 2 2.856 0.058 0.006 
Age 10994.891 1 42.395 <0.001* 0.046 
Body mass index 25556.018 1 98.541 <0.001* 0.100 
Exercise frequency 354.690 1 1.368 0.243 0.002 
GT score 2126.456 1 8.199 0.004* 0.009 
NEO-FFI neuroticism 565.387 1 2.180 0.140 0.002 
POMS A-factor 5532.681 1 21.333 <0.001* 0.024 
Sex (referent male) 367.816 1 1.418 0.234 0.002 
Error 259.343 886    
*Significant at ≤ 0.01 level. 
Notes:  GT score = General technical aptitude score; MS = Mean square; NEO-FFI = NEO Five-Factor 










For the fixed effect of week (Figure VI-43), pairwise differences occurred 
















Figure VI-43. Estimated marginal means for run score by week of training (error bars are 
















For the fixed effect of chronotype (Figure VI-44), pairwise differences occurred 
between evening versus both indeterminate and morning chronotypes (p < 0.009).  Thus, 














Evening-type                  Indeterminate                 Morning-type
 
Figure VI-44. Estimated marginal means for run score by chronotype (error bars are for 
99% confidence intervals). 
 
There was no significant interaction effect between study condition and week.  
Significant covariates included age, BMI, GT score, and POMS A-factor score, although 













The Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) score provides a single global estimate of 
physical fitness and is obtained by summing the scores across the three component fitness 
assessment activities.  An ANCOVA of APFT score was accomplished using treatment 
condition, week, and chronotype as fixed effects and age, caffeine and tobacco use, 
component, fitness factors (BMI and exercise frequency), GT score, personality 
component scores, POMS factor scores, RSES score, sex, and sleep factors (ESS and 
PSQI scores) as covariates (Tables VI-32 and VI-33).  There was no significant fixed 
effect for treatment condition, but there were significant fixed effects for week and 
chronotype as well as a significant interaction effect between treatment condition and 
week.   
 
Table VI-32.  Univariate tests of between-participant effects for Army Physical Fitness 
Test score. 
Source       MS   df F p η2 
Condition 7867.295 1 6.214 0.013 0.007 
Week 24182.956 2 19.102 <0.001* 0.041 
Chronotype 12473.396 2 9.853 <0.001* 0.022 
Condition x Week 9496.913 2 7.501 0.001* 0.017 
Condition x Chronotype 453.751 2 0.358 0.699 0.001 
Chronotype x Week 779.760 4 0.616 0.651 0.003 
Condition x Chronotype x Week 752.311 4 0.594 0.667 0.003 
Age 21989.056 1 17.369 <0.001* 0.019 
Body mass index 114926.602 1 90.779 <0.001* 0.093 
Caffeine use (referent no) 20.595 1 0.016 0.899 <0.001 
Component (referent regular) 32.099 1 0.025 0.874 <0.001 
Epworth Sleepiness Scale 3086.853 1 2.438 0.119 0.003 
Exercise frequency 14194.166 1 11.212 0.001* 0.012 
GT score 23105.988 1 18.251 <0.001* 0.020 
*Significant at ≤ 0.01 level. 




Table VI-33. Univariate tests of between-participant effects for Army Physical Fitness 
Test score (continued). 
Source       MS   df F p η2 
NEO-FFI      
     Neuroticism 3257.315 1 2.573 0.109 0.003 
     Extraversion 2419.963 1 1.911 0.167 0.002 
     Openness to experience 335.026 1 0.265 0.607 <0.001 
     Agreeableness 949.270 1 0.750 0.387 0.001 
     Conscientiousness 192.961 1 0.152 0.696 <0.001 
Profile of Mood States      
     T-factor 5577.076 1 4.405 0.036 0.005 
     D-factor 81.731 1 0.065 0.799 <0.001 
     A-factor 14252.349 1 11.258 0.001* 0.013 
     V-factor 5049.279 1 3.988 0.046 0.004 
     F-factor 3378.278 1 2.668 0.103 0.003 
     C-factor 280.387 1 0.221 0.638 <0.001 
RSES 3535.514 1 2.793 0.095 0.003 
Sex (referent male) 2184.334 1 1.725 0.189 0.002 
Tobacco use 179.788 1 0.142 0.706 <0.001 
Error 1266.002 886    
*Significant at ≤ 0.01 level. 











For the fixed effect of week (Figure VI-45), pairwise differences in APFT scores 
occurred between week 3 versus both week 6 and week 8 (p < 0.001).   
 
 
Figure VI-45. Estimated marginal means for Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) score 

















For the fixed effect of chronotype (Figure VI-46), the pairwise difference in 
APFT scores occurred between evening versus indeterminate chronotypes (p < 0.001).   
 
 
Figure VI-46. Estimated marginal means for Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) score 
















Regarding the interaction effect (Figure VI-47), the intervention and comparison 
groups differed in mean APFT score at week 3, but participants in the comparison group 
improved at a faster rate than those in the intervention group such that there were no 
differences in mean score by weeks 6 and 8.   
 
 
Figure VI-47. Estimated marginal means for Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) score 
by treatment condition and week of training (error bars are for 99% confidence intervals). 
 
Significant covariates included age, BMI, exercise frequency, GT score, and 
POMS A-factor score, but BMI was clearly the most important covariate based on effect 
size.  The analysis of the fitness data was repeated for the subsample of participants for 
which actigraphy data was available.  The same analytic approach was used with the 
exception that average hours slept per week was used as the covariate.  Multivariate tests 
showed that there was not a significant overall effect of average hours slept per week.  
Similarly, the univariate analysis of APFT scores for the subsample of participants with 
actigraphy data showed no significant effect for the covariate, average hours slept per 






6. Post-Study Questionnaire  
Both the pre-study and post-study questionnaires assessed participant sleep using 
two standardized survey instruments: the Epworth Sleepiness Scale (ESS) and the 
Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI).   The effect of the treatment intervention on ESS 
and PSQI scores was assessed using a pre/post study design.  A repeated measures 
ANCOVA of ESS and PSQI scores was accomplished using time as a within-participant 
effect; treatment condition and chronotype as fixed between-participant effects; and age, 
caffeine and tobacco use, component, firearm use, fitness factors (BMI and exercise 
frequency), GT score, personality component scores, RSES score, and sex as covariates.  
Because of participant attrition, there were missing post-study questionnaires for 44 
participants (21%) in the intervention group and 31 participants (17%) in the comparison 















a. Epworth Sleepiness Scale 
Based on a 5% significance level, in terms of within-participant effects of 
Epworth Sleeping Scale (ESS) score (Table VI-34), there was no significant within-
participant effect of time, nor was there a significant interaction effect between time and 
chronotype.  There were significant interaction effects between time and the fixed effect, 
treatment condition, as well as the covariate GT score.   
 
Table VI-34. Within-participant effects for Epworth Sleepiness Scale score. 
Source       MS   df F p η2 
Time 3.157 1 0.231 0.631 0.001 
Time x Condition 259.141 1 18.943 <0.001* 0.060 
Time x Chronotype 7.304 2 0.534 0.587 0.004 
Time x Condition x Chronotype 14.891 2 1.089 0.338 0.007 
Time x Age 2.853 1 0.209 0.648 0.001 
Time x Body mass index 7.710 1 0.564 0.453 0.002 
Time x Caffeine use (referent no) 1.979 1 0.145 0.704 <0.001 
Time x Component (referent regular) 0.406 1 0.030 0.863 <0.001 
Time x Exercise frequency 4.765 1 0.348 0.556 0.001 
Time x Firearm use (referent no) 13.056 1 0.954 0.329 0.003 
Time x GT score 111.942 1 8.183 0.005* 0.027 
Time x NEO neuroticism 0.476 1 0.035 0.852 <0.001 
Time x NEO extraversion 0.261 1 0.019 0.890 <0.001 
Time x NEO openness to experience 4.235 1 0.310 0.578 0.001 
Time x NEO agreeableness 44.847 1 3.278 0.071 0.011 
Time x NEO conscientiousness 4.997 1 0.365 0.546 0.001 
Time x RSES 0.091 1 0.007 0.935 <0.001 
Time x Sex (referent male) 38.794 1 2.836 0.093 0.009 
Time x Tobacco (referent no) 3.389 1 0.248 0.619 0.001 
Error 13.680 296    
*Significant at ≤ 0.05 level. 
Notes:  MS = Mean square; RSES = Response to Stressful Experiences Scale. 
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The interaction effect between time and treatment condition is shown in 
Figure VI-48.  ESS scores increased significantly for participants in the comparison 
group over the course of training but remained unchanged for those in the intervention 
group.  Consequently, the groups’ mean scores differed significantly at the post-study 
assessment with the comparison group reporting greater sleepiness. 
 
 
Figure VI-48. Estimated marginal means for ESS score by treatment condition and week 





















In terms of between-participant effects for ESS score (Table VI-35), there 
was a significant fixed effect of treatment condition, with an estimated marginal mean 
ESS score of 8.978 (95% CI: 8.297, 9.659) in the intervention group versus 11.242 (95% 
CI: 10.595, 11.888) in the comparison group.   
 
Table VI-35. Between-participant effects for Epworth Sleepiness Scale score. 
Source       MS   df F p η2 
Condition 503.762 1 21.635 <0.001* 0.068 
Chronotype 104.965 2 4.508 0.012* 0.030 
Condition x Chronotype 3.886 2 0.167 0.846 0.001 
Age 0.156 1 0.007 0.935 <0.001 
Body mass index 4.916 1 0.211 0.646 0.001 
Caffeine use (referent no) 5.897 1 0.253 0.615 0.001 
Component (referent regular) 20.799 1 0.893 0.345 0.003 
Exercise frequency 14.138 1 0.607 0.436 0.002 
Firearm use (referent no) 17.778 1 0.764 0.383 0.003 
GT score 70.499 1 3.028 0.083 0.010 
NEO-FFI      
     Neuroticism 27.178 1 1.167 0.281 0.004 
     Extraversion 34.900 1 1.499 0.222 0.005 
     Openness to experience 29.898 1 1.284 0.258 0.004 
     Agreeableness 13.613 1 0.585 0.445 0.002 
     Conscientiousness 12.016 1 0.516 0.473 0.002 
RSES 49.023 1 2.105 0.148 0.007 
Sex (referent male) 345.942 1 14.857 <0.001* 0.048 
Tobacco use 96.270 1 4.135 0.043* 0.014 
Error 23.285 296    
*Significant at ≤ 0.05 level. 
Notes:  GT score = General technical aptitude score; MS = Mean square; NEO-FFI = NEO Five-Factor 





There was also a significant fixed effect of chronotype (Figure VI-49), 
with the pairwise difference in ESS score occurring between evening and morning 
chronotypes (p = 0.009).  There was no significant interaction effect for ESS score 
between treatment condition and chronotype.  Significant covariates included sex and 




Figure VI-49. Estimated marginal means for ESS score by chronotype (error bars are for 
95% confidence intervals). 
 
Scores above ten on the ESS are indicative of excessive sleepiness and are 
a cause for concern with respect to performance (Miller, 2006).  Applying this standard to 
our study sample, the odds ratio for a participant reporting excessive sleepiness being in 
the comparison relative to the intervention group was 1.198 (95% CI: 0.765, 1.874) prior 
to training and 2.331 (95% CI: 1.478, 3.679) at the completion of training.   There was no 
difference in the odds of participants in the intervention and comparison groups being 
excessively sleepy at the start of training.  However, participants in the comparison group 
were approximately 1.5 to 3.5 times more likely to be excessively sleepy by the 
conclusion of training, indicative of their sleep debt accrual throughout the course of 





b. Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index 
In terms of within-participant effects of Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index 
(PSQI) score (Table VI-36), there was no significant fixed effect of time, nor was there a 
significant interaction effect between time and chronotype.   
 
Table VI-36. Within-participant effects for Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index score. 
Source       MS   df F p η2 
Time 0.297 1 0.044 0.834 <0.001 
Time x Condition 163.180 1 24.125 <0.001* 0.075 
Time x Chronotype 15.529 2 2.296 0.102 0.015 
Time x Condition x Chronotype 16.370 2 2.420 0.091 0.016 
Time x Age 28.914 1 4.275 0.040* 0.014 
Time x Body mass index 0.180 1 0.027 0.870 <0.001 
Time x Caffeine use (referent no) 0.015 1 0.002 0.962 <0.001 
Time x Component (referent regular) 0.046 1 0.007 0.934 <0.001 
Time x Exercise frequency 12.623 1 1.866 0.173 0.006 
Time x Firearm use (referent no) 1.433 1 0.212 0.646 0.001 
Time x GT score 1.170 1 0.173 0.678 0.001 
Time x NEO neuroticism 6.520 1 0.964 0.327 0.003 
Time x NEO extraversion 0.758 1 0.112 0.738 <0.001 
Time x NEO openness to experience 6.487 1 0.959 0.328 0.003 
Time x NEO agreeableness 3.250 1 0.481 0.489 0.002 
Time x NEO conscientiousness 9.862 1 1.458 0.228 0.005 
Time x RSES 0.526 1 0.078 0.781 <0.001 
Time x Sex (referent male) 0.048 1 0.007 0.933 <0.001 
Time x Tobacco (referent no) 0.215 1 0.032 0.859 <0.001 
Error 6.764 296    
*Significant at ≤ 0.05 level. 




There were significant interaction effects of PSQI score between time and 
the fixed effect, treatment condition, as well as the covariate age.  The interaction effect 
with treatment condition is shown in Figure VI-50.  PSQI scores increased for 
participants in the comparison group and decreased for participants in the intervention 
group over the course of training such that the groups mean scores differed significantly 
at the post-study assessment.    
 
 
Figure VI-50. Estimated marginal means for PSQI score by treatment condition and 
pre/post-training (error bars are for 95% confidence intervals). 
 
In terms of between-participant effects of PSQI score (Table VI-37), there 
was a significant fixed effect of treatment condition, with an estimated marginal mean 
PSQI score of 6.082 (95% CI: 5.629, 6.536) in the intervention group versus 7.539 (95% 
CI: 7.109, 7.970) in the comparison group.  There was no significant fixed effect of 
chronotype, nor was there a significant interaction effect between treatment condition and 
chronotype.  Significant covariates included age and the NEO personality components of 







Table VI-37. Between-participant effects for Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index score. 
Source       MS   df F p η2 
Condition 208.769 1 20.244 <0.001* 0.064 
Chronotype 9.839 2 0.954 0.386 0.006 
Condition x Chronotype 9.636 2 0.934 0.394 0.006 
Age 185.963 1 18.033 <0.001* 0.057 
Body mass index 17.835 1 1.729 0.189 0.006 
Caffeine use (referent no) 8.543 1 0.828 0.363 0.003 
Component (referent regular) 1.432 1 0.139 0.710 <0.001 
Exercise frequency 19.454 1 1.886 0.171 0.006 
Firearm use (referent no) 30.064 1 2.915 0.089 0.010 
GT score 33.465 1 3.245 0.073 0.011 
NEO-FFI      
     Neuroticism 97.425 1 9.447 0.002* 0.031 
     Extraversion 2.788 1 0.270 0.603 0.001 
     Openness to experience 89.635 1 8.692 0.003* 0.029 
     Agreeableness 180.261 1 17.480 <0.001* 0.056 
     Conscientiousness 47.638 1 4.619 0.032* 0.015 
RSES 5.616 1 0.545 0.461 0.002 
Sex (referent male) 17.329 1 1.680 0.196 0.006 
Tobacco use 3.049 1 0.296 0.587 0.001 
Error 10.312 296    
*Significant at ≤ 0.05 level. 
Notes:  GT score = General technical aptitude score; MS = Mean square; NEO-FFI = NEO Five-Factor 
Inventory; RSES = Response to Stressful Experiences Scale. 
 
Scores above five on the PSQI are indicative of poor sleep quality.  
Applying this standard to our study sample, the odds ratio for a participant having poor 
quality sleep being in the comparison relative to the intervention group was 1.684 (95% 
CI: 1.106, 2.565) prior to training and 5.477 (95% CI: 3.343, 8.972) at the completion of 
training.   Moreover, the odds of a participant having poor sleep quality decreased in the 
intervention group from pre-training (odds = 0.791; 95% CI: 0.659, 0.950) to post-
training (odds = 0.470; 95% CI: 0.377, 0.586).  In contrast, the odds of a participant 
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having poor sleep quality increased in the comparison group from pre-training (odds = 
1.332; 95% CI: 1.047, 1.696) to post-training (odds = 2.574; 95% CI: 1.889, 2.509). 
c. Ordinal Sleep Ratings 
 Participants provided ordinal ratings of the adequacy of the sleep obtained 
by themselves and peers using a 5-item Likert scale.  Figure VI-51 provides histograms 










































Figure VI-51. Histogram of participants’ ratings of their own sleep (top) and their peers’ 
sleep (bottom) by treatment condition. 
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The distributions of ratings by the comparison group were positively 
skewed versus those of the intervention group, which were symmetric unimodal.  The 
mean rank for both ratings was higher for the intervention group than the comparison 
group:  own sleep (intervention mean rank = 203.0, comparison mean rank = 110.5, 
Mann-Whitney U = 5164.5, p < 0.001) and peers’ sleep (intervention mean rank = 198.6, 
comparison mean rank = 112.4, U = 5495.0, p < 0.001).  There were small to moderate 
negative correlations between participants’ ordinal ratings of the adequacy of their own 
sleep and their post-training ESS (ρ = –0.351, p < 0.001) and PSQI scores (ρ = –0.505, p 
< 0.001).  Similarly, there was a negative correlation between participants’ own sleep 
ratings and post-training POMS total mood disturbance scores (ρ = –0.370, p < 0.001). 
d. Frequency of Sleep During Activities 
  Participants were asked to report, on average, how often they fell asleep 
during activities such as classes, training, or lectures.  Figure VI-52 provides a histogram 
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Figure VI-52. Histogram of daily frequency that participants report falling asleep during 
activities by treatment condition. 
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The distribution of responses for both groups was positively skewed, but 
the distribution for the intervention group was platykurtic at 0–2 while that of the 
comparison group was mesokurtic between 0–4.  A comparison of mean ranks confirmed 
that participants in the intervention group reported significantly fewer episodes of falling 
asleep than those in the comparison group (intervention mean rank = 137.5, comparison 
mean rank = 179.4, Mann-Whitney U = 9011.0, p < 0.001).  There was a small positive 
correlation between the frequency that participants fell asleep during activities and their 
post-training ESS (ρ = 0.365, p < 0.001) and PSQI scores (ρ = 0.291, p < 0.001).  There 
was also a positive correlation between the frequency that participants fell asleep during 
activities the post-training POMS total mood disturbance score (ρ = 0.206, p < 0.001).  
Additionally, there was a small negative correlation between a participant’s ordinal rating 
of their sleep and the frequency with which they reported falling asleep during activities 
(ρ = –0.250, p < 0.001).   
e. Preference in Timing of Physical Fitness Training 
 Participants were asked to indicate their preference for the best time of day 
for physical fitness training.  Figure VI-53 provides a histogram of the participants’ 




















Figure VI-53. Histogram of participants’ preferred time of the day for physical fitness 
training by treatment condition. 
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 The distribution of responses for both groups was bimodal with the 
primary peak occurring near the respectively scheduled company physical fitness training 
times.  Hence, participants in the intervention group indicated they generally preferred to 
conduct physical fitness training in the evenings as per their training schedule.   
Similarly, participants in the comparison group preferred to conduct physical fitness 
training in the mornings as per their training schedule.  There was a small, negative 
correlation between a participant’s Morningness-Eveningness Questionnaire score and 
their time preference for physical fitness training (ρ = –0.272, p < 0.001).  Thus, evening 
chronotype participants preferred physical fitness training in the evening and morning 
chronotype participants preferred training in the morning. 
7.  Attrition 
It was of interest to determine how participants’ likelihood of completing training 
related to treatment condition and other potential measured covariates.  The databases 
submitted by each of the training companies indicated whether each participant 
successfully completed training.  However, for those participants who did not complete 
training, the databases did not uniformly indicate when an attrition occurred and for what 
reason.  Moreover, the final disposition of participants who did not graduate was not 
always determined, with some being separated from the Army, others on convalescent 
leave pending recovery from an injury or awaiting a physical evaluation board, and still 
others washing back to reaccomplish either portions of or the entire course of training.  
Additionally, participants who did not meet physical fitness standards could also be sent 
to a special training company to focus on further physical conditioning.  Thus, a 
participant being classified as an attrite does not necessarily equate with them being lost 
to the Army.   Accordingly, it was decided to analyze the likelihood of a participant not 
graduating with their initial training cohort using a simple binary logistic regression 
model and limiting the covariates to those measured during the initial study enrollment.   
Overall, 35 (16.7%) participants in the intervention group failed to graduate with 
their cohort as compared to 33 (18.1%) participants in the comparison group, a non-
significant difference ( )21 0.130, 0.718pχ = = .  Table VI-38 shows the results for the 
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fitted binary logistic regression model for failure to graduate.  Accordingly, the odds 
ratios (ORs), calculated from the exponential of the estimated regression coefficients, 
should be interpreted in terms of the likelihood of failing to graduate with one’s initial 
training cohort.  The classification accuracy of the model was 83.9% using a cutoff of 
0.5.   
 
Table VI-38. Results for the fitted binary logistic regression model for failure to 
graduate with initial training cohort. 
Analysis variables Estimate Standard error df Wald p 
Intercept -7.387 1.317 1 31.450 <0.001 
Body mass index 0.104 0.033 1 9.882 0.002 
NEO-FFI neuroticism 0.039 0.017 1 5.507 0.019 
POMS depression-dejection factor 0.024 0.011 1 4.651 0.031 
Sex (referent male) 1.514 0.314 1 23.236 <0.001 
 
There was no significant effect of treatment condition on the likelihood of failure 
to graduate.  However, being female (OR = 4.545; 95% CI: 2.456, 8.411), increased body 
mass index (OR = 1.110; 95% CI: 1.1040, 1.184), higher scores of neuroticism as 
assessed using the NEO-FFI (OR = 1.040; 95% CI: 1.006, 1.074), and depressed mood or 
sense of inadequacy as measured on the POMS (OR = 1.024; 95% CI: 1.002, 1.046) were 
all associated with an increased likelihood of failure to graduate.   
E. DISCUSSION 
Most studies of training effectiveness in military environments have concerned 
themselves primarily with activities that occur during the waking hours.  They tend to 
examine the relationship between time expenditures in training using various modalities 
and measures of individual or system performance—the archetype being the classic 
transfer of training study.  This study took a decidedly different approach, instead 
concerning itself primarily with the importance of the hours spent sleeping and their 
relation to measures of Soldier performance and other indicators of individual 
functioning during basic combat training.  Recognizing that adolescents comprise the 
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majority of military accessions, this study evaluated the impact of accommodating 
adolescent alterations in sleeping and waking patterns.  In particular, the scheduled 
timing of sleep during training was adjusted to account for the developmental phase delay 
of the circadian cycle in adolescents.   The results of this study indicate that, even after 
controlling for factors contributing to individual differences, adjusting the scheduled 
sleep period in a phase delayed direction was associated with increased daily total sleep 
and modest improvements in some indicators of daytime functioning.  These findings 
suggest several operationally-relevant effects of accommodating adolescent sleep 
physiology that military planners may wish to consider in developing future training 
programs of instruction and associated training schedules.   
1. Actigraphic Measures of Sleep 
 Hypothesis 1 predicted that participants on the modified, phase-delayed sleep 
schedule would obtain more daily sleep than participants following the standard Basic 
Combat Training schedule.  This hypothesis was supported with participants on the 
modified sleep schedule obtaining approximately 33 more minutes of total sleep per night 
than those on the standard sleep schedule.  This finding is consistent with that of other 
studies, such as the School Transition Study (Carskadon, 2001), which have found that 
early start times are associated with truncated sleep in adolescents.  The observed 
reduction in sleep with early start times is attributed to the developmental phase delay of 
the circadian cycle in adolescents, which makes it particularly difficult for adolescents to 
advance the evening retiring time in order to obtain an adequate amount of sleep.  
Additionally, Carskadon and colleagues (1998) have demonstrated that adolescents do 
not readily adapt or habituate their circadian cycle to early rising times, although the 
mechanism underlying this observation is not well understood.  It is also interesting to 
note that a similar phenomenon has been described in adult shift workers with very early 
morning starts who tend to experience long sleep latencies when attempting to get 
compensatory sleep in the early evening (Rosa, 2001).   
 Thus, this study demonstrates that scheduling the sleep period for adolescents and 
young adults to better align with the phase delay in their circadian cycle results in a 
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significant improvement in total daily sleep without any concomitant adjustment to the 
quantity of time scheduled for sleep.  Regardless of differences in the timing of sleep 
between the two schedules, morning chronotype participants averaged approximately 15 
minutes more sleep than those participants who were evening chronotype.  This pattern is 
consistent with that described by Wolfson (2001) for adolescent students transitioning to 
a school with an earlier start time: evening chronotype students had more difficulty 
adjusting to the earlier start time and had less total sleep than did morning chronotype 
students.  The implication is that even with the phase-delayed schedule used in this study, 
evening chronotype participants experienced greater difficulty adjusting to their new start 
time.  This result is not surprising given the histograms of participants’ self-reported 
wake times prior to Basic Combat Training, which suggest that the transition to military 
life necessitated earlier start times for the majority of participants.  It is also worth noting 
that the average quantity of sleep obtained by participants was only approximately 60% 
of the 9.2 hours of daily sleep reportedly needed by adolescents (Mercer, Merritt, & 
Cowell, 1998; Wolfson, 2001).  Lastly, the observation that sleep was reduced for 
participants using the modified schedule after the sixth week of training is an artifact 
caused by the commencement of the field exercise portion of Basic Combat Training.  
2. Mood States 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that participants on the modified sleep schedule would 
have less decrement in mood state than participants following the standard Basic Combat 
Training sleep schedule.  There was weak support for this hypothesis based on the 
analysis of the entire study sample, which necessarily excluded consideration of a total 
daily sleep variable in the models.  Irrespective of treatment condition, the general trend 
was for participants to report decreased feelings of tension-anxiety, depression-dejection, 
fatigue-inertia, and confusion-bewilderment over the course of Basic Combat Training.  
Participants in the intervention group reported more stable feelings of anger-hostility and 
exhibited steadier total mood disturbance scores than participants in the comparison 
group.  Participants in the intervention group also tended towards less anger-hostility and 
lower total mood disturbance scores relative to the comparison group early in training, 
although these differences declined during Basic Combat Training.  Participants in the 
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intervention group reported significantly greater feelings of vigor than those in the 
comparison group throughout training, but the effect size of treatment condition was very 
modest in this case.   Overall, there was no evidence that characteristics of chronotype 
significantly affected participants’ mood states.    
There was partial support for Hypothesis 2, particularly with regards to the effects 
for the characteristics of chronotype on mood, when the analysis was restricted to the 
actigraphy subsample and a variable for total daily sleep was included in the models.  
Irrespective of treatment condition, evening chronotype participants reported more vigor 
throughout training than morning chronotype participants.  However, evening chronotype 
participants in the intervention group exhibited less self-reported feelings of tension-
anxiety, depression-dejection, anger-hostility, and confusion-bewilderment than their 
morning chronotype counterparts.  The opposite pattern occurred in the comparison 
group, with evening chronotype participants reporting greater feelings of tension-anxiety, 
depression-dejection, anger-hostility, and confusion-bewilderment than their evening 
chronotype counterparts.  In terms of total mood disturbance score, evening chronotype 
participants in the intervention group had lower scores than their morning chronotype 
counterparts, while a trend in the opposing direction was observed for participants in the 
comparison group.  Taken together, these findings suggest that the phase-delayed sleep 
schedule preferentially impacted, in a positive direction, the mood state of evening 
chronotype participants.  The operational significance of this finding is evident when one 
appreciates that the majority of military accessions are adolescents who, as a 
demographic group, tend to exhibit a biological predisposition for eveningness 
(Carskadon, 2001).   
The rather modest impact of the sleep schedule intervention on subjective mood 
in this study contrasts with other research that has shown that manipulations of the 
duration and timing of sleep episodes can have marked impacts on mood (Birchler-
Pedross et al., 2009; Boivin et al., 1997; Danilenko, Cajochen, & Wirz-Justice, 2003; 
Monk et al., 1992; Selvi et al., 2007; Taub & Berger, 1974; Wood & Magnello, 1992).  
For example, Boivin and colleagues (1997) demonstrated that even moderate changes in 
the timing of the sleep-wake cycle led to profound effects on mood.  Similarly, Danilenko 
 486
and colleagues (2003) showed that advancing the sleep-wake cycle daily by just 20 
minutes for a week led to significant decrements in subjective mood ratings relative to a 
control group with stable sleep.  Interestingly, Selvi and colleagues (2007) showed that 
phase preference modified the effect of partial sleep deprivation on mood, with morning 
chronotypes exhibiting less sensitivity of mood.  A pattern similar to that described by 
Selvi and colleagues was observed, at least for the subsample of the study population 
who had actigraphy data.   
Several hypotheses are suggested to explain the small observed effect of the 
schedule intervention on subjective mood in this study.  Mood is largely a function of 
situational factors (Chamorro-Premuzic, 2007) and the Basic Combat Training 
environment represents a complex milieu of such factors.  Throughout Basic Combat 
Training, the military instructor cadre is working to actively shape and influence the 
mood state of their Soldiers as a means of achieving organizational training objectives.  
Many factors, such as leader-subordinate and peer-to-peer dynamics, unit morale, and 
individual perceptions of acute physical and mental stressors, likely contributed to 
differences in subjective mood among participants.  Given the aggregate of observed and 
unobserved factors in this study, the relationship between sleep and subjective mood was 
most likely reduced to having a small, but still measurable, effect size.  Additionally, 
while the phase-delayed sleep schedule resulted in increased total daily sleep for 
participants in the intervention group, the shortfall in daily sleep relative to known 
adolescent sleep needs for both groups was still large (i.e., on the order of 3–4 hours).  
Consequently, participants in both groups may have had a significant partial sleep 
deprivation that then blunted the observed effect of the schedule intervention.   Finally, 
the phase-delayed sleep schedule, while a marked improvement over the standard Basic 
Combat Training sleep schedule in terms of accommodating adolescent sleep-wake 
patterns, was still significantly out of phase with participants’ baseline patterns as 
inferred from participant responses on the pre-training Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index.  
Such an assertion is supported by Carskadon’s (2001) study of adolescent students, which 
found that school start times around 7 a.m. were difficult for adolescent students, and 
students tended to do better when start times were delayed until 8 a.m. or later.   
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3. Basic Rifle Marksmanship 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that participants on the modified sleep schedule would 
exhibit greater improvement in basic rifle marksmanship scores than those following the 
standard Basic Combat Training sleep schedule.  This hypothesis was supported by the 
study results, although the analysis of marksmanship performance turned out to be far 
from straightforward given differences between training companies in initial performance 
on the first record fire and variability in the number of record fires accomplished by each 
participant.  Despite all this variability, however, it was possible to demonstrate that the 
degree of improvement in marksmanship performance over the serial record fires was 
significantly predicted, in part, by a sleep-related variable.  Moreover, the effect size of 
sleep, while relatively small, was still greater than that attributable to prior experience 
with firearms. 
It is noteworthy that sleep during the week preceding the record fires, when basic 
marksmanship tasks and subtasks were being learned, was more strongly correlated with 
subsequent performance than sleep during the week of the record fires.  This suggests the 
possibility that sleep was acting as a modifier of training effectiveness.  Such an assertion 
is consistent with research showing that procedural memories improve with subsequent 
early slow wave sleep (SWS) and late rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, although there 
is some debate regarding the relative importance of the various stages of sleep.  
Nevertheless, increasing evidence supports the role of sleep in memory consolidation and 
latent learning (Fenn, Nusbaum, & Margoliash, 2003; Gais et al., 2000; Karni et al., 
1994; Stickgold, James, & Hobson, 2000; Walker et al., 2003; Wilson & McNaughton, 
1994).  For example, Gais and colleagues (2000) observed that memories are, on average, 
more than three times improved after sleep containing both SWS and REM sleep than 
after a period of early sleep alone.  Thus, the phase-delayed schedule, which was 
associated with increased total daily sleep, likely increased the opportunity for late REM 
sleep and thereby potentiated the learning and recall of marksmanship skills.      
 488
4. Physical Fitness 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that participants on the modified sleep schedule would 
exhibit greater improvement in physical fitness scores than participants following the 
standard Basic Combat Training sleep schedule.  This hypothesis was not supported by 
the study results.  As in the case of the marksmanship data, the use of nonrandomized 
groups led to significant baseline differences between the intervention and comparison 
groups, with the intervention group exhibiting higher physical fitness scores early in 
training.  However, these differences diminished over the course of training such that the 
groups were equivalent on the final physical fitness assessment.  Thus, the overall pattern 
suggested a regression to the mean phenomenon—an assertion that is supported by the 
absence of any correlation between fitness scores and average total daily sleep for 
participants in the actigraphy subsample.  On the flip side, altering the timing of physical 
fitness training to accommodate the change in timing of sleep did not appear to harm the 
performance of participants in the intervention group.  Additionally, participants in the 
intervention group generally expressed a preference for the later timing of their physical 
fitness training, while participants in the comparison group, on average, preferred the 
earlier timing of their physical fitness training. 
These findings are consistent with that reported in the scientific literature 
examining the effect of sleep deprivation on exercise performance.  Studies of exercise 
performance after periods of sleep deprivation of up to 72 hours have consistently 
demonstrated that muscle strength and exercise performance are not affected (Martin, 
1981; Martin & Gaddis, 1981; Reilly & Deykin, 1983; Van Helder & Radomski, 1989).  
While Martin (1981) was able to show that sleep loss reduced work time to exhaustion by 
an average of 11 percent, this change was attributed to the psychological effects of acute 
sleep debt because subjects’ ratings of exertion were dissociated from any cardiovascular 
changes.  A smaller body of research has also examined the influence of chronotype on 
diurnal changes in muscle strength.  For example, Tamm and colleagues (2009) found 
that evening chronotype individuals could produce a stronger maximum voluntary muscle 
contraction in the evening, while morning chronotype individuals exhibited no significant 
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change in strength throughout the day.  However, the results of this study failed to show 
any significant effect of chronotype for the strength-based fitness assessments.   
5. Sleep Hygiene 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that for participants whose sleep schedules were modified, 
the odds of reporting occupationally significant fatigue (defined as an Epworth 
Sleepiness Scale (ESS) score greater than ten) would be lower than that for participants 
following the standard Basic Combat Training sleep schedule.  This hypothesis was 
supported by the study results, with participants in the comparison group being 2.3 times 
more likely to have occupationally significant fatigue at the end of training—a finding 
with important safety and health implications.  At the beginning of the study, participants 
in the intervention and comparison groups had comparable subjective sleepiness as 
assessed based on ESS scores.  Over the course of training, participants in the comparison 
group exhibited a significant increase in reported sleepiness, while those in the 
intervention group reported no change in subjective sleepiness.  Overall, evening 
chronotype participants reported greater sleepiness than morning chronotype participants.  
This result suggests that the modified sleep schedule, while an improvement over the 
standard schedule, still did not fully accommodate the developmental phase-delay of the 
adolescent and young adult circadian cycle.    
Hypothesis 6 predicted that for participants whose sleep schedules were modified, 
the odds of reporting poor sleep quality (defined as Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index 
(PSQI) score greater than five) would be lower than that for participants following the 
standard Basic Combat Training sleep schedule.  This hypothesis was supported by the 
study results, with participants in the comparison group being 5.5 times more likely to 
report poor sleep quality at the end of training.  Participants in the intervention and 
comparison groups had comparable sleep quality as assessed based on PSQI score at the 
start of the study.  Over the course of training, participants in the comparison group 
exhibited a significant degradation in sleep quality, while those in the intervention group 
exhibited a trend towards improved sleep quality.  Additionally, the odds of participants 
reporting poor quality sleep actually decreased for those in the intervention group relative 
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to the start of the study.  This finding suggests that the phase-delayed sleep schedule was 
an improvement over participants’ baseline sleep schedule—or in other words, Basic 
Combat Training actually improved the sleep hygiene of participants in the intervention 
group.   
To summarize, participants in the intervention group graduating from Basic 
Combat Training did so in a better physiological state than their counterparts in the 
comparison group.  The operational significance of this finding can be inferred from 
research on school age adolescents linking sleep patterns and academic performance 
(Acebo & Carskadon, 2001; Wolfson & Carskadon, 2003).  Thus, participants in the 
intervention group, by way of having improved wake-sleep patterns and increased total 
daily sleep, were better prepared to undertake the more academically rigorous secondary 
military occupation-specific training that follows Basic Combat Training.  Additionally, 
they can be expected to be at lower risk for future lost training days or injuries (Acebo, 
Wolfson, & Carskadon, 1997). 
6. Attrition 
Hypothesis 7 predicted that for participants on the modified sleep schedule, the 
odds of attriting from training would be lower than that for participants following the 
standard Basic Combat Training sleep schedule.  This hypothesis was not supported by 
the study results as evidenced by the absence of treatment condition in the final logistic 
model for attrition.  The single largest risk factor for attrition was sex with females more 
likely to attrite, followed by body mass index (i.e., fitness), neurotic personality 
characteristics, and depressed subjective mood.  Given that the frequency of attrition 
relative to time was positively skewed—that is, most attrition tends to occur earlier rather 
than later in training—it is more likely that pre-existing conditions or vulnerabilities were 
the predominant determinant of attrition.   
F. SELECT HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION ANALYSES 
Up to this point, we have described a research study that was conducted from the 
behavioral sciences paradigm utilizing an experimental methodology and multi-variable 
statistical techniques drawn from experimental psychology.  We proposed a series of 
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research hypotheses and developed corresponding statistical models to aid decision 
making with regards to our accepting or rejecting those research hypotheses (and 
conversely their corollary null hypotheses).   However, if we are to transition from the 
behavioral sciences to the HSI paradigm, we need to take a subset of research hypotheses 
that were accepted based on the statistical models and reformulate those that are of most 
interest to us in terms of tradeoff functions, thereby making possible their direct 
incorporation in the “system analytic thinking process” (Weisz, 1967, p. 3).  The latter is 
involved whenever there is a choice between various alternative system mixes to meet a 
particular requirement or threat.  Historically, systems analysis has been dominated by 
mathematically based operations research techniques developed to facilitate the decision 
making of organizational planners and systems developers (Hughes, 1998).  
Consequently, the objective of our forthcoming HSI analyses is the development of 
mathematical tradeoff functions that can then be used by decision makers to predict the 
optimum mix of human performance determinants, whether in terms of cost, 
effectiveness, or technical feasibility (Weisz, 1967, 1968).  This objective will be 
accomplished using the isoperformance methodology (Jones & Kennedy, 1996) described 
in depth in Chapter IV.  In so doing, we establish the pattern by which human factors 
research and human considerations can be appropriately represented in systems analyses.   
1. Basic Rifle Marksmanship Model 
 The purpose of this section is to develop in a step-by-step fashion an 
isoperformance curve for basic rifle marksmanship.  We start with a model, a criterion 
level, and a confidence level.  The model states the functional dependence of 
marksmanship performance on aptitude and average daily sleep.  The criterion indicates 
the minimal level of performance that one is willing to regard as adequate.  The 
confidence level is the probability of adequate performance, by which we mean that 
performance will equal or exceed the criterion.  What results is essentially a tradeoff 
function for marksmanship in terms of the personnel (i.e., aptitude) and survivability (i.e., 
fatigue) domains of HSI.   
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 Our first step is to obtain an expression for a model for the expected 
marksmanship performance for an individual Soldier, i.   As will be recalled from our 
earlier analysis of the basic rifle marksmanship data for the actigraphy subsample, 
participants in the intervention group tended to have lower initial marksmanship scores 
relative to participants in the comparison group, but they also exhibited a greater 
improvement in marksmanship performance over serial firings.  Additionally, the 
magnitude of this change was positively correlated with average daily sleep during the 
week prior to the serial firings (ρ = 0.341, p = 0.001), which was when they received 
instruction in rifle marksmanship fundamentals.  Moreover, there was no effect of group 
when sleep was included in the analysis, implying that differences in instructor cadre 
were not a likely explanation for the observed difference in basic rifle marksmanship.   
Consequently, we propose the following model for the basic rifle marksmanship data: 
( )S SLPi i ia b εΔ = + +                                                                                            (5) 
where SiΔ  is the difference between first and last serial marksmanship scores for the ith 
Soldier, and SLPi  is the i
th Soldier’s average daily sleep during the week prior to the 
serial firings.  The constants, a and b, are parameters estimated during the model fitting 
and iε  is a normally distributed error term with mean equal to zero and variance equal to 
2
εσ . 
 Table VI-39 presents a conventional readout for the model in terms of expected 
mean squares, F ratio, significance level, and effect size.  The result is that average daily 
sleep is a significant determinant of SΔ , explaining nearly 11% of the variance in the 
change in marksmanship scores.   While average daily sleep has a relatively modest 
effect on marksmanship performance, it is a determinant that is, at least in Basic Combat 






Table VI-39. Expected mean squares, F ratio, significance level, and effect size for the 
basic rifle marksmanship data from the actigraphy subsample. 
Source MS   df F p η2 
Sleep 412.190 1 11.329 0.001 0.116 
Error 36.382 86 — — — 
 
 We can rewrite Equation 5 as follows:  
[ ] ( )S SLPi iE a bΔ = +                                                                                             (6) 
The only difference between the right side of this equation and that of the full model is 
the absence of the error term.  Hence, the expected change in marksmanship performance 
for the ith Soldier depends only on the determinant SLPi .  The next step is to modify the 
model so that the left hand side of Equation 6 is in terms of the excepted final 
marksmanship score.  We begin by noting that 2 1S S Si i iΔ = − , where 1S i  is a Soldier’s 
initial marksmanship score and 2S i  is their final marksmanship score.  According, we 
rewrite Equation 6: 
 [ ] ( )2 1S S SLPi i iE a b− = +                                                                                     (7) 
Since expectation of a difference is simply the difference of expectations: 
[ ] [ ] ( )2 1S S SLPi i iE E a b− = +                                                                                (8) 
Rearranging terms: 
[ ] [ ] ( )2 1S S SLPi i iE E a b= + +                                                                                (9) 
We next propose replacing the [ ]1S iE  term with 1S jE ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , which is the expectation of the 
initial marksmanship score for a Soldier in the jth quintile for initial marksmanship 
performance.  Consequently, Equation 9 becomes 
( )2 1S S SLPij j ijE E a b⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= + +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦                                                                           (10) 
which requires that we recalculate 2εσ .  It is observed that the penalty for this change is 
small, with 2εσ  now equal to 37.049 as compared to 36.382 previously. 
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 We explain further since it may not be intuitive why we have proceeded through 
the following model development steps rather than simply fitting a model directly using 
1S ij , SLPij , and 2S ij .  To start, it was observed that there was a strong multi-collinearity 
between 1S ij  and SLPij , which complicates attempts at regression analysis.   Another 
nontrivial problem encountered in this study was the finding that the intervention and 
comparison groups differed in terms of initial marksmanship performance, and hence, 
aptitude—an observation that can be attributed to the use of non-randomly formed groups 
in the study design.  Since the intervention group, which obtained more sleep by study 
design, had worse initial marksmanship performance, sleep is negatively correlated with 
initial marksmanship scores (i.e., the effect of sleep was confounded by group differences 
in aptitude).  However, as we showed earlier in this section, sleep is also positively 
correlated with improvement in serial marksmanship scores irrespective of group.  These 
are contradictory findings.  If sleep did indeed have a negative effect on initial 
marksmanship performance, it would be expected to have a negative effect on serial 
marksmanship performance as well—but exactly the opposite was observed.  Thus, we 
focused on fitting the latter relationship to minimize potential confounding by the former.  
In the end, however, we still need to express the model dependent variable in terms of 
final marksmanship scores as this is the performance criterion used by the Army.  
 The second step in developing the isoperformance curve is to determine what 
expected performance for the ith Soldier in the jth quintile must be if the probability of 
adequate performance is to equal a specified confidence interval.  In our case, the Army 
has specified a final marksmanship score of 23 as the criterion, and we will presuppose 
0.80 is the desired confidence level.  These specifications are met if the expected 
performance for the ith Soldier in the jth quintile is 
2S 23ijE z εσ⎡ ⎤ = +⎣ ⎦                                                                                                (11) 
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where z equals 0.84 from tables of the normal curve and 37.049εσ =  (see prior 
paragraphs).22  Hence, 
2S 23 0.84 37.049 28.11ijE ⎡ ⎤ = + =⎣ ⎦                                                                   (12)                              
If the final marksmanship score for the ith Soldier in the jth quintile is to equal or exceed 
23 with a probability of 0.80, then the expected final marksmanship score for the Soldier 
must equal 28.11.   
 The third and last step is to put Equations 10 and 12 together.  Doing so produces 
( )128.11 S SLPj ijE a b⎡ ⎤= + +⎣ ⎦                                                                              (13) 
Equation 13 involves two model parameters (a and b), five sample statistics ( )1S jE ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , 
and the determinants SLPi  and quintile j, the latter corresponding to a choice of aptitude 




⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦=                                                                                   (14) 
The estimated values for the model parameters and sample statistics in Equation 14 are 
given below: 
1,1




19.052    12.250
3.861      18.000
                       23.579
                       27.056






⎡ ⎤= − =⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= =⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦
 
This is the basic rifle marksmanship isoperformance curve.  For any given choice of 
aptitude quintile, j, one can now calculate a value of SLPij  such that the two together 
produce adequate performance with the specified level of confidence. 
                                                 
22 For the sake of simplicity of illustration, we fit a confidence interval using the procedure described 
by Jones and Kennedy (1996).  As was discussed in Chapter V, a more conservative trade off analysis 
would be obtained by instead fitting the prediction interval, which accounts for the uncertainty present in 
the estimates of the model parameters.  
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 Figure VI-54 presents three isoperformance curves that trade off aptitude, as 
assessed based on initial marksmanship score, and average daily sleep.  The criterion is 
set at 23 (i.e., the minimum marksmanship qualification threshold), 27, and 30 (i.e., the 
sharp shooter qualification threshold).  Each isoperformance curve traces combinations of 
aptitude and average daily sleep that yield equivalent performance in terms of the 
criterion, which in this case is final marksmanship score.  Thus, these isoperformance 
curves can be read as tradeoff functions.  For example, Soldiers sleeping 7.55 hours per 
day will meet the basic rifle marksmanship qualification threshold of a final score of 23 if 
their initial marksmanship score is at least 18.  Alternatively, if Soldiers are allowed to 
sleep for only 6.77 hours per day, then their initial marksmanship score will need to be at 
least 21 if they are to achieve the basic rifle marksmanship criterion on their final record 
fire.  In other words, it takes one point in marksmanship aptitude to make up for each 16 
minute reduction in Soldiers’ average daily sleep during marksmanship instruction.   
 
   
Figure VI-54. Isoperformance curves trading off aptitude, expressed as initial 
marksmanship score, and average daily sleep, setting the final marksmanship score 




2. Sleep Quality Model 
 Repeating the process used to create the marksmanship isoperformance model, we 
next develop an isoperformance curve for post-training sleep quality as assessed using the 
Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI).  Again, we start with a model, a criterion level, 
and a confidence level.  The model states the functional dependence of post-training sleep 
quality on pre-training sleep quality and average daily sleep during training.  Since sleep 
quality is an important clinical construct and poor sleep quality is a significant symptom 
of many medical, psychiatric, and sleep disorders (Buysse et al., 1988), we utilize PSQI 
scores as a metric for the occupational health domain of HSI.  In terms of a criterion, a 
global PSQI score of greater than 5 was shown by Buysse and colleagues (1988) to have 
a 90% diagnostic sensitivity in distinguishing good sleepers (i.e., healthy individuals) 
from poor sleepers (i.e., individuals with mood or sleep disorders).   What results is 
essentially a tradeoff function in terms of the personnel (i.e., individuals’ baseline sleep 
quality) and survivability (i.e., fatigue) domains of HSI.   
 Our first step is to obtain an expression for a model of the expected post-training 
sleep quality of an individual Soldier, i.   We propose the following model for the post-
training PSQI data: 
( ) ( )2 1PSQI PSQI SLPi i i ia b c ε= + + +                                                                 (15) 
where 2PSQI i  is the post-training PSQI score for the i
th Soldier, 1PSQI i  is the i
th 
Soldier’s baseline PSQI score prior to starting training, and SLPi  is the i
th Soldier’s 
average daily sleep during training.  The constants, a, b, and c, are parameters estimated 
during the model fitting and iε  is a normally distributed error term with mean equal to 
zero and variance equal to 2εσ .  Table VI-40 presents a conventional readout for the 
model in terms of expected mean squares, F ratio, significance level, and effect size.  The 
result is that both baseline sleep quality and average daily sleep are significant 




Table VI-40. Expected mean squares, F ratio, significance level, and effect size for the 
post-training PSQI score data from the actigraphy subsample. 
Source MS   df F p η2 
Baseline PSQI score 39.152 1 4.264 0.043 0.057 
Sleep 64.233 1 6.995 0.010 0.090 
Error 9.183 71 — — — 
 
We can rewrite Equation 15 as follows:  
[ ] ( ) ( )2 1PSQI PSQI SLPi i iE a b c= + +                                                                 (16) 
The only difference between the right side of this equation and that of the full model is 
the absence of the error term.  Hence, the expected post-training PSQI score for the ith 
Soldier depends only of the determinants 1PSQI i  and SLPi .   
The second step in developing the isoperformance curve is to determine what the 
expected post-training PSQI score for the ith Soldier must be if the probability of 
adequate sleep quality is to equal a specified confidence interval.  In this case, we use the 
cutoff global PSQI score of 5 suggested by Buysse and colleagues (1988) as the criterion, 
and we will presuppose 0.80 is the desired confidence level.  These specifications are met 
if the expected post-training PSQI score for the ith Soldier is 
[ ]2 0.80PSQI 5iE z εσ= −                                                                                        (17) 
where z equals 0.84 from tables of the normal curve and 9.183εσ = .  Hence, 
[ ]2PSQI 5 0.84 9.183 2.455iE = − =                                                                   (18) 
If the post-training PSQI score for the ith Soldier is less than or equal to 5 with a 
probability of 0.80, then the expected post-training PSQI score for the Soldier must equal 
2.455.   
 The third and last step is to put Equations 16 and 18 together.  Doing so produces 
( ) ( )12.455 PSQI SLPi ia b c= + +                                                                         (19) 
Rearranging terms so that SLPi  is on the left hand side, one obtains 
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( )12.455 PSQISLP ii a bc
− −=                                                                              (20) 











This is the post-training sleep quality isoperformance curve.  For any given choice of 
baseline sleep quality, 1PSQI i , one can now calculate a value of SLPi  such that the two 
together produce adequate post-training sleep quality (i.e., occupational health) with the 
specified level of confidence. 
Figure VI-55 presents two isoperformance curves that trade off baseline sleep 
quality and average daily sleep during training.  The criterion is set at 5, the clinical 
threshold for healthy individuals, and 6.5, the average baseline PSQI score in the study 
sample.  The latter criterion setting represents the option of “doing no harm”—that is, not 
further exacerbating the sleep quality of already poor sleepers.  Each isoperformance 
curve traces combinations of baseline sleep quality and average daily sleep that yield 
equivalent performance in terms of the criterion, which in this case is post-training sleep 
quality.  Consequently, these isoperformance curves can be read as tradeoff functions.  
For example, Soldiers with poor baseline sleep quality (e.g., PSQI = 9.1) can obtain good 
sleep quality if they are provided 7.98 hours of sleep per night during training.  
Alternatively, if Soldiers are allowed to sleep for only 7.22 hours per day, then their 
baseline sleep quality will need to be fairly good (e.g., PSQI = 3.9) if they are to achieve 
the post-training sleep quality criterion.  In other words, it takes one point in baseline 
PSQI score to make up for each 9 minutes reduction in Soldiers’ average daily sleep 




Figure VI-55. Isoperformance curves trading off baseline sleep quality, expressed as pre-
training PSQI score, and average daily sleep, setting the final PSQI score criterion levels 
at 5 and 6.5 and the assurance level at 80%.   
 
G. CONCLUSION 
In summary, increasing sleep and concomitantly decreasing fatigue had a small 
but measurable influence on various indicators of Soldier functioning even after 
controlling for a variety of factors that affect performance.   Although Soldiers’ responses 
to the phase-delayed schedule intervention were relatively modest, it should be 
appreciated that the majority of outcome measures in Basic Combat Training are not 
highly sensitive to the effects of fatigue.  Thus, the most important finding of the study 
may be the impact of the schedule intervention on sleep quality during Basic Combat 
Training—that is, Soldiers completing Basic Combat Training using the phase-delayed 
sleep schedule had significant improvements in sleep hygiene such that they graduated 
from training in a better physiological state than when they started.  Or, in other words, 
the phase-delayed sleep schedule allowed Soldiers to accomplish the training objectives 
of Basic Combat Training at a lower cost in terms of their sleep reservoir, thereby leaving 
them with a greater available cognitive work capacity going forward for subsequent 




subsequent performance is assessed during the more cognitively demanding secondary 
military occupational specialty training courses—a recommendation for follow-up 
research related to this work.     
While insufficient sleep and the consequent fatigue is a recognized problem in our 
society, concern has mainly been voiced around well publicized, high cost disasters 
resulting from the degraded occupational performance of sleep-deprived adults.  The role 
of sleep in less dramatic circumstances seems to be underappreciated, particularly in the 
military environment where inadequate sleep is considered part and parcel of the routine 
starting in basic military training and onward.   To the extent that adolescents and young 
adults entering the Army are unable to obtain sufficient sleep at the appropriate time to 
facilitate their primary developmental task—that being to master core Soldiering skills 
and incorporate Army values within their evolving self-identity—there are potentially 
significant hidden lost opportunity costs being borne by the Army.  Our HSI tradeoff 
analyses, derived from the results of a behavioral sciences experiment involving a simple 
sleep schedule intervention, provide an empirical foundation to begin quantitatively 
assessing the contribution of sleep to Soldier well-being and performance.   What should 
then emerge is a Weltanschauung that considers the human sleep reservoir in terms of its 
contribution to the performance of the human component of weapon systems or the 
human as a weapon system.  Accordingly, the quantity and quality of sleep become 
limited resource variables that can and must be considered as part of the human factors 
contribution to systems analyses. 
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VII. HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION DOMAIN TRADEOFFS IN 
OPTIMIZED MANNING – THE TASK EFFECTIVENESS 
SCHEDULING TOOL 
Pretending to be superhuman is very dangerous.  In a well-led military, the 
self-maintenance of the commander, the interests of his or her country, 
and the good of the troops are incommensurable only when the enemy 
succeeds in making them so.  It is time to critically reexamine our love 
affair with stoic self-denial…If an adversary can turn our commanders 
into sleepwalking zombies, from a moral point of view the adversary has 
done nothing fundamentally different than destroying supplies of food, 
water, or ammunition.  Such could be the outcome, despite our best efforts 
to counter it.  But we must stop doing it to ourselves and handing the 
enemy a dangerous and unearned advantage (Shay, 1998, p. 104). 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The first mathematical models of sleep and circadian processes were developed 
more than 20 years ago in an effort to explain the timing of the human sleep-wake 
activity cycle.  In the intervening years, a number of applied biomathematical models of 
fatigue and performance have been developed from the first generation of models of 
sleep-wake cycles.  These applied biomathematical models typically use information 
about sleep history, duration of wakefulness, and circadian phase to predict performance 
capability and risk.  They are currently used to assess the potential contribution of fatigue 
to performance degradation at specific points in time, to develop and evaluate work/rest 
schedules, to plan work and sleep in operational missions, and to determine the timing of 
fatigue countermeasures to anticipated performance decrements (Neri, 2004).  The March 
2004 edition of the journal, Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, provides a 
comprehensive review and model-to-data comparisons of seven of the current 
biomathematical models of human fatigue and performance.  Those interested in more 
information on the biomathematical modeling of fatigue and performance should 
reference this resource and the bibliographies contained within. 
The U.S. Defense Department has long pursued applied research concerning 
fatigue in military operations and has developed several biomathematical fatigue models.  
One of these models, known as the Sleep, Activity, Fatigue, and Task Effectiveness 
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(SAFTE) Model, has achieved relatively wide acceptance and seen practical application 
within the Fatigue Avoidance Scheduling Tool (FAST) (Hursh et al., 2004).  FAST is 
used by various military occupational communities in conjunction with rule-based 
heuristics (e.g., shift-work guidelines, hours-of-service rules, etc.) to develop plans for 
staffing system functions or missions.  FAST is also beginning to be used by the system 
development community, again as an augmentation of other heuristics, to develop and 
refine manpower estimates in light of predictions of human performance.  For instance, 
organizational planners may use rule-based heuristics to determine staffing needs, while 
ignoring potential constraints, and then iteratively refine the solution, using heuristics and 
FAST, to then attempt to meet constraints and satisfy objectives.  The result is necessarily 
a trial-and-error approach that attempts to take manpower and performance into account, 
but does not systematically minimize manpower or maximize performance.   
Such instances beg the question: do current, commercially available 
implementations of biomathematical models of fatigue, with FAST being an archetype, 
answer the questions being asked by organizational planners?  In essence, the current 
instantiation of FAST requires the user to provide a schedule for which the software 
computes predicted task effectiveness over some time period of interest.  Thus, given a 
schedule, one can get a forecast for future task effectiveness.  But what about the inverse 
question:  given a desired threshold or lower limit for task effectiveness, what is the 
optimal schedule in terms of the timing of sleep-wake periods and the assignment of 
performance-sensitive duties? And by extension, there is the corollary question, how 
many people are needed to achieve sustained performance above the desired threshold? 
The operational relevance of these questions should be self-evident given the current 
emphasis on minimal manning paradigms for many military weapon systems. 
 In current vernacular, FAST is a point solution because it is tailored to provide a 
forecast of task effectiveness for a particular schedule.  As such, it cannot directly answer 
the aforementioned questions that are most germane to organizational planners—that is, it 
does not allow for a systematic exploration of a solution space to determine an optimal 
solution in terms of manning, schedule, or both.  Consequently, the question taken up 
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here is the feasibility of reconciling this problem within the self-imposed constraint of 
using the existing implementation of the SAFTE model in FAST.      
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 To illustrate an approach to solving this problem, consider the general dynamic 
system represented by the block diagram in Figure VII-1.  The system is subject to both 
exogenous inputs, d, which enter the system as filtered disturbances, w, as well as control 
inputs, u.  The system responds by a measurable system output, y, which results in some 
performance of the system, z.   A system controller, K, is present to supervise the system 
and make inputs as necessary to ensure system performance conforms to organizational 
objectives.  Many systems can be described using this simple notation, although the exact 
form of the transfer functions iG , sysG , and oG may not always be known.  For our 
purposes here, we will assume that the system operates continuously and the controller, 
K, is an individual human operator.  Such a system description might represent an 
operator controlling an unmanned aircraft system or the officer of the deck standing 
watch on the bridge of ship.  Thus, our problem is to determine the minimum number of 
individuals that are needed to staff the function, K, with the constraint that their predicted 
task effectiveness must be above some a priori threshold.  Additionally, it would be 
desirable, once this minimum number of individuals has been established, to determine 
how to schedule their duty periods such that their overall average predicted task 
effectiveness is maximized.   
 
 
Figure VII-1. Block diagram of a generic dynamic system. 
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C. THE SLEEP, ACTIVITY, FATIGUE, AND TASK EFFECTIVENESS 
(SAFTE) MODEL 
The SAFTE model is shown emblematically in Figure VII-2 using a system 
dynamics modeling stock and flow diagram.  The conceptual architecture of the SAFTE 
model centers on a sleep reservoir, representing sleep-dependent processes that govern 
the capacity to perform cognitive work.  Using the language of system dynamics 
modeling, the stock of this reservoir is cognitive work capacity.  Sleep is a replenishing 
flow into the reservoir, while wakefulness is a depleting flow out of the reservoir.  
Replenishment, in terms of sleep accumulation, is determined by information about the 
time-of-day of sleep, reservoir level (i.e., sleep debt), and sleep quality (i.e., sleep 
fragmentation).  The system modeled in Figure VII-2 provides output in terms of 
performance effectiveness, which is simultaneously modulated by circadian effects and 
the level of the reservoir (Hursh et al., 2004). 
 
 
Figure VII-2. Stock and flow diagram of the SAFTE model. 
 
The SAFTE model has been shown to predict changes in cognitive capacity, as 
measured by standard laboratory tests of cognitive performance, with reported 
coefficients of determination ranging from 89%–94%.  It is presumed these cognitive 
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tasks measure changes in the fundamental capacity to perform a variety of real-world 
tasks that rely on such cognitive skills as discrimination, reaction time, mental 
processing, reasoning, and language comprehension and production.  Although specific 
military tasks may vary in their reliance on these skills, Hursh and colleagues (2004) 
assert that it is reasonable to assume that changes in military task performance will 
correlate with changes in the underlying cognitive capacity.  Hence, there is an expected 
monotonic relationship between measured changes in cognitive capacity and military task 
performance.   
Based on the structure of the SAFTE model, the reservoir or stock of cognitive 
work capability, shown emblematically in Figure VII-2, will remain within some finite 
range if an individual maintains a constant wake-sleep schedule—that is, the reservoir 
will exhibit a time-averaged equilibrium state.  The stock and flow diagram also shows 
that sleep accumulation is dependent on information regarding “sleep quality,” which is 
modeled as the contiguity, or conversely, fragmentation of sleep.  The software 
implementation of the SAFTE model (i.e., FAST) addresses sleep quality in terms of the 
sleep environment and the average number of interruptions to sleep expected in that 
environment.  The FAST software provides the following ordinal scale for describing 
sleep environments: 
• Excellent:   0 interruptions per hour 
• Good:   1-2 interruptions per hour 
• Fair:    3-5 interruptions per hour 
• Poor:    6 or more interruptions per hour 
These values are equated to 60, 50, 40, and 30 minutes of effective sleep per hour, 
respectively. 
Given the implications of the SAFTE model structure, it is clear that two classes 
of variables must be considered:  schedule and sleep environment.  The schedule 
determines the timing and duration of sleep and wakefulness, and in conjunction with 
sleep quality, determines the equilibrium state of the reservoir.  In principle, the 
equilibrium state of the reservoir correlates inversely to the degree to which an individual 
is fatigued, the latter being a direct concern of the survivability domain of Human 
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Systems Integration (HSI).   Likewise, the sleep environment is a determinant of sleep 
quality, which modulates sleep accumulation, and in turn, the equilibrium state of the 
reservoir.  Since the sleep environment is shaped by the physical environment of sleeping 
or berthing areas (e.g., adequate space, temperature and lighting control, noise 
attenuation, etc.), it is a direct consideration of the habitability domain of HSI.   
D. AN OPERATIONS RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE  
 The operations research community focuses on the formulation of mathematical 
models of complex engineering or management problems and how to analyze them to 
gain insight about possible solutions.  The three fundamental concerns in forming 
operations research models are the decisions open to decision makers, the constraints 
limiting decision choices, and the objectives that serve as criteria for rating the relative 
preference of decision choices.  Optimization models, which are also called mathematical 
programs, are a class of operations research models that represent problem choices as 
decision variables, which maximize or minimize objective functions of the decision 
variables subject to constraints on variable values expressing the limits on possible 
decision choices.  Once a problem has been formulated as an optimization model, one can 
systematically search for optimal solutions, the latter being feasible solutions that achieve 
objective function values as good as those of any other feasible solution (Rardin, 1998).   
 Part of the art of constructing mathematical formulations of complex problems is 
to see past the unique circumstances of the individual problem and recognize general 
problem types, even if by analogy. The present problem clearly resembles a shift 
scheduling and staff planning model, where the work is already fixed and we need to plan 
the resources to accomplish it.  The main element in any staff planning model is the 
covering constraint, which assures that the work periods chosen provide enough worker 
output to cover requirements over each time period (Rardin, 1998); that is, 
( ) ( )output/worker number on duty period requirement
shifts
⋅ ≥∑ . 
In this case, we express the period requirement in terms of predicted task 
effectiveness, and we consider shifts in terms of organizationally permissible sleep-wake 
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cycles.  Next, without intending to sound dehumanizing, we contemplate a worker on a 
shift as being a metaphorical vessel containing a reservoir of cognitive work capacity, 
such as is depicted in Figure VII-2.  For each worker, periods of wakefulness are 
associated with a discharging flow from the reservoir and periods of sleep are associated 
with a recharging flow into the reservoir.  The output for a worker during a particular 
period, again expressed in terms of task effectiveness, will be a combined function of the 
state of their reservoir and their intrinsic diurnal cycle.   
If we limit the number of workers on duty during any particular period to unity, 
we are forced to select a worker from some shift whose predicted task effectiveness 
meets or exceeds the period requirement for each and every period.  Since a decision to 
use a worker from a particular shift equates to gaining that person in the organization, the 
objective is simply one of minimizing the number of shifts used to cover all work 
periods.  Solving this staff planning model will yield the manpower optimal solution.  
However, we may extend this problem one step further by repeating the analysis, but this 
time restraining ourselves to use no more than the optimal number of shifts and seeking 
the objective of maximizing the average task effectiveness over all periods.  In essence, 
we are looking for the best arrangement of duty periods given the minimum number of 
workers.  Solving this secondary problem will yield a constrained (in terms of manpower) 
optimal solution for average task effectiveness.  In sum, this is the central logic 
underlying the optimization programming method described in the following section. 
E. THE BASIC MIXED INTEGER LINEAR PROGRAM 
 The Task Effectiveness Scheduling Tool (TEST) is a modest mixed integer 
program that assigns persons to wake-sleep cycles and variable duty periods in an attempt 
to provide coverage of some continuous system function using the minimum quantity of 
personnel, while simultaneously ensuring individuals exceed an a priori predicted task 
effectiveness criterion during duty periods.  The program then ensures that the temporal 
scheduling of duty periods maximizes average predicted task effectiveness over a 24-
hour period.  This section presents the formulation of the model with data given in 
lowercase symbols and decision variables in uppercase symbols. 
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1. Indices and [Cardinality]   
q Q∈ — set of ordinal ratings of sleep quality [~4]. 
s S∈ — set of wake-sleep schedules [~72]. 
t T∈ — set of time periods [~48]. 
2. Data and [Units]   
_req eff — required human task effectiveness [%]. 
,_
q
s tsafte data — predicted task effectiveness for time period t when following 
schedule s with sleep quality q [%]. 
_work rule — organizational limit on maximum hours of service [periods]. 
Data on predicted task effectiveness is provided in a matrix with 72 rows and 48 
columns.  Each row corresponds to a unique schedule, s, consisting of a 6-, 7-, or 8-hour 
continuous sleep period and a corresponding continuous wake period.  Each column 
corresponds to a time period, 0000,0030,0100, , 2330t = … , where each t is a 30-minute 
interval and 0000t =  begins at midnight.  Wake periods start on a subset of the collection 
of time periods, 't T∈ , corresponding to the integer hours of the day, which is to say that 
' 0000,0100,0200, , 2300t = … .  Thus, S is an exhaustive combinatorial collection of 
permitted continuous sleep and wake periods.  Each schedule, s, in the collection of 
possible schedules, S, was simulated in FAST version 1.6 over a 30-day period, and the 
predicted task effectiveness for each time period, t, on the 30th day of the simulation, is 
recorded in the matrix.  Predicted task effectiveness is set to zero during time periods of 
sleep.  Additionally, task effectiveness is set to zero for the 60 minutes prior to and after 
the sleep period to account for hygiene and other preparatory activities, which would 
necessarily make an individual unavailable for assignment.   
FAST provides for the ability to set an ordinal rating of sleep quality (i.e., 
excellent, good, fair, or poor) during the sleep period, which impacts the predicted task 
effectiveness.  It is possible to enlarge the matrix of predicted task effectiveness to 
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consider a quadruplet of schedules, varying in terms of sleep quality, for each primary 
schedule, s, in the collection of possible schedules, S:  , , ,excellent good fair poors s s s s s S= ∈ . 
However, this approach adds little to the model, as any attempt to optimize task 
effectiveness will naturally lead to a choice of excellents  in the absence of some penalty 
function.  Thus, the other elements in the quadruplet will not be selected, but the larger 
matrix will drive a correspondingly larger decision matrix, and in turn, unnecessarily 
increase computational burden—a reasonable concern when dealing with integer 
programs.  From a more pragmatic perspective, sleep quality can be ascribed as a 
function of the environment in which sleep is attempted.  Consequently, sleep quality 
may be fixed a priori based on the habitability considerations present within the problem 
context for which a schedule is being sought.  
For the aforementioned reasons, the second approach is used in the subsequent 
model formulation.   Accordingly, separate predicted task effectiveness matrices are 
developed for each ordinal rating of sleep quality, q.  The choice of q is fixed at 'q , 
where 'q Q∈ , and the corresponding predicted task effectiveness matrix, ',_ qs tsafte data , is 
incorporated in the model as data.  The ensuring sections will suppress further reference 
to sleep quality for the purpose of economy of notation.   
3. Variables   
 ,s tASSIGN  — binary decision variable to assign a person following schedule s to 
cover time period t. 
 ,s tD  — difference variable used to determine a change in the state (i.e., on or off 
duty) of a person following schedule s at time period t. 
sMANPOWER — binary decision variable to utilize a person on schedule s. 
4. Constraints 
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Once the value of the manpower objective is minimized (that is, Z* is determined), a new 















Solving the first objective establishes the minimum number of persons required to 
provide coverage of some continuous system function while simultaneously ensuring 
individuals exceed an a priori predicted task effectiveness criterion during duty periods.  
Solving the second objective seeks to maximize the average predicted task effectiveness 
of this minimum number of individuals.  Thus, the program first establishes the optimal 
quantity for manpower to satisfice performance requirements, and then it determines how 
to optimize performance given this now constrained quantity of manpower.   
 Constraint (C1) is a set partitioning constraint requiring that exactly one person 
from the collection of wake-sleep schedules, S, belongs to a solution for time period t.  
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Constraint (C2) tallies the number of time periods an individual on schedule s is assigned 
to provide coverage of a function and enforces organizational hours of service rules.  The 
special case where an organization has no hours of service rules can be simply addressed 
by setting _work rule
 
to 48, which corresponds to the maximum number of time periods 
in the predicted task effectiveness data matrix.  Constraint (C3) enforces the requirement 
that the predicted task effectiveness of an individual following schedule s assigned for 
duty during time period t meets or exceeds some prespecified criterion; alternatively, for 
each time period, t, one could use a filter to only consider the subset of schedules, s′ ,         
where s S′∈ , for which predicted task effectiveness meets or exceeds the criterion.    
 Constraints (C4) and (C5) assess whether a change in assignment status occurs for 
a person following schedule s between time period 1t −  and period t.  Constraint (C6) 
enforces an upper limit on the number of changes in assignment status that can occur for 
a person following schedule s.  By setting this limit at two, assigned duty periods are 
forced to be continuous.  This avoids the undesirable result where individuals are 
assigned to multiple, disjoint time periods.  Constraint (C7) acts as a manpower counter:  
it is set to unity for a person on schedule s if they are assigned for any time period, t. 
 Constraints (C8) and (C9) establish the binary decision variables.  Constraint 
(C10) fixes the upper bounds on the nonnegative variable, ,s tD , at unity.   
F. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
1. Case 1:  High Task Effectiveness Criterion 
When inadequate attention is paid by system developers to human factors 
engineering considerations, a potential outcome is “human factors high drivers” 
(Directorate of Human Performance Integration, n.d.).  Such drivers include tasks that 
require very high levels of sustained human performance, whether that is in terms of 
vigilance and monitoring, cognitive workload, or physical exertion.  This case examines 
the trade-off between the human factors engineering and manpower domains of HSI that 
occurs when a requirement is generated that necessitates a high degree of sustained task 
effectiveness.   
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Figure VII-3 illustrates the TEST results when the required task effectiveness 
criterion is set to 95% and sleep quality is assumed to be good—that is, reasonable 
attention is paid to habitability domain considerations.  Each row in the figure 
corresponds to a single person following a fixed wake-sleep cycle.   
 
 
Figure VII-3. Task Effectiveness Scheduling Tool results when the predicted task 
effectiveness criterion is set to 95% and sleep quality is rated as good. 
 
The shaded boxes in Figure VII-3 are indicative of time periods where a person is 
unavailable:  the first two periods (i.e., one hour) for hygiene and preparatory activities, 
the next 16 time periods (i.e., eight hours) for sleep, and the last two periods for hygiene 
and preparatory activities.  The nonshaded boxes marked with an “X” are indicative of 
those time periods when an individual’s predicted task effectiveness meets or exceeds the 
criterion and they are scheduled to cover the high driver task.  The other empty, 
nonshaded boxes are time periods where a person is available to work, but their predicted 
task effectiveness in below the criterion.  Thus, this time can be allocated to working on 
less demanding tasks and other personal activities. 
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 What is readily apparent from Figure VII-3 is that human factors high-drivers can 
lead to excessive manpower requirements—in this case 10 people—to provide sufficient 
human cognitive resources for the task at hand.  Since physiologically based manpower 
modeling is seldom used in current practice, it is quite likely that individuals charged 
with developing the system manpower estimate would allocate far fewer than 10 people 
to cover such a high-driver task.  What then results is an unrecognized or implicit trade-
off, whereby decreased or more variable performance is accepted, increased systems 
safety risks are entertained, or both.  
 Figure VII-4 illustrates the dramatic impact on manpower than can be achieved by 
mitigating human factors high-drivers during systems development.  In this case, the 
predicted task effectiveness criterion is reduced to 90% and sleep quality is unchanged.  
While the change in criterion appears relatively modest, the corresponding change in 
required manpower is dramatic.  What previously necessitated 10 people working no 
greater than 6.5-hour duty periods is now accomplished using only two people working 
12-hour shifts.   
 
 
Figure VII-4. Task Effectiveness Scheduling Tool results when the predicted task 
effectiveness criterion is set to 90% and sleep quality is rated as good. 
 
2. Case 2:  Organizational Hours-of-Work Rules 
 Sometimes it is the case that individuals performing major system functions 
belong to professions that are governed by regulatory policies that dictate maximum work 
periods and minimum rest periods (Miller, Matsangas, & Shattuck, 2007).  Often these 
policies are influenced by nonphysiological considerations such as personnel availability, 
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mission requirements, and organizational standard operating procedures.  Figure VII-5 
illustrates the impact of enforcing an hours-of-work rule limiting duty periods to no 
greater than 10 hours.  With the exception of the constraint on hours-of-work, there are 
no differences in the settings of the model parameters used in the analysis displayed in 
Figure VII-4 and that shown in Figure VII-5.  While the task could be done effectively by 
two people (Figure VII-4), organizational constraints require that a third person be added 
to the manpower estimate (Figure VII-5).  There is no operationally significant 
improvement in average predicted task effectiveness (94.69% versus 94.64%) between 
the two manpower models, but one would expect there to be significant differences in 
terms of system life-cycle costs.  Observations such as this should, at minimum, prompt 
questions regarding the rationale for the hours-of-work rule.   
 
 
Figure VII-5. Task Effectiveness Scheduling Tool results when the predicted task 
effectiveness criterion is set to 90%, sleep quality is rated as good, and a 10 hours-of-
work rule is enforced. 
   
It is also worth noting in Figure VII-5 that the maximum average task 
effectiveness is obtained using non-uniform duty periods.  The traditional, heuristically 
based approach to scheduling shift work would lead managers to establish three 8-hour 
shifts based on the principle of equity (Miller, 2006).  In contrast, a physiologically based 
approach leads to a 10/4/10-hour, 3-shift system.  Thus, this case illustrates nicely the 
disadvantage of using simple scheduling heuristics.   
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3. Case 3:  Sleep Quality 
 It is generally acknowledged by HSI practitioners and system users that 
habitability domain considerations are important in sustaining human performance.  It is 
also well recognized by these same individuals that senior decision makers tend to be 
reluctant to accept or vigorously advocate for system requirements that can be said to be 
focused on “comfort.”  Even when such requirements are accepted, they are often the first 
to be sacrificed when issues of system development cost, schedule, or performance 
surface.   
 Figure VII-6 illustrates the case where habitability domain considerations are not 
given due diligence with regard to their impact on human performance.  In this scenario, 
sleep quality is set at poor and the predicted task effectiveness criterion is relaxed to 
77.5%, which corresponds to the threshold for the “criterion line” on the current FAST 
graphical display.  The FAST criterion line equates to the performance of a person 
following loss of an entire night’s sleep.  It provides yet another planning heuristic for 
determining whether a particular schedule is acceptable.  However, the validity of this 
heuristic is certainly questionable, particularly if, for example, a system was designed 
under the assumption that the operator would perform with a task effectiveness of at least 
90%.  Nevertheless, even with the reduction in the task effectiveness criterion, it takes 
eight people—some only suitable for two hours per day—to provide effectual coverage.  
Contrast this with the observation from the first case that two people can provide more 
than effectual coverage when sleep quality is set at good.  The difference of six 
individuals between the two scenarios, which can be entirely attributed to the change in 
the model setting for sleep quality, is quite significant when considered in terms of 




Figure VII-6. Task Effectiveness Scheduling Tool results when the predicted task 
effectiveness criterion is relaxed to the FAST criterion line of 77.5% and sleep quality is 
rated as poor. 
 
G. CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter, we developed a novel approach to staffing and shift schedule 
planning that offers two key advantages over conventional approaches.  First, it allows 
organizational planners to import data generated from FAST simulations—in essence, the 
results of individual simulation experiments—into an analytic model whereby answers to 
the question of optimality can be found by mathematical techniques.  Thus, reaching the 
optimal staffing and shift scheduling solution becomes a less elusive and more 
deterministic process.  Second, it recognizes the inflexible boundary of human capacity 
and makes explicit the imperative to acknowledge human limitations in the design of 
staffing and shift schedule solutions.  This process should help foster a more holistic 
approach to designing solutions, thereby taking advantage of the potential trade space 
that exists between the manpower, survivability, habitability, and human factors 
engineering domains of HSI.  These domains, in turn, involve consideration of issues 
related to personnel quantity, fatigue (and inversely, the availability of cognitive 
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resources) and its impact on personnel quality, sleep quality and the opportunity for 
recovery of cognitive resources, and task demands for cognitive resources, respectively.   
By and large, the approach demonstrated here involves nothing uniquely new, 
either in terms of the biomathematical modeling of fatigue or optimization programming. 
Rather, it is a new way of using data from biomathematical models of fatigue to 
systematically find optimal staffing and shift schedule solutions—a way that should be 
appealing to system developers and force planners. While the model formulation used in 
this chapter specifically optimizes in terms of manpower, many alternative formulations 
are possible with minimal modification of the kernel of the model.  Similarly, while the 
model was formulated to address staffing for a single system function (e.g., function K in 
Figure VII-1) requiring a single human controller, it is a simple matter to scale up the 
model for more complex systems.  For instance, incorporating more than one system 
function would primarily involve the addition of an index set, f, to the model formulation 
where { }1 2, , , nf K K K= … . Likewise, the number of individuals required to 
simultaneously perform the controller function, K, may be easily changed by modifying 
the right-hand side of the assignment constraint (C1).   
To summarize, we expect that coupling biomathematical fatigue models and 
optimization programming will prove useful in developing physiologically balanced 
staffing and shift scheduling plans.  Further work on this topic should examine the 
tractability of more complex shift schedule options such as rotating-shift solutions.  
Additionally, given the potential computational burden of even relatively simple-
appearing discrete optimization problems, consideration should be given to the 
applicability of data filtering, linear programming (LP) relaxations, or both on the 
analysis of TEST-derived discrete models.  Finally, it would be useful to consider how 
the HSI domain trade-offs that were demonstrated to be inherent in this approach may be 
incorporated into larger systems analyses.    
H. APPENDIX – GAMS CODE 
Options 
     SOLPRINT =     OFF, 
     DECIMALS =       2, 
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     LIMCOL   =      10, 
     LIMROW   =      10, 
     RESLIM   =     300, 
     ITERLIM  =99999999, 
     LP       =   cplex, 
     MIP      =   cplex, 
     OPTCR    =   0.001 ; 
 
Sets 
t     time periods  / 0000, 0030, 0100, 0130, 0200, 0230, 0300,  
       0330, 0400, 0430, 0500, 0530, 0600, 0630,  
       0700, 0730, 0800, 0830, 0900, 0930, 1000,  
       1030, 1100, 1130, 1200, 1230, 1300, 1330, 
    1400, 1430, 1500, 1530, 1600, 1630, 1700,  
    1730, 1800, 1830, 1900, 1930, 2000, 2030,  
    2100, 2130, 2200, 2230, 2300, 2330 / 
 








     req_eff     minimum required task effectiveness in percent /90/ 
 
     work_rule   maximum allowable continuous hours of work /48/ ; 
 
Variables 
      ASSIGN(s,t) 
      D(s,t) 
      MANPOWER(s) 
      OPT_MANPOWER 
      OBJ1 
      OBJ2 ; 
 
Binary variable ASSIGN ; 
Binary variable MANPOWER ; 
Positive variable D ;  
Positive variable OPT_MANPOWER ; 
 
Equations 
     cover(t)            enforce one person assigned for each hour 
     length(s)           enforce organizational hours of work rules 
     effectiveness(t)    enforce minimum effectiveness requirement 
     statechange1(s,t)   check for change state change from period t-1   
                         to t 
     statechange2(s,t)   check for change state change from period t-1  
                         to t 
     workcycle(s)        ensure person scheduled at most one work 
     convert(s,t)        convert assign decision to manpower 
     control(s,t)        control upper limit of D 
     objective1          total manpower objective function 
     goal_constraint     fix optimal manpower 
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     objective2          average reliability objective function ; 
 
cover(t)..  sum(s, ASSIGN(s,t)) =e= 1 ; 
 
length(s)..  sum(t, ASSIGN(s,t)) =l= work_rule ; 
 
effectiveness(t)..  sum(s, safte_data(s,t)*ASSIGN(s,t)) =g= req_eff ; 
 
statechange1(s,t)$(ord(t) gt 1)..  D(s,t) =g= ASSIGN(s,t) - ASSIGN(s,t- 
                                   1) ; 
 
statechange2(s,t)$(ord(t) gt 1)..  D(s,t) =g= - ASSIGN(s,t) +  
                                   ASSIGN(s,t-1) ; 
 
workcycle(s)..  sum(t$(ord(t) gt 1), D(s,t)) =l= 2 ; 
 
convert(s,t)..   MANPOWER(s) =g= ASSIGN(s,t) ; 
 
control(s,t)..  D(s,t) =l= 1 ; 
 
objective1..  sum(s, MANPOWER(s)) =e= OBJ1 ; 
 
Model fastassign1 / cover, length, effectiveness, statechange1,  
                    statechange2, workcycle, convert, control,  
                    objective1 / ; 
 
Solve fastassign1 using mip minimizing OBJ1 ; 
 
OPT_MANPOWER.FX = OBJ1.L ; 
 
goal_constraint..  sum(s, MANPOWER(s)) =e= OPT_MANPOWER ; 
 
objective2..  (sum((s,t), ASSIGN(s,t)*safte_data(s,t)))/48 =e= OBJ2 ; 
 
Model fastassign2 / cover, length, effectiveness, statechange1,  
                    statechange2, workcycle, convert, control, 
                    goal_constraint, objective2 / ; 
 
Solve fastassign2 using mip maximizing OBJ2 ; 
 
File results /results.csv/ ; 
results.pw=4096 ; 
Put results ; 
Put "Average task effectiveness:", OBJ2.L / ; 
Put "  " / ; 
Put @24 
Loop(t, 
   Put t.tl:6 ; 
   ) ; 
Put / ; 
Loop(s, 
   if( SUM(t,ASSIGN.L(s,t))>0, 
     Put "Schedule ", s.tl ; 
     Loop(t, 
       if( ASSIGN.L(s,t)>0, 
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         Put '     X' ; 
       else 
         Put '      ' ; 
       ); 
     ); 
     Put /; 
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VIII. LESSONS FROM THE DISCOURSE:  WHAT HAVE WE 
LEARNED? 
The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to 
get the old one out. 
— Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart 
 Innovations in the Strategic Air Command 
 
A. OVERVIEW 
This discourse on human systems integration (HSI) consists of ten chapters, each 
of which is relatively unique in terms of the subject matter addressed and the 
methodologies employed.  Excepting the introductory front matter, we may reasonably 
assert that each chapter is an independent scholarly work in its own right.  This approach 
is certainly the manner in which the chapters in this discourse were initially constructed, 
and consequently, each chapter closes with conclusions and recommendations that are 
specific to the thesis of that chapter.  However, these chapters tell a meta-story that 
reflects both my learning and the evolution of my thinking about HSI during my 
postgraduate studies.  What remains here is to bring closure to that story. 
A major purpose in undertaking this discourse was to tackle, head on, two 
fundamental questions:  What is human systems integration (HSI) and how should one 
think about HSI problems?  As discussed in Chapter I, the objective in asking this 
question was to develop a coherent systems method that would improve the integration of 
the HSI domains to create sustainable systems while preserving consideration of system 
stakeholder preferences.  Addressing this question required that we first put the concept 
of HSI in some context, both in terms of a philosophy and a Defense Department 
program.   
B. SUMMARY OF CONCEPTS 
In Chapter II, “Human Systems Integration Philosophy,” we addressed the issue 
of an HSI philosophy with the implicit assumption that HSI is an emerging discipline.  
We began by first tracing the origins of HSI philosophy to the early human factors 
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movement, which approached the problem of human performance in systems from the 
reductionist perspective embodied by the scientific method.  We then discussed the 
limitations of this approach in dealing with the complexity inherent in the problem, which 
led to the emergence of the systems-oriented discipline of HSI based on sociotechnical 
systems theory and the concept of joint optimization of personnel and technological 
subsystems.   We next considered the types of problems HSI typically encounters, often 
referred to as “messes” or “wicked problems,” which entail evolving sets of interlocking 
issues and constraints that can be managed, but not solved, and for which there are many 
stakeholders having divergent values, all of whom must be satisfied to some extent.  We 
subsequently considered the role of HSI in addressing these problems by examining its 
logical placement within a system of systems methodologies.  Accordingly, we suggested 
that various soft systems approaches should first be employed to make problems tractable 
for HSI in terms of clarity of objectives.  In turn, HSI could then be used to make 
problems more tractable for hard systems approaches by reducing problem complexity. 
In contrast, “A Brief History of the Emergence of the Defense Department’s HSI 
Program” (Chapter III) approached the HSI concept based on a historical analysis of HSI 
as it was programmatically instantiated within the U.S. military.  We observed that the 
idea for an HSI program first emerged in the 1960s as a result of the spread of systems 
analysis from the Defense Department to the Army, due in large part to efforts to reform 
the Army’s logistics system.  Thus, early HSI proponents, such as Weisz, focused on 
better integrating human factors engineering and operations research to more broadly 
represent human considerations in weapon system analyses.  However, neither wide 
spread recognition nor high level advocacy for HSI was forthcoming until the Army 
underwent a doctrinal and organizational renaissance in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
driven in large part by fears of an apocalyptic war with the Soviet Union.  These 
conditions led to a rise of science-based military power as the Army sought to leverage 
high technology to achieve a credible parity with the numerically superior Soviet forces.  
A crisis ensued during in the early 1980s in the design of the Army of Excellence, caused 
in large measure by the need to find personnel to create two new light infantry divisions.  
The Army’s solution was to better utilize its personnel resources, especially those tied up 
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in the maintenance and support of increasingly complex, highly technological weapon 
systems.  In 1983, a coalition of senior military and civilian leaders began an HSI 
discourse, including the materiel acquisitions and personnel communities, which was 
eventually to be institutionalized in the Army’s bureaucracy as MANPRINT.  In the 
ensuing decade of the 1990s, this discourse was carried over to the Defense Department 
bureaucracy where it became formally codified as HSI. 
The lesson learned from the juxtaposition of these two conceptual views of HSI 
(i.e., philosophy versus program) was the rejecting of the notion that HSI is simply “post-
modern” human factors.  HSI as a philosophy evolved within the context of the larger 
systems movement that occurred in the 1960s in response to the issue of irreducible 
complexity.  HSI emerged in response to real-world, macroergonomic political and 
military considerations that resulted in an organizational crisis.  This crisis, in the 
simplest of terms, was caused by technological complexity and its effects on personnel.  
Thus, the fundamental impetus for HSI was complexity. 
Allowing philosophy to inform method, the lessons learned from the historical 
analysis were used to characterize and illustrate an approach to addressing HSI 
considerations early in a weapon system acquisition process.  The following prime 
directive—the highest level of abstract, objective statement of purpose—was proposed for 
an HSI program:  To produce sustained system performance that is humanly, 
technologically, and economically feasible.   Based on an analysis of this prime directive, 
and with an implicit reference to sociotechnical systems theory, the following definition 
of HSI was derived:    
A philosophy applied to personnel and technological subsystems within 
organizations in pursuit of their joint optimization in terms of maximally 
satisfying organizational objectives at minimum life cycle cost.  Its 
practice is concerned with the specification and design for reliability, 
availability, and maintainability of both the personnel and technological 





We then asserted that the principle approach to HSI should involve the integration of the 
behavioral sciences, human factors engineering, and operations research to more broadly 
represent human considerations early in weapon system analyses and in the products that 
evolve from these analyses. 
Accomplishing the HSI prime directive necessitates a holistic perspective of the 
performance and economic trade space formed by the synthesis of the HSI domains, and 
as a result, the consideration of individual domain interventions in terms of tradeoff 
decisions.  Accordingly, in Chapter IV, “The Human Systems Integration Trade Space 
Problem,” we took up the primacy of tradeoffs in HSI.  We expanded our 
conceptualization of HSI to consider both a macro-HSI and micro-HSI trade space.  
Macro-HSI focuses on the development and utilization of human resources within 
organizations that own and operate technological systems that are, in turn, the subject 
matter of micro-HSI; macro-HSI is concerned mainly with macroergonomic 
considerations of organizational and work-system design.  In contrast, micro-HSI 
concentrates on individual technological systems and subsystems and, at least in its 
contemporary implementation, is strongly oriented towards human factors engineering or 
microergonomic considerations.  Thus, an overarching goal of HSI must be one of 
making tradeoffs that are organizationally net positive to avoid creating future problems.  
Such a goal is tractable if macro-HSI considerations are used to first bound or constrain 
the micro-HSI trade space.  Then one may deliberatively consider the micro-HSI trade 
space in the systems decision process by integrating Simon’s research strategy of 
efficient multifactor design of experiments, Kennedy and Jones’ isoperformance 
approach, and coupling isoperformance with utility analysis through means such as 
physical programming.  
Although domain tradeoffs are a central element of HSI, there are very few 
studies that aptly illustrate the integration of the behavioral sciences and human factors 
engineering with the tools and methodologies of operations research.  The purpose of the 
subsequent three case studies was to fill that void.  To grasp tradeoffs in any meaningful 
manner, the basic models developed in these case studies were necessarily abstractions or 
simplifications of reality to delineate clearly the basic domain relationships and 
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interactions.  Therein, probably, lies one of their strongest merits, particularly for the HSI 
novice.  With respect to these analyses, I claim no infallibility, particularly where 
practical analysis required judgments to be made to move past inevitable impasses.  
Hopefully, though, these analyses further illuminated the contexts within which 
judgments about HSI tradeoffs can take place.  Chapters V, VI, and VII each presented 
three case studies that illustrated the use of different data sources:  a preexisting 
opportunistic dataset of potential Air Force unmanned aircraft pilots, a prospective 
dataset of Army Soldiers in Basic Combat Training, and data derived from simulation of 
staffing and shift scheduling solutions using a biomathematical model.  
C. CASE STUDY REVIEWS 
In Chapter V, “Isoreliability Models for Human Systems Integration Domain 
Tradeoffs—Choosing a Personnel Supply Source for Future Unmanned Aircraft System 
Operators,” we considered how to address the reliability of the personnel subsystem 
within the joint optimization problem described by sociotechnical systems theory.  We 
utilized an opportunistic dataset from an Air Force study evaluating the impact of prior 
flight experience on acquisition of unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operator skills.  
Based on a derivation of the isoperformance methodology, we developed a simple 
logistic regression-based analysis for relating the personnel and training domains of HSI 
to the proportion of proficient UAS operators, which allowed us to express human 
performance probabilistically in terms of isoreliability.  We also demonstrated the 
feasibility of both including logical decision variables in isoperformance models and 
incorporating such models into larger discrete optimization models that were then used to 
analyze aggregated system functions.  This analysis established the potential to integrate 
isoreliability models into the systems engineering process, thereby allowing consideration 
of personnel and training domain tradeoffs in terms of total system reliability—and 
indirectly, in terms of systems safety.     
The study described in Chapter VI, “Human Systems Integration Domain 
Tradeoffs in Non-Technical Systems—Improving Soldier Basic Combat Training,” 
provided an excellent illustration of the application of HSI outside of the context of 
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systems engineering and program management.  Recognizing that adolescents comprise 
the majority of military accessions, this study evaluated the impact of alterations in 
sleeping and waking patterns on measures of Soldier performance and other indicators of 
individual functioning during basic combat training.  We conducted the study using the 
behavioral sciences paradigm, and thus employed an experimental methodology and 
multi-variable statistical techniques drawn from experimental psychology.  The results 
indicated that, even after controlling for factors contributing to individual differences, 
adjusting the scheduled sleep period in a phase delayed direction (i.e., later bedtime and 
wake-up) was associated with increased daily total sleep and modest improvements in 
some indicators of daytime functioning.  We then transitioned from the behavioral 
sciences to the HSI paradigm by reformulating a subset of the study hypotheses in terms 
of mathematical tradeoff functions, thereby making possible their direct incorporation 
into the “system analytic thinking process.”  Specifically, using the isoperformance 
methodology, we constructed tradeoff models for both rifle marksmanship performance 
and occupational health in terms of the personnel and survivability domains of HSI.   
In the final case study, “Human Systems Integration Domain Tradeoffs in 
Optimized Manning—The Task Effectiveness Scheduling Tool” (Chapter VII), we 
investigated an approach for determining optimal schedules in terms of the timing of 
sleep-wake periods and the assignment of performance sensitive duties when given an a 
priori task effectiveness threshold—essentially an issue of human operational availability 
( )hoA .  The necessary data were generated from numerous simulations conducted using 
the Defense Department’s Fatigue Avoidance Scheduling Tool, which is based on the 
validated Sleep, Activity, Fatigue, and Task Effectiveness (SAFTE) model.  We then 
constructed the Task Effectiveness Scheduling Tool (TEST), a mixed integer program 
that assigns persons to wake-sleep cycles and variable duty periods to provide coverage 
of a system function using the minimum quantity of personnel while simultaneously 
ensuring individuals exceed a specified task effectiveness criterion during duty periods.  
The program then ensures that the temporal scheduling of duty periods maximizes 
averaged predicted task effectiveness over a 24-hour period.  By exercising TEST with 
several use cases, we observed that the mathematical program facilitates explicit 
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exploration of the trade space that exists between the manpower, survivability, 
habitability, and human factors engineering domains of HSI.    
D. EPILOGUE 
We began the introduction to this discourse with the observation that there is 
much ambiguity about what exactly HSI is and how it should work.   This discourse was 
motivated by the wish—and really, my need—to fill this void.  There was also a fair 
sense of urgency in bringing this discourse to fruition given my forthcoming assignment 
within the U.S. Air Force’s still nascent HSI work force.  A quick survey of the current 
environment in which Air Force HSI finds itself suggests, perhaps alarmingly so, that 
time is not working in our favor.  We need to begin to deliver on the promises made by 
the U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board in their 2004 report, Human System 
Integration in Air Force Weapon Systems Development and Acquisition (Report No. 
SAB-TR-04-04).  Otherwise, we risk, and should probably expect, a serious loss in 
advocacy and support for a robust Air Force HSI program in the immediate future.   
While there will always be those who believe we should solve the problems of 
HSI by primarily developing better HSI tools, the reality is that we need to move forward 
with a more pragmatic approach, grounded in science and/or the lessons of history, which 
can achieve some modicum of success in today’s defense acquisition programs given the 
available tools at hand.  Fortunately, guided by our historical insights into HSI, we can 
reasonably assert that the necessary tools, by and large, already exist in the form of the 
experimental and statistical methodologies of the behavioral sciences and human factors 
engineering and the tools and techniques of operations research.  As was aptly illustrated 
by the three case studies presented in this discourse, we can handily accomplish HSI 
tradeoff analyses today, but multiple techniques are needed to formulate and conduct 
these analyses—and hence the futility of the search for a single, comprehensive HSI tool.    
Consequently, there is a clear need for are creative, thinking HSI practitioners who are 
sufficiently savvy in the behavioral science, human factors engineering, and operations 
research such that they can utilize a portfolio of techniques and credibly participate on 
study teams conducting systems analyses.   
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Some may sensibly question whether, given Popper’s criticisms of historicism, we 
have gone down a proverbial rabbit hole to emerge in an academic wonderland.  
Certainly the accounting of HSI provided in this discourse differs markedly from those 
provided by others in the field over the last decade.  While it is impossible to ascertain 
with complete certainty that we have avoided the potential pitfalls of historicism, a recent 
experience appears to suggest that we have, indeed, reached a sensible accounting of HSI.  
To briefly describe that experience, having recently completed the last of the case studies 
in the discourse, I was invited to attend a 3-day training course on pre-acquisition 
analyses that was sponsored by the Air Force HSI community and was lead by the Air 
Force’s Office of Aerospace Studies.   The intent of the training course was to discuss the 
implications of the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, particularly with 
regards to the need for more comprehensive systems analyses prior to Milestone A.  
Although originally advertised as a training course, the majority of the time was spent in 
an interactive and lively discussion—or what might be better described as a joint iterative 
learning cycle (SSM from Chapter II) − between those in the studies and analyses 
community and we in the Air Force HSI community over “where HSI fits in” pre-
acquisition systems analyses.  Reassuringly, the major themes that emerged confirmed 
both the need identified by and the primary thrusts put forth in this discourse.   I would 
argue that this observation provides some tentative corroboration in support of the 
overarching thesis put forth in this discourse.  Definitive proof of this thesis, however, 
will need to await future attempts to actually put it into practice through participation on 
pre-acquisition study teams—an objective for my next military assignment within the 
U.S. Air Force.   
In conclusion, the efforts in this discourse served to accomplish two things:  1) 
extract the lessons learned from a historical analysis of the emergence of HSI both as a 
philosophy and as a Defense Department program, and 2) use those lessons to 
characterize and illustrate a mathematical and technical approach to addressing HSI 
considerations early in the weapon system acquisition process.  While by no means a 
novel approach, for reasons unbeknownst to me it has not been used by those seeking to 
advance the field of HSI.  Nevertheless, we clearly observed that the general systems 
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discourse that occurred over the latter half of the last century, coupled with pressing 
organizational factors within the U.S. Army, were the principal forces that shaped and 
drove the emergence and formal recognition of HSI.  While we primarily considered the 
trajectory of HSI through the Army and on to the Defense Department, future work is 
warranted to develop equivalent case histories for the evolution of HSI within the U.S. 
Air Force and Navy—and other government agencies as appropriate.  Such case histories 
should prove a rich source for high-level lessons regarding the influence of organizational 
context on the implementation of HSI that would be very relevant to those responsible for 
Service-specific HSI programs.  For as Edmund Burke (1729–1797), the British 
statesman and philosopher, is credited with famously warning, “Those who don’t know 
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IX. A NEW HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION 
Think like an architect—not like a bricklayer (Warden & Russell, 2002, p. 
179). 
A. WHAT IS WRONG WITH CLASSIC HUMAN SYSTEMS 
INTEGRATION? 
1. Attitudes and Understanding 
 Quite a lot is wrong, and if you think otherwise, then try discussing human 
systems integration (HSI) as a discipline with many of its current practitioners.  
Invariably there are two reactions: they are too busy to think about such things or they 
vent frustration about a lack of clarity of purpose / underlying theory / evidence of 
success.  Many practitioners do not believe that HSI is a separate discipline.  Instead, they 
prefer to think of it in terms of human factors, systems engineering, or plain common 
sense—although there is plenty of evidence to suggest that such sense is not common, at 
least in the Defense Department. 
 Many practitioners describe HSI as an attitude or state of mind.  Such words as 
“holistic” and “human-centered design” will often emerge to encapsulate the “human > 
hardware ≈ software” view that most feel intuitively sets HSI apart in some degree.  
Behind such slogans, however, is often little more than a self-rationalizing, if not 
pleasing, belief that keeping a laser-like focus on humans throughout the system 
acquisition process is both necessary and sufficient to yield some form of “goodness,”  
the latter often described in vague terms of enhanced systems performance or decreased 
operating costs.  The more rigorous descriptions of HSI, including those contained in the 
few books dedicated to the subject, appear to be based on the premise that the human 
element in complex systems can be addressed through a set of ad-hoc processes and 
actions—many oriented to the individual domains of HSI—and often accompanied by 
only a modicum of analytical results.  Nearly all current HSI practitioners would 
probably not ascribe to the idea that HSI is a hybrid discipline involving the behavioral 
sciences and operations research—an idea that was established in Chapter III.   
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 If the run-of-the-mill HSI practitioner does not believe in HSI as discipline, then 
there is indeed a problem.  While HSI has not had many spectacular successes, high 
profile problems, such as the shortfalls in the design of the Air Force’s Predator ground 
control station, can be seen to have occurred because the simplest of HSI practices were 
not observed—in that case, the Joint Program Office postponed addressing issues related 
to training, maintainability, human factors, and reliability of the system until after the 
prototype system was transitioned to the eventual operator (i.e., the Air Force) (Thirtle, 
Johnson, & Birkier, 1997).   
2. Right Approach, Wrong Result? 
 An interesting aspect of classic HSI is the resistance to it—or at least the 
proclivity to minimize it—by program managers and budgeters, particularly when faced 
with programmatic schedule or cost constraints.  Classic HSI strongly emphasizes front 
end analysis and human factors engineering activities as those are the types of activities 
that are within the purview of program managers and systems engineers working in the 
weapon system acquisition process.  Other HSI domain considerations are then addressed 
primarily in terms of their relation to the human factors engineering domain (Pew & 
Mavor, 2007).  Program managers, seeing no comprehensive framework to trade off 
current materiel development considerations and future non-materiel considerations, 
become frustrated by promises of significant returns on investment from human factors 
engineering activities.  Stoking this frustration is the fact that those benefits will be 
primarily realized by others far removed from the weapon system acquisition process.  
Even when program managers are supportive of classic HSI, compelling success stories 
remain rare. 
The U.S. Army’s RAH-66 Comanche acquisition program is perhaps the most 
notorious and best-documented example of this last point.  The Comanche was the first 
major Army program to both implement classic HSI considerations into the front-end 
analysis phase of the materiel acquisition process and to include HSI in the source 
selection document.  Thus, Comanche became a true experimental program, testing 
where it was possible to introduce advanced technology without creating problems of 
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unsatisfactory total system performance or increasing personnel demands.  Even 
opponents of the Comanche program were impressed by the advances relative to the 
standard of normal acquisition practices; it was estimated that the potential cost 
avoidance in the Comanche program in terms of manpower, personnel, training, and 
safety was $3.3 billion, equating to an 8,000 percent return on investment for the portion 
of the program’s research and development budget that was attributable to HSI (Booher 
& Minninger, 2003; Skelton, 1997).  Nonetheless, the Army made the decision in 2004 to 
cancel the Comanche program, though not for reasons related to HSI.  To date, no similar 
Defense Department case study has demonstrated a comparable level of success. 
B. A NEW HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION METHOD 
Previous chapters have introduced ideas of philosophy and the issues of 
emergence, hierarchy, and irreducible complexity; history and the general systems 
discourse that occurred over the latter half of the last century; the  trade space formed by 
the synthesis of the HSI domains; and many others, which contributed to a new look at 
HSI.  This new look was based on the HSI Hypothesis presented in Chapter II; the 
objective was to use this Hypothesis as a base upon which to develop concepts and 
design a methodology for managing HSI issues (particularly early) in the Defense 
Department’s weapon system acquisition process.  Since the HSI Hypothesis addresses 
any and all systems, such an HSI method should be applicable to any system, be it human 
activity, technological, or any other. 
1. Design Guidelines 
The design guidelines encapsulating the New Human Systems Integration are 






Table IX-1. New Human Systems Integration guidelines. 
Step 1 Establish SOI* objectives and requirements by reference to containing 
system(s) 
Step 2 Identify containing system(s)’ strategic human resources objectives  
Step 3 Identify sibling systems (vis-à-vis shared human resources) and their 
interactions that will be perturbed by the SOI 
Step 4 Develop SOI design trade space to complement sibling systems in 
contributing to containing system(s)’ objectives  
Step 5 Functionally partition SOI and describe required (emergent) human-system 
performance in terms of response surfaces that are functions of the domains 
of HSI 
Step 6 Reduce response surfaces to isoperformance (tradeoff) equations for 
incorporation in system analyses 
Step 7 Seek a balanced design (joint optimization) that satisfices SOI objectives and 
requirements 
Step 8 Continuously reassess and rebalance the design throughout the life of the 
SOI 
*SOI = System-of-interest. 
 
2. Step 1:  Establish SOI Objectives and Requirements by Reference to 
Containing System(s) 
The only tangible value of any system is to be seen in its contribution to its 
containing system(s)’ objectives—see Chapters II and IV.  Note the plurality of 
containing systems; it is quite rare in the real world for any system-of-interest (SOI) to 
have only one containing system.  For example, while weapon systems are contained 
within some user combatant command, they are also contained within a service’s 
personnel system, training system, logistics system, etc.  Thus, reference to relevant 
containing systems—comprising both materiel and nonmaterial aspects of the SOI—is 
necessary if one is to successfully seek a balanced design for the SOI.   
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3. Step 2:  Identify Containing System(s)’ Strategic Human Resources 
Objectives 
 Historically, human (personnel) resources have been the primary driver of system 
life-cycle costs.  Additionally, human resources are often a constrained resource, 
particularly within the Defense Department where Congress legislates arbitrary 
manpower ceilings.  Clearly, if an organization is to manage its largest cost driver, it will 
need a human resources investment strategy.  As described in Chapter IV, a primary 
means for implementing such a human resources investment strategy in the weapon 
system acquisition process is to specify “system proactive” manpower, personnel, and 
training constraints.  System proactive constraints are deliberately formulated to shape 
the design of future systems so that aggregate demand for human resources within the 
containing system(s), both in terms of personnel quantity and quality, is driven toward 
some explicit set of human resources investment goals.  In essence, rather than defining 
what the target audience will need to be given the demands of the technological system, 
one asks what the design of the technological system should be so that some idealized 
future target audience is sufficient.  In economic terms, the emphasis is on human 
resources demand management rather than supply management (i.e., recruiting). Of 
course, any human resources investment strategy must be sensitive to macroergonomic 
considerations such as labor relations.  Nonetheless, the possibility of implementing such 
a human resources investment strategy presupposes the existence of some underlying 
information technology architecture to support aggregation, analysis, and forecasting of 
the organizational supply and demand for human resources.   
4. Step 3:  Identify Sibling Systems (Vis-à-vis Shared Human Resources) 
and Their Interactions That Will Be Perturbed by the SOI 
 Within the containing system(s) are sibling systems with which the SOI will 
interact and which will be disturbed by that new interaction.  Recall from the discussion 
of sociotechnical systems theory in Chapter II that every system, including the SOI, is 




Figure IX-1. A family of interacting systems, to include a system-of-interest and its 
sibling systems, all existing within the environment provided by the containing system. 
 
Each of these personnel subsystems is also part of a larger organizational human 
(personnel) resources system, which is constrained in terms of its total size and 
composition.  Thus, the sibling systems will, in turn, interact, thereby changing the 
environment within the containing system(s), and hence, the interactions with the SOI 
(Figure IX-2).  In complex situations, such interactions may produce results that are 
difficult to predict and could potentially be very undesirable.  In the case of the Defense 
Department, the key insight is that many diverse weapon systems may potentially be 
sibling systems by virtue of shared human (personnel) resources, whether in terms of 




Figure IX-2. Interacting systems readjusting to the addition of a new system-of-interest 
[From Hitchins, 1992]. 
 
5. Step 4:  Develop SOI Design Trade Space to Complement Sibling 
Systems in Contributing to Containing System(s)’ Objectives 
Attempts to optimize the personnel subsystem of the SOI in isolation may create 
changes that propagate throughout the environment of the containing system, disrupting 
the joint optimization of the personnel and technological subsystems comprising sibling 
systems, and degrading sibling systems’ performance.  Thus, the value of a SOI’s 
contribution to the containing system is only relevant in the context of the similar 
contributions of its sibling systems—hence the need to focus on net positive 
contributions.  These considerations throw the most serious doubt on our ability to 
formulate sensible HSI system requirement specifications by simply considering a new 
system.  Rather, HSI specifications must flow down from an aggregate analysis of human 
resources relative to all sibling systems.  Such specifications then serve to provide the 
macro-level bounds on the SOI design trade space.  However, as was discussed with 
regards to a human resources investment strategy, the ability to accomplish this step 
requires the existence of an information infrastructure to allow aggregation, analysis, and 
forecasting of organizational supply and demand for human resources.   
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6. Step 5:  Functionally Partition SOI and Describe Required 
(Emergent) Human-System Performance in Terms of Response 
Surfaces That Are Functions of the Domains of HSI 
Designing the SOI invokes many of the classic systems engineering activities, but 
always from an outward-looking perspective aligned towards the containing system(s).  
Partitioning, or the process of functional decomposition, is crucial to the successful 
design of any SOI.  It determines the SOI’s subsystems and their interactions and 
interfaces, and of particular interest here, it leads to the allocation of functions between 
the personnel and technological subsystems.  The challenge for the systems practitioner is 
then to describe the human performance trade space for potential system concepts (i.e., 
architectures) in terms of the domains of HSI.  Recalling the discussion in Chapter II of 
emergent phenomenon, hierarchy, and the problem of irreducible complexity, describing 
this human performance trade space necessitates a systemic (i.e., holistic) and systematic 
approach that heretofore has been absent in traditional, reductionist approaches to human 
factors.    
Describing the human-system performance trade space for the SOI means 
mapping an emergent property (i.e., human performance) for all feasible settings of its 
producer elements (i.e., the domains of HSI).  Recall that Systems Age thinking is 
concerned with producer-product rather than cause-effect relationships (Chapter II).  As 
was suggested in Chapter IV, this task of mapping the trade space is best accomplished 
using the Simonian approach (Simon, 1977) with its emphasis on economical multifactor 
design of experiments.  Based on a program of research marked by progressive iteration, 
the Simonian approach first employs fractional factorial screening experiments to identify 
the primary “HSI drivers” (as determined based on Pareto analyses of effect sizes), 
followed by advanced experimental designs to describe the response surface that emerges 
from their interactions.  These experiments may utilize human-in-the-loop assessments 
(e.g., virtual environments), modeling and simulation (e.g., IMPRINT), or some 
combination thereof.  Nonetheless, the overall objective of this progressive iteration is to 
describe performance as a polynomial regression function of its many potential 
determinants—a format that should be both intuitive and useful to engineers. 
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7. Step 6:  Reduce Response Surfaces to Isoperformance (Tradeoff) 
Equations for Incorporation in System Analyses 
 The Simonian approach solves the methodological problem of developing 
functional models of performance where there are many determinants of potential 
importance.  Jones and Kennedy (Jones, Kennedy, & Stanney, 2004) provide the 
conceptual approach for reformulating such models into quantitative tradeoff functions 
that can then be incorporated into weapon system analyses.  In so doing, the conceptual 
divide between behavioral science and operations research was bridged as was first called 
for by Weisz in his premonitions of the Army’s MANPRINT program—see Chapter III.  
Based on the functional partitioning of the SOI, classical systems engineering provides 
criterion levels of performance for each function (i.e., functional measures of 
performance), often stated in the Defense Department in terms of threshold (i.e., lower 
bound) and objective (i.e., upper bound) values.  Given such a criterion level of 
performance and a desired assurance (or confidence) level, the isoperformance method 
fixes the dependent variable in the functional model of performance and solves the 
resulting polynomial regression equation in terms of just the determinants—á la the 
tradeoff function.   
8. Step 7:  Seek a Balanced Design (Joint Optimization) that Satisfices 
SOI Objectives and Requirements 
 It is of no use trying to optimize the parts of the SOI and then join them 
together—that is system integration, not system design.  Nor is it any better to review the 
overall results of such integration and then attempt to intuitively adjust some of the 
design parameters.  The primary design perspective must be that of a single system, 
comprised of the combination of personnel and technological subsystems, which is open 
to the environment and the sibling systems it contains.  Consequently, the joint 
optimization of the SOI’s personnel and technological subsystems, with reference to 
more than one containing system, will be an inherently complex problem. 
 Formulating a balanced design for the SOI means formulating a mathematical 
model of what is essentially a complex engineering and management problem, thereby 
facilitating analysis and insight into possible solutions—that is, employing the methods 
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of operations research.  In terms of HSI, this means coupling isoperformance with utility 
analysis in terms of a system analytic meta-model (Chapter IV).  Such a meta-model 
should aggregate the individual isoperformance models, created as a result of the 
functional partitioning of the SOI, into one or more measures of total system performance 
(e.g., rolling up functional isoreliability models using reliability block diagrams to create 
a system-level reliability estimate—see Chapter V).  In a modification of Jones and 
Kennedy’s approach, the dependent variable in each isoperformance model should be 
allowed to vary across the range from threshold to objective values rather than being 
fixed at a criterion level of performance.  Next, appropriate bounds for decision variables 
should be stipulated based on consideration of human resource investment goals (Step 2) 
and the need to complement sibling systems (Step 4).  Lastly, all variables that reflect 
concerns of containing system(s) of the SOI need to be addressed in terms of utility 
functions, preferably using physical programming to minimize controversy over the 
choice of weights and to take advantage of the one-versus-others rule—the latter being an 
important attribute of physical programming that explicitly works to help ensure a 
balanced system design.   
 The modified Jones-Kennedy-Simon approach described above should be familiar 
to engineers.  A similar approach has been used in classic systems engineering to develop 
what here would be characterized as the technological subsystem of the SOI—see the 
paper by de Weck and Jones (2006) describing the application of isoperformance to both 
the design of a satellite and the performance of a sports team.  Thus, seeking a balanced 
design for the SOI needs to lead to a systems analysis that includes isoperformance 
models for both the personnel and technological subsystems, thereby ensuring that 
whatever is being optimized can be credibly claimed to involve the joint (or collective) 
optimization of the personnel and technology subsystems.  Moreover, this approach will 
decrease the likelihood for dominance by either subsystem in the chosen design solution 
because of the appeals of either technology or human-centered design zealots.     
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9. Step 8:  Continuously Reassess and Rebalance the Design Throughout 
the Life of the SOI 
 Given the concept of joint causation (Chapter II), systems practitioners must be 
concerned with changes in the SOI’s environment and corresponding adaptive changes to 
its subsystems.  In all likelihood, joint optimization of the SOI at a particular time will be 
relatively short lived.  Since the technological subsystem, once designed, is relatively 
fixed, any adaptation that the containing system(s) permits the SOI will fall primarily to 
the personnel subsystem for implementation.  There is a need, then, to manage the 
evolution of the SOI throughout its life cycle—hence, the characterization of HSI 
problems as messes or “wicked” problems (again see Chapter II).  However, for the most 
part, much of the original system analysis work should remain valid; the important 
distinction in subsequent analyses is that those variables that were associated with the 
technological system in the original analysis will now need to be considered as fixed.  
This resultant loss of degrees of freedom relative to the original problem highlights the 
challenge of continuously rebalancing the overall design of the SOI over its life cycle.  
Moreover, as the problem space becomes progressively more constrained by the loss of 
decision variables, the point may be reached where the new optimal solution is 
significantly worse than that obtained in the past.    
C. CHALLENGES FOR NEW HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION 
Several challenges spring to mind when looking at New HSI.  Foremost is the 
question of how to operationalize the New HSI design guidelines within the Defense 
Department.  The New HSI approach requires that behavioral scientists and human 
factors engineers, schooled in traditional reductionist science, be reoriented to understand 
Systems Age thinking and the related issues of emergence and hierarchy.   This means 
that experiments examining a handful of potential determinants and geared to testing 
hypotheses need to give way to evolutionary programs of research aimed at mapping 
multi-dimensional human-system performance response surfaces.  Given the marginal 
utility of the human factors literature in this regard (see discussion of Simon’s work in 
Chapter IV), deliberate programs of research will need to be undertaken to generate these 
performance response surfaces—an ideal applied research task for the military service 
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laboratories.  While such programs of research could be managed by behavioral scientists 
and human factors engineers, retrained to be Systems Age thinkers, it will likely be easier 
to have these programs managed instead by systems oriented and systems thinking New 
HSI practitioners. 
But what then is a New HSI practitioner?  If we ascribe to HSI as a discipline, 
then such a person should be characterized as a professional within this discipline, and 
thus a skilled practitioner or expert.  For the vast majority of practitioners, New HSI will 
be a learned profession, meaning that there will be the need for preparatory education.  
As was clearly demonstrated in this discourse, New HSI requires one be a systems 
practitioner—and consequently a Systems Age thinker—who is sufficiently 
knowledgeable in systems engineering, the behavioral sciences, and operations research 
such that they can integrate these fields, reflecting the fact that New HSI is a hybrid 
discipline.  The key to achieving such integration rests with the ability of the New HSI 
practitioner to take considerations of the behavioral sciences and formulate them for 
inclusion in mathematical models of complex engineering and management problems, 
which in turn can be analyzed to gain insights about possible solutions.  It is 
predominately this step of problem formulation, best described as an amalgamation of 
both art and science, which drives the need for preparatory graduate level education in 
New HSI.  While there are many software tools to solve mathematical models once 
formulated, at present, problem formulation remains a job for the gray-matter computer 
comprising the human brain.  Clearly then, educating New HSI practitioners will not be 
quick or cheap—but then again, as the old adage goes, “you get what you pay for.” 
Segueing now to the issue of HSI modeling and simulation tools, our discussion 
of New HSI practitioners should cause us to pause before launching into prescriptions for 
HSI tools.  There currently exist multiple HSI tool repositories, containing literally 
hundreds of tools, as well as numerous ongoing research and development efforts to 
improve existing or develop additional HSI tools.  One cannot help but wonder if the 
unspecified shortfall in existing tools is really one of the tools themselves or the inability 
of classic HSI practitioners to properly formulate problems such that they can then be 
answered using existing tools.  Classic HSI practitioners tend to view tools as a means for 
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directly solving system design problems.  In contrast, New HSI practitioners should 
understand HSI tools to be primarily sources of data; solving a systems design problem, 
however, involves correctly formulating a mathematical model of the problem that can 
then be exercised using the data from the tool to gain insight—an operations research 
problem.  The latter perspective was illustrated by the third discourse case study 
introducing the Task Effectiveness Scheduling Tool (Chapter VII), which in effect was a 
mathematical program that utilized data generated from a validated biomathematical 
simulation—an existing HSI tool—to systemically and systematically explore staffing 
and shift scheduling solutions (i.e., design of the personnel subsystem).  Thus, future 
work on HSI tools should assess the adequacy of existing models and simulations in 
generating the data necessary for response surface mapping—Step 5 in the New HSI 
design guidelines.  Further investments in HSI tools should then focus on closing any 
identified capability gaps in this regard.  In the end, however, it must continuously be 
emphasized that it is the educated New HSI practitioner, and not the tools per se, that 
primarily enable systems to be designed that promise to be flexible, adaptable, reliable, 
inexpensive to own, and long-lived. 
Lastly, from where should New HSI be managed?  At least with regards to the 
Defense Department, Steps 3–5 in the New HSI design guidelines suggest some higher 
integration authority than that which currently exists for classic HSI—the latter being the 
program manager for the SOI.   Clearly, the approach taken in classic HSI does not 
readily allow for consideration of tradeoffs with sibling systems.  Nor does it provide 
sufficient emphasis for the continued management of joint optimization of the SOI after 
its deployment and fielding.  Rather than making specific prescriptions for any particular 
organization, we instead turn to Hitchins (1992) generic reference model and its 
necessary and sufficient set of internal functions:  mission, viability, and resource 
management.  According to Hitchins, mission describes the system purpose, viability 
establishes the system to pursue that purpose, and resources are used both in the pursuit 
of the mission and in the maintenance of viability.  Together, mission, viability, and 
resource management are referred to as the management set.  Figure IX-3 depicts New 
HSI as emerging from the synthesis of the functions comprising Hitchins' management 
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set.  Systems thinkers should be able to conceive of a recursive hierarchy of management 
sets corresponding to the SOI, sibling systems, and containing systems.  Consequently, 
human activity systems (recall Checkland’s systems typology described in Chapter II) 
responsible for New HSI should be established at appropriate levels within an 
organization’s hierarchy of systems where intersections of Hitchins’ management 
functions occur.  As applied to the Defense Department, such an approach should yield a 




Figure IX-3. Generic reference model and New HSI [After Hitchins, 1992]. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
The New Human Systems Integration introduces an approach, unlike classic HSI, 
based on theory, philosophy, and the lessons of history.  It enables specification of 
system designs with clear purpose, which fit into their environments, and that contribute, 
along with their siblings, to the objectives of their containing systems.  The New HSI 
does not negate classic HSI—it enhances it, particularly by emphasizing the initial (i.e., 
pre-acquisition) and final (i.e., post-acquisition) phases of design synthesis, thereby 
drawing attention to the resource allocation decisions that potentially most impact the 
emergent properties valued by stakeholders in the containing systems.  Such notions as 
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“top-down requirements” are given substance, since the top can be clearly identified with 
the objectives of the containing systems, to specifically include the human (personnel) 
resources system.  Classic HSI considerations are retained, but with the essential 
difference that all systems—the SOI, sibling systems, and containing systems—are 
considered at all times in the joint optimization of the SOI.  Thus, it is possible to design 
and implement systems that are humanly, technologically, and economically feasible and 
sustainable.  Systems designed using this approach promise to be more balanced and less 
likely to be dominated by either personnel or technological considerations, which should 
make them more adaptive, flexible, and resilient over their life cycle.  
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X. APPENDIX:  A DISCOURSE IN HUMAN SYSTEMS 
INTEGRATION BRIEFING SLIDES 
 The purpose of this discourse on human systems integration (HSI) was to address 
the central questions of what is HSI and how should one go about thinking about HSI 
problems.  The responses to these questions were developed in terms of a meta-story that 
spans seven chapters, excluding the introductory front and summary end matter in the 
discourse.  Given the length of the discourse, a first draft summary presentation was 
prepared for the dissertation committee members.  The following slides were those 
presented to the committee members prior to the dissertation defense; from these, 66 
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